Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis

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Document Information:

Year: 2013
Country: Transnational
Language: English
Document Type: Publication
Topic: Aid Effectiveness,Assessments,Defending Civil Society,Economic Activities

June 2012
IOB Study
Civil society, aid, and development:
a cross-country analysis
Study carried out by Prof. dr Irene van Staveren and Ellen Webbink,
International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus Universtity Ro!erdam,
for the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department Ministry of Foreign A”airs

Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis
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Preface
International cooperation for development relies on several aid modalities and – in addition
to bilateral and multilateral programs – non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play an
important role in channeling development aid towards their Southern partners. The
support of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign A!airs to developmental NGOs perceives
several objectives, ranging from direct poverty alleviation to capacity building and lobby
and advocacy activities.
Rigorous evaluations of programs and projects executed by non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) are generally scarce and tend to be limited to the analysis of perceived
e!ects at local level. Far less a”ention is usually devoted to the aggregate e!ect of
development aid on global civil society strength and performance. This is, however,
considered of utmost importance given the overarching aim of strengthening the role of
civil society in the development process.
The recently developed database Indices of Social Development (ISD) hosted by the Institute
of Social Studies (ISS) of the Erasmus University Ro”erdam o!ers a unique opportunity to
further analyze the relationships between civil society development and development aid
(ODA) over a 20-years period, making use of cross-country data of multidimensional
indicators related to civic activism, intergroup cohesion and club membership.
The current paper ‘Civil Society, Aid and Development’ has been commissioned by the Policy and
Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign A!airs to
enable the professional discussions regarding the di!erent pathways for strengthening civil
society in developing countries. Such analysis requires a careful appraisal of the direction of
causality and needs to give due a”ention to endogeneity issues, including several control
variables to account for other relevant factors.
The study provides an overview of the literature regarding the inﬂuence of foreign aid on
civil society, drawing extensively on theories of social capital, social inclusion and social
norms. Herea#er, the empirical approach used for the operationalization of civil society
measurement and development outcomes is outlined. Finally, several estimates for the
determinants of civil society development strength are speciﬁed and used in subsequent
estimates of their e!ects on poverty reduction, democratization and human rights.
The main ﬁndings of the study suggest that aid exhibits an ambivalent relation with civil
society development. Most profound positive e!ects are registered for civic action and club
member ship. Also clear interactions with the prevailing rule of law conditions are found,
pointing at complementarities between formal and informal institutions. Whereas aid
contributes to poverty alleviation, direct e!ects of civil society parameters on poverty
reduction are at best modest. E!ects on democratization are di$cult to trace. Otherwise,
quite signiﬁcant albeit contradictory e!ects are found for the e!ects on human rights, with
a positive sign for intergroup cohesion (bridging social capital) but a negative sign for club
membership (bonding social capital).

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Preface
We are grateful to the authors Irene van Staveren and Ellen Webbink for their enduring
e!ort to develop the analytical models and to conduct the data analysis that enables us to
further the discussion on the e!ectiveness of aid for civil society development. We look
forward to further discussions regarding the empirical evidence for the development impact
of NGO aid on civil society performance in developing countries.
Prof. dr. Ruerd Ruben
Director Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
Ministry of Foreign A!airs, The Netherlands

Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis
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Contents
Preface 3
List of tables 6
1 Introduction 8
2 Civil Society and Development: a Literature Review 10
2.1 The emergence of civil society in economic development research 11
2.2 Measurement of civil society and empirical results 16
3 Theoretical framework for the cross-country analysis in this study 18
4 Methodology: measuring civil society and development outcomes 20
4.1 Civil Society variables 21
4.2 Development aid and outcome data 22
4.3 Estimation method 24
5 Empirical Results 26
6 Conclusions and Policy Implications 36
6.1 Conclusions 37
6.2 Policy Implications 39

Annexes 42
Annex 1 About IOB 43
Annex 2 References 45
Annex 3 Diagrams 50
Evaluation reports of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
published 2008-2012 56

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Contents
List of tables

Table 1 Descriptive statistics 23
Table 2 Determinants of Civil Society, random e!ects 27
Table 3 Determinants of Poverty, random e!ects 29
Table 4 Determinants of Democracy, random e!ects 32
Table 5 Determinants of Human Rights, random e!ects 34
Table A1 The indicators of the Civil Activism Index 54
List of diagrams

Diagram A1 Countries with highest and lowest changes in Civic Activism 2000-2010 50
Diagram A2 Countries with highest and lowest changes in Intergroup
Cohesion 2000-2010 50
Diagram A3 Countries with highest and lowest changes in Clubs and
Associations 2000-2010 51
Diagram A4 Sca”er plot for Intergroup Cohesion and log ODA,
average for 1995-2010 51
Diagram A5 Sca”er plot for poverty and Civic Activism, average for 1995-2010 52
Diagram A6 Sca”er plot for democracy and Intergroup Cohesion,
average for 1995-2010 52
Diagram A7 Sca”er plot for human rights and Intergroup Cohesion,
average for 1995-2010 53

Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis
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!
Introduction

Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis
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This study explores the relationships between development aid, civil society and
development outcomes. It hopes to contribute to the debate on aid e!ectiveness, in
particular about the less tangible social dimensions of development. The key asset of this
study is a rich, innovative database of multidimensional social development indicators,
hosted by the Institute of Social Studies. The Indices of Social Development database (ISD)
o!ers a unique source for development policy research, because it stresses dimensions of
development that have hitherto been under-valued and/or were o#en not measured at all.
The six indices in the database are multidimensional measures for civil society and track
social development over time for a large number of countries. The indices allow the analysis
of relationships between aid and civil society on the one hand and between civil society and
development outcomes on the other hand. Both relationships will be tested in this study,
for aid receiving countries for the period 1990-2010.

Civil Society and Development:
a Literature Review
!

Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis
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2.1 The emergence of civil society in economic
development research
The increasing critique on neoliberal development policy and its foundation in mainstream
economics has resulted around the turn of the century in a more explicit concern with
social dimensions of development, such as poverty reduction, inequality, and governance
issues. This has led to the emergence of the Post Washington Consensus in the arena of
multilateral development aid, in which more a”ention to social investment and to
governance issues was added to the original policy set of liberalization, privatization, and
public expenditure restraint. Structural Adjustment was replaced by Poverty Reduction
Strategies; the development of the Asian tiger economies was revisited in analyses
recognizing the role of a strong state in market expansion and accumulation; and
economists looked for ‘the missing link’ for poverty reduction in other disciplines of the
social sciences.
This had led some development economic researchers to enter interdisciplinary
engagements with sociology, anthropology, and political science, resulting in serious
a”ention to two concepts: (1) informal institutions and (2) social capital. Both were
recognized as lying outside the state and outside the market, although, of course, the
market is an institution itself. The a”ention to informal institutions and social capital
brought a relatively new dimension to development economics, namely a”ention to a third
domain next to the market and the state: civil society (see for a conceptual development of
the third domain in economics, van Staveren, 2001). In a recent paper, Fowler and Biekart
(2011: 5) characterize the concept of civil society as a “messy empirical category ”. They list
the various understandings of this concept put together by Glasius (2010) as: social capital,
citizens active in public a!airs, non-violent action, fostering public debate and counter
hegemony. Earlier, Fowler and Biekart (2008) pointed at the dynamic and agency
dimensions of civil society, which they refer to as civic-driven change. Civic-driven change is
in their view a combination of three dimensions: civic agency, collective action, and
empowerment. Hence, they understand civil society as normative, reﬂecting pro-social
values and contributing to development. This is similar to the recent view by World Bank
economist Michael Woolcock (2011) and by political economists Samuel Bowles and Herbert
Gintis (2002) who also regard civil society as pro-social.
Part of the messy empirical categorization of civil society is the related, and equally
ambiguous, concept of social cohesion. As Diego Lanzi (2011: 1092) has phrased it recently:
“the contemporary debate on social cohesion is a ﬁne mess.” The OECD has deﬁned social
cohesion in its latest annual report. “The current report calls a society ‘cohesive’ if it works
towards the well-being of all its members, ﬁghts exclusion and marginalisation, creates a
sense of belonging, promotes trust, and o!ers its members the opportunity of upward
social mobility ” (OECD, 2012: 53). Woolcock (2011) deﬁnes social cohesion in a similar
normative way as the “capacity of societies (not just groups, networks) to peacefully manage
collective action problems, in which all are included and treated equally, without
discrimination”. Easterly et al. (2006: 105), however, have a narrower deﬁnition of social

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Civil Society and Development: a Literature Review
cohesion, namely “as the nature and extent of social and economic divisions in society.”
Finally, Jenson (2010) deﬁnes social cohesion in three dimensions: (1) inequality (2)
institutions and (3) belonging. She argues that “social cohesion is a property of a society … it
is not an individual characteristic…” (Jenson, 2010: 15). Social cohesion is taking over the
highly contested concept of social capital. It is being recognized as the substance of civil
society at the macro level.
In the literature, civil society appears to be an umbrella concept for ‘the third sector’,
characterized normatively as developing pro-social behaviour and as expressing strong
social relations and social values. These characteristics have been operationalized in
development economics research under the broad labels distinguished above: informal
institutions and social capital, to which social cohesion has been added only recently and
covering the same variables in empirical research: informal institutions like social and
cultural norms, religion, and social inequalities on the one hand, and social capital
variables like trust, networks and associations, on the other hand.
The ﬁrst of the two civil society concepts, informal institutions, is o#en simply referred to
as institutions, not always clearly distinguishing between formal and informal institutions.
Institutions have generally been deﬁned as the social norms that shape human behaviour.
The distinction between formal and informal institutions, however, is important, and
summarized by the World Bank (2011: 8) in its latest World Development Report: “Formal
institutions are all aspects pertaining to the functioning of the state, including laws,
regulatory frameworks, and mechanisms for the delivery of services that the state provides”.
In contrast, “Informal social institutions are the mechanisms, rules, and procedures that
shape social interactions but do not pertain to the functioning of the state. (…) Social norms
refer to pa”erns of behaviour that ﬂow from socially shared beliefs and are enforced by
informal social sanctions.” Williamson (2009) makes a similar distinction, though limiting
institutions to constraints on behaviour, as is common in the new institutional economics.
She clariﬁes that “formal institutions are deﬁned as political constraints on government
behaviour enforced by legal institutions. Formal rules encompass constitutional
constraints, statutory rules, and other political constraints.” In contrast, “informal
institutions are private constraints stemming from norms, culture, and customs that
emerge spontaneously. They are not designed or enforced by government” (Williamson,
2009: 372). What is therefore crucial to the understanding of informal institutions is that
they are non-state but emerging in social relationships outside government, in what is
recognized as civil society.
This distinction has consequences for empirical research. Finding a statistically signiﬁcant
impact of informal institutions may not so much be a sign of a strong independent civil
society, but rather signifying a substitution for weak formal institutions, representing a
weak state (Beugelsdijk, 2006; Diani, 2004). Studies relying entirely on the generalized trust
question as a proxy variable for social capital, may therefore yield erroneous conclusions:
they “do not measure (aspects of ) culture or social capital of which many scholars assume
they have economic e!ects, but the well-functioning of institutions” (Beugelsdijk, 2006:
383.) Bowles and Gintis (2002: F431) also recognize the relationship between state

Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis
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institutions and civil society: “The face-to-face local interactions of community are thus not
a substitute for e!ective government but rather a complement.” Another critique on the
empirical research is that the institutional approach to integrating civil society in
development economics has until recently largely ignored the role of asymmetric
institutions, that is, institutions that have di!erent e!ects on di!erent groups in society,
o#en advantaging one group over another as is the case with gendered institutions
(Odebode, van Staveren, 2007). A major step forward has been the work by the OECD on
gendered institutions, showing how these limit women’s access to resources (Morrisson
and Jü”ing, 2005) and constrain their agency (van Staveren, forthcoming).
The research on informal institutions in development economics began to integrate
property rights, governance, democracy, entrepreneurship, productivity, and political and
social stability in growth analyses (Rodrik, 2003; and for a critical discussion, see Durlauf et
al., 2008). Mostly, the institutional variables included in the analyses refer to state
institutions that would facilitate free markets, such as the Rule of Law or time to get
through a bureaucracy when se”ing up a business, or expropriation risk. Chang (2011) is
quite sceptical of this literature, and argues that strong formal institutions that protect
property rights are not a necessary condition for growth, which is for example shown by the
case of China. The research on informal institutions focused in the beginning on religion
and its behavioural norms that are thought to be supportive of markets (Barro and
McCleary, 2003). This focus derived from Max Weber’s thesis of the protestant work ethic
(Weber, 1992) and was later empirically tested and qualiﬁed (Norris and Inglehart, 2009).
More recently, development research recognizes a relationship between formal and
informal institutions. A special issue of World Development on institutions concludes, that
“the papers illustrate in a number of di!erent contexts how informal institutions inﬂuence
the nature and quality of more formal institutions, and how the two together are likely to
inﬂuence the process of development” (Casson et al., 2010: 140). This insight has informed
our empirical analysis by including variables for both formal and informal institutions.
The second of the civil society concepts referred to above is social capital. It was applauded
by the World Bank Social Capital Project as ‘the missing link’ in economic development
research (see for a reﬂection on the project six years later: Bebbington et al., 2004). In this
project, social capital was deﬁned as “the institutions, the relationships, the a”itudes and
values that govern interactions among people and contribute to economic and social
development” (World Bank, 1998: 1). It explicitly includes the notion of institutions and was
regarded as the link between the determinants of economic growth on the one hand and
desirable development outcomes such as poverty reduction, health improvements, or
reductions in inequality on the other hand (see, for example, Isham et al., 2002). Hayami
(2009: 98) deﬁnes social capital “as the structure of informal social relationships conducive
to developing cooperation among economic actors aimed at increasing social product,
which is expected to accrue to the group of people embedded in those relationships.”
Bowles and Gintis (2002: F419) provide a more micro-level deﬁnition, deriving from their
extensive research in experimental economics. “Social capital generally refers to trust,
concern for one’s associates, a willingness to live by the norms of one’s community and to
punish those who do not.”

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Civil Society and Development: a Literature Review
The embracement of the concept of social capital by development economists resulted in
empirical research in which social capital was integrated as a proxy variable both for
analytical purposes as well as for deﬁning possible policy variables (Dasgupta and Serageldin,
1999; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; Grootaert and van Bastelaer, 2002). Most of this literature
measures social capital subjectively through the generalized trust question from the World
Value Surveys (‘do you, in general, trust other people?’) or in micro research, the number and
extent of networks or the extent of associational membership by a target group, such as
micro-borrowers, medium scale entrepreneurs, or farmers. The integration of social capital
as a way to capture civil society has, contrary to its use in sociology by Bourdieu and others,
entered economics in a largely instrumentalist way, namely, as market-friendly potential,
reducing the need for public policy and social spending.
It has been criticized because of this and because of its individualist understanding of civil
society with limited a”ention to inequality (Fine, 1999 and 2001; Baron et al., 2000; van
Staveren, 2003). Bowles and Gintis (2002: F419-420) have formulated the two positions on
social capital sharply: “Those to the le# of center are a”racted to the social capital idea
because it a$rms the importance of trust, generosity and collective action in social
problem solving, thus countering the idea that well-deﬁned property rights and competitive
markets could so successfully harness selﬁsh motives to public ends as to make civic virtue
unnecessary. Proponents of laissez faire are enchanted because it holds the promise that
where markets fail – in the provision of local public goods and many types of insurance for
example – neighbourhoods, parent teacher associations, bowling leagues, indeed anything
but the government, could step in to do the job.” These two very di!erent interpretations of
social capital are allowed by the widespread use of a singular, subjective proxy variable,
namely ‘trust’. But trust may actually be more an outcome than a determinant of social
capital, as Field has argued, and more so within certain groups than across groups (2003,
pp. 65 and 125). Moreover, various micro development economists caution against the use
of simple social capital proxies in complex analyses, because that tends to ignore various
positive and negative externalities (van Staveren, 2000; van Staveren and Knorringa, 2007;
Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004). The sociological and political science literature has revealed
the complexities of social capital, entailing a variety of social values and cultural meanings,
as well as a strong role of power, conﬂict and inequality. In particular, horizontal
inequalities – inequalities between groups – ma”er, as Stewart (2009) has explained. A
rather limited and individualistic approach to measuring social capital in economic
analyses becomes even more worrying when social capital is regarded as a policy variable.
This can easily lead to a position in which poverty is regarded as having a simple cure
without any support from the state, simply by the poor themselves through their social
bonding, trust, and solidarity. This implicit message has met with strong critique, among
others from John Harriss and Paolo de Renzio (1997), Ben Fine (2001) and Frances Cleaver
(2005). Moreover, meso-level research, with a disaggregated approach to measuring social
capital and its economic e!ects, has pointed out that social capital is created at the
meso-level. In line with this recognition, the distinction between bonding and bridging
social capital has been increasingly understood as a crucial di!erentiation, whereby
bonding social capital is limited to the micro level in homogeneous groups, whereas
bridging social capital occurs at the meso-level, and sometimes even extends to the

Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis
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macro level (f.e. through trade, migration, and social activism). It is only the second type of
social capital which leads to social cohesion.
The two approaches towards integrating civil society in development economic research –
as informal institutions and as social capital – have come together over the past ten years.
This has happened probably because researchers realized that the basis for both informal
institutions and social capital is shared social norms and values in a society, either pro-
social and leading to social cohesion, or serving particular interest groups and leading to
inequalities, exclusion, and tensions. This is the case, for example, in studies analysing the
causes of slow growth in Africa (Collier and Gunning, 1999); the e!ects of ethnic group
norms and cooperation on trade success (van Staveren and Knorringa, 2007); the e!ect of
ethnic fragmentation on growth (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Okediji, 2011); or the impacts of
institutions on both inequality and growth (Davis and Hopkins, 2011).
The strength of integrating civil society through informal institutions and social capital
variables is that indeed a missing link was found: the variables o#en, though not
consistently, show statistically signiﬁcant results with development outcomes. Some studies
became quite inﬂuential, such as the volumes put together by Dasgupta and Serageldin
(1999) and Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002) on social capital and development; an
inﬂuential article by Knack and Keefer (1997), followed up by Knack and Zak (2001) on the
impact of trust on growth; and the work on formal institutions of development by La Porta
et al. (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2001). An exception to the narrow focus on GDP in these
studies is a case study on Bangladesh on the e!ect of development aid to civil society and its
positive impact on development outcomes in terms of poverty, equality, and democratization
(Kabeer, Kabir, Huq, 2009). Moreover, the measurement of informal institutions is o#en
narrow, relying on just one social or cultural norm as a proxy variable, which does not do
justice to the broad understanding of informal institutions and their constitution of civil
society. José Antonio Alonso (2011) has therefore rightly argued that institutions play a role
only together with other factors, in which history ma”ers importantly.

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Civil Society and Development: a Literature Review
2.2 Measurement of civil society and
empirical results
The literature on civil society and development does not explicitly measure poverty but uses
GDP per capita levels or GDP growth as outcome variables. The implicit assumption is that
growth will trickle down to poverty reduction, in particular when it is inclusive growth,
presumably associated with a stronger civil society. Some studies include a measure of
inequality among its independent variables, which is an important dimension of civil
society, as we have discussed above. Unfortunately, the vast majority of growth regressions
taking institutions into account only include formal institutions, o#en those related to the
protection of property rights. Social capital is o#en measured only with the general trust
question from the World Values Surveys. Empirical results, nevertheless, all point in the
same direction: stronger formal institutions, less inequality and stronger informal
institutions and social capital are associated with higher levels of GDP per capita and higher
economic growth. Most studies acknowledge that there may be a problem of endogeneity.
Some address this by using time lags while others use instrumental variable analysis, such
as two-stage least squares, others do not address the issue at all. When instruments are used
to address endogeneity, studies only use instruments for formal institutions, o#en
historical measures of state formation or early European se”ler mortality rates. These
instruments, however, are not suitable for informal institutions and social capital variables
because instruments for these civil society measures should reﬂect intangible, social
dimensions of development for which no historical data seems to be available. Therefore,
unfortunately, it is not possible to use two stage least squares or other instrumental variable
analyses for this study. In our methodology section, however, we do come up with a simpler
technique that does at least address the issue to some extent, although we acknowledge
that this is imperfect. We do hope that suitable instrumental variables will be developed in
the near future by data collection on historical values of social development, cultural
norms, and other relevant informal institutions.
Davis and Hopkins (2011: 995) conclude that “institutional reforms that increase the security
of property rights for the poor, or the quality of property rights enforcement more generally,
will tend to increase economic growth while simultaneously reducing income inequality.”
In a comparison of the e!ect of geography, trade and formal institutions, Rodrik et al.
(2004) ﬁnd that the e!ect of institutions is much larger than that of the other two
explanatory variables, which even have the wrong sign in a multivariate estimation. But
they admit that the policy implication of their ﬁnding is “extremely meagre” (p. 157),
because they measure institutions only through the formal institutional variable Rule of
Law, which is a subjective measure consisting of experts’ ratings of the quality of property
rights protection in a country. Easterly et al. (2006) do include measures of civil society and
try eleven di!erent measures for formal institutions, including Rule of Law. They conclude
that “more social cohesion leads to be”er institutions, and that be”er institutions in turn
lead to higher growth. This is true regardless of how we measure institutions” (p. 113). In
one of the very few studies comparing formal and informal institutions, Williamson (2009:
377) ﬁnds that “countries that have stronger informal institutions, regardless of the strength

Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis
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of formal institutions, achieve higher levels of economic development than those countries
with lower informal institutional scores.” This ﬁnding supports Chang’s (2011) scepticism
about the primacy of formal institutions.
The other development outcome variable in our study is democracy. The development
literature distinguishes between di!erent types of democracy (OECD 2012). One such
distinction uses an increasing role of civic agency: representative democracy, participatory
democracy, and developmental democracy (Boyte, 2008: 121). It is probably this diversity
which helps to explain the ambiguous empirical results found in the literature in regression
analyses with civil society variables on the one hand and democracy variables on the other
hand, and of regressions of ODA on democratization (Charron, 2011; Knack 2001). In this
literature, democracy is o#en measured by the Polity 2 variable of the Polity IV Project,
which measures the quality of democracies. Qualitative studies seem to be be”er able to
capture the various relationships between civil society and democracy. A study by Robinson
and Friedman (2005) provides three case studies, on Ghana, South Africa and Uganda. “The
studies demonstrate that … the contribution of civil society organisations to democracy
extends to their ability to foster participation and deliberation, to build leadership capacity,
and to nurture values of tolerance and consensus building, all of which are a function of
internal democratic practices. Its capacity to o!er citizens a say in decisions and to enhance
pluralism may be as important as the ability to inﬂuence decision-making and demand
accountability from state actors” (Robinson and Friedman, 2005: 40).
Apart from the limited measurement of civil society through the general trust question,
there is another problem, which concerns the measurement of the inequality and cohesion
dimensions of civil society. The most frequently used measures are ethnic and linguistic
diversity, assuming that with more diversity there is more inequality and less cohesion, and
hence, a weaker civil society (see, for example, Jenson, 2010). The problem with this
measure is that it confuses diversity with conﬂict: countries with high ethnic, religious, or
linguistic diversity may have much less tensions between groups than countries that have
only two or three major groups – such as blacks, coloured and whites in the Apartheid era or
Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda. Recognizing this trap, the recent OECD report on social
development therefore states that “group polarization, rather than inequality itself ” should
be regarded “as the principal explanation for inter-group inequalities eventually leading to
conﬂict” (OECD, 2012: 106).

Theoretical framework for the
cross-country analysis in this study
”

Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis
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What we learn from the empirical studies is that (1) estimations with informal institutions
need to be complemented by a formal institutional control variable, for which it does not
ma”er much which one is chosen (2) civil society cannot be captured by a single variable
but requires multidimensional measurement for capturing the complexity of the
phenomenon (3) horizontal inequalities, rather than diversity, needs to be taken into
account to capture the dark side of social capital (exclusion, discrimination, conﬂict
between groups) (4) possible endogeneity problems need to be addressed, even when
instruments for civil society variables are unavailable.
We propose the following loosely deﬁned theoretical framework for the cross-country
empirical analysis in this report. First, we understand civil society as a complex set of
informal institutions and social capital with three interrelated dimensions: social bonds,
horizontal inequalities, and transformative agency. We will use therefore multidimensional
measurement of civil society with composite indices. Second, we see civil society as
contributing to development outcomes and in mutual reinforcement with formal
institutions. Civil society and formal institutions will o#en complement each other, rather
than being substitutes, whereby we expect that informal institutions are the most
foundational ones, on which formal institutions may be built, supported, challenged, and
adapted. But a stronger civil society may lead to short run set-backs in development
outcomes, or may only deliver when also formal institutions change, as the recent Arab
Spring developments indicate. Third, we expect that development aid will positively
contribute to civil society, under certain conditions. Due to the heterogeneity of civil
society, support to some civil society organizations and networks may have a stronger e!ect
than support to others, while in some instances, donor aid to civil society organizations
may even undermine the indigenous dynamics of civic driven change and re-enforce
inequalities.
These three elements form our loosely deﬁned theoretical framework, reﬂecting recent
developments in the literature from social capital to social cohesion and from a focus on
formal to a”ention to informal institutions. Our unique contribution to this emerging
theoretical framework is to use multidimensional measures of civil society in which we
account for all key dimensions emerging from the recent literature: social bonds, horizontal
inequalities, and transformative agency. On the basis of this theoretical framework we
hypothesize that for a large sample of developing countries over the period 1990-2010,
development aid will have a positive e!ect on civil society, and that a stronger civil society
will positively contribute to poverty reduction and to democratization.

Methodology: measuring civil
society and development
outcomes
#

Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis
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4.1 Civil Society variables
The database Indices of Social Development (ISD), launched in 2011 by the Institute of Social
Studies, is the ﬁrst database that presents a set of coherent, broad based indices of civil
society for a large number of countries. It is broad because it includes around 200 variables
covering all the relevant dimensions of civil society developed in our theoretical framework
of civil society in development. The data are available for ﬁve years, with ﬁve years in
between, calculated as averages around each of these years (1990-2010).
Emerging research with the ISD points at a wide variety of applications. The ISD Working
Paper Series and the research conference in December 2011 provide an overview of studies
that make use of the database. First, the studies suggest that the indices, such as the Gender
Equality Index, are indeed broad-based as compared to comparable indices like the Gender
Inequality Index published in UNDP’s Human Development Report (van Staveren, 2011).
Second, they conﬁrm that the indices reﬂect informal institutions, social cohesion, and
inequalities, so they are indeed broad-based (Dulal and Foa, 2011). Third, the statistical tests
that have been carried out in developing the six indices have shown that they are quite
distinct. There is no overlap in the underlying indicators but they are complementary. They
are positively correlated to each other, except for Clubs and Associations, which shows
negative correlations with most of the other indices (Foa and Tanner, 2011) 1. Fourth, in a
multivariate regression analysis for aid e!ectiveness, Foa (2011) found that Intergroup
Cohesion has a statistically signiﬁcant negative e!ect on the percentage of donor aid
channelled through a receiving country ’s public ﬁnancial management system. Apparently,
a stronger civil society in this respect does not parallel stronger governance in the receipt
of donor aid.
This study will use three indices from the ISD database, as measures of civil society suitable
for testing the hypotheses formulated above: Civic Activism, Intergroup Cohesion, and
Clubs and Associations. Annex 3 gives an overview of the countries with the largest positive
and negative changes in each of these indices between 2000 and 2010.
1. Civic Activism (34 indicators) covering the transformative agency dimension of civil society:
Civic activism refers to the social norms, organizations, and practices, which facilitate
citizen involvement in public policies and decisions. The index consists of data on, for
example, access to the media, participation in demonstrations and petitions, the density
of international organizations, and the CIVICUS civil society rating.
2. Intergroup Cohesion (27 indicators) covering the macro level of horizontal inequalities
and social cohesion in civil society:
Intergroup cohesion concerns the relations of cooperation and respect between
predominant identity groups in a society. This index includes data on, for example, the
incidence of riots and terrorist acts, tension between ethnic or religious groups,
1 Clubs and Associations correlates negatively with Intergroup Cohesion and positively with Civil Activism.

| 22 |
Methodology: measuring civil society and development outcomes
discrimination of particular groups and the extent to which people reject particular
others as neighbours 2.
3. Clubs and Associations (36 indicators) covering the micro level of horizontal inequalities
and bonding in civil society:
Clubs and Associations refers to bonding ties in communities. Where these ties are
strong, individuals are be”er able to weather the impact of sudden hardship, by relying
on the support of their friends, neighbours, and locality.%The index consists of data on,
for example, membership of community groups, trade unions, development
organizations, time spent on unpaid voluntary health work, and view on whether
neighbours tend to help each other.
4.2 Development aid and outcome data
First, we will estimate the relationship between O$cial Development Aid (ODA) on the one
hand and civil society on the other hand. For this analysis, we use aggregate ODA data for
receiving developing countries, from the OECD (DCD-DAC) database for ODA 3. The data is in
million US dollar at current prices. We take ﬁve-year averages in order to parallel the ISD
ﬁve-year period data. The OECD database does not contain disaggregated ODA data for
funds ﬂowing to civil society, by receiving country for the period 1990-2005. This, however,
is not fatal, since it is expected that a non-negligible share of ODA will support civil society
indirectly, even though direct ODA to civil society related objectives is estimated to be only
2%, according to OECD (2012: 247).
Second, we will estimate the relationship between civil society and development outcomes.
For this relationship, we have tried a variety of indicators in order to capture poverty
reduction and democratization. Unfortunately, the literature did not provide any guidance
on the selection of variables. This is because, as stated above, quantitative studies of civil
society e!ects on development are limited to GDP. The preferred variables for poverty
reduction are the recently developed Human Poverty Index or MDG tracking measures, but
for these there is insu$cient data available for the time period under study. We have
therefore selected the widely used poverty headcount of 1.25 dollar a day to measure poverty
incidence. For democratization we have selected the Polity-2 variable (‘revised democracy
score’) from the Polity IV project, following the literature (Davis and Hopkins, 2011). This
variable represents only one characterization of democracy as mentioned above, namely
representative democracy. Polity-2 is measured on a 21-point scale from fully
institutionalized autocracies to fully institutionalized democracies. We selected in addition
to this variable also a proxy variable for developmental democracy, namely a human rights
2 In March 2012, a sixth index has been added to the ISD database, which uses some of the original indicators, including the one on neighbours from the Intergoup Cohesion index. 3 We de!ne ODA as “Flows of o”cial !nancing administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent (using a !xed 10 percent rate of discount)… ODA receipts comprise disbursements by bilateral donors and multilateral institutions” (OECD, 2003).

Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis
| 23 |
variable. We use the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index, which is an additive index
constructed from the Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and
Disappearance indicators 4. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights)
to 8 (full government respect for these four rights).
For control variables, we use controls that are widely used in growth regressions. We use
GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars for 30 years earlier in order to control for initial
level of development, the primary school enrolment rate for 25 years earlier in order to
control for human capital, which we multiply by a factor 100 in order to make the parameter
values more visible (following Henderson et. al, 2011), and Rule of Law representing formal
institutions, which is a widely used variable in the literature reviewed above (following
Beugelsdijk, 2006; Henderson et. al, 2011; Rodrik et al., 2004; Easterly et al., 2006; Knack,
2001). Rule of Law is taken from the World Governance Indicators and is measured on a
scale between -2.5 and +2.5 in our data, hence a 5 points scale (see Table 1).
The table below shows that the three ISD variables, listed as the ﬁrst three, all range
between 0 and 1, but remaining within these outer limits. The mean values are around 0.5
and standard deviations around 0.1. So, they are not standardized normal distributions, but
standardized to a scale between 0 and 1. This is so, because the values for each index
represent country rankings, for approx. 150-180 countries.

Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Civic Activism #$% &.'() &.&#) &.$$& &.*#+
Intergroup Cohesion ‘+# &.(#) &.&)’ &.&%& &.**&
Clubs and Associations ,#& &.(&+ &.$$$ &.$(( &.%*#
% People living under $.,($ a day +#’ ).%*( $,.,+ & #+.+’
Human Rights #’$ ‘.+’+ ,.&)& & %
Democracy ((( $.++) #.’$* -$& $&
Log ODA *’$ ‘.%#+ $.*+# -‘.#&( %.%*#
Primary Gross Enrollment Rate ‘(‘ %#.+) +’.%( *.&&( ,$’.#
Rule of Law (($ -&.’%, &.#)% -,.(+ $.*$&
Log GDP $&’$ #.)&# $.$$* ‘.,)$ ).++,
4 For details on the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index, see Cingranelli and Richards (1999).

| 24 |
Methodology: measuring civil society and development outcomes
4.3 Estimation method
Because of the availability of data for all variables both at the cross-country level and for the
twenty-year period 1990-2010, we have constructed panel data. It is an unbalanced panel,
because for some years, there is no data available for every country. Following the literature
on panel data analysis with country-year data, we use the unbalanced, larger set of data.
This does not a!ect the reliability of our results, while reducing the panel to a balanced
panel would seriously reduce the sample size. With this panel we tested our hypotheses
employing multivariate GLS random-e!ects panel data analysis with regional dummies. We
opted for a GLS random e!ects model because the Breusch-Pagan test has indicated that
OLS estimations would su!er from heteroskedasticity. We used random-e!ects estimations
because of few years of observations per country (3 or 4).The Hausman test indicated that
for most estimations ﬁxed e!ects were indeed not suitable. The tables report R square
values within countries, between countries and overall.
There are other possible endogeneity problems that need to be addressed, as the theoretical
framework already indicates: it is possible that poverty or democracy inﬂuence the strength
of civil society and that these indicators, as well as civil society, have an e!ect on the level of
ODA that a country receives. The way in which we measure civil society, however, makes it
not very likely that the development outcome variables will have a feedback e!ect on our
civil society measures. That is because we measure civil society with indices that consist of
over twenty ﬁve individual indicators, subjective and objective, slow changing ones and
quicker changing ones. It is not likely that such indices will be a!ected through feedback
loups that a!ect the majority of the underlying indicators in a substantial way 5. But it may
be the case that the strength of civil society inﬂuences levels of ODA. We will address the
possible endogeneity e!ects in the methodological section.
We therefore tested the possible remaining endogeneity in our estimations by relying on
Granger-inspired causality tests of the ISD variables and several development outcome
variables, carried out by Huang and Cameron (2012). This is a test for time-related causality,
assessing statistically whether a change in variable Z occurs later in time than a change in
variable Y as well as a previous value of variable Z, and with which probability. The
development outcome variables tested in that study are GDP per capita, the Human
Development Index (HDI), and the Gini coe$cient for income inequality. The results for the
three ISD indices that we use in our study are as follows. For GDP per capita, Clubs and
Associations shows statistically signiﬁcant causal ﬂows to GDP per capita (p<0.05). Intergroup cohesion shows no causal ﬂow in either direction, and Civic Activism shows a 5 Nevertheless, we did try instrumental variable analysis in order to prevent any possible endogeneity in our estimations. We instrumented ODA with colonial origin of countries as was done by Charron (2011) and we instrumented our civil society indices with dummies for religion as in Foa (2011). The Sargan-Hansen test however, indicated that these are not adequate instruments for our estimation. The reason for this is probably, as was indicated in the literature review, that such instruments are generally used for formal institutions and not for informal institutions. Informal institutions are probably too di"cult to capture with an instrument, because they are intangible, and in our study, measured in a multidimensional way. Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis | 25 | reverse causal ﬂow (p<0.1), namely from GDP per capita to Civic Activism. The results for the estimations with the Civic Activism variable therefore need to be interpreted with caution. For the HDI, Civic Activism shows statistically signiﬁcant causal ﬂows to HDI (p<0.01). There is no Granger causality established between HDI and Clubs and Associations and Intergroup Cohesion. Finally, the results for the Gini coe$cient indicate no Granger causality with Intergroup Cohesion. The test for Civic Activism and Clubs and Associations show statistically signiﬁcant Granger causality to the Gini coe$cient with respectively (p<0.01) and (p<0.1). The results from the Granger-inspired causality tests, hence, do not raise serious concerns for endogeneity e!ects for our civil society variables. There was only one reverse causality established, of Civic Activism with GDP per capita, but this was not the case for the same variable with the HDI and with the Gini coe$cient, where the expected causal relationship from Civic Activism to human development and to income inequality was conﬁrmed. We did Granger-inspired causality tests for the relationships between ODA and our civil society indices for four years and these show more mixed results. ODA has a statistically signiﬁcant (negative) e!ect on Civic Activism in one year, but not for the other three years. For two years, there is a statistically signiﬁcant reverse (negative) e!ect. ODA has a statistically signiﬁcant (negative) e!ect on Intergoup Cohesion in one year, but not for the other three years. For one year, there is a statistically signiﬁcant reverse (negative) e!ect. Finally, ODA has a statistically signiﬁcant (positive) e!ect on Clubs and Associations in two of the four years, while for one year there is a statistically signiﬁcant reverse (positive) e!ect. These results indicate that there may be serious endogeneity e!ects in the estimation of the e!ect of ODA on civil society. We therefore present the results for the ﬁrst set of models with much caution. We addressed possible nonlinearities by using the variables that are expressed in money terms in logarithmic form. We did this for ODA and for initial GDP per capita. Finally, we carried out several robustness tests for our estimations. For primary schooling, we substituted this for secondary schooling which gave similar results. Rule of Law was already tested for its robustness in the literature reviewed above (see, in particular, Easterly at al., 2006). Finally, we used two outcome variables for democracy, and report results for both, because they seem to complement each other rather than showing similar results for all three civil society indices. Annex 3 provides sca"er plots for all dependent variables with the key independent variables. Empirical Results $ Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis | 27 | This section will provide the empirical results in three groups of models, presented in three tables. The ﬁrst set of models concerns poverty, the second set is about democratization and the last set concerns human rights models. Each table shows the model results for each of the three civil society indices: Civic Activism, Intergroup Cohesion, and Clubs and Associations. Table 2 Determinants of Civil Society, random e!ects Civic Activism Intergroup Cohesion Clubs and Associations ODA (Log) &.&&**** -&.&,,*** &.&$'* (&.&&,) (&.&&#) (&.&&%) Primary School Enrollment (*$&&) (,( years prior) &.&''*** &.&+, &.&(' * (&.&&)) (&.&,+) (&.&,%) Rule of Law &.&,&*** &.&*%*** &.&&$ (&.&&() (&.&$,) (&.&$)) Initial GDP (+& years prior) &.&$**** -&.&,%*** -&.&+#** (&.&&') (&.&&$) (&.&$#) South America &.&$$ -&.&&, -&.&'# (&.&$+) (&.&,*) (&.&(+) Africa -&.&,$* -&.&$) -&.&*+ (&.&$,) (&.&,#) (&.&(() Europe -&.&&% -&.&&$ -&.$#,** (&.&$%) (&.&+() (&.&##) Asia -&.&,(* -&.&'** -&.&))* (&.&$+) (&.&,#) (&.&(*) Oceania -&.&('*** -&.&+, (&.&$*) (&.&(,) Constant &.+$&*** &.),'*** &.#)(*** (&.&+*) (&.&%() (&.$+') Observations '&( +$' ,&' Number of id $$, )% #+ R Squared (within) &.$##) &.$&)+ &.&$() R Squared (between) &.('&& &.,)#' &.,+)% R Squared (overall) &.''$' &.,')% &.,'*$ *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 | 28 | Empirical Results Table 2 shows the regression results for the civil society models. The results indicate statistically signiﬁcant correlations between ODA and the strength of civil society. Due to the mixed results of the Granger-inspired causality tests, we cannot interpret these uncritically as uni-directional causal relationships. The model ﬁt is quite good for a panel data model, with overall explanation of the variation in the dependent variable ranging between 25 percent and 44 percent for the three models, while the explained variation between countries is on average higher, as we would expect and indeed test with a random e!ects model (ranging between 24 percent and 54 percent). The regional dummies in all tables are relative to Mexico and the Caribbean (Northern Latin America). For the ﬁrst model, with Civic Activism as the dependent variable, we ﬁnd that a ten percent increase in the amount of ODA received is associated with a statistically signiﬁcant 0.07 points increase in the score for Civic Activism (which runs from 0.00 to 1.00), a moderate e!ect. A one unit increase on the formal institutional variable, Rule of Law, is associated with a statistically signiﬁcant 0.02 point increase in Civic Activism. This implies that going up one ﬁ#h of the ﬁve-point scale for Rule of Law is associated with an increase of more than two-thirds of the standard deviation in the Civic Activism score. The dummy variables indicate three statistically signiﬁcant results, which all have relatively large size e!ects. For African countries, Civic Activism is 0.02 points lower, for Asia it is 0.03 lower, and for Oceania it is 0.05 points lower as compared to Northern Latin America. If we assume a causal relationship between ODA and Civic Activism, this implies that for Africa and Asia, roughly a 13-14 percent increase in ODA for these countries would have the same e!ect on Civic Activism as a ten percent ODA increase for countries in the Caribbean. Of the two control variables for initial conditions, primary schooling has a small association (0.04), which is statistically signiﬁcant. GDP per capita indicates that if initial GDP per capita (30 years earlier) would have been ten percent larger, Civic Activism would be 0.17 points higher, which is a two and a half times bigger e!ect as compared to the e!ect of ODA. The second model, with Intergroup Cohesion as dependent variable, ﬁnds a negative sign for development aid. It shows that a ten percent increase in the amount of ODA is associated with a statistically signiﬁcant 0.22 points decrease in the score for Intergroup Cohesion. This is considerably large, namely three times the standard deviation of Intergroup Cohesion. The association of Rule of Law is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. Again, it is a rather large e!ect: a one point increase in Rule of Law is associated with 0.08 point on the Intergroup Cohesion scale - almost one standard deviation increase in Intergroup Cohesion. The dummy variables for geography show only one statistically signiﬁcant coe$cient, negative, for Asia (-0.05). The control variable for education is 0.03 and not statistically signiﬁcant. For initial GDP per capita, the coe$cient is negative and statistically signiﬁcant (-0.03). In the third model, with Clubs and Associations as dependent variable, we ﬁnd that a ten percent increase in the amount of ODA received is associated with