MDGs post 2015: Beacons in
turbulent times or false lights?
Rolph von der Hoeven

This background paper was prepared for the UN System Task Team on
the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda. An earlier versio n was
presented to the UN Expert Group meeting held in New York from 27-
29 February. The views expressed in this paper are t hose of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Natio ns.
June 2012

2

Following on the outcome of the 2010 High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly
on the Millennium Development Goals, the United Nati ons Secretary-General established
the UN System Task Team in September 2011 to support UN system-wide preparations for
the post-2015 UN development agenda, in consultation with all stakeholders. The Task
Team is led by the Department of Economic and Social A ffairs and the United Nations
Development Programme and brings together senior expe rts from over 50 UN entities and
international organizations to provide system-wide s upport to the post-2015 consultation
process, including analytical input, expertise and outreac h.

3
MDGs post 2015: Beacons in turbulent times
or false lights?

Abstract
Although the MDGs have, since their inception in 2001, played a positive role in drawing
more attention to development aid, current socio-eco nomic developments, notably
increasing inequalities, strong GDP growth in emergi ng countries and climate change, as
well as current geopolitical changes, call for a ne w approach to a post-2015 framework.
Such a post-2015 agenda needs to be based on a globa l social contract, relevant to people in
the South and the North, rather than being dominated by development aid professionals.
The discussions leading to such a global social con tract post 2015 are as important as the
outcome itself.
Table of Contents
Introduction 4
A. Lessons from the MDGs for a post-2015 agenda 5
1. MDGs: Goals without a theory or a theory without goals? 5
2. Living up to the promises of the MDGs? 6
B. Critical development issues for a post-2015 framework 7
3. A changing geo-political and poverty landscape 8
4. Employment 11
5. Inequality
6. Environment
7. Human rights
C. Towards a global social contract
8. Social floor
9. Global governance
10. Can we measure what we wanted to measure?
D. Summary and conclusions
References

4
Introduction 1
This paper reviews the experience of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), analyses
socioeconomic and geopolitical trends that have chan ged the world since their inception in
2001, and draws implications for the post-2015 development a genda.

The contribution starts with a brief evaluation of t he MDGs. Section A argues that the MDGs
have played a positive role in drawing more attention to development aid, but that they
lacked a theoretical underpinning (chapter 1). For this reason, the MDGs were vulnerable to
focus mostly on those specific concerns that were ra ised by aid agencies. As a result, they
tilted development concerns to social development issues (cha pter 2).

Section B reviews socio-economic developments that will h ave a strong impact on global
development and that will have to figure more promine ntly in a post-2015 framework as a
consequence. They include strong GDP growth in emergi ng economies and changing
patterns of poverty (chapter 3), the global rise in unemployment (chapter 4), increasing
inequality (chapter 5), the ever greater urgency to ad dress climate change (chapter 6) and
development of human rights (chapter 7).
Lastly, section C discusses in more detail the implic ations of both lessons learned and
emerging trends for a future global development agen da. It argues that the notion of the
MDGs providing a social floor in global development nee ds to be strengthened (chapter 8),
that global governance in a post-2015 framework need s to be greatly enhanced (chapter 9),
and that the measurement of economic and social pro gress has to be improved (chapter 10).

Framed this way, a post-2015 framework will, as arg ued in section D, take the form of a
global social contract, relevant to people in the Sou th and the North, rather than being
dominated by development aid professionals as is the c ase in the current MDG structure.
The paper further argues that the new agenda has to be agreed upon in an open and

1 I would like to thank participants at the UN-DESA expert meeting o n a Post 2015 Framework, New York, 27-29
February 2012 and especially Diana Alarcon and Rob Vos fo r constructive and stimulating comments.

5
transparent process: the discussions leading to such a global social contract in a post-2015
agenda are as important as the outcome itself.
A. Lessons from the MDGs for a post-2015 agenda
1. MDGs: Goals without a Theory or a Theory without Goals?
An enthusiastic group in the Secretariat of the Unit ed Nations created the MDGs in 2001.
They were based on an earlier conceptualization of d evelopment goals by the OECD and
drew on the Millennium Declaration, accepted by all h eads of state at the Millennium
Summit of the UN in September 2000. The Declaration its elf contains a longer list and
higher set of aspirations, and should not be confus ed with the very specific and time-bound
set of indicators which comprise the eight MDGs and 21 targets through which progress
towards the MDGs are measured (Melamed, 2012, p.4).
The MDGs reflected the wish of many development practi tioners to have, at a global level,
clear goals and measurable outcomes for a number of d esirable development challenges,
without prescribing a fixed set of policies. Being o verly prescriptive would have led to great
controversy and resistance to an otherwise generally a ccepted policy document
(Vandemoortele, 2011). Once agreed upon, the MDGs have led to a flurry of research papers,
discussions and conferences over the last 10 years. Go ogle searches for the MDGs have
grown exponentially and overtaken searches for the Hu man Development Index. The mere
fact that a socio-economic phenomenon has received so much attention indicates that the
MDGs have had a certain impact (Melamed, 2012, p.5).
The MDGs have been distilled from the Millennium Decl aration and they were influenced by
UNDP’s human development approach. In this sense, one could argue that the human
development approach represents a theoretical founda tion and that structured
development thinking was indeed part of constructing the MDGs. Yet, there was also a
deliberate decision not to dwell on different theor ies of development in order to achieve
broad consensus (Vandemoortele, 2010). Prescribing a specific development theory, as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank did in the 1980s and 1990s, when
they promoted structural adjustment and a set of po licies commonly referred to as the

6
Washington Consensus, would have led to rejection of the MDG framework by many
developing countries.
In a later stage, when the MDGs were implemented on the ground, much of the discussion
around the MDGs was however dominated by development aid officials in the industrialised
countries after all, and the MDGs gradually became syn onymous with a Western and donor-
driven approach to development. Furthermore, the count ry-specific interpretations of the
Washington Consensus – in the form of the Poverty Red uction Strategies and the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers – continued to dominate the W estern aid landscape and pulled
the implementation of the MDGs in the same direction (see for example Fisher, 2010; Saith,
2006).
While the outcome-focused approach of the MDGs helpe d to avoid some of the pitfalls of a
descriptive development theory, their success with the donor community did lead to a
neglect of issues that were not explicitly mentioned in the MDGs (e.g. DFID 2011).
2 A
‘perverse’ game ensued where all development efforts by donors had to be mapped onto
one or more of the goals. Development organizations lobbied to get their specific concerns
tagged onto one or more MDGs or to have indicators of specific targets extended to get their
concern explicitly mentioned. Challenges explicitly c overed in the MDGs trumped other
development concerns that arguably were equally import ant. In order to avoid this process
in a post-2015 agenda, one important first lesson is to avoid a donor-driven process of
preparing and implementing a new agenda. The post-2 015 framework has to include more
reflections of Southern thinkers and activists (AIV, 2011; Easterly 2009; Severino and Ray,
2009).
Moreover, in light of this experience, it is questio nable whether a post-2015 framework of
goals and targets should be drawn up without a theo retical foundation. The extraordinary
events of the triple food, financial and environment al crisis (see Addisson et al., 2011) call

2 A recent example is the way DFID has been analysing the ‘effec tiveness’ of different UN organizations with
respect to development. Organization dealing with normative issu es received lower markings in terms of
effectiveness, because activities of these Organizations c ould not fit the numerical targets and metrics designed
by DFID experts to rate effectiveness! See DFID, 2011

7
for a more comprehensive and theoretically grounded development policy in a post-2015
framework. The UN World Economic and Social Survey (WESS) o f 2010, Retooling Global
Development (UN-DESA, 2010) provides a wide range of options in this vein. Their political
feasibility might be questioned by some, but many of t he suggestions and recommendations
in the WESS 2010 can be traced back to the Millennium Declaration, accepted by the heads
of state in 2000. The political consensus achieved i n the Millennium Declaration in 2000
therefore forms a solid base for framing a more cohere nt and more theoretically as well as a
politically sound post-2015 framework.

