ANNUAL REPORT 2013
Violations of the right
of NGOs to funding:
from harassment
to criminalisation
“The topic of this year’s report is most pertinent as lately we have witnessed increased stigmatization
and undue restrictions in relation to access to funding and resources for civil society organizations, in
an attempt to stifle any forms of criticism, especially calls for democratic change or accountability for
human rights violations. […] I am particularly dismayed about laws or policies stigmatizing recipients
due to their sources of funding, which have been adopted in the past months or are under consideration,
in several countries across the world”.
“I am confident that the Observatory report and my work in this field will be complementary and
mutually beneficial. I hope our joint efforts will succeed and will pave the way for better respect of
the right to freedom of association, especially its core component, the access to funding and resources,
in all parts of the world. It is ultimately the obligation of Member States to fully protect this right,
which shall be enjoyed by everyone”.
Maina Kiai , United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and
of Association.
The Annual Report 2013 of the Observatory provides a global review of the violations of the right
of NGOs to funding. It provides a detailed picture of this as yet little studied problem, the growing
dimension of which is a worrying concern. This picture is illustrated with around thirty country
situations affecting human rights organisations. While recalling the legal basis of this right, as well as
its organic relationship with the right to freedom of association and the embryonic jurisprudence on
this subject, the report stimulates deep reflection on the negative impacts of these restrictive measures
and makes concrete recommendations to all relevant stakeholders (beneficiaries, donors, governments
and intergovernmental organisations).
In 2012, the Observatory covered more than 50 country situations , notably through 336 urgent and
follow-up interventions concerning over 500 human rights defenders .
Created in 1997 jointly by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the World
Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders
is the leading global programme on the protection of human rights defenders. It bases its action on
the conviction that solidarity with and among human rights defenders and their organisations ensures
that their voice is being heard and their isolation and marginalisation broken. It responds to threats
and acts of reprisal suffered by human rights defenders through urgent interventions, vital emergency
assistance for those in need, international missions and advocacy for their effective domestic and
international protection.
Violations of the right of NGOs to funding: from harassment to criminalisation
ANNUAL REPORT
2013
Foreword by Maina Kiai
OMCT – FIDH
World Organisation Against Torture

O B S E R VAT O I R E P O U R L A P R O T E C T I O N
DES DÉFENSEURS DES DROITS DE L’HOMME
OMCT / FIDH
“Violations of the right of NGOs to funding:
from harassment to criminalisation”
RAPPORT ANNUEL 2013
PRÉFACE DE
MAINA KIAI

Drafting, editing and co-ordination:OM CT: Isabelle Scherer, Delphine Reculeau, Anne-Laurence Lacroix and Gerald Staberock FIDH: A lexandra Poméon, Hugo Gabbero, Floriane Lefebvre, Isabelle Brachet and Antoine Bernard
The Observatory wishes to express special thanks to all OM CT and FIDH partner organisations, and to the teams of both organisations.
Distribution: The full text of this report is published in Arabic, English, French, Russian and Spanish.
Copyright: The World Organisation Against Torture (OM CT) and the International Federation for Human Rights ( FIDH) authorise the free reproduction of extracts of this text on condition that the source is credited and that a copy of the publication containing the text is sent to their respective International Secretariats.
English translation: Anthony Drummond, Mary Reagan and Christopher Thiéry Graphic Design: Bruce Pleiser / bruce@kyodo.fr Printing: ISI print – 15 rue Francis de Pressensé – 93210 La Plaine Saint Denis Dépot légal février 2013, FIDH Rapport annuel de l’Observatoire ( English Ed.) ISSN en cours – Fichier informatique conforme à la loi du 6 janvier 1978 ( Déclaration N°330 675)
OMCT – World Organisation Against Torture8 rue du Vieux-Billard, Case postale 21 – 1211 Genève 8 – Switzerland Tel. + 41 (0) 22 809 49 39 – Fax. + 41 (0) 22 809 49 29 omct@omct.org / www.omct.org
FIDH – International Federation for Human Rights 17 passage de la Main d’Or – 75011 Paris – France Tel. + 33 (0) 1 43 55 25 18 – Fax. + 33 (0) 1 43 55 18 80 fidh@fidh.org / www.fidh.org

O B S E R VAT O R Y F O R T H E P R O T E C T I O N
O F H U M A N R I G H T S D E F E N D E R S
OMCT / FIDH
“Violations of the right of NGOs to funding:
from harassment to criminalisation”
2013 A N N U A L R E P O R T
FO RE WO RD BY
MAINA KIAI

4
A CRO NY M S MO S T FR EQUEN T LY
USE D IN THI S R EP ORT OBS ERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION O F HUM AN RIGHTS DEFE NDER S 2013 ANNUAL REP ORT

ACH P R African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
CAT Committee against Torture
CCPR Human Rights Committee
CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women
CERD Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
CESCR Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CRC Committee on the Rights of the Child
EU European Union
FIDH International Federation for Human Rights
IACHR Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights
ILO International Labour Organisation
LGBTI Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, Transgenders and Intersex
NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations
OMCT World Organisation Against Torture
OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

5
F OR E WORD BY M AI N A K IAI
U N IT ED NATIO NS SPE CIA L R APP ORT EU R
ON TH E RI GHT S TO FR EE DOM OF PE AC EFUL
ASSE M BLY AN D OF ASS OCIATIO N OBS ERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION O F HUM AN RIGHTS DEFE NDER S 2013 ANNUAL REP ORT
It gives me great pleasure to write the foreword for this year’s Annual
Report of the Obser vatory, a programme which I have known for many
years and whose important advocacy work, since its establishment in 1997,
has benefited countless human rights defenders, including myself in 2008
in Kenya before I took up my functions as Special Rapporteur.
My mandate was established by the Human Rights Council in October
2010, primarily in response to the shrinking space for civil society expres –
sion and participation in several parts of the world. Its establishment
proved to be particularly timely in light of the unfolding historical events in
the Arab region (the so-called Arab Spring) and beyond. While the rights
to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association are to be distinguished,
they are interdependent and mutually reinforcing, and, as recognized by
the Council, are essential components of democracy and important for the
enjoyment of all human rights.
The topic of this year’s report is most pertinent as lately we have wit –
nessed increased stigmatization and undue restrictions in relation to access
to funding and resources for civil society organizations, in an attempt
to stifle any forms of criticism, especially calls for democratic change or
accountability for human rights violations. In fact, since the inception of
my mandate, I have sent numerous communications in this regard 1. I am
particularly dismayed about laws or policies stigmatizing recipients due to
their sources of funding, which have been adopted in the past months or
are under consideration, in several countries across the world.
As highlighted in my first thematic report, the “ability for associations
to access funding and resources is an integral and vital part of the right
to freedom of association […] Any associations, both registered or unreg –
1 / See my observations on communications transmitted to Governments and replies received in UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, Maina Kiai – Addendum , UN Document A/HRC/20/27/Add.3, June 19, 2012.

6
OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
istered, should have the right to seek and secure funding and resources
from domestic, foreign, and international entities, including individuals,
businesses, civil society organizations, Governments and international
organizations” 2. This is all the more relevant in the context of on-going
discussions on the post-2015 Millennium Development Goals Agenda.
Member States should more than ever facilitate, and not restrict, access
to funding for civil society organizations which undertake development
activities, as well as those that seek to increase transparency and account –
ability in their countries.
In light of persisting challenges surrounding access to funding and
resources in general, I will be devoting a significant part of my 2013 the –
matic report to the Human Rights Council to this pressing issue 3. I will
certainly continue to pay attention to this question in my communications
to Governments and during my countr y visits. I am confident that the
Observatory report and my work in this field will be complementary and
mutually beneficial.
I hope our joint efforts will succeed and will pave the way for better
respect of the right to freedom of association, especially its core component,
the access to funding and resources, in all parts of the world. It is ultimately
the obligation of Member States to fully protect this right, which shall be
enjoyed by everyone.
Mr. Maina Kiai
United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights to
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association
2 / See UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association , UN Document A/HRC/20/27, paragraphs 67-68, May 21, 2012 (emphasis added).3 / See UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, UN Document A/HRC/23/39, May 2013.

7
IN TROD U CTIO N
OBS ERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION O F HUM AN RIGHTS DEFE NDER S 2013 ANNUAL REP ORT
Access to funding for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) defend –
ing human rights is a right – a universal right. This postulate is not binding
but reflects an often overlooked legal reality that this report recalls in
a context of unprecedented development of the associative sector, both
in terms of quantity – with the considerable increase in the number of
NGOs – and quality. The sophistication of their strategies and means of
action, coupled with their expertise in international law and use of new
communication technologies to strengthen synergies between them, should
herald a period in which NGOs flourish.
Unfortunately, however, in many countries this development potential
is largely suppressed by the multiplication of obstacles impeding access to
funding for NGOs posed by authorities, including restrictive legal frame –
works and smear campaigns.
In addition, this development potential is also affected by the global
economic crisis that reduces funding possibilities for the associative sector,
notably at national level, where grants are often negligible. As a result,
many NGOs seek financial support from foreign donors, who are them –
selves also affected by the crisis. But in many countries what should be a
straightforward process between donors and recipients is transformed into
repressive State control that seeks purely and simply to stifle NGOs by
partially or completely cutting off their funding.
The repression of human rights defenders can take many forms, ranging
from administrative harassment and extrajudicial executions to arrest
and torture amongst others – human rights violations that often attract
unwelcome global attention to offending States in search of international
recognition. The repression of defenders acting within the framework of
an NGO can entail more devious restrictions affecting access to both local
and foreign funding. Rather than simply ban an NGO considered hostile to
the regime and thus risk incurring a high political cost, many States mul –
tiply obstacles to block access to funding, especially from external sources.
In so doing, they draw on a sophisticated arsenal of restrictive legal, admin –
istrative or practical measures that are less visible than other forms of
human rights abuses, and therefore are less likely to incite international
condemnation.

8
OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
Certain States also resort to using their vast repertor y of defamator y
tactics whereby defenders are labelled “foreign agents” manipulated by
cross-border entities necessarily regarded as hostile to the government,
or “subversive” elements, or are accused of associating with “terrorists” or
committing other offences, including criminal acts, allegations intended to
discredit them in the public eye. These tactics not only endanger defenders
but also often have a pernicious impact on access to funding for NGOs.
In a historical and political environment that is witnessing the overthrow
of authoritarian regimes and the emergence of popular calls for democratic
governance, it is not surprising that some States are adopting a nationalist,
xenophobic or anti-Western stance in order to demonise foreign funding
of NGOs. As they persist in refusing to accept any questioning of their
political system as well as the legitimate demands of human rights NGOs,
repressive regimes are creating and maintaining an amalgam between
defenders and political opponents.
But these restrictions on access to funding, which are more or less embed –
ded in national legislation, together with the defamatory manoeuvres of
States that often rely on pro-government media, contravene international
law and the obligations of States. As stated earlier, access to funding for
NGOs is a right, and any State applying restrictions on the exercise of
that right that are unjustifiable under international law are in violation
of the latter. Restrictions on this right to funding are indissociable from
those that impede the right to freedom of association because the former
is a component of the latter.
The right of NGOs to access funding is as valid as the right of individu –
als to benefit from the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, and
all NGOs should be free to solicit, obtain and use resources as they see
fit, except confirmation of any suspected malpractice or criminal activity.
Because NGOs have both rights and responsibilities, and the exercise of
freedom of association entails respect for the basic rights enshrined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the pursuit of such activi –
ties by peaceful means. States have a legitimate right to counter activities
that endanger security or that are contrary to the public interest, but the
measures put in place should not be transformed into a pervasive system
of preventive control that affects all human rights NGOs.
However, an analysis of the different forms of criminalisation of funding
for NGOs shows that in many countries the fight against terrorism and
money laundering is instrumentalised by authorities to neutralise NGOs
and silence critics. The funding restrictions mainly target national NGOs
engaged in the promotion and protection of civil and political rights, but

9
2013 ANNU AL REPORT
also affect some national branches of international NGOs. In addition,
the impact of funding restrictions is not only noticeable in the activities
of national NGOs, but also affects the regional and international solidarity
networks of human rights NGOs.
The capacity of NGOs to obtain funds obviously pre-supposes that
these entities exist, and therefore that freedom of association is respected.
An over view of the state of the associative sector shows, however, that
this right is violated in a flagrant manner in many countries. W hether
the denial of the right of association stems from an outright ban or a
more oblique approach such as the application of dilator y, expensive or
overly bureaucratic registration procedures, the outcome is almost always
the same: a violation of the right to access funding. Consequently, any
analysis of the multifaceted restrictions that impede access to funding and
the formulation of effective responses should necessarily take into account
constraints affecting freedom of association.
But the institutional, legal and practical responses aimed at resolving the
problem of barriers blocking access to funding are still in their infancy,
both with regard to intergovernmental organisations for the protection of
human rights and the entities mainly affected, namely NGOs, as well as
foreign donors confronted by laws that criminalise their grants.
It is imperative that States realise that restrictions on access to funding
are not to be equated with accessory control measures or other possible
forms of legitimate and legal regulation, but represent a blatant violation
of the right to freedom of association. A State that is offended by the
arbitrary banning of an NGO in a third country must be able to condemn
with equal vigour any impediment to access funding, as the two transgres –
sions are essentially part of the same problem: the violation of the right to
freedom of association.
The climate of international solidarity that characterised the work of
human rights NGOs around a common vision of promoting compliance
with these rights has given way to doubt and suspicion. States that practice
such restrictions must radically transform their perception and treatment
of this issue: this entails moving from a system wherein the State assumes
the right to control access to funding to one wherein the State fulfils its
obligation to support, directly or indirectly, the funding of civil society
activities – no more, no less. This radical change of course implies that
States recognise the crucial role played in society by NGOs to ensure better
compliance with international law. And this can only be achieved if donors
and human rights defenders work together with the States concerned.

10
OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
This report is based on the experience of partner organisations of the
Obser vator y for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, on their
responses to a questionnaire on this issue, and on the Observatory’s daily
work in support of defenders. It provides a detailed picture of this as
yet little studied problem, the growing dimension of which is a worrying
concern. While recalling the legal basis of the right of access to funding,
as well as its organic relationship with the right to freedom of association
and the embryonic jurisprudence on this subject, the report stimulates deep
reflection on the negative impacts of these restrictive measures and makes
concrete recommendations to all stakeholders – beneficiaries, donors,
governments and intergovernmental organisations working on the protec –
tion of human rights.

11
C HA P T E R I
T H E RI G HT OF NG OS TO ACC ESS
F UN DI NG, IN C LU DI NG FOR E IGN
F UN DI NG – IN T E R N AT I O N A L
A N D R EG IO N A L INS TR U M EN T S
OBS ERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION O F HUM AN RIGHTS DEFE NDER S 2013 ANNUAL REP ORT
A. Access to funding: a component of freedom of association
The right to freedom of association, along with the right to freedom of
expression, opinion and peaceful reunion, is enshrined in all international
and regional human rights instruments. It plays a vital role in the exercise
of many other rights, such as civil, cultural, economic, political and social
rights. Because of this interdependence, it is a valuable indicator of the
extent to which a State respects the enjoyment of many other human
rights.
Access to funds and resources is essential for NGOs, and is an inte –
gral component of the right to freedom of association. Without funding,
NGOs obviously cannot effectively engage in the defence and promotion
of human rights.
Many human rights bodies and special procedures, particularly those
within the United Nations system, have emphasised the principle that
access to funding is an integral part of the right to freedom of associa –
tion, and that NGOs should have free access to funds, including foreign
funds.
International level
The right to freedom of association is a fundamental and universal right
enshrined in numerous international treaties and standards, especially
Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). In its Communication No. 1274/2004, the United Nations
Human Rights Committee (CCPR) observed: “ The right to freedom of
association relates not only to the right to form an association, but also
guarantees the right of such an association freely to carry out its statutory
activities. The protection afforded by article 22 extends to all activities

12
OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
of an association […].” 1 This means that fundraising activities are also
protected by Article 22.
Moreover, under its Convention No. 87 on the Freedom of Association
and Protection of the Right to Organise, adopted nearly 20 years before
the ICCPR, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) also recog –
nised this right. Although the Convention protects freedom of association
from a trade union perspective and essentially advocates for the defence of
trade unionists, it constitutes a reference instrument of international law.
The Convention states: “ Workers’ and employers’ organisations shall have
the right to […] organise their administration and activities and to for –
mulate their programmes.” It also stipulates: “The public authorities shall
refrain from any interference which would restrict this right or impede the
lawful exercise thereof ” (Articles 3.1 and 3.2). This right of trade unions
to manage their own affairs as they see fit implicitly includes the right to
determine their mode of financing.
The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and
of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly in 1981 contains the first explicit reference to
the right to access funding. It states: “The right to freedom of thought,
conscience, religion or belief shall include, inter alia, [the right to] solicit
and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals
and institutions” (Article 6f ).
The Declaration on the right and responsibility of individuals, groups
and organs of society to promote and defend universally recognised human
rights and fundamental freedoms (hereafter Declaration on Human Rights
Defenders) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1998
explicitly grants human rights defenders the right to access funding.
Article 13 of this Declaration states: “ Everyone has the right, individu –
ally and in association with others, to solicit, receive and utilize resources
for the express purpose of promoting and protecting human rights and fun –
damental f reedoms through peaceful means, in accordance with article 3 of
the present Declaration ”.
It should be noted that while the Dec laration on Human Rights
Defenders protects the right to solicit, receive and utilize funds, it does
not place restrictions on the sources of the funding (public / private, local /
1 / See CCPR, Communication No. 1274/2004 – Belarus , United Nations (UN) Document CCPR/ C/88/D/1274/2004, November 10, 2006, paragraph 7.2.

13
2013 ANNU AL REPORT
foreign). Therefore, it implicitly includes in its scope the right of NGOs
to access funds from foreign donors. Moreover, the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders emphasised that
the Declaration protects the right to “receive funding from different
sources, including foreign ones 2. The Special Rapporteur, like the Special
Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on the situation of
human rights defenders before her 3, considered that “Governments should
allow access by human rights defenders, in particular non-governmental
organizations, to foreign funding as a part of international cooperation, to
which civil society is entitled to the same extent as Governments” 4.
Moreover, the Special Rapporteur stressed that access to funding “is an
inherent element of the right to freedom of association”, and that “in order
for human rights organizations to be able to carry out their activities, it is
indispensable that they are able to discharge their functions without any
impediments, including funding restrictions” 5.
“! e Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly
and of association took up these recommendations in his “rst report to
the Human Rights Council, and added that “[a]ny associations, both reg –
istered or unregistered, should have the right to seek and secure funding
and resources from domestic, foreign, and international entities, includ –
ing individuals, businesses, civil society organizations, Governments and
international organizations”. He also emphasised that States should not
resort to “scal pressures to discourage association from receiving funds, in
particular foreign funding 6.
States should therefore promote and guarantee the right of NGOs to
access funding – including foreign funding – as an integral part of their
obligation to respect and promote the right to freedom of association.
2 / See UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders , UN Document A/66/203, July 28, 2011, paragraph 70. 3 / See UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights defenders, UN Document A/59/401, October 1, 2004, paragraph 82. 4 / See UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, UN Document A/66/203, July 28, 2011, paragraph 70. 5 / See UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, UN Document A/64/226, August 4, 2009, paragraph 91. 6 / See UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, UN Document A/HRC/20/27, May 21, 2012, paragraphs 67-72.

14
OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
Regional level
At regional level, the right to freedom of association is guaranteed by
Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 10
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 16 of the
American Convention on Human Rights and Article 24.e of the Arab
Charter on Human Rights.
In 2007, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted
a recommendation which established the framework for the legal status
of NGOs in the region. Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)14 devotes a
speci “c section to the question of funding (“Fundraising”), in which it
notably rea #rms the right of NGOs to access funding, without restrictions
regarding its sourcing 7. In addition, it stipulates that “NGOs should be free
to engage in any lawful economic, business or commercial activities in order
to support their not-for-pro “t activities without any special authorisation
being required, but subject to any licensing or regulator y requirements
generally applicable to the activities concerned” 8.
! is recommendation furthermore identi “es facilities that should be
available to NGOs in terms of funding. It states that NGOs with legal
personality should have “access to banking facilities” and bene “t from
assistance in the form of “public funding and other forms of support, such
as exemption from income and other taxes or duties on membership fees,
funds and goods received from donors or governmental and international
agencies” 9.
In 2008, following adoption of the recommendation, the Conference of
NGOs of the Council of Europe created an “Expert Council on NGO
Law” tasked with promoting a favourable environment for NGOs in the
region through the study of national legislation on NGOs, monitoring
implementation, and advocating for respect of Council of Europe norms
and European best practices in relation to NGOs. In its second Annual
Report, the Expert Council noted that in certain member States of the
Council of Europe “the scope of obligations with respect to the audit –
ing of accounts and reporting on activities is not always entirely clear
and may not always be appropriate”, and that “there appears to be some
signi “cant in $uence exercised over NGO decision-making through the
power of authorities to grant or withdraw public funding and through the
7 / See Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)14 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, paragraph 50.8 / Idem , paragraph 14. 9 / Idem , paragraphs 51 and 57.