a statistically signiﬁcant 0.14 points increase in the score for Clubs and Associations. This is again a relatively large e!ect, namely more than one standard deviation in the score for Clubs and Associations. Rule of Law has a coe$cient of zero, which is not statistically signiﬁcant. The regional Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis | 29 | dummies show negative statistically signiﬁcant e!ects for Europe (0.16 points lower) and Asia (0.10 points lower). This implies that, if we assume causality between ODA and Clubs and Associations, European ODA receiving countries need to receive twice as much ODA (hence, not ten but twenty percent increase) as Caribbean countries in order to see the same increase in Clubs and Associations. Asian countries would need to receive an additional seven percent of ODA to generate the same increase. Education has a small coe$cient (0.05), although it is statistically signiﬁcant. The coe$cient for initial GDP per capita is statistically signiﬁcant and negative (-0.036). The implication is that if initial income would have been ten percent higher, Clubs and Associations would have been 0.36 points lower, which is a third on the entire scale. The conclusion from the ﬁrst set of estimations is that if we can assume causality from ODA to civil society, there is a relatively large e!ect of ODA on civil society, positive for Civic Activism and Clubs and Associations, but negative for Intergroup Cohesion. We also see a large e!ect of formal institutions measured by Rule of Law, and a small e!ect of the initial primary schooling rate. The e!ect of initial GDP per capita is ambiguous while there are considerable negative regional e!ects, in particular for Asia. Table 3 Determinants of Poverty, random e!ects Civic Activism Intergroup Cohesion Clubs and Associations Civic Activism -',.$**** ($$.,)&) Intergroup Cohesion -$.$*$ ((.$&') Clubs and Associations -(.%*, ((.,'&) ODA (Log) -$.,(*** -$.+,'** -$.&)&** (&.(#+) (&.(),) (&.(,+) Primary School Enrollment (*$&&) (,( years prior) -$.,#& -+.'%& -'.+*& (,.$#&) (,.*,&) (,.)#&) Rule of Law &.$) -&.'$* &.$'' ($.+%#) ($.'(() ($.'#%) Initial GDP (+& years prior) -*.&&'*** -*.',,*** -*.'&+*** ($.$$+) ($.$+#) ($.$%$) South America -&.&**+ &.$#% &.+#) (+.,+%) (+.,#)) (+.#)*) Africa $.,'( +.+#) ,.'*( | 30 | Empirical Results Table 3 Determinants of Poverty, random e!ects Civic Activism Intergroup Cohesion Clubs and Associations (+.,&+) (+.(++) (+.)#() Europe -#.()( -(.+(, -*.*,$* ('.&#$) ('.&$') ('.#+&) Asia -#.+&,* -'.()# -'.)', (+.,'&) (+.+)() ('.&+*) Oceania -&.#'$ -&.%*$ (#.#()) (%.,'&) Constant %%.+,&*** *,.+$&*** *'.%(&*** ().%+,) ($&.)$&) ($&.*'&) Observations ,$) $%# $', Number of id ), %& (* R Squared (within) &.+&)* &.,+&% &.++*, R Squared (between) &.#$$# &.#((% &.(()) R Squared (overall) &.#&)$ &.#,$* &.(%%# *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 3 shows the regression results for the three poverty models, one for each civil society index, with the proportion of people living under 1.25 dollar a day as dependent variable. All signs are as expected, namely, more civil society, ODA, or initial income lead to lower levels of poverty. The ﬁrst model shows a statistically signiﬁcant negative e!ect of Civic Activism on the extent of poverty. When Civic Activism increases 0.10 points, the poverty ratio goes down by 4.2 percentage points – a moderate e!ect. Development aid also has, as expected, a statistically signiﬁcant negative e!ect on poverty. A ten percent increase in ODA leads to a decline of poverty by 12.6 percentage points, which is substantial. Rule of Law and initial primary school enrolment have no statistically signiﬁcant e!ects. Initial GDP per capita has a large statistically signiﬁcant negative e!ect. If initial GDP per capita would have been ten percent higher, than the proportion of people living in poverty would have been 70 percentage points lower. The regional dummy points out that countries in Asia have a 6.3 percent lower poverty ratio than those in the Caribbean. The second model shows no statistically signiﬁcant e!ect of Intergroup Cohesion on poverty, and the size e!ect is negligible. ODA has a statistically signiﬁcant negative e!ect on poverty, which is similar to the previous model. A ten percent increase in ODA results in a decline of the poverty rate by 13.2 percentage points. Education and Rule of Law have again no statistically signiﬁcant e!ect on poverty. Initial GDP per capita has a large statistically signiﬁcant negative e!ect. If initial GDP per capita would have been ten percent higher, Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis | 31 | than the poverty headcount ratio would have been 74 percentage points lower. There are no statistically signiﬁcant geographical e!ects. The third model shows no statistically signiﬁcant e!ect of Clubs and Associations on poverty, and the size e!ect is negligible. Development aid has a statistically signiﬁcant negative e!ect on poverty, which is slightly smaller than that of the previous two models. A ten percent increase in ODA results in a decline of the poverty rate by 11 percentage points. The regional dummy indicates that countries in Europe have a 7.7 percent lower poverty ratio than those in the Caribbean. The conclusion from the poverty models is that civil society has only a statistically signiﬁcant e!ect on poverty through Civic Activism. ODA has a substantial positive and statistically signiﬁcant e!ect on poverty reduction. Formal institutions, measured through the Rule of Law, have no statistically signiﬁcant e!ect and initial primary education also has not. Initial income has a moderate to large e!ect on poverty, and there are very few geographical e!ects. Table 4 shows the results for the relationships between civil society and democracy. It is important to remember that this variable ranges between -10 and +10 (see Table 1), so changes should be taken relative to a 21-point scale. The ﬁrst model shows no statistically signiﬁcant e!ect of Civic Activism on democracy, and the size e!ect is negligible. For ODA we ﬁnd a positive statistically signiﬁcant e!ect that is substantial. A ten percent increase in ODA implies an increase in democracy of 7.9 points, which is more than one standard deviation on the scale of the democracy variable. Rule of Law shows, as expected, a positive and statistically signiﬁcant e!ect on democracy. A one point increase in Rule of Law (a ﬁ#h on the 5-point scale) results in a 2.5 points increase in democracy, which is more than 10% on the democracy scale, which seems a moderate e!ect. Initial GDP has no statistically signiﬁcant e!ect but initial education has. For a 10 points increase in the initial primary enrolment rate, democracy improves by 0.3 points, which is a small e!ect. The regional dummies indicate that the level of democracy is 7.2 points lower in Africa and 8.8 points lower in Asia. | 32 | Empirical Results Table 4 Determinants of Democracy, random e!ects Civic Activism Intergroup Cohesion Clubs and Associations Civic Activism $.### ((.,$&) Intergroup Cohesion -).(+)*** (,.(',) Clubs and Associations '.*#+ (+.$,%) ODA (Log) &.*)+*** &.($#* &.$$+ (&.,(*) (&.,%#) (&.++') Primary School Enrollment (*$&&) (,( years prior) +.&*&*** +.()&*** ,.*&&** ($.&)&) ($.+$&) ($.,#&) Rule of Law ,.(&+*** +.(#'*** $.#('* (&.#+)) (&.*#() (&.%(,) Initial GDP (+& years prior) -&.*$% -$.$)*** -&.(,' (&.(,() (&.()$) (&.#%%) South America -$.)+# -$.%%* -&.+,$ (,.&&%) ($.)*)) (,.$*,) Africa -*.,&,*** -*.#$)*** -#.&$#*** ($.%#%) ($.),&) (,.+&,) Europe -'.(,#* -'.*$(* -&.++, (,.#)$) (,.#(&) (,.)$%) Asia -%.*()*** -).#,%*** -#.%''*** ($.),+) ($.)&*) (,.+(#) Oceania -,.**, -(.$(+ (+.$',) (+.##() Constant *.&,' $%.#*&*** #.)(% ('.%#,) ((.*,)) (#.,#&) Observations +*' +&+ $)% Number of id $&, )( #$ R Squared (within) &.&*(' &.$,&& &.&,)( R Squared (between) &.+,+, &.++(( &.+'%( R Squared (overall) &.+$$( &.++(& &.+',( *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis | 33 | The second model shows a statistically signiﬁcant but negative e!ect of Intergroup Cohesion on democracy. A 0.10 points increase in Intergroup Cohesion is associated with a 0.95 point decline in democracy, which is almost ﬁve percent on the democracy scale. For ODA we see a positive relationship, which is statistically signiﬁcant. For an increase in ODA by ten percent, democracy rises by 5.6 points. The e!ect of Rule of Law is again positive and statistically signiﬁcant. A one point increase in Rule of Law (a ﬁ#h on the 5-point scale) results in a 3.6 points increase in democracy, which is more than half of a standard deviation on the democracy scale. The e!ect of initial GDP is negative, statistically signiﬁcant and quite big. When initial GDP would have been ten percent higher, democracy would have been 12.0 points lower, which is almost twice the standard deviation of democracy. For a 10 points increase in the initial primary enrolment rate, democracy improves only by 0.4 points. Again, the regional dummies show negative and statistically signiﬁcant e!ects for Africa (-7.6) and Asia (-9.6) on democracy. The third democracy model shows no statistically signiﬁcant e!ect of Clubs and Associations on democracy while also development aid and initial level of GDP have no signiﬁcant impact. Rule of Law shows a positive and statistically signiﬁcant e!ect. For a one point increase on the Rule of Law scale, democracy improves by 1.7 points. Initial education has a statistically signiﬁcant positive e!ect. A ten percent higher level of initial primary school enrolment would have resulted in a 0.3 points higher level of democracy, which is a small e!ect. As in the other two democracy models, the regional dummies point out lower levels of democracy in Africa (-6.0) and Asia (-6.8). The conclusion from the democracy models, is that the only statistically signiﬁcant e!ect of civil society on democracy is negative. Initial levels of GDP per capita have no statistically signiﬁcant e!ect in two of the three models. Rule of Law clearly ma"ers, in a positive way, just like initial levels of primary schooling. The e!ect of ODA is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in two of the three models and of moderate size. The regional e!ects are very similar in all three models and show substantial negative e!ects for Africa and Asia on the level of democracy. This implies that for these two regions, extra policy e!orts are needed in order to generate substantial improvements in the quality of democracy. The ﬁnal set of models is for an alternative measure for democracy namely, human rights. This is measured by the Physical Integrity Rights Index, on an 8 points scale. The ﬁrst model shows a negative but no statistically signiﬁcant e!ect of Civic Activism on human rights. This is a somewhat surprising result. The e!ect of ODA is signiﬁcant, negative, and quite substantial. It indicates that a ten percent increase in ODA is associated with a decline in human rights of 1.4, which is 18% on the human rights scale (running between 0 and 8). There are no statistically signiﬁcant e!ects of initial education and initial GDP. Formal institutions, measured as Rule of Law, show a positive and statistically signiﬁcant e!ect on human rights. A one point increase in Rule of Law (20% of the scale) is associated with 1.6 point increase in human rights, which is also a 20% increase on the human rights scale. The regional dummies only show a statistically signiﬁcant e!ect for Asia, which is negative (-1.9). | 34 | Empirical Results The second human rights model shows a positive and statistically signiﬁcant e!ect of Intergroup Cohesion on human rights. A 0.10 points increase on the scale of Intergroup Cohesion is associated with 0.34 points increase in human rights, which is quite moderate. There are no statistically signiﬁcant e!ects of ODA, initial education and initial GDP. Rule of Law does have a statistically signiﬁcant and positive coe$cient. One point increase in Rule of Law leads to a 1.3 points increase in human rights, which is a strong e!ect. The regional dummy for Asia is -1.9, as in the previous model. Table 5 Determinants of Human Rights, random e!ects Civic Activism Intergroup Cohesion Clubs and Associations Civic Activism -$.