2. Living up to the Promises of the MDGs?
In the absence of any counterfactual, it is difficu lt to assess whether progress in
development since 2000 has been the result of the MD Gs or the result of other factors
(Fukada-Parr 2010). However, applying a ‘ post hoc ergo propter hoc’ approach, recent
reviews report that some MDGs have been reached at a g lobal level, especially the target of
halving the proportion of people living in absolute p overty, and that substantial progress
has been made in others (Melamed, 2012). This positive global assessment however is
largely the result of successes in a limited number of large and fast-growing countries.

The decline of the world’s poor by 445 million peopl e, from 1.820 million people in 1990 to
1.375 in 2005, is entirely due to the decline in the nu mber of poor people in China. In fact, in
various regions of the world the number of poor has actually increased between 1990 and
2005. Countries that were characterized by below-aver age economic or institutional
performance at the onset of the MDGs in particular performed worse than countries that
had a better starting position (World Bank 2011, Ch. 1).
Did the MDGs lead to higher development aid? The pic ture is mixed. Official development
assistance (ODA) in general increased, but this was partly due to the huge expenses for the
war in Iraq and spending on other countries in the Middle East. It also should be noted that
ODA increased much less than G8 countries had promised at the Gleneagles summit in 2005,
when promises of substantial ODA increases were mad e on the basis of calculations of the
costs of achieving the MDGs (UN, 2011).

8
The purpose of this paper is not to provide a conclusive review of what the MDGs did
achieve (see for example AIV, 2011; UN 2010a and 2011 ; Melamed, 2012; World Bank
2011). Yet, it is important to note that this quest ion probably cannot be answered
satisfactorily. What we can observe is that the MDGs put a str ong emphasis on social issues.

Other issues, such as environmental concerns (part o f MDG7) and global governance
(MDG8), were brought in at a later stage and contain much less concrete goals and
indicators. It is not surprising then that the MDGs contributed to a (already existing) trend
of an increasing share of ODA commitments for the soc ial sector over the last two decades:
3
from 16 per cent in 1990 to 34 per cent at the intr oduction of the MDGs in the year 2000, to
over 40 per cent in 2008 (Fig 1.) This was not only the case for ODA commitments to poorer
countries: in all major groupings, ODA commitments on social sectors amounted to 42 per
cent or more in 2009 (fig.2).
Figures 1 and 2: ODA by region and sector

3 OECD DAC online, consulted 15-01-2012

9

Source: OECD DAC secretariat online database
The OECD ODA statistics relate to traditional donor s. Indications are that new donors like
China and India dedicate a larger share of their ai d to infrastructure, transport, mining, and
other productive sectors.
4 At this point, these flows are still considerably s maller than the
flows from traditional donors, but they are increasin g faster than traditional ODA and might
in future change the current emphasis of ODA on social se ctors.

The focus on social development issues has in some c ases taken attention from other,
equally important aspects of development, such as emp loyment generation. One illustration
for the effects of this prioritization is the ‘Arab spring’ of 2011. At the beginning of 2011,
various Arab regimes were toppled by populations that not only asked for more democracy,
but perhaps even more importantly, for good jobs and the prospect of advancement in life
for their youth. Yet this turmoil took place in count ries that scored very high on progress
indices of the Millennium Development Goals (table 1).

4 Information Office of the State Council, The People's Repub lic of China, 2011, China's Foreign Aid, April 2011,
Beijing

10
Table 1: MDG progress ranks and youth unemployment, selected countries
Country MDG progress rank 2010 Youth
unemployment 2009

Egypt 6 24.7 (2007)
Tunisia 1 30.6 (2005)
Jordan 6 26.9

Brazil 5 15.5
Vietnam 6 4.6 (2004)
Source: GCD (2011), ILO (2011)
Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan were among the eight best pe rforming countries with respect to
progress in the MDGs in 2010 (CGD, 2011). Their lea ders at that time belonged to the
Socialist International and many politicians and rese archers hailed the progress in human
development in the Arab world.
5 Yet, despite this very good score on MDG progress, you th
unemployment was and remained stubbornly high in thes e countries. Progress in achieving
the MDGs is not a guarantee for broad-based social developm ent.
6

B. Critical development issues for a Post 2015
framework
Developments since the formulation of the MDGs in 200 0, in particular the triple crisis of
food, finance and the environment (Addisson 2011), a s well as the Arab Spring, have given
more urgency to a number of additional development c oncerns that were not adequately
addressed in the MDGs. A post-2015 framework will ha ve to create a framework that
enables sustained, equitable and inclusive growth . To do so, a number of critical issues that
have either been absent or did not receive sufficient attention in the MDG agenda, or that
did not play a similarly important role a decade ago, will need to be addressed. These new
and emerging concerns need to be part of evaluating the role and functioning of the MDGs
and also need to inform the formulation of development goals i n a post-2015 framework.

5 See for example the blog of Dani Rodrik ‘The unsung devel opment miracles of our time ’Nov.13 2010 which
commends the educational policies and access to health which also empowered women

6 After the change in regimes in various Arab countries in spring 2011, the leaders of development agencies
quickly retorted that something must be done about employment. e. g. Helen Clark ‘Jobs, Equity and Voice: Why
both Economic and Political Inclusion matter in the Arab world ’ (Huffington Post, 7 April 2011)

11
3. A Changing Geo-political and Poverty Landscape
One of the most important trends of recent years is the rapid growth of large developing
countries such as China, India and Brazil. The figur e below shows the growing economic
weight of these countries, especially over the last d ecade. The share in global GDP of
Western Europe and the US, the principal providers of ODA, has fallen to below 40 per cent
in 2008. Ironically, however, it was not the greatly increased GDP of the emerging countries,
but the financial crisis of 2008 that led to change s in global governance that better reflected
the shifts in economic power. The G-20 replaced the G -8 as the key institution of global
economic governance to fend off the crisis and to bui ld a basis for an improved global
financial structure. A post-2015 framework of develo pment cannot ignore the changed geo-
political landscape and thus can no longer be driven by traditional donors alone, as was the
case in 2000.

Source: UN-DESA,WESS, 2011
The MDGs were formulated as goals at the global leve l. Various authors have pointed out
that it is therefore not appropriate to break these global targets down to a regional or
national level: this would be especially unfair to poo rer countries (Easterly, 2009). However
there are also drawbacks to keeping the MDGs restricted to t he global level. When MDGs are
interpreted to be of relevance only at the global leve l, the performance of a few large and
fast growing countries will determine any global out come. For example, depending on exact

12
definitions and interpretation of the time frame, 7 the MDG 1 target of halving poverty has
been achieved long before 2015 because of the extrao rdinary growth in China, India and
Brazil.
Because of these extraordinary growth performances, th ree quarters of the world’s poor
now live in middle-income countries. A number of larg e low-income countries in 2000 have
‘graduated’ to the group of middle-income countries. As a result, most of the world’s poor
no longer live in poor countries but in middle-incom e countries (see table below, Sumner
2010). This trend will continue in the coming years. O nly 28 per cent of the poor now live in
low-income countries, of which 12 per cent live in fr agile and conflict-affected countries and
16 per cent in stable countries.

7 This important discussion on quantifying the targets , setting th e trajectory and the initial values , which is not
only a technical one but which also has political ramific ations will not be reproduced here: for a discussion se e
Fukada-Parr 2010.