15
2013 ANNU AL REPORT
participation of o #cials as board members, which does not always seem
to be connected with legitimate public interests related to the regulation
of NGOs”. Consequently, “[…] there is a need to ensure that the scope of
obligations relating to the auditing of accounts and reporting on activities
is clari “ed and does not place an undue burden on NGOs” and “[…] public
authorities should not use their powers to grant or withdraw funding or
the participation of o #cials in meetings of NGO decision-making bodies
to exercise undue in $uence on the decisions being taken by NGOs” 10.
It should also be noted that the O #ce for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) has produced an interactive guide on freedom of asso –
ciation entitled “AssociatiOnline”, which lists the international norms and
basic principles regarding this fundamental right. AssociatiOnline also
compiles existing case law on this subject and presents examples of good
practices in legislation on NGOs in the OSCE region 11.
Staying at the European level, the European Union “G uidelines
on Human Rights Defenders” refer to the issue of foreign funding of
NGOs active in countries where EU diplomatic missions are present.
! e Guidelines propose that missions adopt concrete measures in support
of defenders, in particular in the framework of the EU development policy.
! ey recommend that missions strive to “ensure that human rights defend –
ers in third countries have access to resources, including funding, from
abroad and that they are informed of the availability of resources and the
means to secure them” (paragraph 14).
For its par t, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR),
which has ruled on several cases of restrictions on access to funding from
abroad, notably in its two reports on the situation of human rights defend –
ers, considers that “One of the State’s duties stemming from freedom of
association is to refrain from restricting the means of “nancing of human
rights organizations” 12.
10 / See Council of Europe, Expert Council on NGO Law, Second annual report on the internal governance of non-governmental organizations, January 2010, paragraphs 388, 389, 397 and 398. 11 / See https://associationline.org for further information on challenges identified by the ODIHR in terms of funding of NGOs.12 / See IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas , Document OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66, December 31, 2011, paragraph 179.

16
OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)
also expressed its concern on the issue of funding for NGOs. ! e Special
Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights Defenders in Africa notably
recommended that States “[…] continue providing both “nancial and
material support to Human Rights Defenders to facilitate the realization
of their mandate of human rights promotion and protection in Africa” 13.
B. Financial support to NGOs: a primary responsibility of the State
W ith the adoption of the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders
and the increasing focus on obstacles faced by NGOs in their work to
promote and protect fundamental freedoms, the issue of access to foreign
funding has become more pressing. ! is situation, as well as the numerous
complaints submitted by NGOs a %ected by restrictive practices or laws
hampering United Nations institutions or treaty bodies, has prompted the
latter to adopt decisions, opinions or recommendations on this matter.
! ese measures are not limited to defending the right to access funding,
including foreign funding, but also re $ect the growing sophistication of
the means used by States to limit the exercise of this right and to silence
the daily work of NGOs.
! e Declaration on Human Rights Defenders outlines the responsibility
of the State to adopt the necessary measures “[…] to ensure that all persons
under its jurisdiction are able to enjoy all social, economic, political and
other rights and freedoms in practice” (Article 2). However, the reference
to “economic conditions” is very general.
Article 13 of the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders 14 must there –
fore be read in conjunction with Article 12.2 of the said Declaration,
which stipulates the following: “ ! e State shall take all necessary measures
to ensure the protection by the competent authorities of everyone, indi –
vidually and in association with others, against […] arbitrary action as a
consequence of his or her legitimate exercise of the rights referred to in
the present Declaration”, and in light of the more general law on freedom
of association.
States therefore have a double obligation: on the one hand, the negative
obligation to refrain from interference in access to funding, and on the
other hand, the positive obligation to establish a legal and administrative
framework as well as a practice that facilitate access to and the use of

13 / See ACHPR, Intersession Report, November 2011 – April 2012, paragraph 50. 14 / See above.

17
2013 ANNU AL REPORT
such funding by NGOs. ! is analysis is re $ected in the jurisprudence of
numerous United Nations human rights bodies.
On many occasions, United Nations Committees have stressed the crucial
role that States should play in supporting NGOs directly or indirectly
to access funding, in particular by creating a conducive legal framework,
institutional environment and e %ective practices in this regard. United
Nations Committees have not only denounced cases of $agrant violations
by States parties of the right to freedom of association, such as limit –
ing access to foreign funds or arbitrarily imposing prior authorisations or
excessive taxes on NGOs. More generally, they have also reminded States
of the importance of “nancial support for institutions and organisations
active in the promotion and protection of human rights.
In this regard, for example, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) called on Ireland to “nancially support human
rights organisations in the country 15. Similarly, the Committee on the
Rights of the Child (CRC) recommended that the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC) “[…] encourage the active and systematic involvement
of civil society, including NGOs, by providing “nancial assistance […]” 16,
and that Malawi “[…] provide civil society organizations, including NGOs,
with adequate “nancial and other resources to enable them to contribute
to the implementation of the Convention” 17.
! e Committee against Torture (CAT ) recommended that Belarus
acknowledge the “crucial role”  played by NGOs and that it “[…] enable
them to seek and receive adequate funding to carr y out their peaceful
human rights activities” 18.
! e Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW ) recommended that Lithuania “develop clear criteria for render –
ing and ensuring sustained and su #cient governmental “nancial support at
the national and local level for the work of women’s NGOs to increase their
15 / See CERD, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: – Ireland , UN Document CERD/C/IRL/CO/2, April 14, 2005, paragraph 12. 16 / See CRC, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child – Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Document CRC/C/COD/CO/2, February 10, 2009, paragraph 25. 17 / See CRC, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child – Malawi , UN Document CRC/C/MWI/CO/2, March 27, 2009, paragraph 25.18 / See CAT, Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture – Belarus, UN Document CAT/C/ BLR/CO/4, December 7, 2011, paragraph 25.

18
OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
capacity to support women’s human rights” 19. It also urged the Netherlands
“[…] to reconsider the funding of organizations working in the “eld of
women’s rights, including organizations of black and migrant women, in
order to contribute in an e #cient manner to the continuing implementation
of the Convention” 20. Finally, it recommended Denmark to “ensure that
an adequate level of funding is made available for the non-governmental
organizations to carry out their work, including to contribute to the work” 21.
! e CRC also emphasised the necessity for NGOs to receive adequate
funding to conduct their activities. It furthermore called on the Central
African Republic to do its utmost to “[…] strengthen the role played by
civil society [through] the provision of support to civil society in accessing
resources […]” 22.
! e IACHR considered that States “[…] should allow and facilitate
human rights organizations’ access to foreign funds in the context of inter –
national cooperation, in transparent conditions” 23, and, more generally, that
they should “[…] respect this right without any restrictions that go beyond
those allowed by the right to freedom of association 24”.
! ese few examples illustrate the importance the Committees and the
IACHR attach to the responsibility of States to promote funding for
NGOs. ! ey con “rm that respect for the right of freedom of associa –
tion entails support for a conducive environment in terms of access to
funding, including from abroad, as well as respect for NGOs to manage
their funding strategies free from interference by authorities.
! e right of civil society organisations to manage and use their “nancial
resources as they see “t to conduct their activities has also been recognised
as applicable to unions. ! us, according to the Committee on Freedom of
Association of the ILO: “It is for the organizations themselves to decide
whether they shall receive funding for legitimate activities to promote and
19 / See CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women – Lithuania, UN Document CEDAW/C/LTU/CO/4, July 8, 2008, paragraph 83. 20 / See CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women – Netherlands, UN Document CEDAW/C/NLD/CO/5, February 5, 2010, paragraph 21. 21 / See CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination – Denmark , UN Document CERD/C/DNK/CO/18, August 27, 2010, paragraph 43. 22 / See CRC, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child – Central African Republic , UN Document CRC/C/15/Add.138, October 18, 2000, paragraphs 22 and 23. 23 / See IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas , Document OEA/ Ser.L/V/II.124 Doc. 5 rev.17, March 2006, recommendation 19.24 / See IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas , Document OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66, December 31, 2011, paragraph 186.

19
2013 ANNU AL REPORT
defend human rights and trade union rights”. ! e Committee found that:
“Provisions which give the authorities the right to restrict the freedom of
a trade union to administer and utilize its funds as it wishes for normal
and lawful trade union purposes are incompatible with the principles of
freedom of association” 25.
C. Elimination of obstacles to access to funding: a requirement
of the right to freedom of association
Several human rights bodies have called for the elimination of obstacles
to access to funding by NGOs.
Restrictions on foreign funding
IACHR has de “ned its position regarding cases where there are special
funds managed by government international cooperation agencies for col –
lecting monies received in the context of international cooperation. In some
cases local NGOs receiving funds from abroad have to register with such
government agencies, give them advance notice of funding received (public
and private), and align their action programmes on national development
priorities laid down by the government. In such cases, IACHR considers
that the right to freedom of association includes the right for NGOs to
set in motion “their internal structure, activities and action programme,
without any inter vention by the public authorities that could limit or
impair the exercise of the respective right, regardless of whether the goals
they are pursuing are being carried out with foreign or domestic funding” 26.
IACHR also considers that defenders should be able to exercise the right
to freedom of association and ful “l their own objectives, with both national
and international funding 27.
! e United Nations Committees have not only condemned restrictive
legislation on foreign funding, but also taken a stand on upstream attempts
to restrict access to such funding. In January 2011, for instance, CEDAW
warned Israel against a plan to set up a parliamentar y commission to
investigate the foreign funding of Israeli NGOs. ! e purpose of the ini –
tiative was to silence NGOs that had denounced acts committed by the
army, in particular during Israel’s military o %ensive against the Gaza Strip
in December 2008-January 2009 28. CEDAW called on the authorities
25 / See ILO, Freedom of association – Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO. Fifth (revised) edition, 2006, paragraphs 494 and 485. 26 / See IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas , Document OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66, December 31, 2011, paragraph 183. 27 / Idem. 28 / For further information, see Chapter 4.

20
OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
to “ensure that civil society organizations and women’s non-governmen –
tal organizations are not restricted with respect to their establishment
and operations and that they are able to function independently of the
government ” 29.
Restrictions on the type of activity financed by foreign funding
! e United Nations Committees also addressed the question of restric –
tions imposed on NGOs concerning programmes speci “cally “nanced
through foreign funding. In the case of Turkmenistan, for instance,
CEDAW deplored restrictions imposed on NGOs, in particular regard –
ing programmes and projects “nanced by foreign donors. It also urged
the authorities “to provide an enabling and conducive environment for
the establishment and active involvement of women’s and human rights
organizations in enhancing the implementation of the Convention in the
State party” 30.
Prior authorisation, control of foreign grants and freezing
of bank accounts
Several United Nations Committees have taken a stand on the issue
of prior authorisation being required for receiving and using funds from
abroad.
CCPR , for instance, expressed concern that failure to obtain prior
authorisation from the authorities could lead to criminal prosecution.
It considers that NGOs should be able “to discharge their functions
without impediments which are inconsistent with the provisions of article
22 [freedom of association] of the Covenant, such as prior authorization,
funding controls and administrative dissolution” 31. It called on Egypt to
review its legislation and practice accordingly.
! e question of the obligation to obtain prior authorisation was also
addressed by CRC, which recommended, inter alia, that Nepal should
“remove all legal, practical and administrative obstacles to the free func –
tioning of [NGOs]” 32.
29 / See CEDAW, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women – Israel , UN Document CEDAW/C/ISR/CO/5, April 5, 2011, paragraph 51. 30 / See CEDAW, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women – Turkmenistan , UN Document CEDAW/C/TKM/CO/3-4, unedited version, October 24, 2012. 31 / See CCPR, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee – Egypt , UN Document CCPR/ CO/76/EGY, November 28, 2002, paragraph 21.32 / See CRC, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child – Nepal , UN Document CRC/C/15/Add.261, September 21, 2005, paragraphs 33 and 34.

21
2013 ANNU AL REPORT
D uring consideration of the repor ts submitted by Algeria several
Committees, such as CRC and CEDAW, also noted the potentially restric –
tive impact of the prior authorisation requirement on NGO activities.
CEDAW in particular recommended that the State should “enable the asso –
ciations working on gender equality and empowerment in a developmental
context to receive funding from international donors without unnecessary
administrative requirements, which may impair such activities” 33.
! e Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)
has clearly denounced the incompatibility between ful “lling the obliga –
tion to respect freedom of association and restrictions imposed on NGO
“nancing, concluding that legislation that “gives the Government control
over the right of NGOs to manage their own activities, including seeking
external funding” does not “conform” to Article 8 [on freedom of associa –
tion] of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) 34. It recommended that Eg ypt amend or repeal the
law imposing such controls, which are contrar y to its obligations under
ICESCR (Article 8).
Concerning the freezing of assets, in the case of Ethiopia, for instance,
CESCR “[was] also concerned that the Charities and Societies Agency has
frozen [the] assets of some of those organizations, including the Ethiopian
Women Lawyers Association, forcing them to downsize, close regional
o#ces and suspend some of their ser vices”. CESCR recommended that
the State party “lift the funding restrictions, and unblock all the assets of
local human rights NGOs” 35.
ILO has also made its position clear concerning several cases in which
trade union bank accounts have been frozen. ! e Committee on Freedom
of Association considers that such a measure may constitute “serious inter –
ference” by the authorities in trade union activities 36.
33 / See CEDAW, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women – Algeria , UN Document CEDAW/C/DZA/CO/3-4, March 23, 2012, paragraph 20. 34 / See CESCR, Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – Egypt , UN Document E/C.12/1/Add.44, May 23, 2000, paragraph 19. 35 / See CESCR, Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – Ethiopia , UN Document E/C.12/ETH/CO/1-3, May 31, 2012, paragraph 7. 36 / See ILO, Freedom of association – Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO . Fifth (revised) edition, 2006, paragraph 486.

22
OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
Unfavourable tax regime
! e United Nations Committees have also denounced discriminator y
legislation and tax practices that, far from helping NGOs, aim at penalising
them indirectly for the nature of their activities.
CCPR, for instance, deplored the signi “cant fall in foreign funds received
by NGOs after Russia had reduced the number of international donors eli –
gible for tax exemption. ! e Committee noted that such measures a %ected
enjoyment of the rights a %orded by Articles 19, 21 and 22 of the ICCPR,
and cautioned the State party against “adopting any policy measures that
directly or indirectly restrict or hamper the ability of non-governmental
organizations to operate freely and e %ectively” 37.
Several Committees also drew attention to the prejudicial consequences
of the absence of favourable tax regimes for NGOs, in view of the special
nature of the work they carry out in the public interest by helping States
to promote and protect human rights, in accordance with their obligations
under international and regional instruments, and where applicable, the
relevant constitutions and charters.
CRC, for instance, was concerned that commercial entities and non-
profit organisations were subjected to the same tax regime. It urged
Bosnia-Herzegovina “to consider according civil society and NGOs a
more conducive context for their work, inter alia , through funding and
lower tax rates” 38.
IACHR , for its part, considers that respect for freedom of association
requires that human rights organisations be exempted from taxation.
Noting that the bene “t of tax exemption is often subject to the discretion
of the authorities, it believes that “those bene “ts should be clearly de “ned
in laws or programs and should be administered with no discrimination
whatsoever” 39.
37 / See CCPR, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee – Russian Federation , UN Document CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6, November 24, 2009, paragraph 27.38 / See CRC, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child – Bosnia and Herzegovina , UN Document CRC/C/BIH/CO/2-4, November 29, 2012, paragraph 26. 39 / See IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas , Document OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66, December 31, 2011, paragraph 187.

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
Funding restrictions on contributions from foreign donors
! e United Nations Committees have also taken a stand on the ques –
tion of a maximum percentage being put on foreign funding in the total
budget of NGOs.
When in January 2009 Ethiopia passed a law that, inter alia , placed
a 10% limit on the foreign funding of national NGOs 40, s e ve r a l
Committees (CAT, CEDAW, CERD, CESCR) condemned the measure
and unanimously called on Ethiopia to abolish such restrictions 41. More
speci “cally, CESCR noted with concern that “certain provisions of the
Charities and Societies Proclamation (No. 621/2009) have had a pro –
found obstructive e %ect on the operation of human rights organizations”.
It recommended that the State party “amend [that] Proclamation […],
with a view to omitting provisions restricting the work of human rights
organizations and lifting the funding restrictions” 42.
D. Limits to a fundamental right: admissible restrictions
! e right to freedom of association, including the right to have access
to funding, is not absolute, and may be limited in accordance with the
criteria speci “ed in ICCPR, Article 22.2. While certain restrictions may
be imposed, it should be emphasised that freedom should be the rule, and
restrictions the exception.
! e only restrictions admissible under ICCPR are those “which are
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security or public safety, public order ( ordre public ),
the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others” (Article 22.2).
In its General Comment No. 27 (1999), CCPR s t i p u l a t e d t h a t
“in adopting laws providing for restrictions […] States should always be
guided by the principle that the restrictions must not impair the essence
of the right […]; the relation between right and restriction, between norm
40 / See Chapters 2 and 3. 41 / See CAT, Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture – Ethiopia, UN Document CAT/C/ETH/CO/1, January 20, 2011, paragraph 34; CEDAW, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women – Ethiopia, UN Document CEDAW/C/ETH/CO/6-7, July 27, 2011; CERD, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination – Ethiopia , UN Document CERD/C//ETH/CO/7-16, September 8, 2009, paragraph 14; CESCR, Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – Ethiopia , UN Document E/C.12/ ETH/CO/1-3, May 31, 2012, paragraph 7.42 / See CESCR, Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – Ethiopia , UN Document E/C.12/ETH/CO/1-3, May 31, 2012, paragraph 7.

24
OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
and exception, must not be reversed”. When, therefore, States contemplate
a restriction of such rights, they must be sure to comply with the above
conditions. Any restriction must therefore be motivated by one of the
interests speci “ed, be on “rm legal grounds (i.e. imposed “in accordance
with the law”, which implies that the law must be accessible and that it is
su#ciently precisely worded), and be “necessary in a democratic society”.
In its Communication No. 1119/2002, CCPR stressed that “the exist –
ence of any reasonable and objective justi “cation for limiting the freedom
of association is not su #cient. ! e State Party must further demonstrate
that the prohibition of the association and the criminal prosecution of
individuals for membership in such organizations are in fact necessary to
avert a real, and not only hypothetical danger to the national security or
democratic order and that less intrusive measures would be insu #cient to
achieve this purpose” 43.
Reacting to the criminalisation of defenders belonging to organisations
receiving funds from abroad, IACHR has also taken a stand on admissible
restrictions to access to funding. It concluded that “the right to receive
international funds in the context of international cooperation for the
defence and promotion of human rights is protected by freedom of associa –
tion, and the State is obligated to respect this right without any restrictions
that go beyond those allowed by the right to freedom of association” 44.
Furthermore, as pointed out by the Special Rapporteur on the rights to
freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, while some restrictions
to access to foreign funding may be legitimate in the context of the “ght
against money-laundering and terrorism, “this should never be used as a
justi “cation to undermine the credibility of the concerned association,
nor to unduly impede its legitimate work” 45. He recommended that States
should use alternative mechanisms, such as banking laws and criminal laws
that prohibit acts of terrorism, as long they conform to international human
rights legislation, including the principle of legality, and include e %ective
guarantees of respect for the right to freedom of association 46.
43 / See CCPR, Communication No. 1119/2002: Republic of Korea. 23/08/ 2005, UN Document CCPR/ C/84/D/1119/2002, August 23, 2005, paragraph 7.2.44 / See IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas , Document OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66, December 31, 2011, paragraph 186.45 / See UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai , UN Document A/HRC/20/27, May 21, 2012, paragraph 94. 46 / Idem.

25
2013 ANNU AL REPORT
! e Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders has
upheld the same position . While noting that “there may be various reasons
for a Government to restrict foreign funding, including the prevention of
money-laundering and terrorist “nancing, or increasing the e %ectiveness
of foreign aid” 47, s h e s t r e s s e d t h a t “ i n m a n y c a s e s s u c h j u s t i “cations are
merely rhetorical and the real intention of Governments is to restrict the
ability of human rights organizations to carry out their legitimate work in
defence of human rights” 48.
And indeed, as this report purports to analyse and illustrate, in a large
number of countries the authorities misuse such legitimate reasons to
impose restrictions.
47 / See UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders , UN Document A/64/226, August 4, 2009, paragraph 94. 48 / Idem.

26
C HA P T E R II
F R EE DOM OF A SS OCIATIO N:
A N ESSEN TIA L P R E CO N DITIO N
FOR NG O ACC ESS TO F UN DI NG
OBS ERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION O F HUM AN RIGHTS DEFE NDER S 2013 ANNUAL REP ORT
Respect for the right to freedom of association is an essential precon –
dition for human rights defenders to be able to solicit, receive and use
funding for their work of promoting and protecting fundamental rights.
Defenders and NGOs must be able to enjoy the right to operate legally
in the country in which they carry out their activities and to decide what
form their organization will take. The issue of access to funding is closely
linked to the legal recognition of NGOs, to the various forms of authorisa –
tion and registration, and to the possible existence of obstacles to the life
of an association.
However, NGO access to funding is fraught with a great many chal –
lenges, in both legal and practical terms. Whether the problem is one of
the complexity or the slowness of registration procedures, arbitrary appli –
cation of the law, exclusion of certain areas of NGO activities or those
who benefit from them, obstacles to opening a bank account, or, what is
more serious, the criminalisation of some organisations, defenders are faced
with a multitude of restrictions – implicit or explicit, legal or practical –
that undermine their right and ability to finance themselves. This chapter
looks at the legal framework and the practices of certain States relating to
freedom of association, which affect the ability of NGOs to exercise their
right to solicit, receive and use funding.
The right to freedom of association is generally defined as the right to
associate with other individuals and entities in the pursuit of a common
interest. As mentioned previously 1, the right to freedom of association is
firmly anchored in positive law, at international as well as regional and
national level. It is enshrined in ICCPR Article 22, which stipulates that
“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others,
1 / See Chapter 1.