+,& ($.#+#) Intergroup Cohesion +.+((*** (&.*%#) Clubs and Associations -$.*#$* ($.&+&) ODA (Log) -&.$'+* -&.&+*, -&.,%%*** (&.&*#) (&.&%') (&.$$&) Primary School Enrollment (*$&&) (,( years prior) &.,&( &.+'+ &.(&$ (&.+&#) (&.+*$) (&.',&) Rule of Law $.#&**** $.+&+*** $.'#$*** (&.$%&) (&.,$&) (&.,##) Initial GDP (+& years prior) -&.,&) -&.$'# -&.(*)*** (&.$($) (&.$()) (&.,$+) South America -&.+*& -&.(' -&.'+, (&.(&*) (&.'%#) (&.#'') Africa -&.(+' -&.#*& -&.),% (&.'##) (&.'*$) (&.#*)) Europe -&.(&# -&.#%& -&.*+( (&.##+) (&.#,() (&.%$*) Asia -$.%)**** -$.)#'*** -,.'*&*** (&.'*)) (&.'*$) (&.*&') Oceania $.$))* &.#&+ (&.#(*) (&.),') Constant %.''&*** '.#+&*** $$.)'&*** Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis | 35 | Table 5 Determinants of Human Rights, random e!ects Civic Activism Intergroup Cohesion Clubs and Associations ($.+*') ($.(*+) ($.)**) Observations +)+ +$+ ,&' Number of id $$$ )% #+ R Squared (within) &.$$() &.$+&( &.&%*, R Squared (between) &.'*#+ &.'(%, &.'*+) R Squared (overall) &.'$#+ &.',(( &.',%* *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The third human rights model shows a small statistically signiﬁcant e!ect of Clubs and Associations, which, however, is negative. The size is moderate, with a ten percent increase in the score for Clubs and Associations implying a decline in human rights by 0.18 points. ODA also shows a negative statistically signiﬁcant e!ect. A ten percent increase in ODA leads to a decline in human rights by 2.9 points, which is more than a standard deviation on the human rights scale. There is no statistically signiﬁcant e!ect of initial education. Rule of Law shows a positive and statistically signiﬁcant e!ect on human rights. When Rule of Law increases one point, human rights improve by 1.5 points. Initial GDP shows a negative e!ect, which in this model is statistically signiﬁcant and quite large. This implies that if initial GDP per capita would have been ten percent higher, human rights would be 5.8 points lower. Finally, the regional dummies show a similar result as the two other human rights models. The conclusion of the three human rights models is that civil society has an ambiguous e!ect on human rights. Intergroup Cohesion has a substantial positive e!ect, whereas Clubs and Associations has a negative e!ect, which is half the size of that of Intergroup Cohesion. Civic Activism has no statistically signiﬁcant e!ect. Development aid has a negative e!ect on human rights, which is statistically signiﬁcant in two of the three models. Initial GDP is only in one of the models statistically signiﬁcant and negative, whereas education is not signiﬁcant in either of the three models. Rule of Law, however, appears to have a relatively strong positive e!ect on human rights, in all three models. The regional dummies show that only for Asia there is a statistically signiﬁcant e!ect, which is negative. Conclusions and Policy Implications % Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis | 37 | 6.1 Conclusions The study has two parts: a literature review and an empirical analysis. The literature review has led to several interesting insights about the relationship between civil society and development outcomes, which have formed the backbone of our analytical framework. First, there are no quantitative studies available, to our knowledge, on the relationships between civil society on the one hand and poverty and democracy on the other hand. Studies that look at institutions and development are restricted to formal institutions and a very narrow social capital variable, while their focus of analysis is limited to GDP. Quantitative research on democracy also ignores the role of civil society, except for conceptually problematic variables of ethnic or linguistic fractionalization. Second, Social Capital has increasingly been recognized as a micro-variable for which the general trust question is not adequate. Recently, researchers have identiﬁed social cohesion as the more appropriate concept for measurement of cohesion of civil society. Third, recent research begins to include both formal and informal institutions, hence, both state and civil society institutions, in order to capture substitution e!ects and complementarity e!ects between these two sectors in society. Fourth, civil society is widely recognized as a normative concept, implying that a stronger civil society is good for development outcomes, such as poverty reduction, democratization, and human rights, except when there are strong horizontal inequalities. Fi#h, horizontal inequalities ma"er for both civil society – in the social capital literature referred to as bonding social capital (in groups) versus bridging social capital (social cohesion) – and for development outcomes. The empirical analysis started out with a justiﬁcation and explanation of the variables used, remaining largely in line with the current quantitative and qualitative empirical literature about civil society and development. The methodological explanation and justiﬁcation of our estimation method included a set of Granger-inspired causality tests, as a substitute for the unavailability of instrumental variables for a two stage least square estimation, also in the literature that we reviewed. These suggested that the ﬁrst set of models, on the e!ect of ODA on civil society, need to be taken with much caution. They do not imply causal relationships. The main statistically signiﬁcant and substantially meaningful ﬁndings of our model estimations are as follows. First, we ﬁnd two positive and one negative association of ODA with civil society. The e!ects are quite substantial, but should not be taken as causal, as was mentioned just above. Rule of Law shows a large positive e!ect in two of the three civil society models. This seems to suggest complementarity between formal institutions and informal institutions for Civic Activism and Clubs and Associations and substitution between these two types of institutions for Intergroup Cohesion. This ﬁnding is in line with the principal components analysis and OLS regressions by Williamson (2009: 378). “In some countries, they are complementary and at other times they are substitutes.” Hence, we conclude from the ﬁrst set of models that ODA may have a small positive e!ect on strengthening civil society but may at the same time undermine intergroup cohesion. Further research is necessary to uncover both the causality of the relationship as well as the unexpected negative sign for one of the civil society indices. | 38 | Conclusions and Policy Implications Second, the poverty models are more robust according to the Granger tests performed. They show a moderate positive impact of Civic Activism on poverty reduction but not of the other two civil society indices. ODA has a substantial positive e!ect on poverty reduction in all three models. Interestingly, formal institutions, measured by Rule of Law, do not have any e!ect on poverty reduction. Also this ﬁnding can be related to Williamson, who concludes that countries with weak formal institutions but strong informal institutions, such as the Netherlands, perform be"er economically than those with strong formal institutions and weak informal institutions – a category with only developing countries in her analysis, which includes for example Pakistan. Third, the democracy models show a modest negative impact of one of the civil society indices, namely Intergroup Cohesion. ODA and Rule of Law both have positive e!ects on democracy. Finally, the human rights models show that not only Intergroup Cohesion but also Clubs and Associations have a substantial e!ect on human rights. However, the sign for Intergroup Cohesion is positive, whereas the sign for Clubs and Associations is negative. This indicates that more cohesion between groups promotes humans rights whereas more memberships of organizations reduces human rights. This can be explained with the distinction between bonding and bridging capital in the social capital literature: people may be member of social-group based organizations along ethnic, religious or gender lines, for example, which will undermine social cohesion. At the same time, in poor societies, clubs and associations are an important source of welfare provisions. So, ODA does seem to have a positive e!ect on poverty reduction, also when controlled for the strength of civil society. Development aid appears to have a negative e!ect on human rights. This, however, may be the case in which high levels of inequality both explain low protection of human rights and high amounts of ODA. So, there may be a selection bias involved with ODA-receiving countries. Rule of Law has a positive and quite strong e!ect on human rights. This suggests, as expected, that Rule of Law is a necessary condition for improving human rights in a country. It also indicates that formal institutions are complementary to Intergroup Cohesion and have a substitution e!ect with Clubs and Associations. This may explain what Davis and Hopkins (2011) have found in their analysis of formal institutions, inequality, and growth, namely that the equality of formal institutions ma"ers more than the quality of formal institutions. “One of our central contentions has been that low quality institutions are inherently associated with unequal economic and political rights” (p. 995). Hence, our ﬁnding that the Rule of Law has a positive and strong impact on human rights while at the same time Clubs and Associations have a negative e!ect may indicate that the quality of formal institutions may be strong, but the institutions are implemented in an unequal society, where people organize themselves along social divisions. And as Williamson (2009) has argued, this tends to lead to lower development outcomes than when civil society institutions are strong (implying low inequality) with weaker formal institutions. Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis | 39 | 6.2 Policy Implications It should be borne in mind that the policy implications may be inﬂuenced by possible endogeneity e!ects, which have only been partially addressed in our study. Taking this into account, we identify cautiously a couple of possible implications from the statistically signiﬁcant results of our empirical analysis. Civil society contributes positively to poverty reduction and human rights through Civic Activism and Intergroup Cohesion. This implies that development policy targeting poverty and human rights could be made more e!ective by strengthening these two dimensions of civil society. This concerns in particular strengthening the free press, which is implied in the indicators of Civic Activism, and helping to reduce prejudices and tension between groups in society, which is an important aspect of the Intergroup Cohesion index. ODA has a direct positive e!ect on Civic Activism, but a direct negative e!ect on Intergroup Cohesion. This suggests that more of the current type of ODA is likely to increase civic activism but not social cohesion. This result supports the need for donors to move towards an inclusive growth agenda with an important role for social cohesion, as the recent OECD report already recognizes: “A social cohesion agenda seeks to leverage di!erent sector policies so that they promote social inclusion, build trust and civic participation, and foster social mobility. Taking these three dimensions as the pillars of a social cohesion agenda goes beyond the traditional ‘pro-poor-growth’ approach that has been extensively discussed in the last ﬁve years” (OECD, 2012: 249). The negative coe$cient for the direct e!ect of ODA on Intergroup Cohesion suggests that the current type of ODA may perhaps not