13
These changes have important consequences for poverty reduction and for other MDG
targets. For most of the world’s poor ODA in the traditional sense will be less relevant. Poor
households in middle income countries would benefit more from an improvement in
income distribution, improved access to social servic es, good productive jobs, and a well-
functioning rights-based system that gives people acc ess to government services and
ensures that workers benefit from labour rights. De velopment goals in a post-2015
framework therefore have to be formulated in a way tha t the poor in middle income
countries benefit from development in their countries . Hence a post-2015 framework has to
deal with human (economic, social and cultural) and labour rights as well as with issues of
inequality and redistribution.
It has also become clear that people in fragile and conflict-affected countries (23 per cent of
the world’s poor) cannot be adequately reached throu gh traditional development aid. In
this sense the goals and targets designed in 2000 a re relevant only to 16 per cent of the
world’s poor.

The changing geopolitical landscape and the diversity o f developing countries, as well as the
fact that the poor live in countries of radically dif ferent development levels and
development patterns all imply that a post-2015 develo pment framework needs to give
much more attention to development patterns, goals a nd targets at the national level.
8 An
emphasis on the national level would also allow stre ngthening the special position of the
least developed countries and the poor which are livi ng in these countries. A post-2015
framework could continue to give special attention to least d eveloped countries.

Lastly, the prolonged debt crisis in developed countr ies and its dramatic impact on job
markets make it clear that protecting the poor and the socially disadvantaged in
industrialised countries has become a serious polit ical and societal problem. One might
therefore contemplate to set targets for developed c ountries as well. Firstly, such targets
would better capture the growing globalization and greater interconnectedness that is

8 This is actually already an on-going trend: since 2000 v arious countries have either reproduced or translated
MDGs at their own national level.

14
creating hardship and vulnerability for different socio-economic groups in developed
countries as well. Secondly, targets for developed co untries in a post-2015 framework
should also better express the continuing responsib ility of these countries for a global
development agenda.

4. Employment
Globalization and especially financial globalization have had a huge impact on working
conditions and employment security. The nature of wo rk is changing: more flexible work in
developed countries and a continuously high or even growing role of informal work in many
developing countries. Work opportunities in the form al sector may have increased in more
dynamic developing countries, but were accompanied by increasing wage inequality and
increasing insecurity.
Financial globalization started in the 1990s with t he liberalisation of banking systems in
many developed countries. At the same time, the Bretton Woods institutions exerted
growing pressure on developing countries to liberal ize external capital markets. This has
given rise to eight trends on labour markets worldwide: 1. An increase in service employment;
2. Declining labour-force participation, especially of males ;
3. A continuously high share of workers in the informal econom y;
4. Continuing or increasing youth unemployment;
5. A declining wage share in national income;
6. Increasing wage and income inequality;
7. Growing importance of multinational enterprises; and
8. A growing number of migrant workers in industrialised cou ntries.

These paint a general picture of increased “precari sation” of many workers and their
families in most countries in the world.
The crisis of 2008 had great repercussions on labou r markets around the world. As was the
case in previous crises, employment did not recover a s quickly as GDP growth. In addition,

15
most workers, both in the global North and South had not benefited from the pre-crisis
bubble.

Source Van Bergeijk, de Haan and van der Hoeven,2011
Actually, poor workers and their families were hurt t rice (table 1.1 of van Bergeijk et.al):
firstly, because they were left behind in the run up to the crisis; secondly, they were
severely affected during the crisis; and thirdly, they are now suffering from reduced
government expenditure as a consequence of increased public debt, which was used largely
to bail out banks and to stimulate the economy during the crisis .

Governments did act during the 2008 crisis, and in th is sense their response was much
better than during the world economic crisis of the 1930s.
9 The crisis of 2008, and the bold
measures that were initially taken, could have been a signal for an overhaul of financial
globalization and of arresting the trend of growing inequality and precarisation in labour
markets (van der Hoeven, 2010a). However, this did not happen. Most governments shied

9 Demand stimulus of 1.7 % of world GDP took place. Banks wer e massively bailed out, costing Europe and the
US an amount equal to one-sixth of world GDP.

16
away from special measures to protect labour. Governments and international
organizations acted as a lender of last resort, but not as an employer of last resort in order
to protect workers and in order to stimulate employment gr owth.

The current sovereign debt problems in Europe underscor e this point. Instead of aspiring to
higher growth, leading to more employment and to redu ced debt-to-GDP ratios,
governments are slashing public expenditure, further reducing growth and thus making it
near impossible to reduce public debt.
On the other hand, the adverse consequences of unfet tered globalization and the ensuing
crisis have resulted in increased concern for emplo yment and for decent work and
productive employment in the current discourses on d evelopment and development
cooperation (Ocampo and Jomo, 2007; ILO, 2011).
It should be recalled that employment issues were no tably absent from the MDGs when
they were first formulated in 2000. Mkandiwire (2011) and the late Amsden (2011) argue
that the neglect of attention to employment issues in the 1990s and the beginning of the
third Millennium resulted from too much focus on poverty al leviation: ‘To slay the dragon of
poverty, deliberate and determined investments in jobs above starvation wages must play a
central role, whether for self-employment or paid em ployment. The grass roots approach to
solving poverty doesn’t go far enough, because it aims o nly at improving the supply side of
the labor market, making job seekers more capable, and not the demand side, making new
jobs available for them. … Employment generation is di fferent from poverty alleviation
because it has a concept behind it, “capital.” Thi s means that the labor market is influenced
by, and influences, all flows through the savings-inve stment nexus, including accumulation,
distribution and innovation. It is at the heart of political conflict.’ (Amsden 2011)

However, five years after the formulation of the Mille nnium Development Goals, the World
Summit 2005 outcome document did contain a reference ( paragraph 47) to employment

17
issues. 10 This led to the inclusion of a new sub-goal (under MDG 1) in 2007: ‘Achieve full and
productive employment and decent work for all, including wom en and young people’.
11

Many questions, however, remain unanswered. In recen t writings (see for example
Melamed et al., 2011), there is a growing concern t hat too little coordinated effort has been
undertaken, even though the goal of full employment h as now been established. A recent
review of the MDGs (UNDG, 2010), issued five years after the inclusion of the sub-goal of
employment in the MDGs, reports on the progress or r egress in employment issues globally
as well as in some countries by means of a number of employment indicators. 18 narratives
explain how certain development projects have contri buted to more or better employment
in individual countries. Successful examples include employment schemes, training
schemes for entrepreneurs, training schemes for une mployed youth, and improved
collective bargaining.
However, looking at the different examples chosen in the UNDG 2010 review, it is not
always clear how international support in general ha s contributed to more or better
employment since the introduction of full employmen t as a target in the MDG framework.
Most of the examples do not make use of any counterf actual analysis or even mention
whether other schemes have been contributing to empl oyment creation as well. Notably
absent is any macroeconomic analysis of total volumes o f aid on growth and its possible
impact on employment. It therefore remains difficult to distil how successful development
and development aid efforts have been with regards to creating more and better
employment.

10 ‘We strongly support fair globalization and resolve to make the goals of full and productive employment and
decent work for all, including for women and young people, a central objective of our relevant national and
international policies as well as our national development strateg ies, including poverty reduction strategies, as
part of our efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals . These measures should also encompass the

elimination of the worst forms of child labour, as defined in International Labour Organization Convention No.
182, and forced labour. We also resolve to ensure full respect for the fundamental principles and rights at work’.
UN,2005
11 With four indicators: (1) Growth rate of GDP per perso n employed; (2) Employment-to-population ratio; (3)
Proportion of employed people living below $1 (PPP) per da y; and (4) Proportion of own-account and
contributing family workers in total employment.