27
2013 ANNU AL REPORT
including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his
interests”. Article 5 of the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders is
even more specific:  “Everyone has the right, individually and in association
with others, at the national and international levels: to meet or assemble
peacefully; to form, join and participate in non-governmental organiza –
tions, associations or groups; to communicate with non-governmental or
intergovernmental organizations”. Everyone therefore has the right to form
or to join an association, organisation or group to collectively express,
promote, work for and defend human rights. The right to freedom of
association includes the right to form any legal group or body, independ –
ently and free from any interference by the authorities.
Admissible restrictions to the exercise of this right are clearly identified
in positive law. The only restrictions admissible are those “prescribed by
law” and that are “necessary in a democratic society” 2. I n d e e d , d e m o c r a c y,
which is founded on the pre-eminence of the rule of law, presupposes the
respect and protection of human rights defenders. The right to freedom of
association may only be restricted in relation to the legitimate interests of a
State to protect its citizens’ rights. As a result, the criteria to be met to limit
this right are very restrictive. Yet, in many countries, the authorities distort
and misuse the notion of “admissible restrictions” in order to justify repres –
sive policies, at the same time maintaining a gloss of apparent legitimacy.
Although the constitutions of most States guarantee the right to freedom
of association, many countries limit exercise of the right through restrictive
and ambiguous provisions, or provisions that go beyond legally permitted
restrictions. In addition, administrative or judicial authorities often delib –
erately misinterpret the reasons for restrictions. An adverse context (for
example, a climate of insecurity, a situation of armed conflict or political
crisis) is also likely to be an obstacle to enjoyment of this right. A growing
number of countries prefer to use illiberal laws or abusive administrative
procedures, which are also contrar y to the obligations and the spirit of
international human rights norms, to restrict the work of the NGOs, rather
than simply banning them.
In this way, many States use a variety of measures to restrict freedom
of association, such as banning informal groups; establishing complex,
inaccessible and ill-defined registration procedures; using discretionary or
discriminatory practices in the recognition of freedom of association; and
interfering in the functioning of associations. All these obstacles, applied
2 / Idem .

28
OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
separately or together, often undermine freedom of association and, directly
or indirectly, affect the ability of NGOs to access funding to carry out their
work of promotion and protection of human rights.
A. Banning of informal groups
Members of associations must be free to carry out their activities, either
within the framework of an informal structure, or within the frame –
work of a formal structure with a legal status.
The right to freedom of association makes no distinction between formal
and informal groups and is applicable to both types. The founders of an
association are free to decide whether or not to register their NGO with
the competent authorities in order to obtain legal status. Defenders should
have the right to form groups in order to carry out legal activities, without
the obligation to register as legal entities, in accordance with ICCPR
Article 22 and Article 5 of the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders.
NGOs sometimes decide not to register formally for different reasons,
for example so as not to be subjected to pressure – or even repression –
by illiberal authorities, or to avoid a complex registration procedure that
will inevitably become bogged down, or because their structure is not
yet stable. Finally, the difficulty or the cost of the registration process in
some countries is not suited to the infrastructure of an association, as in
the case of small associations that have very limited resources. Failure to
register may turn out to be particularly problematic when access to funding
is made impossible by the lack of legal status. In some situations it also
means that NGOs may not enjoy certain privileges, such as tax deductions
or exemptions, for example.
Furthermore, some countries require organisations to be formally regis –
tered to be entitled to carry out their work. The insistence of some govern –
ments that all groups must register- whatever their size or their degree
of sophistication – is evidence of their desire to systematically control all
NGO activities and screen groups that are likely to criticize their human
rights record. The obligation to register is frequently accompanied by the
adoption of laws that criminalise the activities of unregistered groups, as,
for example, in Algeria , Bahrain , Belarus , Burma , Egypt , Uganda and
Syria . This criminalisation is one of the most disturbing trends and has
the greatest impact on defenders. In some cases, criminal penalties can be
up to seven years imprisonment, accompanied by high fines. This kind of
criminalisation is all the more problematic because it violates the right to
solicit and obtain funding. Incidentally, it also discourages potential donors,
precisely as often unregistered NGOs only survive thanks to such funding,

29
2013 ANNU AL REPORT
including from abroad. In these countries, organisations are therefore
doubly vulnerable. Furthermore, this type of criminalisation puts current
and possible future donors in a difficult position, since it bans them from
indirectly funding unregistered NGOs, and carries the threat of possible
acts of punishment.
The requirement to register, coupled with the ban on carr ying out a
broad range of activities 3 and extremely harsh penalties, results in asso –
ciations being considerable vulnerable in many countries. This repressive
environment obviously has an extremely dissuasive effect on the creation of
new NGOs. It is equivalent to a serious violation of the right to freedom
of association and, by the same token, undermines the foundations of the
right of access to funding.
B. Notification or registration? Procedures for constitution are
complex and inaccessible
The constitution of an association should be subject to a system of notif i –
cation. The procedure for creating an association should be simple, easily
accessible, non-discriminatory and inexpensive, or even free. In the case
of compulsory registration, reasons must be given for any rejection, and
the bodies that take the decision must provide detailed, written justif i –
cation within a reasonable time. Associations should be able to contest
rejection before an impartial, independent tribunal.
The granting of legal status to an NGO enables it to increase its ability
to act and its impact. A registered NGO may, for example, rent offices,
employ staff, benefit from tax breaks, seize the courts and open an account
in the name of the association so that it may receive subsidies. It is vital for
many NGOs to be able to have a bank account, as some funding bodies
only subsidise registered associations. In addition, without legal status,
NGOs may not, for example, register for international cooperation funding
programmes or maintain official relations with national authorities .
Two types of system are applied to civil society organisations that wish
to acquire legal status: the so-called simple “notification” system and the
system of “prior authorisation”.
The most liberal legislations have provision for the notification system,
also called the system of “declaration”. Under this regime associations auto –
matically have legal status as soon as the authorities are notified by the
3 / See above.

30
OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
founder members. It is not a prerequisite for the creation of an association,
but a communication that enables the administration to take note of its
constitution.
The declaration procedure is preferable to other forms of registration.
However, although it is apparently simple, this procedure may sometimes
be misapplied by an over-scrupulous bureaucracy or one that makes exces –
sive use of its discretionary powers.
v In Mexico , civil society organisations may register as a civil association by making
a declaration to the public register of legal entities. This system of declaration
nevertheless obliges NGOs to follow a complex procedure that generally ends only
after several months. The NGO must register its name and its business name and file
its statutes with a notary public, before registering with the Federal District Chamber
of Commerce, then as a legal entity with the Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit,
which finally issues the inscription on the federal register of tax payers in the form
of a unique inscription code ( Clave Única de Inscripción – CLUNI). Although inscrip –
tion on the public register is not compulsory for the NGO to be able to operate, it
is nonetheless essential to be able to access public and private funding or to open
a bank account.
The complexity of the notification procedure that is common in some
countries can delay official recognition of the creation of an NGO and
directly affect the availability of resources necessary for its work.
Unfortunately, the system of notification does not always lead to the
successful conclusion of the accreditation procedures. In some countries –
and for some NGOs – the obstructionism of the authorities corresponds
to a blunt rejection and violates the right of NGOs to their legal existence.
v In Venezuela , associations are subject to a simple system of declaration and are
only required to file their act of constitution with the Public Registration Office in
the town where they have been set up. Although the law makes no provision for
any formal restriction on the registration of associations, in practice, especially
since 2000, several have been faced with discretionary, arbitrary rulings by the
authorities.
For example, the Forum for Life ( Foro por la Vida ), a Venezuelan leading network
created in 1997 and formed of around twenty human rights NGOs, has since 2009
followed all the procedures required to register officially with the Public Registration
Office, with no result to date.

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
v This is also the case in Cambodia where, despite the existence of a system of
declaration, the Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC) has been
waiting to be registered since 2000.
In the system of prior authorisation, on the other hand, association
members must wait for the competent public body to make a ruling on a
request for registration. In general, the authorities are required to rule on
a request within a reasonable period. In the meantime, the administrative
authority may grant a temporary registration certificate.
Refusal to register constitutes one of the main obstacles to the right
to freedom of association and, for many human rights NGOs, represents
the most extreme measure taken by governments to erode this right. The
consequences of a refusal to register are even worse in the case when
activities carried out by non-registered bodies result in criminal penalties.
In some countries, the public authorities refuse to issue a receipt, or even
to accept registration documents. An authority frequently takes its time to
make a decision concerning the request and delays can be extremely long.
Non-respect of the obligation to register is sometimes punished by a fine
(for example in Nepal ). However, in many countries the laws provide for
prison sentences, as in Belarus for example (from six months to two years
in the case of a repeated offence), in Algeria (from three to six months),
in Bahrain (up to six months) and in Egypt (up to one year in prison).
v In the Syrian Arab Republic , Law No. 93 of 1958 on associations and institutions
requires all organisations to obtain permission to register from the Ministry of
Social Affairs and Labour. Any organisation set up without prior authorisation may
be penalised by the Criminal Code, which contains multiple provisions to repress
numerous activities that human rights organizations are likely to carry out, and
which the authorities use arbitrarily. The Criminal Code in particular provides for
imprisonment or house arrest for between three months and three years for the
members of political and social organisations of an “international nature”.
In some countries, legislation establishes an explicit relationship between
the “illegality” of an NGO (in other words its failure to register) and the
criminalisation of members who contribute to its funding.
v In Burma , where a prior authorisation registration system is in force, the 1908
Unlawful Associations Act provides for prison sentences of between two to three
years and a fine for people who are members of an “illegal association” and who
take part in its meetings, contribute to its funding or participate in any way in its
activities (Article 17).

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
In addition, a complex procedure, the arbitrary nature of the examination
of the application for registration and the cost of the procedure may be
serious obstacles to NGO activities. Many NGOs are affected by frequently
unwieldy administration, coupled with ill-defined registration procedures.
The slowness of registration procedures mean that NGOs that apply for
official authorisation may not operate legally during the waiting period,
and if they do they defy the law at their own risk and peril. W hile the
application is being considered, it is therefore practically impossible, and
even dangerous, to solicit and obtain financial support, especially from
foreign donors.
In some countries, associations sometimes wait for several years before
receiving a response to their application for registration. In Rwanda,
for example, organisations must wait patiently, in some cases for several
months, before receiving a reply from the Rwandan Governance Board
and obtaining the legal status that is essential to be able to carry out their
activities legally and fund themselves.
Even when they receive a negative response, many NGOs are not
informed of the reasons for rejection, although this should be given in
detail in writing within a reasonable period of time.
v In Algeria , the new Law No. 12-06 on Associations, adopted on January 12, 2012,
replaces the system of simple notification with compulsory prior authorisation.
It provides that the NGO should obtain prior agreement from the Communal Popular
Assembly, the Wilaya or the Interior Ministry, depending on the territorial level at
which the association is created (Article 7).
On October 29, 2012, the National Association for the Fight against Corruption
(Association nationale de lutte contre la corruption – ANLC) was informed of the
Interior Ministry’s refusal to issue a registration receipt, equivalent to accreditation
of the association, without giving any reason for the refusal, although the law pro –
vides that reasons for the decision are required (Article 10). Formal notification of
the refusal merely refers to “non-respect of the Law on Associations”, with no other
information, therefore preventing the ANLC from either correcting its application or
contesting the refusal before a court.
In some cases, approval for an application for registration is not only
deferred, but is arbitrarily rejected. In Belarus , for example, human rights
NGOs regularly encounter rejection of their registration applications,
making them vulnerable to criminal penalties if they still continue their
activities. These regular rejections have come following the authorities’
closure of several associations in 2003-2004.

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
For defenders who have managed to overcome registration problems,
other obstacles may arise later on. In several countries, the law has been
changed in order to extend the discretionary powers of the authorities, in
particular by requiring NGOs that are already registered and operational
to re-register, or by imposing an even more restrictive system of authorisa –
tion. Bureaucratisation of the procedure and the increase in the number of
levels of authorisation slow down the authorisation procedure and paralyse
NGO activities. They find themselves in an administrative limbo in which
their status is vague. This situation is obviously highly detrimental to their
ability to solicit and obtain funding.
In some countries, in fact, NGOs are forced to re-register. Re-registration
may be periodic, as in Uganda (yearly) or in Burma (every two years), or
introduced when a new law is adopted, or in reaction to a change in an
NGO mandate (as in Tajikistan ). Compulsor y re-registration gives the
authorities the opportunity to place obstacles in the way of the opera –
tions of groups whose activities they do not approve of, without having to
explicitly ban or dissolve them.
v In Tajikistan , the Law on Public Associations, adopted in 2007, requires existing
NGOs to re-register.
The Association of Young Lawyers “Amparo”, an active member of the Coalition
against Torture, officially registered in 2005, had to re-register in 2007. Furthermore,
as the Law provides that any modification to the association’s charter of constitution
requires it to re-register, in July 2012 the NGO submitted to the Justice Ministry the
documents required for the procedure after it decided to extend its regional mandate
to a national mandate. However, on October 24, 2012, a court in the city of Khujand
ordered the dissolution and closure of Amparo. This legal ruling related to a motion
filed in June 2012 by the Justice Ministry following a civil service audit of Amparo’s
offices in Khujand. This motion accused the organisation of multiple breaches of
its legal and administrative obligations, including the fact that it had changed its
address without re-registering (which is incorrect), and of leading courses on human
rights issues without permission (which is also incorrect, since such courses have
taken place with the agreement of the Ministry of Education and/or local officials).
The organisation’s dissolution therefore appears to be arbitrary. On January 15,
2013, the Sogdiane District Court confirmed the decision to close the organisation
at an appeal hearing.
As this example illustrates, the obligation to re-register gives the authorities
a pretext to suspend the activities of an NGO by refusing its accreditation.
Furthermore, in some countries, as in India for example, NGOs eli –
gible for foreign funding are also required to submit to a re-registration

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
procedure 4. In some cases, the obligation to re-register is coupled with a
complex procedure that requires a report to be submitted that includes an
audit and an annual plan for the next accounting period, as in Nepal , for
example. Non-respect of this administrative requirement leads to progres –
sive monetary penalties.
Imposition of new, periodic registration also contributes to a growing
feeling of insecurity amongst human rights organisations and a climate of
intimidation may be detrimental to their activity planning, and promote
self-censorship.
The cost of the registration procedure may also be a hindrance to the
creation of an NGO.
v In Burma , the process of registration through an authorisation issued by the
Ministry of Internal Affairs may be extremely long and prohibitively expensive: it
starts at municipal level and ends with central government, and involves costs of up
to 500,000 kyat (around 460 euros) – a considerable amount for a small NGO. The
obligation to register is in addition to the criminalisation of unregistered NGOs 5.
The procedures and criteria for being given authorisation are unclear, and the vague
nature of the appeal procedure leaves the NGOs concerned with little room for
manoeuvre to contest the authorities’ decisions.
As the examples above illustrate, the length of the procedure, rejection
of registration, the obligation to re-register (which often comes on top of
allegations of breaking the law) and the dissolution of NGOs are some of
the variants the authorities use to paralyse associations and considerably
undermine their ability to solicit and receive funding.
In some countries, it is all of the above techniques together that prevent
independent human rights organisations to register.
v In China , NGOs are subject to an extremely unwieldy system of registration,
which in reality allows the authorities to exercise tight control over them. Some
groups consequently chose to work without official status, or they opt for legal forms
other than the status of NGO, with the accompanying problems this may entail.
No independent human rights NGOs are currently officially registered in China.
4 / See Chapter 3.5 / See above.

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
v In Iran , the Iranian Constitution recognises freedom of association provided that
the principles of independence, freedom, national unity, the criteria of Islam, and
the basis of the Islamic Republic are respected (Article 26). Restrictions are vaguely
formulated and largely exceed the restrictions on freedom of association admissible
under international law. In addition, no independent human rights NGO has existed
since the closure in 2008 of the Defenders of Human Rights Centre (DHRC), the
Centre for the Defence of Prisoners’ Rights (CDPR) and the Journalists’ Association.
In addition, the Law on Associations explicitly prohibits any foreign funding.
C. Discriminatory practices in the recognition of freedom
of association
National legislation should not include any restriction based on the
identity of association members, its operating methods and the nature
of the rights it defends.
Everyone should be able to benefit from the right to create an associa –
tion, without any kind of discrimination. For example, civil servants, for –
eigners, women, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI)
people, and minors must all be able to enjoy their right to found an NGO.
However, in many countries, some laws prohibit specific categories of
society from creating an association. For example, in several countries in
the Gulf (such as the United Arab Emirates , Kuwait , Qatar ) and Asia (for
example Malaysia , Thailand ), only citizens of the country may found an
association. As a result, migrant workers, refugees and stateless persons
may not form authorised groups. The implications of this ban are par –
ticularly serious in countries such as Qatar , for example, where migrant
workers represent 80% of the population. This means that hundreds of
thousands of people may not, via an association, collectively denounce the
grave violations to which they are subject, and are not able to follow the
procedures necessary at national, regional or international level in order
to call for improved respect for their rights. This restriction violates the
State’s obligations to respect freedom of association for all persons under
its jurisdiction, whatever their nationality.
v In Kuwait , the law that applies to NGO activities (Law No. 24 of 1962 on Clubs
and Associations of Public Interest) provides that only citizens of Kuwait may found
an association, prohibiting de facto migrants from creating associations (Article 4).
This law specifies that migrants may only join an association as active members
or associates who have do not have the right and are not eligible to vote, and the
general assembly may only be made up of Kuwaiti members (Article 13).

36
OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
Discrimination may also concern the types of activity that NGOs are
authorised to carry out. In fact, in some countries, laws prohibiting asso –
ciations from carrying out programmes related to subjects that are often
considered to be sensitive, such as human rights, election observation, the
rights of LGBTI individuals, reproductive and gender rights, the rights of
migrants, of women, of ethnic or religious minorities, etc. Some legislations
justify restrictions using vague concepts such as “national values”, “public
order”, “standards of behaviour”, “morality”, “common peace”, “tranquil –
lity”, “secure communications”, or the “regular functioning of the State”.
The legislation of many countries (such as Algeria , Azerbaijan , Bahrain ,
Burma , the Russian Federation , Malaysia , Turkey ) facilitates the authori –
ties’ discretionary practices with regard to NGOs.
Associations that actively protect the rights of women and ethnic or
religious minorities are particularly subject to the restrictive interpretation
of these laws. The reference to “morality” as a reason for banning associa –
tions particularly affects NGOs that are active in the area of the rights of
LGBTI people.
v In Uganda , a draft “anti-homosexuality” law was presented for the first time in
October 2009 before Parliament, which adjourned the vote in May 2011, then again
in October 2011. The draft law was finally reintroduced in its original version in
February 2012. At the end of 2012, the Parliamentary President promised a vote on
the law before the end of the year as a “Christmas present”. Although this schedule
has not been adhered to, it is likely that the draft will once more be on the agenda
when Parliament meets again in February 2013. If it is adopted, it will formally
ban all assistance to homosexual people. Associations that work to defend LGBTI
rights are particularly targeted by this draft law, which provides for the withdrawal
of their registration certificate and exposes their legal representative to a seven
year prison sentence.
v Similarly, in the Russian Federation , a law criminalising the promotion of homo –
sexuality was due to be examined in January 2013 by the lower chamber of the
Federal Assembly. Similar laws have already been adopted in many regions of the
Federation, such as Saint-Petersburg, Ryazan, Archangel and Kostroma. These provi –
sions, combined with the provisions that came into force in January 2013 prohibiting
NGOs that carry out “political” activities from benefiting from financial support
from American individuals or organisations 6, risk infringing the right to freedom of
association, including access to funding for LGBTI NGOs.
6 / See Chapter 3.

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
In several countries, the ban on activities relating to particular categories
of right is not limited to a specific domain, as in the example of Uganda
referred to above, but can be extended to almost unlimited fields. These
very general bans on certain activities lead to the paralysis of civil society.
Not only do they violate the right to freedom of association but they are
often symptomatic of massive violations of human rights within the country.
v In the Syrian Arab Republic , the Criminal Code penalises membership of an
association established “for the purpose of changing the economic, social or political
character of the State”. It provides for the closure of the association, and sentences
to hard labour for a minimum term of seven years for the founders and directors of
these organisations (Article 306). The Syrian authorities frequently use the provi –
sions of this article to pass heavy sentences on association activists.

The Syrian Criminal Code therefore contravenes international law,
which permits associations to carry out any activity that complies with the
Declaration on Human Rights Defenders and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, especially including the promotion and protection of
economic, social and cultural rights – domains that are explicitly referred
to in the Syrian Criminal Code. This general ban nips in the bud any
desire to create an NGO whose goals could – misguidedly – be considered
to “change the economic, social or political character of the State”. By
denying the right to freedom of association, it annuls the basic condition
for funding.
Discrimination may also concern the original nationality of an NGO
whose headquarters are in a third party country. As an example, in Egypt ,
although the last draft law presented by the Minister of Insurance and
Social Affairs in October 2012 reinstates a system of simple notification,
several provisions in particular place foreign organisations and funding
from foreign sources under strict government control. Non-Eg yptian
NGOs are still subject to the obligation to obtain authorisation to con –
tinue their activities.
Discrimination may also relate to the minimum size of an NGO,
by imposing a lower limit on the number of members. As an example,
in Turkmenistan , the law requires that an NGO should have at least
500 members before it can be established. This requirement is indirectly
equivalent to a pure and simple negation of the right of association. In a
repressive political environment that tolerates no opposition or criticism,
the requirement for a minimum number indirectly favours the emergence
of pro-government NGOs (or GONGOs), which the authorities have no
problem in setting up, thanks to their many partisans.

38
OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
Discriminatory practices with regard to the identity or number of indi –
viduals who wish to exercise their right to freedom of association or to the
categories of rights that an NGO may defend and promote are therefore
subterfuges to ban the existence of associations. NGOs affected by such
discrimination may not be set up and obviously may not solicit and receive
funds to carry out their promotion and protection activities.
D. Interference in the operation of associations
The right to freedom of association applies throughout the life of an
association. Associations must be free to determine their statutes, their
structure and their activities, and to make decisions without interference
from the State.
Whether or not they have legal status, once they have been created,
associations must be free to determine their statutes, their structure and
their activities, and to make decisions without interference from the State.
Associations must enjoy the right to express an opinion, to publish infor –
mation, to address the people, to protest peacefully and to interact with
foreign governments and international organisations and bodies.
However, in practice the public authorities often monitor the work of
an association in an intrusive and discretionary manner. Such interference
takes various forms, in particular the requirement to be notified of the
decisions adopted by the board, the obligation to submit periodic activity
reports and financial reports, repeated and plainly abusive audits, inter –
ference in the make-up of the board or management, etc. The law and
administrative regulations may also impose obtaining prior authorisation
for the organisation of all sorts of public events, especially for the collection
of funds or the adoption of a code of conduct by associations.
Furthermore, in some countries the authorities force NGOs to comply
with the programming priorities set by the government.
v In The Gambia , NGOs are forced to adhere to an NGO Code of Conduct signed with
ministries, departments or competent agencies. This Code lays down the conditions
within which they must “participate in the development of activities that are in line
with government policies and priorities for which [the NGO] has the appropriate
resources and expertise” (Article 12 of Decree No. 81). In other words, the NGO Affairs
Agency (NGOAA) strictly monitors the activities of the NGOs, which are bound by
the principles set by the Government.

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
v In Bahrain , too, the Government may refuse to register an association if it con –
siders that “society does not need its services or if another association in the same
sector of activity already exists and fulfils the needs of society”.
These governments assume the right to decide on the validity of the
activities that NGOs propose to carry out, and knowingly violate the right
to freedom of association. They force defenders who wish to create an
NGO in a field of activity they consider to be “pointless” or superfluous
to give up their project. This means that NGOs may not carr y out the
activities they consider necessary in line with their analysis of the needs
and priorities identified, and they may not solicit and obtain funding to
carry out priority programmes.
In addition, other forms of interference are likely to hinder NGO access
to funding. In fact, the authorities may, directly or indirectly, oppose the
receipt of funds from certain donors (for example Bangladesh , Ethiopia )7.
In other cases, government bodies may require, abusively, the submission
of a great many documents and supporting material relating to private
funding or from foreign organisations. When they are without foundation,
these requirements contribute to establishing a permanent climate of inse –
curity, preventing NGOs from continuing their work of protecting victims’
rights, and dissuading the most fragile NGOs from soliciting financial
support to carry out their activities.
v In Malaysia , in a context of harassment of the members and employees of the
human rights NGO Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM), the authorities, since July
2012, have demanded the submission, within very short time limits, of numerous
documents and information concerning the association’s activities and accounts.
For example, on October 2, 2012, an administrative agency requested SUARAM
to present, in less than 24 hours, a large number of documents relating to all
the subsidy contracts and project proposals with the National Endowment for
Democracy (NED) and the Open Society Institute (OSI), as well as all the receipts
relating to campaign expenses between 2006 and 2011.
This administrative obstinacy is equivalent to taking reprisals against
SUARAM for having solicited and obtained outside funding, with the aim
of dissuading the NGO from renewing its requests for financial support
in the future.
7 / See Chapter 3.

40
OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
The suspension of an association and its forcible dissolution constitute
one of the most serious attacks on freedom of association. Consequently,
the authorities should only resort to this in the case of clear and immi –
nent danger resulting from the flagrant violation of national legislation,
in accordance with international human rights law. Measures of this kind
must be in strict proportion to the legitimate objective that they seek to
achieve.
However, in some countries, the authorities carry out abusive dissolutions
whose sole aim is to eliminate NGOs they consider to be too critical of them.

To justify a threat of dissolution, or the actual dissolution of an NGO,
the authorities often refer to offences against tax laws and administrative
procedures – offences that in most cases turn out to be unfounded. The case
of Ta j i k i s t a n has already been mentioned 8, b u t Belarus has also recently
made use of this practice.
v In Belarus , on October 9, 2012, the Minsk Economic Court ordered the closure of
Platforma, a human rights organisation that specialises in the protection of prison –
ers’ rights. This ruling followed a complaint filed by the Tax Office in the Savestki
district of Minsk, accusing the organisation of not submitting its tax declaration
within the required time and not informing it of its change of address. These allega –
tions turned out to be unfounded, as the lack of a tax receipt was probably due to the
Tax Office in Minsk losing the document. In the months before the dissolution ruling,
Platforma had been the target of repeated judicial harassment by the authorities,
aimed in particular at its Director, Mr. Andrei Bandarenka.
Whether the issue is that of the obligation to respect a code of conduct,
of following government priorities, administrative harassment – especially
relating to applications for foreign funding – or purely and simply the
dissolution of an NGO, the authorities impose constraints that violate the
provisions of the right to freedom of association and prevent the emergence
of human rights NGOs. They cause a great many to disappear. By disquali –
fying these NGOs, the authorities deprive them of the basic conditions
for the fulfilment of their right to solicit, receive and use funding, whether
its source is local or foreign.
8 / See above.

41
C HA P T E R III
D IR E CT R ES TRICTIO NS
O N ACC ESS TO F UN DI NG,
IN C LU DI NG FOR E IGN F UN DI NG
OBS ERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION O F HUM AN RIGHTS DEFE NDER S 2013 ANNUAL REP ORT
As stated ear lier, the right of access to funding, inc luding foreign
funding, is a fundamental right. S tates are nonetheless within their
legitimate rights to regulate the local or foreign funding of human rights
NGOs, in accordance with the principle of transparency, in particular to
combat certain forms of international crime such as corruption, money
laundering, drug trafficking, human trafficking and terrorism. Indeed,
it is not only their legitimate right but essential for States to investigate
such crimes, in compliance with the principles of the rule of law and the
right to a fair trial.
However, as stipulated in Article 22.2 of the ICCPR, no restriction
may be placed on the exercise of the right to freedom of association – and
therefore to funding – “other than those prescribed by law and which are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or
public safety, public order […], public health or morals […] or the rights
and freedoms of others” 1.
A registration system in itself does not necessarily violate the right to
freedom of association, provided it is not the only applicable system (i.e.
defenders are also able to associate themselves without being obliged to
register), and that the principle of proportionality is respected. Under this
principle it is imperative that the scope of measures applied is propor –
tionate to the specific reasons invoked for their justification. It therefore
follows that a prior authorisation procedure that is unduly burdensome
and slow constitutes a disproportionate measure that violates the right to
freedom of association. But in many cases, the real goal of legislation or
administrative measures on funding is to obstruct the activities of human
rights defenders, in violation of international law.
1 / See Chapter 1.

42
OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
Restrictions on access to financing can affect both local and foreign
sources. Various types of restrictions may target local funding: a State may
decide to restrict public funding available in the associative sector, or to
fund only NGOs that comply with policies set by the authorities, or to
hamper fundraising activities at national level. Smear campaigns against
NGOs can also affect fundraising activities. In addition, barriers imped –
ing access to local funding are often concomitant to insufficient, scarce
or even non-existent public or private funding available to local human
rights NGOs.
Consequently, in a large majority of countries, human rights NGOs
survive through the support they receive from foreign donors (intergovern –
mental organisations such as the UN, NGOs or foundations, and foreign
government institutions, such as funds managed by a ministry, or private
individuals). In this context, more and more States are resorting to an
arsenal of legislative and administrative measures to legitimise unjustified
or disproportionate restrictions on NGO access to foreign funds, thus jeop –
ardising their ability to function and sometimes even their very survival.
Means to restrict access to foreign financing are manifold. Legislation
in some countries effectively prohibits or renders impossible all foreign
funding (e.g. Algeria , Bahrain , Belarus , Iran ). Certain countries forbid
foreign funding of certain activities and/or organisations (e.g. Ethiopia ),
while in others access to foreign funding is subject to specific authorisation
from the government or a government agency (e.g. Bangladesh , Egypt ,
India ). The law in some countries requires that foreign funds be trans –
ferred through financial institutions or banks controlled by the govern –
ment (e.g. Bangladesh , Sierra Leone , Uzbekistan ). In some cases, NGOs
that receive foreign funding are given special status ( Russian Federation ).
Finally, tax systems sometimes constitute potent weapons of dissuasion
targeting human rights organisations (e.g. Azerbaijan , Belarus , Mexico ,
Russian Federation ).
A. Examples of authorisation systems that impede
all access to foreign funding
The authorities in some countries prohibit or impede NGO access to
funding from abroad.
Thus, for example, in Algeria , Bahrain and Belarus almost all NGOs are
refused registration, and all foreign funding for NGOs must be registered
and approved by the authorities, making it virtually impossible for NGOs
to receive such funding. Under these conditions, human rights NGOs
have no other choice but to disband or breach these regulatory constraints.

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
Belarus: the de facto impossibility of receiving funding from abroad
v In Belarus , all foreign funding must be registered and approved by the authori –
ties. In November 2011, controls against unauthorised foreign funding were tight –
ened. Thus, Article 21 of the Law on Public Associations categorically prohibits
Belarusian NGOs from holding an account in a bank or a financial institution located
abroad, and any use of unauthorised foreign funds is criminalised. The law provides
for administrative and criminal sanctions to punish NGOs and their management
personnel who receive foreign funds without authorisation.
These new provisions were adopted at a time when Mr. A les Bialiatski , President
of the Human Rights Centre Viasna and Vice President of the FIDH, was sentenced
to four and a half years imprisonment in an unfair trial for failing to report foreign
funds in his personal bank accounts in Lithuania and Poland utilised to finance
Viasna’s activities in Belarus. This indicates a clear link between the “Bialiatski
Case” and the introduction of the new provisions.
Any violation of the regulatory provisions on foreign funding for NGOs can lead
to the confiscation of unauthorised funds and the payment of a fine equal to
the amount of the latter (Article 23.24 of the Code on Administrative Offences).
Individuals risk confiscation of an unauthorized grant and a fine of 450 to 1,800
euros. If an offence is repeated within 12 months, the offending NGO staff or indi –
vidual are liable to a two-year prison sentence (Article 369.2 of the Criminal Code).
This legislation, coupled with the fact that almost all human rights NGOs have been
closed or denied registration 2, renders all foreign funding of human rights NGOs
impossible.
It is on the basis of this finding that the United Nations Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) qualified the detention of Mr. Bialiatski as arbitrary
in that it results from the exercise of the right to freedom of association. Indeed,
to fund the activities of Viasna, Mr. Bialiatski had no other choice but to open
foreign bank accounts and not to report the funds to the Belarusian authorities.
The WGAD added that States parties to the ICCPR “[…] are not only under a nega –
tive obligation not to interfere with the founding of associations or their activities”
but are also under a “positive obligation” to facilitate “the tasks of associations
by public funding or allowing tax exemptions for funding received from outside
the country […]” 3.
It should also be noted that after examining the report submitted by Belarus in
November 2011, CAT called on Belarus authorities to acknowledge “the crucial role”
2 / See Chapter 2.3 / See UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its sixty-fourth session, August 27–31, 2012 – No. 39/2012 (Belarus) , United Nations Document A/HRC/WGAD/2012/39, November 23, 2012, paragraph 48.

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
of NGOs and to “[…] enable them to seek and receive adequate funding to carry out
their peaceful human rights activities” 4.
Algeria: de facto ban on all foreign funding
v In Algeria , Law No. 12-06 on Associations, adopted in January 2012, contains
numerous restrictions, in particular in relation to the search, collection and utilisa –
tion of funds from abroad. It prohibits “all associations from receiving funds from
the legations and foreign non-governmental organisations” (Article 30), except
in cases of “cooperative relations duly established with foreign associations and
[international NGOs]” authorised by the competent authorities, or “express agree –
ment of the competent authority”. Articles 40 and 43 provide that any funding from
“foreign legations” obtained in violation of Article 30 may result in suspension or
dissolution of the NGO by the administrative court.
NGOs fear discretionary interpretation of this law by the authorities. Moreover,
the vagueness of its provisions, coupled with the impossibility for most NGOs to
register, severely constrains their ability to finance themselves and to benefit from
overseas funding.
After Algeria presented its report to CEDAW in March 2012, the latter expressed its
concern regarding “[…]the provisions of the Law on Associations, adopted in January
2012, stipulating a requirement of specific authorisation for an association so that
it can receive funding from international donors, which may negatively impact the
activities of those associations working on gender equality and empowerment in
a developmental context” 5.
Bahrain: de facto ban on all foreign funding
v In Bahrain , only one human rights NGO – the Bahrain Human Rights Society
(BHRS) – is registered and can therefore claim access to foreign funding. Decree-
Law No. 21/1989 on associations, social clubs and cultural institutions as well as
on youth and sports bodies requires that prior authorisation must be given by the
Ministry of Social Development for all foreign funding (Article 20). In recent years,
BHRS has been denied access by the authorities to public and private funds, both
domestic and foreign. The organisation has challenged these refusals before the
courts since 2001, as yet to no avail.
4 / See CAT, Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture – Belarus , United Nations Document CAT/C/BLR/CO/4, December 7, 2011, paragraph 25.5 / See CEDAW, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women – Algeria , United Nations Document CEDAW/C/DZA/CO/3-4, March 23, 2012, paragraph 19.

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
B. Examples of bans on foreign funding for certain activities/
organisations
In some countries, such as Ethiopia and Zimbabwe , legislation explicitly
prohibits foreign funding for certain activities and / or certain types of
organisations.
Ethiopia: restrictions on access to foreign funding for certain activities/
organisations
v In Ethiopia , the Charities and Societies Proclamation (No. 621/2009) has created
a highly restrictive environment for human rights organisations, forcing them to
significantly reduce their activities, in particular because of draconian measures
that restrict their funding sources.
Indeed, this Proclamation applies the definition of “foreign association” to all
domestic NGOs that receive more than 10% of their funding from foreign sources,
and also prohibits them from engaging in numerous human rights activities, in par –
ticular those in relation to the rights of women and children, handicapped persons,
ethnic issues, conflict resolution, governance and democratisation.
In a country where 95% of local NGOs received more than 10% of their funding
from abroad in 2009, and in which local sources of funding are virtually non-exist –
ent, this doubly restrictive legislation directly affected the ability of domestic human
rights NGOs to conduct their activities.
A dozen NGOs have had to abandon their activities due to their “suspension” ordered
by the authorities 6. Others have been forced to operate from abroad, making it more
difficult for them to document violations of human rights in the country.
Moreover, several NGOs have had their funds blocked by the Charities and Societies
Agency (ChSA), including the Human Rights Council (HRC), which was forced to
close nine of its twelve local offices in December 2009, and its Nekemte office in 2011,
due to lack of funding. The ChSA decided to freeze HRC foreign funds even though
this financial support was granted before the entry into force of Proclamation No.
621/2009 and some of the funds were not from foreign sources. In February 2011,
the ChSA rejected an appeal submitted by the HRC, arguing wrongly that the latter
had not provided documents proving the domestic source of some of the funds, even
6 / They include the African Initiative for a Democratic World Order (AIDWO), the Action Professionals Association for People (APAP), the Organisation for Social Justice in Ethiopia (OSJE), the Society for the Advancement of Human Rights Education (SAHRE), the Ethiopian Human Right & Civic Education Promotion Association (EHRCEPA), the Centre for the Advancement of Peace & Democracy in Ethiopia (CAPDE), the Ethiopian Federation of Persons with Disabilities (EFPD), the Research Centre for Civic & Human Rights Education, “Hundee” (Roots), “Zega le-Idget”, “Zema Setoch Lefitih”, and Kembatta Women’s Self-Help Center Ethiopia Association.

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
though the HRC had submitted relevant extracts of its 18 most recent audited annual
reports. On October 19, 2012, the Supreme Court rejected HRC’s appeal.
Several United Nations Committees have voiced their concern reg ardin g
Proclamation No. 621/2009, in particular concerning the 10% ceiling on funding
from abroad. In January 2011, CAT expressed “serious concern” about this law and
demanded that Ethiopia “unblock any frozen assets” of NGOs 7. Similarly, in August
2011, CCPR noted: “This legislation impedes the realisation of the freedom of asso –
ciation and assembly as illustrated by the fact that many NGOs and professional
associations were not authorised to register under the new Proclamation or had
to change their area of activity” (Arts. 21 and 22). It recommended that Ethiopia
in particular “[…] should reconsider the funding restrictions on local NGOs in the
light of the Covenant and it should authorise all NGOs to work in the field of human
rights” 8. These recommendations were renewed by the CESCR in May 2012 9.
Zimbabwe: ban on foreign funding for activities related to voting rights
education and risk of similar ban on activities related to governance
v In Zimbabwe , there is no general ban preventing NGOs from receiving funding
from abroad. However, activities related to civic rights education or governance, as
defined by Article 16 of the 2005 Zimbabwe Electoral Commission law 10 and Article
17 of the 2004 NGO Bill 11 (if it enters into force) 12, may not benefit from foreign
funding. Consequently, human rights NGOs may not rely on foreign funding of their
projects related to free and transparent election rights or the fight against corruption.
C. Authorisation systems that delay access to foreign funding
While some States no longer require NGOs to obtain prior permis –
sion to receive foreign funding, numerous others continue to apply this
procedure.
7 / See CAT, Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture – Ethiopia , United Nations Document CAT/C/ETH/CO/1, January 20, 2011, paragraph 34.8 / See CCPR, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee – Ethiopia , United Nations Document CCPR/C/ETH/CO/1, August 19, 2011, paragraph 25.9 / See CESCR, Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – Ethiopia , United Nations Document E/C.12/ETH/CO/1-3, May 31, 2012, paragraph 7. 10 / “The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act (ZEC Act) prohibits the receipt of foreign funding for conducting voter education,” but allows foreign contributions or donations to the Electoral Commission.11 / Local NGOs are prohibited from receiving any foreign funding to carry out activities involving or including “issues of governance”.12 / This draft law was adopted by Parliament in December 2004, but has not been signed by the President.

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
One of the main arguments put forward by many national authorities to
justify registration is the need to “preserve national security”. Government
authorisation may be an obstacle in itself for certain groups promoting
freedom of expression ( India ). In other cases, the lack of government
response to registration applications can jeopardise the pursuit of human
rights activities ( Bangladesh ).
India: prior authorisation is mandatory, subject to renewal, and refused
for certain activities
v In India , Article II of the 1976 Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA), as
amended in 2010, requires all persons “[…] having a definite cultural, economic,
educational, religious or social programme” to register with the Government before
it may receive foreign grants. The law also states that non-registered NGOs can
access foreign financial support on condition that they obtain prior permission
from the Government. Therefore, whatever the case, authorisation is required to
receive foreign funding. The FCRA, as amended, states that any “[…] correspondent,
columnist, cartoonist, editor, owner, printer or publisher of a registered newspaper”
is prohibited from receiving foreign funding. Certain human rights activities could be
affected by this provision. Worse still, the FCRA now requires NGOs to renew their
registration under this Act every five years, although already registered NGOs may
be exempted from re-registering during the five years following the entry into force
of the amended FCRA. The latter also provides that any NGO whose registration cer –
tificate has been cancelled or revoked may register or obtain prior authorisation for
a maximum period of three years from the date of cancellation. Moreover, the reg –
istration certificate may be cancelled for various reasons, for example in the event
that the NGO concerned has not conducted any activities for the past two years.
The impact of this law on Indian NGOs that receive external funding
is very harmful. In particular, the requirement of NGOs receiving foreign
grants to re-register results in an insecure situation detrimental to the
pursuit of their activities and can lead to a form of self-censorship, while
providing an opportunity for authorities to suspend organisations that
conduct activities they dislike. The FCRA, as amended, is not consistent
with the recommendations of the Special Rapporteur on human rights
defenders, which noted that existing laws “should not require that organisa –
tions re-register periodically” 13.
13 / See United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders , Commentary to the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, July 2011, p. 46.