18
Young people have suffered particularly heavily from the deterioration in labour market
conditions. The rate of youth unemployment rose glo bally, from 11.7 per cent in 2007 to
12.7 per cent in 2011. Advanced economies were parti cularly hard hit, with the youth
unemployment rate jumping from 12.5 per cent to 17.9 per cent over this period. In
addition to the 74.7 million unemployed youth around t he world in 2011 – a growing
number of whom are in long-term unemployment – an esti mated 6.4 million young people
have given up hope of finding a job and have dropped o ut of the labour market altogether.
Young people who are employed are increasingly likel y to find themselves in part-time
employment and often on temporary contracts. In devel oping countries, youth are
disproportionately represented among the working poor (ILO, 2012). It is somewhat ironic
to note that MDG goals and targets exist for youth in terms of literacy rates and knowledge
to HIV prevalence, but not in terms of how these young people cou ld obtain a decent job and
contribute actively to society.
A post-2015 system thus needs to develop a better ap proach and better indicators for
employment, including youth employment .

5. Inequality
Various authors (van der Hoeven, 2010c, Vandemoortele , 2011, Melamed, 2012) have
argued that the MDGs, by emphasizing targets at a gl obal level, have ignored inequalities
that average figures conceal. They suggest that atten tion to inequality should be a basic
element of all targets, and that they should be broke n down for different socioeconomic
classes or for different income groups. This would reveal whether poorer income groups or
excluded socio-economic classes have gained access to social services or gained from
increases in national income. These arguments have recently been strengthened by analysis
that shows that greater equality and more equal acces s to government services will also
contribute to improved and sustained development in ge neral (Wilkenson and Pickett,
2009).
However, for a workable post-2015 framework, more vis ibility of its impact on poorer
groups and suggestions for correctives in terms of p ublic and development aid expenditure
will not be sufficient. There is a need for a bette r understanding of the underlying causes of

19
enormous (and often growing) inequalities. Such analysis would inform whether a post-
2015 strategy should explicitly incorporate economic p olicies that are pro-poor and that
reduce inequalities.
One important aspect of rising income inequality is the change in the functional income
distribution in the course of the last three decade s. A recent report by Stockhammer (2012)
for the ILO observes that, as part of a broader tren d towards greater social inequality, wage
shares in national income have declined in all OECD c ountries. In developing and emerging
economies the picture is less homogenous, but in mos t of these countries wage shares have
also declined. Stockhammer argues that financialisation emerges as the single most
important cause for the decline in the wage share, accentuated by the retrenchment of the
welfare state and by globalisation. He refutes two widely held views about income
distribution. First, changes in income distribution in advanced economies have not been
driven primarily by technological change. While techno logical change has had a negative
effect on wage shares in developed economies, this e ffect is relatively small. Second,
globalisation did not benefit workers in developing and emerging economies. In fact,
globalisation has a negative impact on wage shares in devel oping economies.

These findings have important implications for econo mic and social policy. They suggest
that income distribution is not primarily determined by technological progress, but rather
depends on social institutions and on the structure of the financial system. Strengthening
the welfare state, strengthening the bargaining pow er and greater inclusion of groups that
are at the bottom of the income distribution as well as financial regulation could help
increase the wage share with little, if any, cost in terms of e conomic efficiency or growth.

A recent report on growing inequalities by the OECD ( 2011) provides a useful way of
analysing the different causes and consequences of i nequality and provides insights into
monitoring growing inequality and into ways to implem ent corrective actions (see figure
below).

20

Source: OECD, 2011

A post-2015 framework therefore should not only give more attention to inequalities, but
should also be more explicit about the causes of su bstantial and growing inequality. It
should further incorporate goals and targets in rel ation to social and economic systems,
which will lead to reduced inequality .

6. Environment
A post-2015 framework needs to be more cognisant of challenges to the environment and
energy consumption. In the discussions leading up to the United Nations Conference on
Sustainable Development (Rio+20), various proposals we re made. The High Level Panel on
Global Sustainability (2012) underscores the following iss ues:

1. The number of people living in poverty is declining , but the number of hungry
people is rising;
2. Inequality in wealth distribution is rising;
3. Access to clean water is increasing, but 2.6 bil lion people lack access to modern
sanitation;

21
4. By 2030, demand for food will rise by 50 per cent, demand for energy by 45 per
cent and demand for water by 30 per cent;
5. Women are too often excluded from economic opportunities ;
6. The financial crisis was partly caused by market r ules that encourage short-
termism and do not reward sustainable investment; and
7. The current economic model is "pushing us inexorab ly towards the limits of
natural resources and planetary life support systems".

The panel recommends that governments should adopt indicato rs of economic performance
that go beyond simple GDP, and that instead measure t he sustainability of countries'
economies. In addition, governments should change the regulation of financial markets to
promote longer-term, more stable and sustainable inve stment. It recommends that
subsidies that damage environmental integrity be phase d out by 2020. Currently,
governments spend more than $400bn each year subsidiz ing fossil fuels, while OECD
countries alone spend nearly the same amount on agric ultural subsidies. The panel argues
that, in parallel to these more general recommendati ons, access to energy, clean water,
sanitation and food should be increased, not only to meet existing MDGs, but going beyond
them. New targets should be established that ensure "universal access to affordable
sustainable energy" by 2030. Governments "should consider establishing a global fund for
education" in order to meet the existing MDG on univers al access to primary education by
2015, and aim for universal access to secondary educ ation by 2030. According to the
Commission, these and other targets should be incorp orated into a new set of Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), to be drawn up in the next few years.
12

Should such Sustainable Development Goals be conceived? What targets might be selected
for these goals in a post-2015 framework? The curre nt MDGs have four goals and targets
related to the environment (MDG 7),
13 of which two relate to clean drinking water and

12 Some of these recommendations run with parallel the initia l draft agreement drawn up for the Rio+20
Summit.

13 Target 7.A Integrate the principles of sustainable developm ent into country policies and programs and
reverse the loss of environmental resources.
Target 7.B Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving by 2010 a significant reduction in the rate of loss
Target 7.C Halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sus tainable access to safe drinking water and basic
sanitation
Target 7.D Have achieved a significant improvement by 2020 in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers

22
people living in slum dwellings. The Global Monitoring Report 2011 (World Bank, 2011, p.
39) states that Goal 7 on environmental sustainability and biodiversity has no well-defined
targets, but it affects other MDGs such as child he alth and human development more
generally.
If sustainability becomes a core aspect of the post-2 015 framework, then it will have to be
measured. The Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi (SSF) commission (St iglitz, 2010) offers four ways to
measure sustainability: (1) large and eclectic dashb oards; (2) composite indices; (3) indices
that consist of correcting GDP in a more or less ext ensive way; and (4) indices that
essentially focus on measuring how far we currently ‘over-consume’ our resources
(including the ecological footprint). Each of these indicators has its limitations. The SSF
commission therefore argues that it is, as yet, not p ossible to devise a single indicator for
sustainability, because such an indicator comprises too ma ny uncertainties.

Measuring sustainability differs from standard stati stical practice in a fundamental way (p.
263), since projections rather than merely observation s are needed for adequate
measurement. Some would argue that, in a world of per fect capital markets, all the relevant
information on this future path of the economy is co nveyed in the current valuation of
assets or of the services that they currently provide. Yet, recent events have confirmed to
what extent even well-established capital markets ca n be mistaken in their implicit
predictions of future economic developments. The SSF co mmission also warns of measuring
sustainability by merely surveying people, as is often t he case for the measurement of well-
being. Measuring sustainability also entails prior r esponses to normative questions: the
coexistence of different appreciations of sustainab ility may not only reflect different
predictions of what the future can be, but also dif ferent views about what will really matter
in the future for us or for our descendants. Thirdl y, sustainability cannot be assessed by
each country separately. The problem is global. Instead of m easuring national sustainability,
the contribution of each country to global sustainab ility or unsustainability has to be
measured.
The SSF report therefore recommends that a sustainabi lity assessment requires a well-
identified global dashboard, and that sustainabilit y has to be treated separately from the

23
measurement of monetary or non-monetary dimensions of current well-being. All
components of such a global dashboard should be int erpretable as variations of “stocks”.
However, phrasing sustainability in terms of preservati on of stocks or “capital” goods does
not imply that these stocks or goods must be managed o r traded like ordinary capital goods.
The question of sustainability is a question of know ing whether we pass enough of all this
stock of wealth on to future generations.
The SSF report further argues that a monetary index o f sustainability has its place in a
sustainability dashboard, but that it should essenti ally remain focused on economic aspects
of sustainability. A stock-based approach to sustain ability can look at variations in each
stock separately, with a view to doing whatever is ne cessary to keep it from declining, or it
could summarize all stock variations in synthetic fig ures. Since aggregation cannot be based
on market values, one has to turn to imputations, wh ich raise both normative and
informational difficulties. For these reasons, the SSF commission suggests a more modest
approach, focusing the monetary aggregation on items for which reasonable valuation
techniques exist, such as physical capital, human c apital and fossil resources. The
stock/flow indicator that is best suited to play thi s role is “the ecological footprint”, since it
essentially focuses on contributions to global non-sustai nability.

A post-2015 agenda should therefore have a small da shboard of sustainability indicators,
firmly rooted in the logic of the “stock” approach to sustai nability, which would combine:

· An indicator more or less derived from the extended wealth approach, “greened” as
far as possible on the basis of currently available k nowledge, but whose main
function would be to send warning messages concerni ng “economic” non-
sustainability. This economic non-sustainability coul d be due to low savings or low
investment in education, or to insufficient reinvestm ent of income generated by the
extraction of fossil resources (for countries that strongly rely on this source of
income).
· A set of well-chosen physical indicators, which woul d focus on dimensions of
environmental sustainability that are either already im portant or could become so
in the future, and that remain difficult to capture in monet ary terms.

24
7. Human Rights
Chapter five of the Millennium Declaration refers specifically to the importance of
respecting human rights and confirms principles of i nternational equality and shared
responsibility. The AIV Report (2011, p. 64) notes t hat: “…although not formulated in terms
of ‘rights’, the MDGs are an important milestone in a chieving economic, social and cultural
rights. Conversely, human rights strategies support ac hievement of the MDGs, because they
address the discrimination, exclusion and accountabi lity failures that often underlie poverty
and development problems” (see also van Ginneken, 2011) . In a human rights approach,
promoting development is not seen as charity. “Developme nt is considered to be the right of
every individual and it is the duty of the state to gua rantee it. A human rights approach
provides principles on which action should be based. They include non-discrimination,
human dignity, participation and accountability”.
The AIV report reviews how human rights can strengt hen the MDGs in a variety of areas.
“Firstly, this approach focuses on vulnerable groups , and on people who are discriminated
against or whose rights are violated and those who a re responsible for this. At the moment,
the MDGs are based on average progress by countries a s a whole. Secondly, a human rights
approach can provide working principles for achieving the MDGs; non-discrimination,
participation and accountability can act as guidelin es in implementing development policy.
Thirdly, changing a goal into a right can encourage people to demand accountability from
the state. The MDGs would then no longer be mere tar gets, but legal obligations to be
fulfilled by the state. Specifying human rights in rel ation to the MDGs could result in
improved monitoring mechanisms.
14 Fourthly, a human rights approach could ensure that
attention is devoted to the quality of services, and n ot only the quantity. Human rights
treaties often prescribe minimum criteria, which could also be used to measure the MDGs.”

The AIV report stresses that “these rights will con tinue to be valid after 2015; in the long
term, all rights must be achieved for all people. In this respect a human rights approach is
more sustainable and focuses on overcoming structura l causes of rights violations and
underdevelopment”. Various international human rights lawyers (e.g. Allston, 2005) have

14 For example by making use of information gathered and asse ssed as part of existing human rights
procedures, e.g. under the International Convention on Economic, S ocial and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).

25
argued that the lack of a human rights basis of the MDGs is a serious omission. According to
them, a rights based approach could support groups w hich are negatively affected by
globalisation and financialisation in obtaining a g reater share of national income or access
to state-provided social services and thus would contri bute to achieving the MDGs.

The Report discusses three options in which human r ights approaches could play a greater
role in a post-2015 framework:
· One option is that countries add an extra goal, fol lowing the example of Mongolia
which has drawn up a ninth national MDG on human rights and demo cracy.
· A second option is to indicate how each MDG relates to existing human rights. Many
countries already use their reporting obligations un der international human rights
conventions to report on progress on the MDGs.
· The third option, preferred by the AIV, entails a ge neral reference to the importance
of the human rights approach in the post-2015 frame work through a differentiated
measurement and incorporation of references. This wo uld enable the underlying
principles of human rights to be declared applicabl e to all stages in the MDG process.
Goals and targets in a post-2015 framework could thu s be explicitly linked to
broadly endorsed agreements from the past, through r eferences to the Beijing
Declaration on women’s rights (MDG 3), the Cairo Decla ration on population and
development (MDG 5) and relevant articles from widely ratified UN human rights
conventions. This would also allow avoiding a difficult pr ocess of renegotiation.

This third option is indeed the most pragmatic way of incorporating a human rights
approach into a post-2015 framework while preservin g the existing international
consensus.

C. Towards a global social contract
If greater attention is given to the inclusion of d eveloping countries in preparations for the
post-2015 agenda, and if inequality and human rights become an integral part of the agenda,
then the post-2015 development agenda essentially bec omes a global social contract. This

26
contract would guarantee LDCs concessional resources to achieve inclusion in the world
economy and to reduce poverty, while families in LDCs , emerging and developed countries
would have the ability to exercise economic, social a nd labour rights for a better share of
national development outcomes, and where they would b enefit from a minimum set of
safeguards (a social floor) for social protection, especi ally in times of economic turmoil.

8. Social Floor
The financial crisis has clearly demonstrated the need for a social floor on a national level.
Although a global social floor is only one element of a broader socio-economic strategy,
evidence shows that it can arrest growing trends of inequality and poverty in several
circumstances (see WCSDG, 2004; Van Ginneken, 2009). The need for a global social floor
was recognized in the 2010 MDG outcome document (UN 20 10b)
15 and discussed in the
WESS 2010 (p. 43-45).
Most recently, the Social Protection Advisory Group (20 11) argues that “With the
Millennium Development Goals deadline fast approaching, it is important to intensify efforts
to achieve existing commitments and to start discussi ng a new framework for coming
decades. The social protection floor can be of help in this endeavour. By addressing
multidimensional vulnerabilities in an integrated an d interconnected way, it complements
the MDGs perspective and provides a coherent and cons istent social policy tool to
accelerate the achievement of the MDGs before 2015 an d beyond. We recommend that the
floor approach be taken into consideration in the d esign of future development
commitments.” One of the members of the commission (H erfkens, 2011) observes that
progress in MDGs in global averages masks the prevalen ce of continuous and, in many cases,
growing inequalities within countries—which make it d ifficult to achieve the MDGs for the
very poor. As noted above, inequalities have neither be en emphasized nor properly
monitored in the MDG framework. Moreover, the sector al focus of most MDGs has
deemphasized integrated approaches to development, fo cused attention solely on income
poverty, and created policy fragmentation in the pursuit of in dividual goals.

15 Paragraph (23) f: Promoting universal access to public and social services and providing social protection
floors. (UN 2010)

27
Herfkens further argues that the establishment of a Social Protection Floor (SPF) in
developing countries would address these shortcoming s in achieving the MDGs. Social
protection floors are instrumental in ensuring that the very poor are not left behind, and
they provide enabling frameworks for comprehensive app roaches to address income and
non-income inequalities. She recalls that the major responsibility for achieving the MDGs
rests with developing countries themselves. In particular, m iddle-income countries have the
resources and capacities to establish their own SPF. Many are doing so using home-grown
approaches that are more likely to be successful tha n adopting approaches from developed
countries. Low-income developing countries will need ODA in order to create effective SPF.
Herfkens maintains that ODA funding for SPF has the potential of addressing the needs of the
poor in developing countries, being effective, and satisfying the political requirements of
donors.
Three observations would be relevant for a post-2015 framewo rk:
1. Greater attention within the MDG framework on setting and monitoring both income
and non-income equality targets;
2. Developing countries and emerging countries should establi sh or further develop SPF as
a means of reducing inequality and achieving the MDGs or their s uccessors; and
3. Donors should increase ODA to low income countries a nd place greater emphasis and
resources on a SPF.