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
Egypt: funding conditioned upon prior authorisation by the Ministry
of Solidarity and Social Justice
v In Egypt , Law No. 84 of 2002 governing the formation, funding, and operation of
associations and foundations prohibits any association from receiving funds from
domestic or foreign sources without the authorisation of the Ministry of Solidarity
and Social Justice. Obtaining such funds without authorisation is punishable by
a prison sentence of up to six months and a fine of up to 2,000 Egyptian pounds
(about 246 euros). On April 27, 2009, the Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights
(EOHR) received written notification from the Ministry of Solidarity and Social
Justice threatening it with dissolution and closure on the basis of Articles 42 and 17
of Law No. 84. This was in response to the organisation by EOHR, in partnership
with the Centre for Media Freedom in the Middle East and North Africa (CMF MENA),
of a conference in Cairo on January 27 and 28, 2009 on the topic “Information is
a right for all”. Earlier, on July 31, 2008, EOHR had requested permission from the
authorities to receive CMF MENA funds to cover the costs of the conference. The
request was never answered. Following an international outcry and mobilisation
in favour of EOHR, the latter was formally notified by the Ministry of Solidarity and
Social Justice on May 10, 2009 that no measures had been taken to dissolve or close
the organisation, and that the previous notification of the ministry was merely a
reminder of the legal procedure governing grants from abroad.
The fall of President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 was not accompanied by any
improvement in this regard. On July 6, 2011, the Minister of Solidarity and Social
Justice, Dr. Gouda Abdel Khaliq, warned civil society organisations and NGOs against
“[…] any attempt to seek foreign funds” and said he considered any direct funding
provided by the United States to Egyptian NGOs a violation of Egypt’s sovereignty.
During the summer of 2011, in an obvious move to try to collect incriminating evi –
dence against these organisations, he also announced that he had asked the Central
Bank of Egypt to inform him of all banking transactions on accounts held by NGOs
in Egypt.
In December 2011, heavily armed Egyptian security forces conducted search raids on
the premises of 17 Egyptian and international NGOs, including the Arab Center for
Independence of Justice and Legal Professions (ACIJP); the Budgetary and Human
Rights Observatory; the Cairo and Assiut offices of the National Democratic Institute
(NDI), an American organisation close to the Democrat Party; the International
Republic Institute (IRI), an American organisation close to the Republican Party;
Freedom House (an American NGO); and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.
On February 6, 2012, a list of 43 people facing possible prosecution for “illegal
acquisition of foreign funds” was made public. The list comprised only local and
international employees of foreign NGOs – seven from Freedom House, 14 from the
IRI, five from the International Center for Journalists (ICFJ), two from the Konrad
Adenauer Foundation, and 5 NDI staff. Legal proceedings were initiated against
them on February 26, 2012, and the trial, which is ongoing, is expected to resume in
June 2013. This example demonstrates the determination of the Egyptian authorities

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
to sanction members of Egyptian or foreign organisations who receive funds from
American or European sources to finance their activities.
It is in the context of these raids that in late 2011, the Minister of Solidarity and Social
Justice reiterated his intention to revise the law on associations. It is feared that
even more drastic restrictions will be imposed on access to funding. This process
of tightening restrictions on NGOs was still underway by the end of 2012, and the
latest draft law upholds constraints on foreign funding.
Some States use the technique of “restriction by omission” to prevent
human rights NGOs’ access to funding. By not applying the procedure laid
down by their own laws and regulations, the authorities deny NGOs the
ability to carry out projects funded by organisations or foreign countries
(Bangladesh ).
Bangladesh: excessive delays in obtaining authorisations obstruct NGO
activities
v In Bangladesh , the Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation Rules of
1978 prohibit NGOs operating in the country from receiving foreign funding without
governmental approval 14.
For example, since 2009, access to foreign funding for the human rights NGO
Odhikar has continued to be hampered by administrative measures. Indeed, the
NGO Affairs Bureau (NGO AB), under the aegis of the Ministry of Interior, only
replied on January 25, 2012 to the submission made by Odhikar on December 28,
2010 of a project called “Education on the additional Protocol to the Convention
against Torture (OPCAT)” funded by the European Union. Odhikar had to wait for
over 13 months to get permission to conduct this project. This was in clear breach of
NGO AB regulations, which require that replies should normally be issued within
45 days from the date of receipt of the submission. Meanwhile, since the period
covered by the funding had lapsed, Odhikar had to re-submit the same project,
which it did on February 16, 2012. This time, NGO AB notified authorisation on July
7, 2012, nearly five months later.
In August 2009, the Government refused an Odhikar project called “Training and
advocacy for human rights defenders in Bangladesh”, funded by the Danish branch
of the Research Centre for Torture Victims (RCT). Odhikar challenged this decision
before the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, and obtained
an order of suspension of the decision. However, when RCT Denmark requested
Odhikar to extend the duration of the project by three months, the Ministry of
14 / See Article 4 of the Foreign Donations Regulation Rules of 1978, which states: “No person or organisation […] shall receive or operate any foreign donation without prior approval or permission of the Government for such receipt or undertaking”.

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
Internal Affairs raised the same objections. Odhikar was finally not able to imple –
ment the project because it was de facto impossible to access the RCT Denmark
funds. Other NGOs are subjected to the same restrictions and authorisation delays.
D. The Russian example: a specific system aimed at stigmatising
human rights organisations that receive foreign funding
Since November 2012, the system of barriers erected by the Russian
Federation to restrict the foreign funding of NGOs has become much
more pernicious. Although the law does not explicitly prohibit foreign
funding, any NGO that receives funding from abroad to conduct what the
authorities call “political” activities” is now considered a “foreign agent ” by
the Russian authorities.
Russian Federation: a specific system to regulate organisations
“carrying functions of a foreign agent”
v In the Russian Federation , a law adopted in July 2012 amending the status of
“non-commercial organisations” entered into force in November 2012. This new
law requires all NGOs that receive funds from abroad and that conduct “political
activities” to register with a government agency. Such NGOs are now categorised
as “non-commercial organisations carrying functions of a foreign agent”.“Political
activities” are defined by the new law as “participation in the organisation and
conduct of political actions for the purposes of influencing decision-making by
governmental bodies aiming to change the governmental policies implemented by
them, as well as in the formation of public opinion in said purposes”. This extremely
vague definition enables the authorities to target human rights organisations which,
by their very nature, contribute towards influencing authorities and public opinion
on public affairs.
Under these new provisions, an NGO that receives foreign funding will be subject
to tighter control: annual audits, separate accounts on the use of foreign funds,
half-yearly activity reports and quarterly financial reports the format and content
of which have yet to be defined.
Moreover, “special controls” apply to all money transfers exceeding 2,000 roubles
(about 50 euros) received by NGOs based in Russia. The form that these special
controls will take is as yet unknown.
Finally, the failure of an NGO that receives foreign funding to register with the said
government agency is punishable by suspension of its activities, and its failure to
“provide information required by the law” by a fine of up to 50,000 rubles (about
1,200 euros) for its members and 1 million rubles (about 25,000 euros) for the NGO
itself.

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
A few days before the adoption of the bill by the Duma, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights and three United Nations Special Rapporteurs (on
freedom of association, freedom of expression, and the situation of human rights
defenders) expressed deep concern over the likely major negative implications of
this reform for civil society in the country, and urged the Russian authorities not to
adopt it, but their appeal was disregarded 15.
In addition, on January 1, 2013, further provisions restricting access to financing
came into force. Henceforth, Russian NGOs conducting “political activities” will
no longer be authorised to receive financial support from United States nationals
and organisations, under the pretext that such support constitutes a “threat to the
interests of the Russian Federation”. NGOs that violate this provision are subject
to suspension by decision of the administrative body in charge of NGO registration
and confiscation of their funds and property by court order. In a context where the
notion of “political activity” is interpreted very broadly, this new provision may
further stigmatise and criminalise human rights activities in the country.
E. Obligation to transfer foreign funds via a government fund
or via bank accounts controlled by the authorities
In some countries ( Bangladesh , Sierra Leone , Uzbekistan ), NGOs must
ensure that grants they receive transit via a government agency or a bank
controlled by the authorities. ! ese measures are also designed to control
or limit the ability of NGOs to function. In most cases, these restrictions
apply solely to funds received from foreign sources.
v In Uzbekistan , for example, all foreign funding approved by the commission
controlled by the ministerial cabinet must transit via one of the two State banks –
Akasa or the National Bank of Uzbekistan. These banks then decide whether or
not to pass on the funds to the NGO beneficiaries. In most cases, the funds remain
blocked in the accounts of the State banks, thus affecting the capability of the NGOs
concerned to function.
v In Bangladesh , the NGO Affairs Bureau (NGO AB) demands that NGOs deposit
funds they receive in a bank designated by the authorities. No NGO can receive
funding without a certificate of authorisation issued by the NGO AB, and no bank
is permitted to release such funds without prior government approval.
A similar system whereby an authorisation certi “cate or prior govern –
ment approval is required exists in India , as provided for under Article
15 / See United Nations Press Releases, July 12 and 18, 2012.

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
17 of the 1976 Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA), with the
di%erence that NGOs in this countr y are free to designate the bank of
their choice to receive the funds.
v In Sierra Leone , the 2009 Revised NGO Policy Regulations require NGOs to
route their assets through the Sierra Leone Association of Non-governmental
Organisations (SLANGO), an umbrella organisation, and the Ministry of Finance
and Economic Development (MoFED). The Government has sought to justify this
measure by claiming that it aims to align the work of NGOs with public policy.
F. Complex procedures and burdensome tax systems
Human rights defenders naturally have both rights and responsibilities,
including those incumbent on them as citizens of a State, in particular
with regard to their obligation to pay taxes. NGOs must also ful “l their
obligations in relation to bookkeeping, social charges and taxation in a
transparent and honest manner, in accordance with the administrative
provisions in force in each country.
As emphasised by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights  defenders: “ ! e registration and super visor y organs should have
the right to examine the books, records and activities of civil society
organisations only during ordinary business hours, with adequate advance
notice.  Such auditing and supervisory powers should not be used arbitrarily
and for the harassment or intimidation of organisations” 16.

Meeting the requirements of the taxation system is an important com –
ponent of the overall obligations of NGOs. However, in many countries
restrictive tax systems constitute another way of limiting the ability of
NGOs to function. ! e absence of tax exemptions or reductions for non-
pro “t activities, coupled with cumbersome and complicated regulator y
procedures and burdensome controls, hampers the work of NGOs.
Foreign donors supporting human rights NGOs are sometimes speci “-
cally targeted by such obstacles ( Russian Federation ).
16 / See United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Commentary to the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders , July 2011, p. 46.

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
Russian Federation: tax exemptions limited to certain donors identified
by decree
v In the Russian Federation , the legal framework is imposing more and more
obstacles impeding access to foreign funding for NGOs through regulatory texts on
taxation. Indeed, the law stipulates that all foreign funding must have prior govern –
ment approval in order to benefit from tax exemption. Presidential Decree No. 485 of
June 28, 2008 radically shortened the list of international organisations whose
grants to NGOs benefit from tax exemptions approved by the Government 17.
In all other cases, NGOs may not claim tax exemptions for funds they receive from
organisations not included on this list.
The regulations imposed on foreign funding contrast with those applicable to
national funding sources. In the latter case, the Tax Code (Article 149 (2)) grants
VAT exemptions to certain non-profit organisations on services they provide in the
fields of culture, health, education or assistance to the population. Nonetheless,
it is deplorable that activities in defence of human rights are excluded from this
exemption, even in the case of locally generated funds.
! e authorities in some countries with laws that provide for tax cuts
deliberately misinterpret these laws in order to sanction the work of NGOs.
! is may even result in a tax increase ( Azerbaijan ), or a restriction of their
right to a tax reduction, de jure or de facto (Mexico ), or criminalisation of
their activities on the grounds that they failed to comply with the laws on
taxation ( Belarus )18.
Azerbaijan: NGOs subject to highly dissuasive tax regime
v In Azerbaijan , the Tax Code provides that “charitable organisations” benefit
from tax exemptions, except on revenues derived from their economic activities.
However, no law deals with the status of these “charitable organisations”, and there
is no procedure in either the Tax Code or any other law that defines what type of
entity should be granted this status. These legal and procedural gaps leave NGOs
in the dark as to whether they are entitled to benefit from a tax exemption, or
whether they are eligible to one on condition that all or some of their activities
are “charitable”. This lack of clarity encourages arbitrary taxation. NGOs may carry
out economic activities and the profits are taxed in the same way as commercial
entities. In addition, funds from foreign donors are subject to an additional tax of
22% on wages, raising total social charges to 39%, but is not applied in case of
17 / This list is established by “the Ministry of Finance […] jointly with the Ministry of Education and Science, […] the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Health and Social Development […] and other relevant Federal bodies, and is then submitted to the Russian Government for approval”, Article 2, Presidential Decree No. 485, June 28, 2008.18 / See above.

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
agreement between the Government and a donor, as is the case, for example, with
the European Commission. This legislation strongly discourages any foreign donor
from providing – and any NGO from soliciting – such funds.
Mexico: NGOs subject to a complex and extremely dissuasive tax regime
v In Mexico , non-profit organisations are exempt from taxation and tax reductions
can be claimed on donations. However, the tax system is extremely complex and
sometimes contradictory for individuals, NGOs and businesses alike. This complex –
ity impairs the ability of NGOs to carry out their activities effectively because they
must often surround themselves with experts in the fields of taxation – sometimes
on a full-time basis – to monitor and control compliance with the tax regulations
and procedures in place. The result can be particularly harmful to the development
of small NGOs and can even threaten their very institutional survival.

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C HA P T E R IV
FUN DI NG, A P R E T EX T
TO DI S CR E DIT NG O s
OBS ERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION O F HUM AN RIGHTS DEFE NDER S 2013 ANNUAL REP ORT
The defamation of NGOs in relation to funding – notably its sources –
is a particular form of denigration of defenders. It almost always occurs
in countries where laws restrict access to funding from external sources.
Smear campaigns and unfounded accusations against defenders con –
stitute attacks on their honour and reputation, and violate Article 12 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which stipulates: “No one
shall be subjected to […] attacks upon [their] honour and reputation”.
In addition, Article 12.2 of the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders
states  that authorities have an obligation to protect human rights defend –
ers from “[…] violence, […] pressure or any other arbitrar y action as a
consequence of his or her legitimate exercise of the rights” enshrined in
the Declaration.  But defamation is effectively an arbitrary act – regardless
of the author – against which defenders should be protected because, in
the worst case scenario, it can foster the emergence of an environment of
violence against them.
The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders
has repeatedly expressed concern about “the growing characterization” of
human rights defenders as “terrorists”, “enemies of the State” or “political
opponents” by State authorities and State-owned media. She described it as
a particularly “worrying trend” because “it is regularly used to delegitimise
the work of defenders and to increase their vulnerability”, contributing to
“the perception that defenders are legitimate targets for abuse by State
and non-State actors” 1.
The link between defamation and the instigation of violence against
defenders has also been observed at regional level, notably by the IACHR,
which considers that “the statements by State representatives, expressed in
the context of political violence, sharp polarization, or high levels of social
conflict, puts out the message that acts of violence aimed at suppressing
1 / See UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Mrs Margaret Sekaggya , UN Document A/HRC/13/22, December 30, 2009, paragraph 27.

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
human rights defenders and their organisations enjoy the acquiescence of
the government. For this reason, indiscriminate and unfounded criticisms
that help create adverse conditions for the work of human rights defenders
are profoundly harmful to the democracies of the hemisphere” 2.
The IACHR has also expressed the following concerns: “In public
statements, state agents have identified the work done by human rights
defenders as illegal, or they have been publicly accused of being criminals,
subversives or terrorists merely because of providing legal defence to persons
accused of committing certain crimes, or merely out of a desire to publicly
stigmatize them” 3. It recommended that “public officials must refrain from
making statements that stigmatize human rights defenders or that suggest
that human rights organizations act improperly or illegally, merely because
of engaging in their work to promote and protect human rights” 4.
In its ruling on a Mexican case, the IACHR observed that the Mexican
authorities “made statements and issued communiques in which General
[ Jose Francisco] Gallardo is blamed for deeds not proven, as a result of
which it is considered that his honour and dignity have been attacked, for
his good name and reputation have been injured, particularly considering
that there are judicial decisions acquitting him, which demonstrates that
he has been subjected to public harassment” 5. It also reiterated that, based
on the principle of the presumption of innocence, “cases in which state
authorities make statements or issue communiqués publicly incriminating a
human rights defender of acts that have not been legally proven constitute
a violation of the human rights defender’s right to honour” 6.
However, in a globalised world where information – and misinforma –
tion – often circulate instantly, authorities in many countries initiate or
encourage smear campaigns against NGOs. They call into question their
honesty and credibility in order to deny the legitimacy of their activities in
defence of human rights, in particular their criticism of human rights viola –
tions committed by the authorities. The forms of denigration employed
2 / See IACHR, Report on the situation of human rights defenders in the Americas , Document OEA/ Ser.L/V/II.124 Doc. 5 rev.1, March 7, 2006, paragraph 177. 3 / Idem , paragraph 175. 4 / Idem , recommendation 10. 5 / See IACHR, Report 43/96, case 11.430, Jose Francisco Gallardo (Mexico) , October 15, 1996, paragraph 76. Cited in: IACHR, Second Report on the situation of human rights defenders in the Americas , Document OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 6631, December 2011, paragraph 123. 6 / See IACHR, Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela , paragraph 616; IACHR, Report 43/96, case 11.430, Jose Francisco Gallardo (Mexico) , October 15, 1996, paragraph 76.

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
are numerous, ranging from simple criticism of the functioning of NGOs
to far more serious charges such as “treason”, “espionage”, or “terrorism”.
In the speci “c context of smear campaigns in relation to funding, many
States accuse NGOs, without any evidence, of o %ences ranging from plot –
ting against the State, foreign interference, espionage, treason, attempted
destabilisation, collusion with organised crime, funding terrorist or armed
opposition groups, or other acts perceived as hostile to the authorities
or in violation of the law. Such charges or false claims are sometimes
made directly by senior State o #cials, or even by a State President in
public speeches or through written communiqués, and are often relayed
by pro-government media. In other cases, criticism is more insidious, and
is channelled by the authorities through media outlets that are only too
willing to publish the accusations.
One can generally identify two types of defamation: one is based on the
conspiracy theory or external interference, while the other raises the spectre
of a threat of internal subversion. ! e choice of which of the two contrived
defamatory attacks to initiate is determined by the political context.
A. Invoking the spectre of foreign interference
D ue to lack of financial resources available at national level, many
organisations very often have no other option than to solicit foreign funds.
This provides many States with an easy pretext to demonise NGOs because
of the nationality or geographical location of their donors. Thus, via offi –
cial media, political leaders develop discourses on external interference or
plot conspiracies, inciting xenophobic and nationalistic sentiment against
foreign entities perceived to be meddling in internal State affairs by trying
to impose their values and foreign policy objectives through local NGOs.
These fallacious claims aim to create in the public eye an amalgama –
tion between “foreign funding” and “foreign intervention in the affairs of
the country”. This link between vague but emotionally charged concepts
enables the authorities to depict foreign donors as destabilising forces
endangering the country, and local NGOs as their agents.
Defamation in relation to funding sources threatens to undermine the
principle of international solidarity in the movement for the defence of
human rights that prevailed until recently. Indeed, the positive rea #rma –
tion of the right of defendants to bene “t from international support –
including “nancial support – in the common pursuit of improved respect
for human rights, which should be a universal goal shared by the whole
international community, has given way to a negative environment marked
by suspicion of criminal activity and foreign interference.

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
The criminalisation of foreign funding and the resulting sanctions
against the NGOs concerned, in particular the arrest and detention of
their members, contribute towards delegitimising the work of defend –
ers in the eyes of the public. ! e Special Rapporteur on the situation of
human rights defenders deplored this phenomenon and emphasised that
“the multitude of arrests and detentions of defenders also contributes to
their stigmatization since they are depicted and perceived as troublemakers
by the population” 7.
As far back as 2006, IACHR condemned this contrived link between
the foreign funding of NGOs and interference in the internal a %airs of
a State. ! us, after reviewing the situation in Ve n e z u e l a , it noted that
“broad criminal law de “nitions have been adopted and broadly applied
to criminalize persons who belong to organizations that receive foreign
“nancing. Based on the notion that organizations that receive foreign
funding support foreign intervention in domestic political a %airs, some
States have enshrined criminal law de “nitions in their legislations such as
the conspiracy to destabilise the State, and similar crimes. ! e IACHR has
received several complaints from human rights defenders who have been
tried on these charges, or harassed because of their source of “nancing” 8.
! e case of the Russian Federation provides a very disturbing illustration
of this recourse to accusations of foreign interference.
v As mentioned earlier 9, in 2012 the Russian Federation notably adopted a “Law on
Non-Commercial Organisations” which obliges NGOs that receive foreign funding to
register as “foreign agents”. Under this law, registration is mandatory for all organi –
sations engaged in activities considered “political” by the authorities – though they
do not define what they mean by “political” – and this has led to de facto tighter
controls over them.
This law was passed in haste just two months after the inauguration of President
Vladimir Putin on May 7, 2012. It was drafted in the wake of large anti-Kremlin
demonstrations during the winter of 2011-2012. President Putin accused the United
States and, more generally, foreign governments of instigating these protests and
defended the draft law on the grounds that it was necessary to protect the country
from foreign intervention in domestic political affairs.
7 / See UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Mrs Margaret Sekaggya , UN Document A/HRC/13/22, December 30, 2009, paragraph 32. 8 / See IACHR, Report on the situation of human rights defenders in the Americas 2006 , Document OEA/ Ser.L/V/II.124 Doc. 5 rev.1, March 7, 2006, paragraph 200. 9 / See Chapters 2 and 3.

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
One parliamentarian defending the draft law said it was a response to attempts to
influence Russian domestic politics. During a parliamentary session, he strongly
attacked the NGO Golos – the only independent election monitoring body in
Russia – for allegedly receiving “two million dollars […] in 2011 to smear the Russian
authorities”. Golos reported widespread violations during parliamentary elections
in December 2011.
Local NGOs consider that this law seeks to erode their credibility in the public eye
and to facilitate their repression by State organs, and that their categorisation as
“foreign agents” will, at best, discredit them and, at worst, depict them as spies
working for an “enemy”. The term “foreign agent” has a very negative connotation
in Russia, given police practice at the time of the Soviet Union when spying and
repression by the State police were widespread. In Russian, in fact, the word “agent”
has a meaning close to the word “spy”, and several NGOs fear that if they register as
a “foreign agent”, they will exclude themselves from society, become suspect in the
public eye, and that any contact they seek with official interlocutors will be denied.
Reaction to the adoption of this law was immediate. On the very day of its entry
into force on November 21, 2012, the Centre for Human Rights Memorial discovered
graffiti with the inscription “Foreign Agent. I USA” spray-painted on the walls of
its headquarters office building in Moscow. On the same day, the NGO For Human
Rights was also tagged with the words “foreign agent”.
In November 2012, during its consideration of the report of the Russian Federation,
CAT held the view that “foreign agent” is a term “that seems negative and threaten –
ing to human rights defenders, including organizations that receive funding from
the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture” 10. It therefore called on
the Russian authorities to repeal this provision of the law.
Attempts to delegitimise NGOs continued in October 2012 with the adoption by the
lower house of Parliament of a series of amendments to the laws on treason and
espionage that introduced new provisions in the Criminal Code. The new legislation
broadens the definition of treason to include “providing financial, technical, advisory
or other assistance to a foreign state or international organization […] directed at
harming Russia’s security”. Under its provisions contacts with a foreign entity are
subject to de facto criminalisation and can lead to a 20-year prison sentence. The
use of very vague terms such as “assistance of another nature” allows for arbitrary
application of these provisions.
The activities of many NGOs naturally lead them to interact regularly with very
different kinds of organisations located abroad (e.g., international organisa –
10 / See CAT , Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of the Russian Federation, adopted by the Committee at its forty-ninth session (October 29-November 23, 2012), UN Document CAT/C/RUS/CO/5, December 11, 2012, paragraph 12.