9. Global Governance
Although the Millennium Declaration had a special parag raph on strengthening the role of
the United Nations and on improved global governance in genera l, the MDGs did not contain
explicit references to global governance, with the excepti on of vague references in MDG 8.
With hindsight, this neglect of global governance has had a negative impact on the
implementation of the MDGs. Whether it was the major cause for missing some of the
targets is open for debate, but it has certainly been one of t he causes. The hike in food prices
in 2007 and in subsequent years, climate change, and the g reat recession in 2008 (Addison
2011) were all the consequence of failed global governanc e. The reforms in global
governance that we did see in this period, most importantly t he greater role for the G-20 in

28
global economic governance, have been the result of these crises rather than an outcome of
the MDG process.
The most important aspect of an improved global gover nance system is enhanced policy
coherence in economic, social and environmental polic ies, both at the national and the
international level (WCSDG, 2004, van der Hoeven, 2010, UN-DESA, 2010). Although there
is a notion of policy coherence in MDG 8, a post-2015 framework has to pay much greater
attention to policy coherence will have to go far beyond what i s contained in MDG 8.

On the other hand, calls for policy coherence could lead to international institutions
dictating a certain development ideology, thereby limi ting policy space for smaller actors –
as was the case with Structural Adjustment Programs o f the international financial
institutions in the 1990s (van der Hoeven, 2010b). Th is concern was expressed by the
World Commission of the Social Dimensions of Globalizat ion in 2004, but has since
decreased because major emerging and developing coun tries play an increasingly large role
in global governance. Industrial countries would thu s find it difficult to simply dictate a
development model (see for example G-20, 2010).
By now, there is a broad understanding of the major d evelopment trends that contributed
to achieving the MDGs and which need to be made mor e explicit in a coherent post-2015
development agenda. Nayyar (2012) lists the following: necessity of economic growth;
institutional mechanisms to translate growth into me aningful development by improving
conditions of people; the importance of public acti on; and employment as the only
sustainable means of poverty reduction. This requires coherence between various aspects
of economic policy (macroeconomic, trade and investmen t policy), social policy and
environmental policies. The G-20, born out of the 200 8 financial crisis, might be seen as a
first attempt to improve coherence at the global leve l. But the G-20 is neither an adequate
nor a sufficient forum. It is not adequate because the secretariat functions are performed by
the IMF, and it is not sufficient as it lacks inter national political legitimacy. Ocampo and
Stiglitz (2011) therefore suggest using the politica l momentum for improved policy
coherence to strive for a Global Economic Coordination Counc il (GECC). The latter would

29
have more global political legitimacy, and it would be an ideal forum to foster the necessary
policy coherence for a post-2015 framework of development.

High on the agenda of a GECC would be the formulation of a coh erent global response to
national and international financial crises and the inher ent financial instability that
characterizes the current financial system. Increased a ttention to crises and global financial
instability is important in a post-2015 agenda for development . As argued above, the global
financial crisis in 2008 caused majors setback in the achi evements of the MDGs (World
Bank 2101) and halted the upward trend in development assistan ce. A formulation of the
post-2015 agenda should therefore refer to possible risks of future financial crises, it should
contain indications of how resources for achieving goals a nd targets will be safeguarded in
times of global financial crises, and it should indicate h ow policies for economic recovery
will include special measures to reduce poverty and social de privation. One example are
automatic stabilizers at a global level, such as a global s ocial floor discussed above.

National policy space would be another priority of th e GECC. Rodrik (2011) argues for a
system of global governance that respects national po licy space as much as possible,
allowing countries and people to choose their prefe rences in terms of social policies and
social protection, for example. The combination of improved global governance with ample
room for exercising national social policies needs to be a cornerstone of a post-2015
framework of development.
In addition to improved policy coherence, the provisio n of global public goods is another
essential part of an improved system of global govern ance. Even though the discussion on
public goods is sensitive because of its potential i mpacts on national sovereignty, it cannot
be ignored in a post-2015 framework. As the AIV (20 11) argues: “Global public goods
present new opportunities to define common interests , now that the traditional idea that
development is essentially a national public good is changing. In a time in which more and
more doubts are being expressed about the effective ness and efficiency of development aid
and when international solidarity is no longer taken for granted, global public goods point
to the interests that the developed countries increa singly share with developing countries.
What does the global public goods agenda offer over and above classical international

30
cooperation? In addition to highlighting the above-mentioned need for a joint approach –
with the corresponding funding – in a mutually depende nt world, the concept of global
public goods can also clarify how this need should be met”.

In reaction to the financial crisis, the call for t he provision of global public goods has
become even stronger. The chief economist of the Fina ncial Times, Martin Wolf (Wolf 2012)
recently stated that “a central element of the debat e is how to avoid extreme financial
instability. Such instability is a public bad. Avoiding it is a public good. Those acting inside
the market system have no incentive to supply the good or avoid the bad. […] Our states
cannot supply public goods on their own. They need to co-operate. Traditionally, the least
bad way of securing such co-operation is through som e sort of leadership. The leader acts
despite free riders. […] But as we move again into a multipolar era, the ability of any country
to supply such leadership will be limited. Even in the unipolar days, it only worked where
the hegemon wanted to provide the particular public good in question. […] Ours is an ever
more global civilization that demands the provision of a wide range of public goods. The
states on which humanity depends to provide these go ods, from security to management of
climate, are unpopular, overstretched and at odds. W e need to think about how to manage
such a world. It is going to take extraordinary creativity.”
A post-2015 agenda for development therefore needs t o contain an articulation of the
various sets of global public goods, how they are fin anced, and which global institutions can
be held accountable for the provision of these global public g oods.

10. Can we measure what we want to measure?
During the implementation of the MDGs, various author s have argued for improved
measurement of development and social progress, for e xample in the Stiglitz, Sen, Fitoussi
(SSF) Report on Measuring of Economic Performance and S ocial Progress (Stiglitz et. al.,
2010, see also chapter 6 above). It refers explicitly to ear lier work of Amartya Sen on human
development and on the capabilities approach, which had influenced the Millennium
Development Declaration and the formulation of the M DGs. The SSF report might provide
useful pointers for the design and monitoring of a p ost-2015 framework, especially because
it was issued partly in response to the great recession of 20 08.

31
The SSF report suggests improvements in measuring three areas of development:

1. An improvement in measuring GDP;
2. An attempt to quantify the quality of life; and
3. Proposals for measuring sustainable development and i ts impacts on the environment.

The report names various reasons for the gap between t he statistical measurement of socio-
economic phenomena and citizens’ perception of the same phen omena (p. 7-8):

· The statistical concepts may be correct, but the mea surement process may be
imperfect;
· In many cases, there are debates about what are the right concepts, and about the
appropriate use of different concepts;
· When there are large changes in inequality (more gene rally a change in income
distribution), GDP per capita may not provide an accura te assessment of the
situation in which most people find themselves. If ine quality increases enough
relative to the increase in average per capita GDP, a majority of people can be worse
off even though average income is increasing;
· The commonly used statistics may not be capturing phen omena which have a large
and increasing impact on the well-being of citizens;
16
· Current reporting and use of statistical figures ma y provide a distorted view of
economic trends. For example, much emphasis is usuall y put on GDP, even though
net national product (which takes into account the effect of depreciation), or real
household income (which focuses on the real income o f households within the
economy) may be more relevant. These numbers may differ markedly. GDP is not a
wrong measurement as such, but it is used in the wrong cont ext; and
· The adequacy of current measures of economic performa nce has been a matter of
concern for a long time, in particular those solely based on GDP. GDP is an

16 For example, traffic jams may increase GDP as a resul t of the increased use of gasoline, but obviously not the
quality of life. Moreover, if citizens are concerned about the quality of air, and air pollution is increasing, then
statistical measures, which ignore air pollution, will prov ide an inaccurate estimate of what is happening to
citizens’ well-being.