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tions, multilateral bodies, national NGOs, representatives of foreign States, etc.).
This amended law can therefore seriously affect the ability of NGOs to maintain
contacts with such partners abroad.
For example, in November 2012, CAT considered that the law “could affect persons
providing information to the Committee against Torture, the Sub-Committee on
Prevention of Torture or the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture,
which the Committee is concerned could be interpreted as prohibiting the sharing
of information on the human rights situation in the Russian Federation with the
Committee or other United Nations human rights organs. 11” CAT called on the
Russian authorities to repeal the amended definition of the crime of treason in the
Criminal Code and to “review its practice and legislation”.
The authorities have also stepped up direct efforts to stigmatise NGOs and their
work. For example, the Federal Security Service (FSB) has claimed, in an explana –
tory memorandum accompanying the new legislation on treason and espionage,
that foreign intelligence services were “actively” using foreign governmental and
non-governmental organisations to undermine the security of the State.
This claim has been defended by an FSB Deputy Director, Yury Gorbunov, who
reportedly asserted before the Duma on September 21, 2012 that “classic definitions
of espionage and treason had to be broadened to include cooperation with inter –
national organizations, which might include NGOs and media groups, because the
world has become more dangerous. We should include international organizations
on the list of agents that can be charged with treason due to the fact that foreign
intelligence agencies actively use them to camouflage their spying activity” 12.
In this country, the fabrication of theories of foreign infiltration via NGOs to discredit
the latter is a growing trend.
Beyond the legal scope of this unjust legislation and the damage that could result
from its potential application, the laws concerned appear to have another more
insidious objective, namely to enable the FSB to monitor NGOs, including outside
the framework of any criminal proceedings, and to instil within Russian society
a general climate of suspicion vis-à-vis NGOs. Citizens find themselves progres –
sively more and more confined to a space strictly dominated by the discourse of the
authorities who wish to eliminate any criticism against them, in particular regarding
human rights violations in the country.
11 / Idem . 12 / See Christian Science Monitor, Russian NGOs in panic mode over proposed “high treason” law , September 26, 2012.

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
! e case of Egypt is a further illustration of attempts by authorities to
tarnish the reputation of defenders in the eyes of the public. Authorities’
conspiracy theories of foreign interference serve to silence NGOs.
v In Egypt , tensions between the authorities and NGOs, which were permanent
during the Mubarak era, persisted after his fall in February 2011 and during the
period of political transition managed by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces
(SCAF). The SCAF military sought to depict foreigners and international organisa –
tions as subversive agents bent on shaping post-revolutionary Egypt according to
Western interests, especially those of the United States. The political instability
favoured SCAF criticism of NGOs, especially those receiving funds from abroad, in
particular from the United States. These organisations were accused of destabilis –
ing the country and acting as agents of American political interests. Most Egyptian
media outlets gave widespread coverage to these slanderous attacks.
In January-February 2012, the smear campaign focused on civil society organisa –
tions, despite the important role they played in the revolution and in denouncing
violations committed by the Mubarak regime.
For example, on January 2, 2012, the Arab Media Network, Moheet, and the electronic
portal, Al Wafd , published an article entitled “On Wikileaks, the foreign funding
scandal” that undermined the reputation of several NGO leaders, intellectuals and
Egyptian personalities 13. The article claimed that Wikileaks had published cables on
the secret funding in recent years of Egyptian human rights defenders by the United
States embassy in Cairo, and hinted at secret meetings between NGO personnel and
representatives of the embassy.
Several senior NGO officials targeted in the article filed a complaint against Moheet
and Al Wafd , and requested an investigation, judging that the article fanned hatred
and prejudice against them, and constituted slander. The complainants considered
that the information published was false, inaccurate and did not include any content
of the cables released by Wikileaks.
Repression reached its highest level in February 2012, when authorities announced
their intention to prosecute 43 defenders, active in the promotion of civil and politi –
cal rights, including 19 Americans 14.
13 / The article cited, among others, the Arab Center for Independence of Justice and Legal Professions (ACIJP); the Arab Center for Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession; the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR); and various public figures, including the founder of the newspaper Al Masry Al-Youm , Mr. Hisjam Kassem; a member of the journalists’ union; a journalist from Al Ahram; and a member of the National Council for Human Rights. 14 / See Chapter 3.

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
This action mainly targeted four foreign-based NGOs receiving funds from the
United States government. The charges notably included the pursuit of activities
such as “research for the United States” and “serving foreign interests.”
Against this inauspicious backdrop, numerous NGOs stopped soliciting or accepting
foreign funding. In addition, several local NGOs had to return donations received
from abroad, including for example grants from the American organisation Freedom
House and from the United Nations Democracy Fund – UNDEF. Indeed, in November
2012, in the absence of a response from the Ministry of Solidarity and Social Justice
to their request to return the funds they allocated in May, these two organisations
asked the Arab Programme for Human Rights Activists to intercede to ensure reim –
bursement.
Azerbaijan also links NGOs to foreign interference theories.
v In Azerbaijan , the media often describe NGOs that receive funding from abroad
as foreign agents. For example, in 2011-2012, pro-government media such as Yeni
Azerbaycan and Merkez ran a smear campaign against the Institute for Reporters’
Freedom and Safety – RATI after the latter received a warning from the Ministry of
Justice for alleged violations of the Law on NGOs. In particular, the media accused
RATI of using its funding to conduct anti-State activities and to finance mass protests,
such as for example the “Sing for Democracy” campaign launched in the context of
the Eurovision Song Contest held in Baku in May 2012.
The authorities have continued to create and foster a contrived link between NGOs
and political interests in order to depict defenders as subversives, criminals or
traitors. In June 2012, the newspaper Yeni Azerbaycan published an article entitled
“Foreign sources and traces of criminal funding for AXCP” (Azerbaijan Popular Front,
one of the main opposition parties). The article published the names of several NGOs
that it claimed had donated more than 800,000 USD in 2011-2012 to AXCP. These
included the NGO Free Person, the Azerbaijan Lawyers’ Association, the Azerbaijan
Foundation for the Development of Democracy, the Centre for the Observation of
Elections and Democracy Education, the Public Social Union of Strategic Research
and Analytical Investigation, and the NGO Support of Free Economy. Two days later,
the same newspaper published an article entitled “The Soros Foundation is the
mainstay of the fifth column”, in which it described the beneficiaries of the Open
Society Institute (a Soros-funded Foundation) as an “anti-Azerbaijan network”.
In a countr y like Azerbaijan, where freedom of the press is severely
constrained, and where such claims are uncontested, these smear cam –
paigns against NGOs seriously contribute to the stigmatisation of of these
organisations and defenders by depicting them as “traitors to the nation”.

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
One of the most serious examples of the denigration of NGOs that
receive donations from abroad and their resulting marginalisation in society
is illustrated by the case of Ve n e z u e l a .
v Article 1 of the Venezuela Constitution stipulates: “Independence, liberty,
sovereignty, immunity, territorial integrity and national self-determination are
unrenounceable rights of the Nation”.
This article was improperly invoked to justify the denial of the civil and politi –
cal rights of defenders and to brand them as “foreign agents”. For example,
on May 16, 2012, the President of the Permanent Financial Commission of
the National Assembly proposed that the commission should investigate the
origin of the resources of the Venezuelan NGOs “Transparencia Venezuela”
(the national chapter of Transparency International) and “Monitor Legislativo” .
He affirmed that NGOs “never work to eradicate the problems of society”, because
their budgets increase in proportion to the problems at hand, and they therefore
have no incentive to solve them. Moreover, he maintained that foreign funding of
domestic political activities appeared to represent a “violation of Article 1 of the
Constitution of Venezuela, which stipulates that “foreign agents” must not interfere
in the political life of the State to undermine its independence and sovereignty” 15.
It should be recalled that in its reports for 2009 and 2011, Transparencia Venezuela
identified Venezuela as one of the most corrupt countries in the world.
The IACHR has observed a deterioration in the situation of human rights defenders
in the country since 2003, characterised notably by “a policy to confront and pub –
licly discredit defenders and their organizations, which has had consequences on
their work” 16. “State officials have persisted in publicly discrediting human rights
defenders so as to delegitimise any complaint they may present regarding violations
to human rights, in some cases accusing them of being part of a destabilisation
plan and of acting ‘against the revolution’ for having received funds from foreign
organisations and countries for their financing” 17.
This smear campaign has been relayed by the media, which has not hesitated to
use aggressive language. For example, during a radio broadcast on June 21, 2011, a
journalist with the State-run Venezoelano de Televisión (VTV) called Carlos Correa ,
Executive Director of the human rights organisation Public Space ( Espacio Público )
a “mercenary, traitor to the nation, an individual who prostitutes himself with the
empire – the United States – that gives him money. He himself admits it” 18.
15 / See Article of Agencia Venezolana de Noticias , Proponen investigar origen de recursos de la ONG Transparencia Venezuela y Monitoreo Legislativo , May 16, 2012. Unofficial translation. 16 / See IACHR, Democracy and human rights in Venezuela , Document OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 54, December 30, 2009, paragraph 590.17 / Idem , paragraphs 591 and 592. 18 / See Radio Nacional de Venezuela , Caso El Rodeo: El Pran Humberto Prado , June 21, 2011.

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
The following day, Diario Vea published an editorial entitled “the Department of
State [of the United States] came [to solve] the prison problem”, in which it accuses
several NGOs of being manipulated by and in the pay of the United States 19.
NGOs that receive funding from the United States are indeed subject to strong
defamatory verbal abuse, and are notably accused of “spying”, “conspiracy”, “desta –
bilization” and “crime”.
Following this campaign, several criminal investigations were launched against
NGOs that have received funds from the United States in the framework of interna –
tional cooperation. As of the beginning of 2013, the NGOs concerned had not been
informed of any follow-up action in relation to these investigations. It should be
noted that the Supreme Court of Justice had already ruled in 2010 that NGOs that
received funding in the framework of international cooperation were guilty of the
crime of “treason” 20.
In December 2010, a Law on the protection of political freedom and national
self-determination entered into force. It targets NGOs active in the field of “the
defence of political rights” or other “political objectives” and prohibits them from
holding or receiving donations from foreign sources. This law therefore regards
these NGOs as entities that oppose national “self-determination” – in itself a
defamatory claim.
! e theor y of foreign interference through NGOs funded by foreign
donors has also been propagated by States as a pretext in support of the
adoption of laws restricting the work of NGOs.
v Thus, on November 13, 2011 in Israel for example, the Ministerial Legislative
Committee approved two draft law proposals intended to significantly limit the
funding of human rights NGOs by governments and foreign entities.
The first bill sought to impose a 45% tax on donations from “foreign state entities”
to “public institutions”, with the exception of “sponsored” institutions (as defined
in the Foundation Budget Act, 1985). To justify the proposal, the parliamentarian
behind it stated that “several organisations that operate in the country sought to
defame the State of Israel in the eyes of the world and to encourage the persecution
of officers and soldiers [from Israel Defense Forces – IDF] by attacking their reputa –
tion. These entities, which present themselves as ‘organisations defending human
rights’, are funded by States and other obscure sources that seek only to harm and
alter the political discourse of Israel from inside the country”. The parliamentarian
referred to the contributions of NGOs to the conclusions of the Goldstone Report
19 / See Diario Vea , El Problema carcelario le llegó el Departamento de Estado , June 22, 2011. 20 / See Decision of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice No. 796, file No. 09- 0555, July 22, 2010.

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
mandated by the United Nations, which criticised the conduct of the IDF during
Israel’s Operation Cast Lead military offensive in Gaza in December 2008-January
2009. Regarding the complaints lodged by certain NGOs against senior Israeli
civil servants and senior army officers, the parliamentarian said that these NGOs
had attempted to “present IDF soldiers as war criminals, to encourage people to
refuse military service, and to call for an economic and political boycott of Israel”.
She explained, as if it were a crime, that these organisations had “revealed” that they
were funded by European governments and that she considered that the latter “were
intervening in the internal Israeli political discourse in an attempt to delegitimise
IDF activities and soldiers. Foreign money pays for the actions that these organiza –
tions are waging against the IDF”. This bill sought to punish NGOs for their positions
considered contrary to the interests of the State. Thus, its author clearly stated that
she aimed to “deny the right” of these NGOs to benefit from a tax exemption granted
by the State – an exemption that would nevertheless continue to benefit organisa –
tions “working to advance Israeli society in areas such as welfare and education” 21.
The author of a second draft law 22, a member of the party in power, was even more
direct and proposed an outright ban on associations that receive donations from
foreign governments or international bodies such as the United Nations or the
European Union, “given the activities of incitement conducted by many org aniza –
tions that claim to be organizations in defence of human rights and that aim to influ –
ence the political discourse, the nature and policies of the State of Israel” 23. Stating
that the bill was intended to prevent foreign States from intervening in Israeli poli –
tics via their support for associations of a “political nature” 24, this parliamentarian
considered “intolerable” that Israel allows other States to freely “intervene in its
domestic affairs.
The two parliamentarians subsequently introduced only one bill, combining the two
aforementioned proposals and establishing three categories of NGOs: the first cat –
egory would not be allowed to receive foreign funding; those in the second category
would be authorised to receive such donations on condition that they currently
receive funding from the Israeli government; and those in the third category would
be subject to a 45% tax on donations or grants from abroad. Following a national
and international outcry this draft law was never put to the vote 25. In December
2011, the Attorney General warned Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu that the
21 / Bill for Amendment of the Income Tax Order (Taxation of Public Institutions that Receive Donations from a Foreign State Entity) – 2011, presented by Knesset member Fania Kirschenbaum (Yisrael Beitnu). Unofficial translation.22 / The Association Act Banning Foreign Diplomatic Entities’ Support of Political Associations in Israel. Draft law submitted by Knesset member Ofir Akunis. Unofficial translation.23 / Idem . 24 / The Association Act Banning Foreign Diplomatic Entities’ Support of Political Associations in Israel), submitted by Knesset member Ofir Akunis. Unofficial translation.25 / The investiture of the new Knesset following elections in January 2013 moreover nullified this draft law.

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
proposal was unconstitutional. In addition, as mentioned above 26, CEDAW also
cautioned Israel in January 2011 against the creation of a parliamentary commission
with a mandate to investigate the foreign funding of Israeli NGOs.
Under the pretext of fighting against the “delegitimisation of Israel”, the parlia –
mentarians sought to delegitimise NGOs that denounce human rights violations –
especially those committed by army personnel – and considered by their detrac –
tors as vectors of the foreign policy of third States. The NGOs targeted were clearly
those that denounced human rights violations committed by Israel in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory or that defend the rights of the Arab minority in Israel.
It should also be noted that on February 21, 2011, the Knesset passed a bill in its final
reading to restrict funding from abroad for Israeli NGOs 27. This law states that in all
their public speeches and public documents the NGOs concerned are required to
declare that they receive funding from a “foreign political entity”. In addition, they
must disclose on their websites the names of their donors and the destination of
the funds they receive, and submit a quarterly report to the authorities containing
information on donations from foreign governments. Non-observance of this provi –
sion is punishable by fines and imprisonment.
Foreign plot theories exist in numerous countries.
v In Malaysia , for example, several newspapers close to the Barisan Nasional
(BN – the largest political coalition in the country), including The Malaysian
Insider and New Straits Times , published articles on September 21, 2012 alleging
that NGOs such as Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM) and the Coalition for Clean
and Fair Elections (Bersih) had received foreign funding in the context of a plot to
destabilise the country. Similarly, in an article published on the front page of New
Straits Times , the newspaper of the largest party in Parliament, the United Malays
National Organization – UMNO), entitled “Conspiracy to destabilise the govern –
ment,” the author claimed that the government had foiled a foreign destabilisation
plot. It added that the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) had donated up
to 400,000 euros to the NGO SUARAM between 2005 and 2011. Suspecting SUARAM
of receiving funds from NGOs based abroad, the Minister for Internal Trade in
September 2012 requested the Central Bank of Malaysia, Bank Negara Malaysia ,
to investigate SUARAM in the framework of a 2001 law on the fight against money
laundering and the funding of terrorism. The investigation was ongoing at the end
of 2012.
The article did not provide any detail on how these NGOs planned to “destabilise”
the country. It mentioned in particular that the billionaire George Soros, whose Open
26 / See Chapter 1. 27 / This refers to the law stipulating the information disclosure obligations of beneficiaries of support from a foreign political entity.

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
Society Institute (OSI) had allegedly also funded SUARAM, was the mastermind of
a plot to “ruin the economy of the country”.
This smear campaign emerged in an environment wherein several of the NGOs
targeted had been engaged in recent years in the promotion of electoral reform
and the fight against the abuse of power and corruption.
B. Invoking the spectre of internal threats to the nation
If their accusations do not relate to foreign meddling in internal politi –
cal a %airs, States determined to rein in NGOs they feel are too critical of
national authorities invoke their participation in or support for internal
threats to national stability and security. ! e authorities in these countries
target NGOs directly or via pro-government media, and conduct smear
campaigns equating NGOs with criminal groups, armed movements or
other illegal entities opposed to the government. By alleging – without
any evidence – that these NGOs are supported or funded by illegal armed
groups in con $ict with the State, the authorities are fostering – as is also
the case in some other countries – a contrived amalgamation to discredit
them.
v Mexico , which is experiencing a severe political crisis marked by the militarisa –
tion of society and growing insecurity, provides a good illustration of this trend.
The “total war” launched by the authorities against drug traffickers is accompanied
by serious human rights violations, including extrajudicial executions, unfair trials,
and arbitrary detention. In this environment, characterised by the weakening of the
rule of law, some media and State actors have helped to spread the perception that
human rights defenders protect delinquents. They have also propagated the idea
that some NGOs are financed by organised crime.
For example, in a document entitled “Programme of Strategic Studies 2010” the
Centre for Investigation and National Security ( Centro de Investigación y Seguridad
Nacional – CISEN), NGO activities are depicted in the same categories as corrup –
tion, migration and “naturally” organised crime as a risk to national stability.
This assimilation between human rights defenders and threats against national
stability not only constitutes flagrant defamation but also increases the vulnerability
of human rights defenders, in a country where many State and non-State actors are
responsible for acts of violence against people deemed “subversive”.
In yet another example, the newspaper Mi Ambiente published an article on August
9, 2009 claiming that the authorities’ fight against crime was being thwarted by
NGOs “waving the banner of human rights” that had become “reckless accomplices”

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
of drug traffickers, and that sympathise with delinquency and therefore weaken the
government structures 28.
! e impact of defamatory attacks against NGOs can also be felt at the
level of donors, disrupting their funding strategies.
v In Guatemala , for example, NGOs engaged in the defence of environmental law
and the rights of indigenous peoples, or that provide legal assistance, have been the
target of a smear campaign relayed by national media since June 2010. Editorials and
television reports have stated that the international community was supporting ter –
rorists and murderers. Several embassies of European countries that support local
NGOs through financial grants or acts of solidarity have also been targeted. The first
phase of this campaign led to the suspension of relations of several embassies with
NGOs. In 2011, following initiation of this campaign, the embassies of two European
countries 29 suspended official cooperation with a local NGO active in the field of
environmental protection.
In February and March 2012, the media campaign attacked the embassies of two
Nordic countries in relation to a project in support of indigenous peoples. In view
of the absence of reaction from the government, despite its previous approval of
this programme of activities, one of the embassies demanded the reformulation
of eight projects on legal support, human rights education, and capacity building
on communication. In addition, in July 2012, representatives of local institutions
wrongly accused an NGO defending the rights of peasant communities of having
armed elements in its ranks. These allegations prompted a foreign embassy to with –
draw its funding for two projects (job creation for communities and legal support)
implemented by the NGO, despite an assertion by the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights confirming the peaceful nature of the NGO
concerned.
These examples illustrate the impact in real terms of smear campaigns
on the ability of the NGOs targeted to access foreign funding.
Depending on the context, smear campaigns that equate NGOs with
armed opposition movements can jeopardise the physical safety of their
personnel and their families.
28 / See Mi Ambiente article, August 9, 2009. 29 / The source requested that the identity of the NGOs and countries concerned remain confidential.

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
v In Colombia , for example, the authorities’ strategy, which equates armed gue –
rilla movements with NGOs that promote civil and political rights, not only serves
to discredit the NGOs. It also endangers the personnel of these organisations by
depicting them as enemies of the State and subversive elements, and contributes
to undermining their meagre funding opportunities at local level. For instance,
the Defence Minister declared on August 10, 2012 that the Patriotic March ( Marcha
Patriotica ) social movement 30 was financed by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia ( Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) movement. In
a context of armed confrontation between the FARC and the Colombian army, in
which many State and non-State actors resort to violence against people deemed
“subversive”, this has the effect of greatly increasing the physical vulnerability of
members of the Patriotic March movement.
! e assimilation of NGOs to terrorist groups represents another facet
of defamation, but involves the same potential dangers as other situations
mentioned above.
v In Turkey , for example, defenders who denounce human rights violations com –
mitted in the context of the fight against terrorism and those who engage in the
defence of Kurdish minority rights are regarded by the authorities in the same
way as terrorist groups. Dozens of them have been arrested and prosecuted in the
framework of anti-terrorist operations. The pro-government media relays informa –
tion about these procedures and the unfounded accusations against human rights
defenders. These judicial and media campaigns contribute to discredit NGOs in the
eyes of both the public and national and foreign potential donors, and at the same
time endangers defenders’ personal safety.
C. Donors and legal constraints
In addition, in donor countries, the actual ability of donors to “nance
foreign NGOs may be seriously a %ected by the legal framework in place.
Indeed, in some countries, laws impose restrictions on the “nancing of
entities considered hostile to the interests of the State. ! is is particularly
the case of legislation relating to terrorism or national security, which
prohibits, among other things, “nancing or material support to groups
regarded as “terrorists”. Although it is perfectly legitimate to “ght against
terrorism, including by criminalising its “nancing, the objectives of such
legislation are sometimes diverted to paralyse the work of human rights
defenders. ! us, numerous pieces of legislation and practices do not comply
with international human rights conventions.
30 / The Patriotic March is a social movement grouping student, union, peasant, indigenous, Afro- Colombian, women’s and workers’ organisations that denounce political corruption and cronyism, and that defend the sovereignty of local populations over natural resources, among other causes.

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
In situations of armed con $ict or security or political crises, NGOs
and human rights defenders are frequently wrongly accused of giving
“support ” to or “sympathising” with terrorist causes because, as mentioned
above, they denounce human rights violations committed in the contexts
of such crises as well as in the framework of the “ght against terrorism.
! is can put them in serious physical danger. Indeed, the application of
certain anti-terrorism laws can cause human rights defenders problems
and endanger their security. Since 2001, in particular, a large number of
human rights defenders in numerous countries have been subjected to
unwarranted criminal proceedings for allegedly belonging to or supporting
a terrorist organisation, regardless of whether or not they were involved in
or provided support for terrorist acts.
Indeed, the descriptions of o %ences related to “material support ” to
“terrorist activities”, and to the “ “nancing of terrorism”, are vague and
can allow for the inclusion of activities unrelated to terrorism, such as the
promotion and defence of human rights.
In some cases, the executive authorities use the quali “cation “terror –
ist ” improperly without a determination by the judiciary. Such practices
violate the principle of the presumption of innocence. ! e United Nations
Special Rapporteur on human rights and terrorism recommended that
anyone suspected of a #liation, association or providing support to a ter –
rorist organisation should not be prosecuted as a member of a terrorist
organisation unless the terrorist nature of that organisation has been pre –
viously determined by a judicial organ 31. During hearings of witnesses by
the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human
Rights, the panel observed that the absence of a clear de “nition of “ter –
rorism” was aggravated by the fact that the national legislation in ques –
tion was not in compliance with international standards. For instance, at
the hearing on Canada – a country that in 2001 created the o %ence of
“facilitating” a terrorist activity – one witness declared that the formulation
of the o %ence was so vague that it could deter charities from supporting
humanitarian work in con $ict areas where armed groups, characterised as
“terrorist ”, operate 32.
Restrictions on the funding of NGOs under the guise of the “ght against
terrorism or money laundering have unfortunately become widespread in
31 / See UN General Assembly , Report of the Special Rapporteur on human rights and terrorism , UN Document A/61/267, August 16, 2006, pages 11-12.32 / See International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Assessing damage, urging action, Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights , 2009, page 133.

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
recent years, and even a %ect donor countries, whose traditional support
in the humanitarian and human rights “elds is now potentially restricted.
! is worrying trend was notably con “rmed by the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF), which recommended States to “ensure that [NGOs] cannot
be misused: (a) by terrorist organisations posing as legitimate entities; (b)
to exploit legitimate entities as conduits for terrorist “nancing, including
for the purpose of escaping asset-freezing measures; and (c) to conceal or
obscure the clandestine diversion of funds intended for legitimate pur –
poses to terrorist organisations” 33. ! e potential prejudicial character of this
recommendation on the work of NGOs is aggravated by the fact that it
is not accompanied by explicit guaranties of the right of NGOs to access
funding.
v In the United States , three federal laws prohibit “material support” to and
the financing of terrorism, including the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
(Patriot Act of 2001). This Act reinforces offences already provided for under the
Presidential Decree signed by the President at the time, George W. Bush, and sanc –
tions any person that knowingly or intentionally provides “expertise, training or any
other service” 34 to a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO). Thus, donors supporting
foreign organisations can potentially be considered to have knowingly or intention –
ally provided support to groups regarded as terrorist organisations, regardless of
whether or not this support is material.
The risk of excessive interpretation of these provisions became a reality in June
2010, when the United States Supreme Court considered that the prohibition of
the provision of support to terrorist groups also extends to peaceful activities
conducted in the framework of international humanitarian law 35. The case con –
cerned the American NGO Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), which advised that
it wanted to provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) – listed as a terrorist organisation by the United
States and the European Union – in the form of legal assistance, and training
in United Nations special appeal procedures and peaceful measures for conflict
resolution. The Court concluded that in adopting the Patriot Act the United States

33 / See FATF, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation, February 2012, Recommendation VIII, page 13. 34 / See 2001 Patriot Act, USC, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113B, § 2339A 18 USC § 2339A – Providing material support to terrorists.35 / See Judgement of the United States Supreme Court, Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, et al., Petitioners, v. Humanitarian Law Project et al., June 21, 2010 and the Center for Constitutional Rights CCR: https://www.ccrjustice.org/holder-v-humanitarian-law-project.

72
Congress had sought to prohibit this type of support to “terroristf groups because
it could serve to “legitibisef theb.
It is noteworthy that the Suprebe Court judges’ decision was far frob unanibous 36.
It followed several judgebents of the lower courts, which had considered that the
provisions of the Patriot Act were vague. The Suprebe Court, however, held that
the law was clear, and that it did not violate the right to freedob of expression or
association. It should also be noted that in August 2009, a federal court for the first
tibe considered that the governbent could not freeze the assets of an organisation
without first obtaining legal authorisation.
The jurisprudence of the Suprebe Court ibplies that donors cannot finance con –
sultancy services, training or other services for the peaceful resolution of conflicts
involving a terrorist organisation, even if the goals and bodes of action defined
are consistent with the Universal Declaration of Huban Rights, without expos –
ing thebselves to prosecution for “supporting terrorisbf. NGOs and huban rights
defenders conducting such activities would also be exposed to prosecution, which
would obviously have the direct consequence of baking it ibpossible for NGOs to
solicit funds for their activities. This furtherbore abounts to a serious attack on
donor integrity. In this sense, application of this abusive law represents a forb of
“legitibisedf defabation of the donor-defenders concerned.
Beyond the risk of the cribinalisation of donors for providing baterial assistance to
terrorist groups, this jurisprudence – which is counter-productive and detribental
to the probotion of huban rights – has a buch bore serious consequence because
of its bore general ibpact: it deters potential donors, who will in future not take
the risk of financing not only HLP, but also other NGOs that seek to ibplebent
sibilar prograbbe activities whose goals are perfectly peaceful and consistent with
international instrubents, particularly in contexts of open or festering conflicts, or
occupation, in which defenders are often accused by the authorities of supporting
the opposition.
Thus, such provisions may lead to paradoxical situations wherein a State
that promotes human rights and condemns restrictions on foreign NGOs
to access funds from abroad adopts legislation prohibiting the funding of
programmes for the implementation of international law.
36 / It was adopted by six votes for and three votes against.
Th        Th     Th         Th      Th   Th          
    f     f   

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
D. Consequences of smear campaigns against human rights NGOs
and defenders
! e examples above show that smear campaign strategies against human
rights NGOs and defenders, regardless of whether they are based on accu –
sations of foreign interference or support for internal destabilisation plots,
are extremely harmful. ! e consequences of this stigmatisation generally
fall into the following categories:
Defamation in relation to funding:
– as mentioned above, constitutes a violation of the right to preservation of
defenders’ honour and reputation enshrined in Article 12 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights;
– seriously endangers the physical safety of defenders. By depicting them
as traitors or enemies of the State in countries plagued by violence com –
mitted by State and non-State actors, they become potential targets of
physical attacks;
– leads some NGOs to practice a form of auto-censorship and to refrain
from submitting funding requests to potential donors. In this context,
authorities no longer have to apply visible pressure to achieve their
objective, for example by enacting unpopular and more restrictive laws
or administrative measures (such auto-censorship has been noted for
example in the case of several countries in the Euro-Mediterranean
basin) 37;
– can in certain cases prompt active donors to terminate their funding. ! is
disastrous consequence for the work of the NGOs concerned represents
a victory for the authorities who no longer have to bear the direct politi –
cal cost and responsibility for the suspension or suppression of foreign
funding;
– undermines NGOs in the eyes of the public and saps the ability of
defenders to encourage public and private local donors to contribute
“nancially to NGO budgets – paradoxically at a time when they need
this “nancing more than ever before due to the increasing restrictions
on access to foreign funding;
37 / See Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), EMHRN Annual Review of freedom of association in the Euro-Mediterranean region – 2010: Civil society in danger, chapter on the funding of associations in the Euro-Mediterranean region, 2010.

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
– leads certain NGOs to revise the de “nition of their programmes and
their level of engagement in the debate on the promotion and protection
of human rights in society, which result in a reduction of their activi –
ties. ! e IACHR declared that in some States of the Americas human
rights defenders “have seen their work limited by forms of discourse that
characterize their work in a negative light” 38.
Moreover, in the context of consideration of the report submitted by
Ve n e z u e l a , t h e I AC H R h a s c o n c l u d e d : “ D i s p a r a g i n g h u m a n r i g h t s d e f e n d –
ers and their organizations could cause them, out of fear of possible repris –
als, to hold back from making public statements critical of government
policies, which in turn hampers debate and the ability to reach basic agree –
ments regarding the problems that a ‘ict the Venezuelan people” 39.
! e consequences of these di %erent forms of slander against defenders in
connection with “nancing are therefore not limited to the issue of funding
for their activities, but also a %ect other key areas of the life of NGOs and
human rights defenders, in particular their right to physical integrity and
respect for their privacy.
38 / See IACHR , Report on the situation of human rights defenders in the Americas , Document OEA/ Ser.L/V/II.124 Doc. 5 rev.1, March 7, 2006, paragraph 175. 39 / See IACHR , Democracy and human rights in Venezuela , Document OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 54, December 30, 2009, paragraph 603.

75
C O N C LUS IO N
A N D R E COMM EN DATIO NS
OBS ERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION O F HUM AN RIGHTS DEFE NDER S 2013 ANNUAL REP ORT
A. Conclusion
Although the right to access funding is an integral part of the right to
freedom of association – itself a universally recognised right enshrined in
numerous international and regional instruments – many States are guilty
of placing abusive restrictions on this right.
Limitations or even the outright denial of the right to freedom of asso –
ciation constitute the most radical restriction on access to funding. Such
measures can have an impact on the conditions for the establishment or
management of an NGO, which should be guaranteed without any inter –
ference or pressure from the authorities.
The right of NGOs to access funding is violated either indirectly by
restricting the ability of defenders to operate openly in the framework
of an NGO, or directly through legislation, regulations or administrative
practices that explicitly restrict or prohibit access to funding. Whatever the
strategies adopted by States, they have a devastating impact on the ability
of NGOs to conduct activities to promote and protect human rights, as
provided for in the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders.
Even worse, smear campaigns related to the issue of funding for NGOs
pervert and demonise the concept of solidarity or international coopera –
tion to the detriment of the movement in defence of human rights and
the advancement of democratic principles. In the process, the issue of
international solidarity is degraded to the level of a breach of national
sovereignty, and defenders are portrayed as criminals.
Yet, the right of NGOs to solicit, obtain and use funding places States
under a dual obligation: on the one hand, a negative obligation not to
impede and to fully respect the exercise of this right, and on the other
hand, a positive obligation to create a framework that facilitates NGO
access to funding. The State must establish and ensure favourable con –
ditions enabling NGOs to achieve this goal, for example by creating a
legal and administrative framework conducive to the enjoyment of this
right. By promoting access to funding for NGOs the State is not granting

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
any privilege to defenders – it is merely assuming its responsibility.
This double obligation should be reflected in national legislation, which
must allow NGOs to solicit, receive and utilise funds from both domes –
tic and foreign sources. In many cases, however, States adopt a contrary
approach by imposing improper controls over NGO funding rather than
actively supporting the latter.
This right of NGOs to access and use funds, especially funds from
abroad, is naturally accompanied by certain responsibilities on their part,
especially in terms of transparency and good governance, as in any other
sector of society. Still, the State should not impose a general system of
prior authorisation for access to foreign funding. In general, and to the
extent that States have a legitimate interest to control illegal sources of
funding, for example in the context of the fight against money laundering,
such concerns are addressed through criminal or administrative investiga –
tions conducted on the basis of suspected acts of embezzlement or other
violations of the law.
From a legal perspective, legitimate restrictions on the right of access to
funding are the same as those admitted with regard to the right to freedom
of association: they are only authorised under strict and cumulative condi –
tions. They must be “prescribed by law ” and “necessar y in a democratic
society”, and respect the primacy of the general interest and the principle
of proportionality.
In some countries, the authorities impose a system of prior authorisa –
tion for the establishment of an association or even prohibit or criminalise
unregistered NGOs. The absence of a legal status blocks NGO access
to some funding, regardless of whether it is public, private, domestic or
foreign. The situation is more serious in countries where the activities
of unregistered NGOs are prohibited, or heavily penalised, and where
defenders, as well as persons or entities that support NGOs – including
financially – are exposed to fines or imprisonment.
The official reasons given by authorities for denying the right to freedom
of association, including the right to access funding, are based notably on
vague concepts – defined diversely in different national legislations – such
as “public order”, “tranquillity ”, “morality ”, “political activities” or – even
worse –amalgamations that portray defenders as being close to or sympa –
thising with supporters of “terrorism”. The reasons put forward may also
include discriminator y criteria based, for example, on the nationality of
defenders.

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
In some (including Western) countries, anti-terrorism or national secu –
rity laws contain provisions (mostly introduced in the wake of the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 and based on United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1373) which pose problems for the proper functioning
of NGOs. Indeed, some of these provisions, if interpreted broadly, could
wrongly impede the right of NGOs to access funding for activities in
situations where certain parties to a conflict are considered supporters or
members of terrorist organisations. This may occur even if the said activi –
ties are consistent with the goals of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and seek, as a priority, to promote political dialogue or a cessation
of the violence. In some cases, these provisions also impede the ability of
donors to finance human rights-related projects for fear of prosecution or
proceedings against them based on an anti-terrorist law.
Even when defenders are able to register their NGO they can face
a second type of impediment directly related to their ability to access
funding. Indeed, in many countries, NGOs often have no choice but to
seek financial support from foreign organisations and it is these external
sources of funding that certain States seek to drain as a priority. These
States thus limit access to foreign funding either by: explicitly prohibit –
ing it altogether; imposing unfavourable taxation rates on such funding;
limiting the types of activities or NGOs that can benefit from foreign
funding; imposing a prior official authorisation requirement; or forcing
donors to transfer funds exclusively via institutions approved by the State.
Very recently, the Russian Federation introduced legislation that classifies
NGOs that receive funding from abroad as “foreign agents”, thus adding a
new category to the manifold means of repression that could be described
as “legalised defamation”.
The specious nature of the reasons invoked by certain States to restrict
access to funding is especially well illustrated by their contradictory approach
in relation to the categories of recipients of grants from foreign sources.
Indeed, many States that restrict NGO access to foreign funding very often
receive international aid themselves. This is not only paradoxical, but above
all reflects the application of an unacceptable double standard, both vis-à-vis
the law and from the standpoint of ethics and equitable practice.
This report shows that the limitations imposed by State authorities
in many countries on NGO access to funding are not consistent with
the applicable legal criteria, and therefore constitute a violation of their
international obligations. The reasons authorities invoke for restricting
this right are fallacious and unjustified in law, and are in reality intended
to stifle the activities of defenders considered hostile and overly critical.

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
The impact on defenders of funding restrictions targeting NGOs is
evident at several levels:
First, financial restrictions obviously jeopardise the ver y sur vival of
NGOs. Such restrictions become all the more damaging in situations
where international funding is prohibited or severely constrained and, for
numerous reasons, only limited funding is available from domestic sources.
In addition, smear campaigns that accuse NGOs of supporting “foreign
interests” further undermine their prospects of obtaining funding at local
and national levels because they discredit them in the eyes of the public. In
yet other cases – especially in conflict zones – donors apply self-imposed
censorship on grants or adopt strategies to minimise their exposure to
potential risks. They may be tempted, for example, to finance only activi –
ties considered “inoffensive” by the authorities, or entities or organisations
that work in close cooperation with the government. Moreover, the mere
risk of being exposed to charges of illegal funding, whether as a recipient
or a donor, often prompts donors to end financial support to NGOs. In
such cases, the scope of activities of the NGOs affected have to be cut
back drastically.
At the moral and ethical levels, smear campaigns inhibit the development
of a culture of human rights in the country. By accusing NGOs that receive
external funding of serving foreign interests, States implicitly disqualify the
cause of human rights by suggesting that the latter are not in the national
interest and are even contradictory. This denigration of NGOs and their
work can invalidate any potential criticism that defenders may make with
regard to the authorities’ lack of respect for human rights: statements made
by NGOs depreciated in the eyes of the public have little impact. NGOs
thereby disqualified become isolated from their national, regional and /
or international networks of defenders. The impact is not only felt by
local NGOs that would like to carry out joint activities with regional and
international NGO partners, but also by the latter which generally benefit
from the experience and first-hand information provided by the former.
The defamation of NGOs related to their use of foreign funding is
only one form among others of the defamator y assaults made against
human rights defenders in many countries – assaults that in reality violate
their right to respect for their honour. In most cases, smear campaigns
are based on accusations of foreign interference. But in some countries
facing a political crisis, armed rebellion or widespread criminality repres –
sive regimes manipulate categorisations to portray defenders as subversive
elements or criminals, thus endangering – including physically – the NGOs
and defenders concerned. The devaluation of NGOs, mentioned above,

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
has another even more corrosive impact because it not only affects those
NGOs that are explicitly targeted, but also the entire community of human
rights defenders, including defenders engaged in areas perceived as less
sensitive by the authorities. The adoption of certain laws, whose purpose
is not so much their application as the creation of a general climate of self-
censorship by defenders, further extends this more widespread secondary
impact.
Finally, on a general level, barriers to funding are often erected in the
context of a per vasive climate of repression in which restrictive laws
combine with smear campaigns and legal proceedings against NGOs and
their members to create a hostile environment towards activities in defence
of human rights. The application of these restrictive laws is often not
necessary to restrict the activities of human rights defenders because the
mere threat they pose is sufficiently dissuasive.
The study of the problem demonstrates that State barriers to the financ –
ing of NGOs represent one of the most serious institutional problems
currently facing defenders. In recent years, this problem has become the
focus of increasing attention by the affected NGOs, as well as by donors
and certain regional and international human rights organisations. Despite
awareness on this issue, the legal and institutional responses to violations of
this component of the right to freedom of association remain inadequate,
perhaps because of the myriad forms of the restrictions on funding. There
is a pressing need to define a dual strategy that both calls on authorities
to lift all restrictions and strengthens the capacities of NGOs and donors
to overcome the impediments blocking free access to funding for NGOs.
B. Recommendations
1. To States
On freedom of association and the work of defenders
– To respect all components of the right to access funding – the right to
solicit, receive and utilise funding – and to take a public stand on the
right of human rights defenders and NGOs to benefit from support and
international networks;
– To recognise the importance of the role played by human rights defenders
in society and to ensure their protection;
– To respect the fundamental right to freedom of association, as guaran –
teed in particular under Article 22 of the ICCPR, without limitation

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
or discrimination based on the identity of members or the nature of the
rights defended;
– To review legislation regulating the establishment, registration and
operation of NGOs in order to create a straightfor ward and coherent
legal and administrative framework favourable to the development of
NGOs and their work;
– To repeal any legislation which prohibits or criminalises unregistered
NGO activities, or which applies similar sanctions against NGOs merely
on the grounds that they receive funding from abroad;
– To ensure that any limitation on the right to freedom of association is
consistent in its entirety with Article 22 of the ICCPR;
– To respect the right of NGOs to manage their resources – including
funding – and to formulate their programmes and activities independ –
ently without interference from the authorities;
– To guarantee the right of NGOs to an effective remedy in the event
of denial of registration, suspension or dissolution, and to benefit from
suspensive measures in all cases of suppression or limitations placed on
their right to freedom of association and funding.
On access to funding and the taxation system
– To respect the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, in particular
its Article 13 on the right to solicit and receive resources from institu –
tional or individual donors, as well as from other States and multilateral
agencies;
– To replace a discriminatory or unjustified regulatory and control approach
toward funding with a policy of effective encouragement through the
adoption of concrete legal and administrative measures;
– To ensure access to funding for NGOs – including from abroad – without
the requirement to obtain prior governmental authorisation, and under
equitable conditions;
– To abolish all restrictions on foreign sources of funding imposed under
the pretext of combating “foreign interference” and defending “national
interests”, and respect at all times the right of NGOs to promote and
protect all human rights – including political rights;

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
– To refrain from invoking efforts to eradicate money laundering and ter –
rorism as pretexts for imposing restrictions on NGO access to funding;
– To e x e m p t N G O s f r o m i n c o m e t a x a n d o t h e r t a x e s a p p l i c a b l e t o f e e s ,
funds and property received from donors or international organisations,
and only perform controls that are absolutely necessar y for legitimate
purposes defined by law;
– To refrain from interfering with the use of funds by NGOs, and ensure
the application of clear, objective and non-discriminatory criteria for all
forms of public aid they receive.
On defamation
– To fully assume their responsibility to respect, support and promote
the work of NGOs, in particular by refraining from engagement in all
forms of defamation, unfounded criticism and smear campaigns directed
against them because of the source of their funding, or for any other
reason, in accordance with Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
2. To donors (States/Organisations/Foundations)
– To organise coordination meetings between donors to define a common
strategy, and formulate concrete responses in cases where their beneficiar –
ies are faced with problems of access to funding;
– For States and institutions that finance cooperation programmes in
countries imposing restrictions on the right to external funding: to use
these relationships to highlight the inconsistencies in the policies on
foreign funding of the States concerned, and to call on States that are
beneficiaries of cooperation programmes to lift all legal, administrative
and practical restrictions on foreign funding imposed on local NGOs;
– To maintain funding – planned or ongoing – for NGOs that may be
victims of smear campaigns orchestrated by their government and
domestic media as well as in cases where it is impossible to obtain legal
recognition of the right of NGOs to access funding due to arbitrar y
government policy;
– To ensure that the laws or other provisions against terrorism, including
concepts such as “material support ”, are not invoked unduly in relation to
financial support for NGOs working perfectly legally and pursuing goals
consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
– To include the issue of funding of NGOs in their bilateral and multilat –
eral discussions, guidelines and policies on support to NGOs;
– To support organisations and regional and international networks that
assist local NGOs, particularly in cases where the latter are under threat;
– To ensure that diplomatic representations in third countries effectively
support local NGOs facing difficulties in accessing funding, including
from abroad; and, if necessary, intercede with the authorities concerned.
This applies especially to the European Union, in accordance with its
Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders;
– To respect the autonomy of NGOs in relation to programme priorities
identified by them, and give preference to general financial support rather
than funding that favours specific activities/programmes.
3. To NGOs affected by funding restrictions
– To alert the relevant United Nations mechanisms, such as the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders and the Special
Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of associa –
tion as well as treaty bodies and, as appropriate, regional mechanisms in
order to raise awareness to this issue and the applicable body of case law;
– To analyse restrictions on access to funding in light of the criteria defined
by international law regarding limitations on the right to freedom of
association (Article 22.2 of the ICCPR) and, in case of violation of
these legal restrictions, alert the domestic courts and, where appropriate,
regional and international jurisdictions;
– To develop arguments based on international law, including relevant
caselaw, decisions, opinions, recommendations and statements made by
United Nations and regional human rights bodies;
– To d e v e l o p c o m m o n s t r a t e g i e s t o c o u n t e r a t t e m p t s b y S t a t e s t o d e f a m e ,
belittle, marginalise and criminalise NGOs that receive foreign funding,
including by developing support networks;
– Develop strategies to maximise opportunities to access funding sources
at local level.