32
inadequate metric to gauge well-being over time, particularly in its economic,
environmental, and social dimensions, and in terms of its s ustainability.

The SSF report is relevant for the post-2015 discussions for var ious reasons:

· Correctly measuring inequality (chapter 5 in this paper);
· Concepts of development (chapter 1 and 3 in this paper); and
· Measuring important phenomena affecting the quality of life, particularly wellbeing
and sustainable development (chapter 6 in this paper).

With its recommendations, the SSF commission aims to paint a more accurate picture of the
contemporary distribution of income, access to social services and enjoyment of a quality of
life, within countries and communities, between coun tries and communities, and between
present and future generations.
Some observers argued that the SSF report saw economic g rowth as less important or even
completely unimportant, and that for this reason, d evelopment aid should be concentrated
on social issues like education, health, and income -generating programmes for
disadvantaged groups. The ensuing debates argued abo ut whether development aid should
stimulate more economic or social development (see e .g. WRR. 2011). However, this is a
mis-interpretation of both the MDGs and the SSF report .
17 A post-2015 agenda should thus
incorporate the relevant conclusions of the SSF Repor t on improved measurement of
economic, social and sustainable development.

17 Questioned by the public whether economic growth should be given less emphasis in the context of a Human
Development Strategy, Amartya Sen remarked that when the UNS G asked his opinion on the MDGs , he
informed the SG that developing countries might have gotten a bad deal as there was little on growth and
economic convergence in the MDGs . Sen also reminded the aud ience that in the wake of the great recession of
2008, and the subsequent debt crises, many countries needed m ore rather than less economic growth.(7th
Meeting of the Human Development Association,5 sept.2011,The Ha gue).

33
D. Summary and Conclusion
Taking the post-2015 development agenda as an opportunity to formulate a global social
contract as suggested in the previous sections might be seen as risky by some – it might
undo one of the major perceived strengths of the current MDG fram ework, its simplicity.
18

However, in light of the triple crises of nutrition, finance and environment, as well as
political manifestations like the Arab spring, it ha s become clear that traditional
development aid interventions, as formulated in the M DGs, are no longer the most effective
response. Neither do they enable the poor to grow ou t of poverty. New and emerging
challenges need to be confronted in a post-2015 fra mework, but they have to be put in the
context of a global social contract. This contract can answer the question of “how families
and poor households in developing countries can rely on a post 2015 development agenda
in times of economic crises”.
19

In the process of developing this framework, all con cerns should be discussed; precluding
certain issues or concerns beforehand, because they may make a future set of development
goals too broad, is not helpful at this point. If i ssues are kept off the table, the future
agreement on a post-2015 development framework might b e compromised from the
beginning.
The discussions leading to such a global social con tract for a post-2015 framework are as
important as the outcome itself. Ideally, these disc ussions will take the Millennium
Declaration of 2000 as their starting point. On thi s basis, a (restricted) set of development
goals and targets in a post-2015 era can be formulated.
Framing the deliberations for a post-2015 Developmen t Framework on (an actualization of)
the Millennium Declaration would thus base its prep arations on a set of issues that carry a
globally accepted political consensus and would thus avoid a laundry list of good intentions.

18 The 8 points of the Millennium Declaration led to a much s maller number of MDG clusters (Development and
Poverty Eradication and more limited: Protecting the Vulnerabl e and protecting our Common Environment).
19 A point made by Jan Pronk at a UNDESA working group on a post 2 015 framework, New York 27 -29
February 2012.

34
The following table provides some elements that could be discussed in the lead-up to a
global post-2015 framework for development. This table is no t exhaustive but is intended to
guide discussions and deliberations for a post-2015 develop ment framework.
MDGs Post-2015 development agenda Referred to in
paper
Process Secretariat, donor driven Wider consultations Chapter 1
Macro-economic framework Absent Sustainable and
equitable growth Chapter 1
Principle means to achieve
goals Development aid,
national public
expenditure Changes in
international system,
national public
expenditure, aid for
fragile and low
income states Chapter 2
Measurement Inequalities,
sustainability, well
being not fully
captured Improved
measurements of
goals/targets
Chapter 10
Target group Poor in developing
countries Poor in all countries Chapter 3
Employment Added in 2005 Better approach and
indicators Chapter 4
Inequality Not adequately
reflected Explicit attention,
including goals and
targets Chapter 5
Environment Not adequately
reflected Inclusion of
sustainable
development goals Chapter 6
Human rights Absent Reemphasizing
existing rights, global
social floor, claims
for redistribution Chapter 7, 8
Targets Global Global and link to
national Chapter 8, 9,
10
Global governance Not adequately
reflected Provision of global
public goods Chapter 9

In conclusion, the MDGs have played a positive role i
n drawing more attention to
development aid since their inception in 2001. But cu rrent socio-economic developments,
notably increasing inequality, strong GDP growth in em erging countries and climate change,
current geopolitical changes as well as changes in the poverty landscape call for a new
approach to a post-2015 framework. A new framework ha s to be based on a global social

35
contract, relevant to people in the South and the North, rather than being dominated by
development aid professionals and merely applicable to the South. A global social contract
strives for sustainable and equitable growth in all countries, while paying particular
attention to employment, inequality, sustainable devel opment, human rights, a global social
floor, and to improved global governance. The establi shment of a Global Economic
Coordination Council will result in better policy co herence between economic, social and
environmental policies at national and international level, as well in a better provision of a
number of essential global public goods. It will th us be an important element to achieve
improved global governance in a post-2015 framework. R eformulated and reconceptualised
MDGs in this framework can become beacons in the turbulent t imes to come.

36
References
Addison, A, (2005) Post-Conflict Recovery: Does the Global Economy Work for Peace? UNU-
WIDER working paper 2005-5 Helsinki, UNU-WIDER
Addison, A et.al. (2011) “The Triple Crisis and the Global Aid Architecture” in African
Development Review Vol.23, No.4, pages 461–478,
Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV), (2011) The P ost-2015 Development
Agenda: The Millennium Development Goals in Perspective, Advi sory Report, 74, April.
Alston, Ph. (2003) A human rights perspective on the Millenni um Development Goals. New
York, New York University Law School, Center for Human Rights a nd Global Justice .
Amsden, A, (2011), ‘ Say’s law, Poverty Persistence, and Employment Neglect, ‘in van der
Hoeven, R, 2011,
Centre for Global Development ( CGD) ( 2011),MDG Scorecards, Was hington DC.
Department for International development (DFID) (2011) Mu ltilateral Aid review, Ensuring
maximum value for money for UK aid through mutilateral organis ations, March, 2011,
London ,DFID
Easterly, W, (2009). How the Millennium Development Goals are Un fair to Africa, World
Development, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp.26-35.
The Economist, (2011) Charity begins abroad, new sources of aid, issue of 13 August 2011
Fischer, A. (2010) ‘Towards Genuine Universalism within Co ntemporary
Development Policy’, IDS Bulletin 41.1, special issue on MDGs and beyond: p.36–44
Fukuda-Parr, S, (2009) Empowering People: Human Rights Revi ew of Haiti’s Poverty
Reduction and Growth Strategies An Issues Paper, mimeo, The N ew School , NY
Fukuda-Parr, S. (2010) Reducing Inequality – The Missing MD G: A Content Review of PRSPs
and Bilateral Donor Policy Statements, IDS Bulletin, Vol. 41, No. 1
G-20 (2010) Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth, Seou l
Herfkens.E, (2011) Enhancing the Millennium Development Goals : Reducing Inequalities
and Improving Coherence through Social Protection Floors’ Ba ckground paper prepared for
the Social Protection Floor Advisory Group, Geneva, ILO
World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (200 4) A fair globalization:
Creating opportunities for all. Geneva, ILO.

37
Information Office of the State Council, The People's Republic of China, (2011) China's
Foreign Aid, April 2011, Beijing
ILO (2009) World of Work report 2011:The global jobs Crisis , Geneva
ILO( 2011) Key Indicators of Labour Markets (KILM) , Geneva
ILO (2012) Global Employment Trends 2012 Geneva
Melamed, C. (2012) After 2015: Contexts, politics and pro cesses for a Post 2015 Global
Agreement on Development, London, ODI
Melamed, C, Hartwig, R, and U, Grant, (2011), Jobs, growth an d Poverty : what do we know ,
what do donon’t know what should we know? ODI Background Note , ODI, London
Mkandawire, T, (2011),’How the New Poverty Agenda neglected So cial and Employment
Policies in Africa ‘in van der Hoeven, R,, 2011,
Nayyar,D,(2012) The MDGs after 2015: Some reflections on the Po ssibilities ,Background
paper for UNDESA ,UN ,New York
OECD (2011), Divided We Stand, Why Inequality Keeps Rising, Paris
Ocampo J,A, and Jomo,K,S, ( eds.) (2007) Towards Full and Dec ent Employment, Orient
Longman and Zed Books,
Ocampo,J,A and Stiglitz,J ( 2011) From the G20 to a Global Econo mic Coordination Council,
Mimeo Columbia University,
Robinson,M (2010) “The MDG-Human Rights Nexus and Beyond ”,IDS Bu lletin Vol. 41,no 1 p
81
Rodrik D (2011) The Globalization Paradox, Why Global Markets, States and Democracy
can’t coexist, Oxford University Press, Oxford
Saith, A. (2006). From Universal Values to Millennium Develop ment Goals: Lost in
Translation, Development and Change, Vol. 37, No. 6, pp. 1167- 1199.
Severino,J-M, and O. Ray (2009) The end of ODA: Death and rebirth of Global Public Policy,
Working paper 167, Washington D.C., Centre for Global Develo pment (CGD)
Sepúlveda, (2009),’ The obligations of international assista nce and cooperation under the
ICESR: A possible entry point to a human rights based approach t o MDG8,’ in The
International Journal of Human Rights Vol. 13, no 1 p 87
Social Protection Advisory Group, (2011), Social Protection Flo or for a Fair and Inclusive
Globalization, Geneva, ILO

38
Stiglitz,J et. al. (2010). Mis-measuring Our Lives, Why GDP Doesn’t Add Up, New Press, New
York
Stockhammer , E (2012 )Why have wage shares fallen? A panel analysi s of the determinants
of functional income distribution, (ILO) project “New Per spectives on Wages and Economic
Growth” Kingston University, UK
Sumner ,A (2010) Global Poverty and the New Bottom Billion: What i f Three-quarters of the
World’s Poor Live in Middle-income Countries? IDS working p aper 349, Brighton, Sussex
IDS
UNDP (2010) What will it take to Achieve the Millennium Deve lopment Goals?, United
Nations, New York.
United Nations (2000). Millennium Declaration, A55/2, Un ited Nations, New York..
United Nations (2005) 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1
United Nations (2010). The Global Partnership for Developm ent at a Critical Juncture, The
MDG Task Force Report 2010, New York
United Nations (2010) Keeping the Promise: United t o Achieve the Millennium
Development Goal. A/65/L.1, United Nations New York
United Nations (2011), Accelerating progress towards the millennium development goals:
options for sustained and inclusive growth and issues for ad vancing the United Nations
development Agenda beyond 2015 A/66/126 11 July 2011
United Nations ,DESA (2010) World Economic and Social Survey, 2010 Retooling
Development , New York.
UNDG, (2010) Thematic paper on MDG 1, Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger, New York,
United Nations
United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Globa l Sustainability (2012)
Resilient people, resilient planet: A future worth choosin g, New York: United Nations.
van Bergeijk P, A.de Haan and R. van der Hoeven , eds. (2011) The Fin ancial Crisis and
Developing Countries. A Global Multilateral Perspective, Abi ngdon, Edward Elgar,
van der Hoeven, R. (2009) “Inequality” in Handbook of Economics a nd Ethics, Peil,J and van
Staveren,I (eds) Edward Elgar ,2009
van der Hoeven, R, (2010 a), Labour Markets Trends, Financial Globalization and the
current crisis in Developing Countries, UN-DESA Working Pape r No. 99 October 2010, New
York United Nations

39

van der Hoeven, R. (2010 b ) Policy Coherence: The newest fad in the international
discourse?” in Paul Hoebink ( ed) European Development Coope ration, In Between the
Local and the Global, Amsterdam University Press,
van der Hoeven, R. (2010 c) “Income Inequality and Employment Revi sited: Can One Make
Sense of Economic Policy? ” in Journal of Human Development and Cap abilities, vol 11, no
1 pp 67-84
van der Hoeven, R.,ed. (2011) Employment, Inequality and Globaliz ation: A Continuous
Concern London, Routledge
van der Hoeven, R., and M. Luebker ( 2007) “Financial Opennes s and Employment: The
Need for Coherent International and National Policies ” i n Ocampo J,A, and
Jomo,K,S, ( eds.) Towards Full and Decent Employment, Orient Lo ngman and Zed Books,
Vandemoortele, J.( 2011) “The MDG Story: Intention denied “i n Development and Change
42(1), pp.1-21.
van Ginneken, W.. (2009). “Social security and the global socio -economic floor: Towards a
human rights-based approach” Global Social Policy , 9(2), pp. 228-245.
van Ginneken,W, (2011) Social Protection and the Millennium Development Goals: Towards
a Human Rights-based Approach paper prepared Internationa l Conference on Social
Protection and Social Justice (13-15 April 2011) Centre fo r Social Protection (Institute of
Development Studies, Brighton)
van Lieshout et.al(2010) Less Pretention, More Ambition: Deve lopment in times of
Globalisation , Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR ) , The Hague
Wilkinson, R. and K. Pickett (2010) The Spirit Level. Why Equalit y is Better for Everyone.
London, Penguin Books.
World Bank (2010) Global Monitoring Report 2010: The MDGs after the crisis. World Bank,
Washington
World Bank (2011) Global Monitoring Report 2011: Improving t he Odds of Achieving the
MDGs, World Bank, Washington

40
UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda
Membership
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), Co-Chair
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Co-Chair
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
Department of Public Information (DPI)
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESC AP)
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA)
Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG)
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (F AO)
Global Environment Facility (GEF)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
International Labour Organization (ILO)
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
International Organization for Migration (IOM)
International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)
Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS)
Office of the Deputy Secretary-General (ODSG)
Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR)
Office of the High Representative for the Least Deve loped Countries, Landlocked Developing
Countries and Small Island Developing States (OHRLLS)
Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSAA)
Peace building Support Office (PBSO)
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

41
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Orga nization (UNESCO)
United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment o f Women (UN Women)
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN FCCC)
United Nations Fund for International Partnerships (UNFIP )
United Nations Global Compact Office
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT)
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reducti on (UNISDR)
United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)
United Nations Millennium Campaign
United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA)
United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refu gees in the Near East (UNRWA)
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (U NRISD)
United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordinat ion Secretariat (CEB)
United Nations University (UNU)
United Nations Volunteers (UNV)
United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO)
Universal Postal Union (UPU)
World Bank
World Food Programme (WFP)
World Health Organization (WHO)
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
World Meteorological Organization (WMO)
World Trade Organization (WTO)