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
On the responsibilities of defenders
In order to avoid unfounded indictment by the authorities and to con –
tinue to benefit from the protection afforded by the Declaration on Human
Rights Defenders, NGOs are required to:
– Ensure that their modes of operation and purpose are consistent with
Article 22 of the ICCPR, and at all times ensure that their activities
comply with universal human rights norms;
– Fully assume their responsibility to contribute to the promotion of the
right of all persons to a social and international order that encourages
full realisation of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights instruments, in
accordance with the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders;
– Respect, to the extent possible, the provisions relating to the transparency
of financing and auditing.
4. To human rights institutions, bodies and agencies:
To n a t i o n a l h u m a n r i g ht s i n s t i tu t i o n s / O m b u d s m a n
– To strengthen recognition of the legitimacy of human rights defenders
and their work, and facilitate dialogue between authorities and defenders,
including on the question of funding;
– To heighten attention to the issue of funding, especially from foreign
sources and in relation to defamation; to denounce unjustified restrictions
and adopt clear recommendations based on international law.
To international and regional organisations
– To heighten attention to the issue of funding, especially from foreign
sources and in relation to defamation; to denounce unjustified restrictions
and adopt clear recommendations;
– To explicitly denounce – in particular through public denunciations – barriers
blocking access to funding as a violation of the fundamental right to
freedom of association, and raise specific problems during bilateral and
multilateral meetings with the authorities of the countries concerned.

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
To the United Nations Human Rights Council and the Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
– To adopt a resolution reaffirming, inter alia, the right of NGOs to access
funding, especially from foreign sources, and calling on States to respect
the rights of NGOs to manage their resources – including funding – and
to formulate their activity programmes independently without interfer –
ence from the authorities;
– To denounce any violations of this right in resolutions on countries and
in cases where defamation in relation to funding sources is perpetrated
or tolerated by the authorities;
– To discuss and address this question during the review of reports during
the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) sessions;
– To request Special Procedures mandate-holders to pay particular atten –
tion to this issue by addressing it in their thematic or country reports,
and by inviting the countries concerned to meetings / roundtables to
identify concrete solutions.
To the relevant Special Procedures of the United Nations
and regional organisations
– To pay systematic attention to the problem of access to funding during
in situ missions and in their reports, and to adopt strong and public
positions;
– To promote exchanges between affected NGOs / donors, as well as
with countries restricting access to funding, in order to raise awareness
to this issue; to recall the legal framework; and to formulate responses
and recommendations;
– To a d o p t r e s o l u t i o n s r e a f f i r m i n g t h e r i g h t o f d e f e n d e r s t o a c c e s s f u n d i n g ,
including foreign funding.
To United Nations Treaty Bodies
– To pay sustained attention to this issue during consideration of reports
of States parties, and to adopt strong recommendations;
– When reviewing individual complaints, to adopt clear and strong case-
law in relation to violations of the right to access funding.

85
ANNEX I
LI ST OF IN TER N AT I O N A L A N D R EG IO N A L
H U MA N RI G HT S INS TR U M EN TS THAT
ENS HRI NE TH E RI G HT TO FR EE DOM
OF A SS OCIATIO N, IN CLU DI NG TH E RI G HT
OF NG O s TO ACC ESS FUN DI NG
OBS ERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION O F HUM AN RIGHTS DEFE NDER S 2013 ANNUAL REP ORT
As seen in Chapter 1 of this report, all international and regional human
rights instruments enshrine the right to freedom of association. The unre –
stricted access of non-governmental human rights organisations to funds
and resources – including from abroad – is an integral component of that
right. Following is a recapitulative list of these international and regional
instruments:
A. International instruments
v Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (1966):
“1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others,
including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection
of his interests.
2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than
those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a demo –
cratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public
order ( ordre public ), the protection of public health or morals or the
protection of the rights and f reedoms of others. This article shall not
prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the armed
forces and of the police in their exercise of this right.
3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International
Labour Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organize to take legislative
measures which would prejudice, or to apply the law in such a manner
as to prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention ”.

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v Ar tic le 3 of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organise Convention (No. 87), International Labour
Organisation (1948):
“1. Workers’ and employers’ organisations shall have the right to draw
up their constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full
freedom, to organise their administration and activities and to for –
mulate their programmes.
2. The public authorities shall refrain from any interference ”. 
v Article 6.f of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief
(1981):
“ […] the right to f reedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief shall
include, inter alia, the following f reedoms […] to solicit and receive
voluntar y f inancial and other contributions f rom individuals and
institutions ”.
v Article 5 of the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of
Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect
Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(1998) – hereafter the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders:
“ For the purpose of promoting and protecting human rights and funda –
mental f reedoms, everyone has the right, individually and in association
with others, at the national and international levels:
[…] (b) To form, join and participate in non-governmental organizations,
associations or groups;
(c) To communicate with non-governmental or intergovernmental
organizations ”.
v Article 13 of the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders:
“ Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to
solicit, receive and utilize resources for the express purpose of promoting
and protecting human rights and fundamental f reedoms through peaceful
means, in accordance with article 3 of the present Declaration ”.

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
B. Regional instruments
v Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950):
“1. Everyone has the right to f reedom of peaceful assembly and to f reedom
of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade
unions for the protection of his interests.  
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other
than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals
or for the protection of the rights and f reedoms of others. this article
shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise
of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the
administration of the State ”.
v Article 16 of the American Convention on Human Rights (1969):
“1. Everyone has the right to associate freely for ideological, religious,
political, economic, labor, social, cultural, sports, or other purposes.
2. The exercise of this right shall be subject only to such restrictions estab –
lished by law as may be necessary in a democratic society, in the interest
of national security, public safety or public order, or to protect public
health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.
3. The provisions of this article do not bar the imposition of legal restric –
tions, including even deprivation of the exercise of the right of associa –
tion, on members of the armed forces and the police ”. 
v Article 10 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(1981):
“ Every individual shall have the right to f ree association provided that
he abides by the law ”. 
v Article 24 (5) of the Arab Charter on Human Rights (2004):
“ Every citizen has the right to form associations with others and to join
associations ”.

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
v Paragraph 14 of the European Union Guidelines on Human Rights
Defenders (2004):
These Guidelines recommend EU diplomatic missions to seek “ to ensure
that human rights defenders in third countries can access resources, includ –
ing f inancial resources, from abroad and that they can be informed of
the availability of those resources and of the means of requesting them ”.

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ANNEX II
TH E OBSE RVATOR Y FOR TH E PROT ECTIO N
OF HU MA N R IG HT S DE FEN D ER S:
AN OMCT A N D FIDH J OI N T PRO G RAMM E
OBS ERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION O F HUM AN RIGHTS DEFE NDER S 2013 ANNUAL REP ORT
Activities of the Observatory
The O bser vator y is an action programme based on the belief that
strengthened co-operation and solidarity among human rights defend –
ers and their organisations will contribute to break their isolation. It is
also based on the absolute necessity to establish a systematic response
from NGOs and the international community to the repression of which
defenders are victims. The Observatory’s activities are based on consul –
tation and co-operation with national, regional, and international non-
governmental organisations.
With this aim, the Observatory seeks to establish:
a) a mechanism of systematic alert of the international community on cases
of harassment and repression of defenders of human rights and funda –
mental freedoms, particularly when they require urgent intervention;
b) an observation of judicial proceedings, and whenever necessary, direct
legal assistance;
c) international missions of investigation and solidarity;
d) a personalised assistance as concrete as possible, including material
support, with the aim of ensuring the security of the defenders victims
of serious violations;
e) the preparation, publication and world-wide dissemination of reports
on violations of the rights and freedoms of individuals or organisations
working for human rights around the world;
f) sustained action with the United Nations (UN) and more particularly
the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, and when neces –
sary with geographic and thematic Special Rapporteurs and Working
Groups;
g) sustained lobbying with various regional and international intergov –
ernmental institutions, especially the Organisation of American States
(OAS), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the
Council of Europe, the International Organisation of the Francophonie

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
(OIF), the Commonwealth, the League of Arab States, the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the International Labour
Organisation (ILO).
With efficiency as its primary objective, the Obser vatory has adopted
flexible criteria to examine the admissibility of cases that are referred to it,
based on the “operational definition” of human rights defenders adopted
by FIDH and OMCT:
“Each person victim or at risk of being the victim of reprisals, harassment
or violations, due to his or her commitment, exercised individually or in
association with others, in conformity with international instruments of
protection of human rights, to the promotion and realisation of the rights
recognised by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and guaranteed
by the different international instruments”.
To ensure its activities of alert and mobilisation, the Obser vatory has
established a system of communication devoted to defenders in danger.
This system, known as the Emergency Line, is available by:
Email: Appeals@fidh-omct.org
Te l : + 3 3 1 4 3 5 5 2 5 1 8 / F a x : + 3 3 1 4 3 5 5 1 8 8 0 ( F I D H )
Te l : + 4 1 2 2 8 0 9 4 9 3 9 / F a x : + 4 1 2 2 8 0 9 4 9 2 9 ( O M C T )
Animators of the Observatory
From the headquarters of FIDH (Paris) and OMCT (Geneva), the
Obser vator y is super vised by Antoine Bernard, FIDH Chief Executive
Officer, and Juliane Falloux, Executive Director, as well as by Gerald
Staberock, OMCT Secretary General, and Anne-Laurence Lacroix,
OMCT Deputy Secretary General.
At OMCT, the Observatory is run by Delphine Reculeau, Coordinator,
with the assistance of Isabelle Scherer, Coordinator a.i., Marc Aebersold,
Halima Dekhissi, Guro Engstrøm Nilsen, Pierre-Henri Golly, Silvia
Gómez Moradillo, Marinella Gras, Alexandra Kossin, Andrea Meraz
Sepulveda, Helena Solà Martín and Anne Varloteau.
At FIDH, the Observatory is run by Alexandra Poméon, Head of the
Programme, and Hugo Gabbero, Programme Officer, and the support
of Catherine Absalom, Victor Allenou, Hassatou Ba, Céline Balléreau,
Clémence Bectarte, Corinne Bezin, Karine Bonneau, Katherine Booth,
Isabelle Brachet, Marie-France Burq, Marie Camber lin, Montserrat
Carboni, Delphine Carlens, Isabelle Chebat, Claire Colardelle, Kate Coles,
Audrey Couprie, Stéphanie David, Nicolas Diaz, Gaelle Dusepulchre,

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
Salma El Hoseini, Charline Fralin, Serguei Funt, Christophe Gardais,
Florent Geel, Caroline Giraud, Julie Gromellon, Tchérina Jerolon, Michelle
Kissenkoetter, David Knaute, Alexandra Koulaeva, Nathalie Lasslop, James
Lin, Antoine Madelin, Arthur Manet, Samia Merah, Tony Minet, Pia
Navazo, Lidya Ogbazghi, Glenn Payot, Antonin Rabecq, Jimena Reyes,
Jean Marie Rogue, L ea S amain-Raimbault, Marceau S ivieude, Elin
Wr z onc ki.
The Observatory wishes to thank Sherif Bahlol, Anthony Drummond,
Mary Reagan, José Ricardo Sáenz, Manuela Sáenz Devia and Christopher
Thiéry, as well as the Eurideas Agency for their contribution to the transla –
tion of the report.
The Observatory’s activities are assisted by all OMCT and FIDH local
partners.
Operators of the Observatory
FIDH
Created in 1922, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
brings together 164 leagues in more than 100 countries. It coordinates and
supports their work and provides a relay for them at international level.
FIDH works to protect the victims of human rights violations, to prevent
these violations and to prosecute those responsible. FIDH takes concrete
action for respect of the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights – civil and political rights as well as economic, social and
cultural rights. Seven priority themes guide the work of FIDH on a daily
basis: protection of human rights defenders, promotion of women’s rights,
promotion of the rights of displaced migrants and refugees, promotion of
the administration of justice and the fight against impunity, strengthen –
ing of respect for human rights in the context of economic globalisation,
strengthening of international and regional instruments and mechanisms
to protect and support human rights and the rule of law in conflict periods,
emergency situations and during political transition periods.
FIDH has either consultative or observer status with the United Nations,
UNESCO, the Council of Europe, the OIF, the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), the OAS and the ILO.
FI DH is in regular, dail y contact with the UN, the EU and the
International Criminal Court through its liaison offices in Geneva, New
Yo r k , B r u s s e l s a n d T h e H a g u e . F I D H h a s a l s o o p e n e d o f f i c e s i n C a i r o ,
Nairobi and Bangkok to further its work with the League of Arab States,
the AU and the ASEAN. Ever y year, FIDH provides guidance to over

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OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
200 representatives of its member organisations, and also relays their activi –
ties on a daily basis.
The International Board is comprised of: Souhayr Belhassen (Tunisia),
President; Artak Kirakosyan (Armenia), Roger Bouka Owoko (Republic
of the Congo), Khadija Cherif (Tunisia), Paul Nsapu Mukulu (DRC),
Luis Guillermo Perez (Colombia), General Secretaries; Jean-François
Plantin (France), Treasurer; and Yusuf Atlas (Turkey), Aliaksandr Bialiatski
(Belarus), Amina Bouayach (Morocco), Juan Carlos Capurro (Argentina),
Karim Lahidji (Iran), Fatimata Mbaye (Mauritania) Asma Jilani Jahangir
(Pakistan), Paulina Vega Gonzalez (Mexico), Sorraya Gutierez Arguello
(Colombia), Raji Sourani (Palestine), Mario Lana (Italy), Katherine
Gallagher (United States of America), Arnold Tsunga (Zimbabwe),
Dan Van Raemdonck (Belgium), Dismas Kitenge Senga (DRC), Vice-
Presidents.
OMCT
Created in 1985, the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT)
is today the main international coalition of NGOs fighting against
torture, summary executions, enforced disappearances and all other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment. With 311 affiliated organisations in its
SOS-Torture Network, OMCT is the most important network of non-
governmental organisations working for the protection and the promotion
of human rights in the world.
Based in Geneva, OMCT International Secretariat provides personalised
medical, legal and/or social assistance to victims of torture and ensures the
daily dissemination of urgent interventions across the world, in order to
prevent serious human rights violations, to protect individuals and to fight
against impunity. Moreover, some of its activities aim at protecting spe –
cific categories of vulnerable people, such as women, children and human
rights defenders. OMCT also carries out campaigns relating to violations
of economic, social and cultural rights. In the framework of its activities,
OMCT also submits individual communications and alternative reports to
the United Nations mechanisms, and actively collaborates in the respect,
development and strengthening of international norms for the protection
of human rights.
A delegation of the International Secretariat has been appointed to
promote activities in Europe and to represent OMCT to the EU. It con –
stitutes the link with European institutions; its role is to support and to
implement the International Secretariat ’s mandate at the European level.
OMCT has either a consultative or obser ver status with the United
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the ILO, the OIF,
the ACHPR and the Council of Europe.

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2013 ANNU AL REPORT
Its Executive Council is composed of Mr. Yves Berthelot, President
(France), Mr. José Domingo Dougan Beaca, Vice-President (Equatorial
Guinea), Mr. Dick Marty, V ice-President (Switzerland), Mr. Anthony
Travis, Treasurer (United Kingdom), Mr. Santiago Alejandro Canton
(Argentina), Ms. Aminata Dieye (Senegal), Mr. Kamel Jendoubi (Tunisia),
Ms. Tinatin Khidasheli (Georgia), Ms. Jahel Quiroga Carrillo (Colombia)
and Mr. Henri Tiphagne (India).

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TA BLE OF CO N T EN T S
OBS ERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION O F HUM AN RIGHTS DEFE NDER S 2013 ANNUAL REP ORT
Acronyms most frequently used in the report 4
Foreword by Maina Kiai 5
Introduction 7
Chapter I 11
The right of NGOs to access funding, including foreign funding –
international and regional instruments
Chapter II 26
Freedom of association: an essential precondition
for NGO access to funding
Chapter III 41
Direct restrictions on access to funding,
including foreign funding
Chapter IV 55
Funding, a pretext to discredit NGOs
Conclusion and recommendations 75
Annex 1 85
Annex 2 89

95

OMCT and FIDH would like to thank the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Finnish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Fondation de France, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the International Organisation of the Francophonie (OIF), the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Paris City Hall, the Sigrid Rausing Trust and the Swedish International Development
Cooperation Agency (SIDA) for making the publication of the Annual Report 2013 of the
Observatory possible. Its content is the sole responsibility of FIDH and OMCT and should in
no way be interpreted as reflecting the view(s) of the supporting institutions.

ANNUAL REPORT 2013
Violations of the right
of NGOs to funding:
from harassment
to criminalisation
“The topic of this year’s report is most pertinent as lately we have witnessed increased stigmatization
and undue restrictions in relation to access to funding and resources for civil society organizations, in
an attempt to stifle any forms of criticism, especially calls for democratic change or accountability for
human rights violations. […] I am particularly dismayed about laws or policies stigmatizing recipients
due to their sources of funding, which have been adopted in the past months or are under consideration,
in several countries across the world”.
“I am confident that the Observatory report and my work in this field will be complementary and
mutually beneficial. I hope our joint efforts will succeed and will pave the way for better respect of
the right to freedom of association, especially its core component, the access to funding and resources,
in all parts of the world. It is ultimately the obligation of Member States to fully protect this right,
which shall be enjoyed by everyone”.
Maina Kiai , United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and
of Association.
The Annual Report 2013 of the Observatory provides a global review of the violations of the right
of NGOs to funding. It provides a detailed picture of this as yet little studied problem, the growing
dimension of which is a worrying concern. This picture is illustrated with around thirty country
situations affecting human rights organisations. While recalling the legal basis of this right, as well as
its organic relationship with the right to freedom of association and the embryonic jurisprudence on
this subject, the report stimulates deep reflection on the negative impacts of these restrictive measures
and makes concrete recommendations to all relevant stakeholders (beneficiaries, donors, governments
and intergovernmental organisations).
In 2012, the Observatory covered more than 50 country situations , notably through 336 urgent and
follow-up interventions concerning over 500 human rights defenders .
Created in 1997 jointly by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the World
Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders
is the leading global programme on the protection of human rights defenders. It bases its action on
the conviction that solidarity with and among human rights defenders and their organisations ensures
that their voice is being heard and their isolation and marginalisation broken. It responds to threats
and acts of reprisal suffered by human rights defenders through urgent interventions, vital emergency
assistance for those in need, international missions and advocacy for their effective domestic and
international protection.
Violations of the right of NGOs to funding: from harassment to criminalisation
ANNUAL REPORT
2013
Foreword by Maina Kiai
OMCT – FIDH
World Organisation Against Torture