help to improve intergroup cohesion in developing countries. This might be because it strengthens some groups and not others, or because it reinforces, unwi"ingly, existing prejudices and tensions between social groups. This caution is precisely what we ﬁnd in the policy recommendations by Robinson and Friedman (2005: 43), concluding that donor support should: “ensure that groups in rural or urban low-income areas and those with a mass membership also receive adequate support … this approach would have the advantage of strengthening organisations that represent poorer groups and potentially increase the diversity perspectives under a democratic system.” However, they warn that even then, inequality and tensions can still arise: “But this does not mean that increased support to grassroots organizations would necessarily strengthen democracy, since many are exclusive in their membership (by gender and ethnicity), are not transparent in their internal a!airs and are not accountable to their members” (ibid.) Furthermore, Intergroup Cohesion has a negative e!ect on democracy whereas Clubs and Associations has a negative e!ect on human rights. Again these e!ects may indicate that social cohesion and club membership run largely along social divisions in society, reinforcing negative a"itudes and tensions between social groups. | 40 | Conclusions and Policy Implications The relatively unambiguous e!ect of civil society on a development outcome, directly and through ODA, is Civic Activism on poverty reduction: ODA seems to strengthen Civic Activism, while Civic Activism seems to contribute to poverty reduction. Here the size e!ects become relevant. A ten percent increase in ODA would improve Civic Activism by seven percent (Table 2). And a seven points increase in Civic Activism would lead to a reduction in poverty by three percent (Table 3). In addition, there appears to be a direct e!ect of ODA on poverty reduction: a ten percent increase in ODA reduces poverty by 12.6 percentage points (Table 3). If we would take these two together, ignoring for the moment possible endogeneity e!ects, the direct and indirect e!ect of a ten percent increase in ODA on poverty reduction could be around 15-16 percent. This suggests that ODA might become even more poverty reducing when it would actively stimulate Civic Activism, which means in particular by supporting free press, in order to enable people’s objective information gathering about politics and what is going on in the world through newspapers, radio, tv and internet (see the Annex 3 for a full list of the indicators in the Civic Activism Index). Access to and use of (independent) news media and participation in demonstrations and petitions will support the accountability of government policy and ﬁnances, and allows the building up of public pressure for a more equal distribution of expenditures and more progressive taxation. This helps to reduce relative and absolute levels of poverty. Even though in our empirical results Civic Activism has a positive but not statistically signiﬁcant coe$cient on democracy and human rights, the literature that we reviewed advises the support of Civic Activism also for these development outcomes (Robinson and Friedman, 2005; OECD, 2012). They advise this precisely because it would “increase the support for strengthening the more qualitative side of democracy: civil society, the free press, union movements, and any counterweight to the constitutional power of the state” (OECD, 2012: 248). Donors should contribute to “building political e$cacy for a wider and more representative range of civil society organisations, with positive implications for strengthening democracy through autonomous civic action” (Robinson and Friedman, 2005: 44). Rule of Law is the other relevant policy variable in our empirical analysis. We ﬁnd that it tends to improve the democracy scores, even when the civil society indices show no e!ect or a negative e!ect, as is the case for Intergroup Cohesion. It also appears to improve human rights, complementary to the positive e!ect of Intergroup Cohesion and substituting for the negative e!ect of Clubs and Associations. This suggests that diplomacy to improve the Rule of Law in developing countries seems a useful tool to support democracy and human rights. But for poverty reduction, this variable does not have any e!ect. This indicates that for development, Rule of Law is probably a necessary condition, but not a su$cient one. That is precisely why the latest OECD annual report recommends that donors should go beyond “focusing simply on pu"ing in place the right institutional mechanisms” (OECD, 2012: 249). Easterly at al. (2006: 117) have made the point even stronger by advising that support for civil society should best go “through the empowerment of domestic constituencies rather than via ‘conditionalities’ imposed by external donors and development agencies.” Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis | 41 | The main, tentative, policy conclusions of our study in relation to our hypothesis are that a focus of ODA on Civic Activism might help to strenghten the poverty reducing e!ect of ODA, that diplomacy focusing on strengthening formal institutions could support both democracy and human rights (but not poverty reduction), and that any direct or indirect ODA to civil society should actively prevent inequalities, prejudices and tensions between social groups. With all the caveats in our empirical study, our tentative results support a conclusion that it is important to move away from a fragmented support of civil society towards a social cohesion agenda for ODA, which involves an integrated approach of fostering civic activism and diverse forms of self-organisation while at the same time actively helping to reduce inequalities and prejudices between social groups, through governments and next to government support. Annexes Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis | 43 | Annex 1 About IOB Objectives The remit of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) is to increase insight into the implementation and e!ects of Dutch foreign policy. IOB meets the need for the independent evaluation of policy and operations in all the policy ﬁelds of the Homogenous Budget for International Cooperation (HGIS). IOB also advises on the planning and implementation of evaluations that are the responsibility of policy departments of the Ministry of Foreign A!airs and embassies of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Its evaluations enable the Minister of Foreign A!airs and the Minister for Development Cooperation to account to parliament for policy and the allocation of resources. In addition, the evaluations aim to derive lessons for the future. To this end, e!orts are made to incorporate the ﬁndings of evaluations of the Ministry of Foreign A!airs’ policy cycle. Evaluation reports are used to provide targeted feedback, with a view to improving the formulation and implementation of policy. Insight into the outcomes of implemented policies allows policymakers to devise measures that are more e!ective and focused. Organisation and quality assurance IOB has a sta! of experienced evaluators and its own budget. When carrying out evaluations it calls on assistance from external experts with specialised knowledge of the topic under investigation. To monitor the quality of its evaluations IOB sets up a reference group for each evaluation, which includes not only external experts but also interested parties from within the ministry and other stakeholders. In addition, an Advisory Panel of four independent experts provides feedback and advice on the usefulness and use made of evaluations. The panel’s reports are made publicly available and also address topics requested by the ministry or selected by the panel. Programming of evaluations IOB consults with the policy departments to draw up a ministry-wide evaluation programme. This rolling multi-annual programme is adjusted annually and included in the Explanatory Memorandum to the ministry ’s budget. IOB bears ﬁnal responsibility for the programming of evaluations in development cooperation and advises on the programming of foreign policy evaluations. The themes for evaluation are arrived at in response to requests from parliament and from the ministry, or are selected because they are issues of societal concern. IOB actively coordinates its evaluation programming with that of other donors and development organisations. | 44 | Annexes Approach and methodology Initially IOB’s activities took the form of separate project evaluations for the Minister for Development Cooperation. Since 1985, evaluations have become more comprehensive, covering sectors, themes and countries. Moreover, since then, IOB’s reports have been submi"ed to parliament, thus entering the public domain. The review of foreign policy and a reorganisation of the Ministry of Foreign A!airs in 1996 resulted in IOB’s remit being extended to cover the entire foreign policy of the Dutch government. In recent years it has extended its partnerships with similar departments in other countries, for instance through joint evaluations and evaluative activities undertaken under the auspices of the OECD-DAC Network on Development Evaluation. IOB has continuously expanded its methodological repertoire. More emphasis is now given to robust impact evaluations implemented through an approach in which both quantitative and qualitative methods are applied. IOB also undertakes policy reviews as a type of evaluation. Finally, it conducts systematic reviews of available evaluative and research material relating to priority policy areas. Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis | 45 | Annex 2 References Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. Robinson (2001) ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Advantage’, American Economic Review 91 (5), pp. 1369-1401. 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The Hague: Institute of Social Studies. Durlauf, Stephen, and Marcel Fafchamps (2004) Social Capital. NBER Working Paper 10485. Cambridge (MA): National Bureau of Economic Research. Durlauf, Steven, Andros Kourtellos and Chih Ming Tan (2008) ‘Are Any Growth Theories Robust?’, The Economic Journal 118, pp. 329-346. Easterly, W., and R. Levine (1997) ‘Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 94), pp. 1203-1250. Easterly, William, Jozef Ritzen, and Michael Woolcock (2006) ‘Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth’, Economics & Politics 18 (2), pp. 103-120. Field, John (2003) Social Capital . London: Routledge. Fine, Ben (2001) Social Capital versus Social Theory. Political Economy and Social Science at the Turn of the Millennium . London: Routledge. Foa, Roberto (2011) Indices of Social Development – Research Applications. 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An Empirical Assessment . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Harriss, John and Paolo de Renzio (1997) ‘’Missing Link or Analytically Missing. The Concept of Social Capital: an Introductory Bibliographic Essay ’, Journal of International Development 9 (7), pp. 919-937. Henderson, Daniel, Chris Papageorgiou, and Christopher Parmeter (2011) ‘Growth Empirics without Parameters’, The Economic Journal , Doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02460.x Hayami, Yujiro (2009) ‘Social Capital, Human Capital and the Community Mechanism: Toward a Conceptual Framework for Economists’, Journal of Development Studies 45 (1), pp. 96-123. Huang, Yih Lerh, and John Cameron (2012) Granger Inspired Testing the ISDs for Possible Causal Relationships. ISD Working Paper no. 2012-01. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies. Isham, Jonathan, Thomas Kelly, and Sunder Ramaswamy (2002) Social Capital and Economic Development. Well-being in Developing Countries. Cheltenham; Edward Elgar. Jensen, Jane (2010) Deﬁning and Measuring Social Cohesion. London: Commonwealth Secretariat. Kabeer, Naila, Ariful Haq and Tahera Yasmin Huq (2009) Quantifying the Impact of Social Mobilisation in Rural Bangladesh; Donors, Civil Society and ‘The Road Not Taken’’ IDS Working Paper no. 333.Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. Knack, Stephen (2001) ‘Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: Cross-Country Empirical Tests’, Southern Economic Journal 68 (2), pp. 310-329. Knack, Stephen, and Philip Keefer (1997) ‘Does Social Capital have an Economic Payo!?’A Cross-Country Investigation’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (4), pp. 1251-1288. Knack, S., and P.J. Zak (2001) ‘Trust and Growth’, The Economic Journal 111 (470), pp. 295-321. La Porta, R., F. Lopezs-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (1999) ‘The Quality of Government’, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15, pp. 222-279. Lanzi, Diego (2011) ‘Capabilities and Social Cohesion’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 35, pp. 1087-1101. | 48 | Annexes Morrisson, Christian, and Johannes Jü"ing (2005) ‘Women’s Discrimination in Developing Countries: A New Data Set for Be"er Policies’, World Development 33 (7), pp. 1065-81. Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart (2009) ‘Max Weber and the Protestant Work Ethic’, in Jan Peil and Irene van Staveren (eds.) Handbook of Economics and Ethics , Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 578-587. Odebode, Sunbo, and Irene van Staveren (2007) ‘Gender Norms as Asymmetric Institutions. A Case Study of Yoruba Women in Nigeria’, Journal of Economic Issues 41 (4), pp. 903-925. OECD (2003) Glossary of Statistics: h!p://www.imf.org/external/pubs/"/eds/Eng/Guide/ index.htm OECD (2011) Perspectives on Global Development: Social Cohesion in a Shi"ing World . Paris: OECD. Okediji, Tade O. 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Williamson, Claudia (2009) ‘Informal Institutions Rule: Institutional Arrangements and Economic Performance’, Public Choice 139, pp. 371-387. Woolcock, Michael, and Deepa Narayan (2000) ‘Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research, and Policy ’, The World Bank Research Observer 15 (2), pp. 225-249. Woolcock, Michael (2011) What Distinctive Contribution can Social Cohesion make to development Theory, Research and Policy? Speech at an OECD Conference, 20 January 2011. Paris. World Bank (1998) The Initiative on Deﬁning, Monitoring and Measuring Social Capital. Overview and Program Description. Social Development Family Paper. Washington D.C.: World Bank. World Bank (2011) World Development Report 2012. Gender Equality. Washington D.C.: World Bank. | 50 | Annexes Annex 3 Diagrams Diagram A1 Countries with highest and lowest changes in Civic Activism 2000-2010 Diagram A2 Countries with highest and lowest changes in Intergroup Cohesion 2000-2010 -0,08 -0,06 -0,04 -0,02 0,00 0,02 0,04 0,06 0,08 0,10 Croatia Trinidad and Tobago Moldova Albania Costa Rica Libya Barbados Ecuador El Salvador Macedonia, FYR Haiti Gambia, The Guinea Mali Kyrgyz Republic Nepal Ghana Cape Verde Bhutan Angola -0,5 -0,4 -0,3 -0,2 -0,1 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3 Iraq Thailand Pakistan Syrian Arab Republic China El Salvador Mali Niger Botswana Uganda Bolivia Sri Lanka Dominican Republic Congo, Rep. Zimbabwe Ecuador Indonesia Brazil Angola Algeria Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis | 51 | Diagram A3 Countries with highest and lowest changes in Clubs and Associations 2000-2010 Diagram A4 Sca#er plot for Intergroup Cohesion and log ODA, average for 1995-2010 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 (mean) intergroup Cohesion 0 2 4 6 8 (mean) Log ODA -0,25 -0,20 -0,15 -0,10 -0,05 0,00 0,05 0,10 0,15 0,20 Ecuador Uruguay Ghana Chile Paraguay Jordan Pakistan Botswana Ukraine Iran, Islamic Rep. Nicaragua Bangladesh Malawi Tunisia Tanzania Guatemala Indonesia Georgia Honduras Turkey | 52 | Annexes Diagram A5 Sca#er plot for poverty and Civic Activism, average for 1995-2010 Diagram A6 Sca#er plot for democracy and Intergroup Cohesion, average for 1995-2010 0 10 20 30 40 (mean) percentage poverty .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 (mean) Civic Activism !10 !5 0 5 10 (mean) democracy .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 (mean) Intergroup Cohesion Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis | 53 | Diagram A7. Sca#er plot for human rights and Intergroup Cohesion, average for 1995-2010 0 2 4 6 8 (mean) human rights .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 (mean) Intergroup Cohesion | 54 | Annexes Table A1 The Indicators of the Civic Activism Index Indicator Source Countries % of public who have listened to radio news ‘in the last day’ or ‘several times in the last week’ Afrobarometer $# % of public who have watched TV news ‘in the last day’ or ‘several times in the last week’ Afrobarometer $# % of public who have read newspaper news ‘in the last day’ or ‘several times in the last week’ Afrobarometer $# Civicus civil society rating — Structure Civicus +* Civicus civil society rating — Environment Civicus +* Civicus civil society rating — Values Civicus +* Civicus civil society rating — Impact Civicus +* Radios per capita Intern. Telecom. Union $)* Radios per household Intern. Telecom. Union $)* % of public who ‘have’ or ‘would be prepared’ to take part in a peaceful demonstration Latinobarometer $) % of public who ‘have’ or ‘would be prepared’ to sign a petition Latinobarometer $% Respondent says they use radio to inform themselves about politics Latinobarometer $% % says they use newspaper to inform themselves about politics Latinobarometer $% Respondent says they use TV to inform themselves about politics Latinobarometer $% % of respondents who watch TV news a great deal or very much Latinobarometer $% % of respondents who read newspaper news a great deal or very much Latinobarometer $% % of respondents who listent radio news a great deal or very much Latinobarometer $% Average number of days spent watching TV news, per week Latinobarometer $) Average number of days spent reading newspaper news, per week Latinobarometer $) Average number of days spent listening to radio news, per week Latinobarometer $) Density of secretariats of international non-governmental organisations in a country Global Civil Society Project $*( Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis | 55 | Table A1 The Indicators of the Civic Activism Index Indicator Source Countries Extent to which organisations and individuals are members of INGOs, number of INGOs with members in that country Global Civil Society Project $*# % of the workforce employed in the NGO sector SAIS +# Newspapers per capita UNESCO $&* Daily newspaper titles, per capita UNESCO $&* % of respondents who either ‘have done’ or ‘might’ sign a petition World Values Surveys, Latinobarometer %) % of respondents who either ‘have done’ or ‘might’ join a boyco- World Values Surveys %$ % of respondents who ‘have done’ or ‘might’ a-end a peaceful demonstration World Values Surveys, Afrobarometer, Latinobarom - eter )# % of respondents who have used a daily newspaper in the last week to !nd out what is going on in the world World Values Surveys ,, % of respondents who have used news broadcasts on radio or TV in the last week to !nd out what is going on in the world World Values Surveys ,, % of respondents who have used printed magazines in the last week to !nd out what is going on in the world World Values Surveys ,, % of respondents who have used in depth reports on radio or TV in the last week to !nd out what is going on in the world World Values Surveys ,, % of respondents who have used books in the last week to !nd out what is going on in the world World Values Surveys ,, % of respondents who have used internet or email in the last week to !nd out what is going on in the world World Values Surveys ,, | 56 | Evaluation reports of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) published 2008-2012 Evaluation reports published before 2008 can be found on the IOB website: www.minbuza.nl/iob IOB no. Year Title evaluation report ISBN +#* ,&$, Energievoorzieningszekerheid en Buitenlandbeleid – Beleidsdoorlichting ,&&#-,&$& )*)-)&-(+,%-','-* +## ,&$, Drinking water and Sanitation – Policy review of the Dutch Development Cooperation $))&-,&$$ )*%-)&-(+,%-',+-& +## ,&$, Drinkwater en sanitaire voorzieningen – Beleids - doorlichting van het OS-beleid $))&-,&$$ )*%-)&-(+,%-',,-+ +#( ,&$, Tactische diplomatie voor een Strategisch Concept – De Nederlandse inzet voor het NAVO Strategisch Concept ,&$& )*%-)&-(+,%-',$-# +#' ,&$, E.ectiviteit van Economische Diplomatie: Methoden en Resultaten van Onderzoek. )*%-)&-(+,%-',&-) +#+ ,&$$ Improving food security: A systematic review of the impact of interventions in agricultural production, value chains, market regulation, and land security )*%-)&-(+,%-'$)-+ +#, ,&$$ De Methodische kwaliteit van Programma-evaluaties in het Mede!nancieringsstelsel-I ,&&*-,&$& )*%-)&-(+,%-'$%-# +#$ ,&$$ Evaluatie van de Twinningfaciliteit Suriname- Nederland )*%-)&-(+,%-'$*-) +#& ,&$$ More than Water: Impact evaluation of drinking water supply and sanitation interventions in rural Mozambique )*%-)&-(+,%-'$'-% +() ,&$$ Regionaal en geïntegreerd beleid? Evaluatie van het Nederlandse beleid met betrekking tot de Westelijke Balkan ,&&'-,&&% )*%-)&-(+,%-'$#-, +(% ,&$$ Assisting Earthquake victims: Evaluation of Dutch Cooperating aid agencies (SHO) Support to Haiti in ,&$& )*%-)&-(+,%-'$+-$ +(* ,&$$ Le risque d’e.ets éphémères: Evaluation d’impact des programmes d’approvisionnement en eau potable et d’assainissement au Bénin )*%-)&-(+,%-'$(-( +(* ,&$$ The risk of vanishing e.ects: Impact Evaluation of drinking water supply and sanitation programmes in rural Benin )*%-)&-(+,%-'$,-' +(# ,&$$ Between High Expectations and Reality: An evaluation of budget support in Zambia )*%-)&-(+,%-'$$-* +(( ,&$$ Lessons Learnt: Synthesis of literature on the impact and e.ectiveness of investments in education )*%-)&-(+,%-'$&-& +(' ,&$$ Leren van NGOs: Studie van de basic education interventies van geselecteerde Nederlandse NGOs )*%-)&-(+,%-'&)-' Annexes Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis | 57 | +(+ ,&$$ Education ma-ers: Policy review of the Dutch contribution to basic education $)))–,&&) )*%-)&-(+,%-'&%-* +(, ,&$$ Un!nished business: making a di.erence in basic education. An evaluation of the impact of education policies in Zambia and the role of budget support. )*%-)&-(+,%-'&*-& +($ ,&$$ Con!anza sin con!nes: Contribución holandesa a la educación básica en Bolivia (,&&&-,&&)) )*%-)&-(+,%-'&#-+ +(& ,&$$ Unconditional Trust: Dutch support to basic education in Bolivia (,&&&-,&&)) )*%-)&-(+,%-'&(-# +') ,&$$ The two-pronged approach Evaluation of Netherlands Support to Formal and Non-formal Primary Education in Bangladesh, $)))-,&&) )*%-)&-(+,%-'&'-) +'% ,&$$ Schoon schip. En dan? Evaluatie van de schuldver - lichting aan de Democratische Republiek Congo ,&&+-,&$& (Verkorte samenva-ing) )*%-)&-(+,%-'&+-, +'* ,&$$ Table rase et après? Evaluation de l Allègement de la De-e en République Démocratique du Congo ,&&+-,&$& )*%-)&-(+,%-'&,-( +'# ,&$$ Vijf Jaar Top van Warschau De Nederlandse inzet voor versterking van de Raad van Europa )*%-)&-(+,%-'&$-% +'( ,&$$ Wederzijdse belangen – wederzijdse voordelen Evaluatie van de Schuldverlichtingsovereenkomst van ,&&( tussen de Club van Parijs en Nigeria. (Verkorte Versie) )*%-)&-(+,%-+)%-$ +'' ,&$$ Intérêts communs - avantages communs Evaluation de l’accord de ,&&( relatif à l’allègement de la de-e entre le Club de Paris et le Nigéria. (Version Abrégée) )*%-)&-(+,%-+))-% +'+ ,&$$ Wederzijdse belangen – wederzijdse voordelen Evaluatie van de schuldverlichtingsovereenkomst van ,&&( tussen de Club van Parijs en Nigeria. (Samenva-ing) )*%-)&-(+,%-+)*-' +', ,&$$ Intérêts communs - avantages communs Evaluation de l’ccord de ,&&( relatif à l’allègement de la de-e entre le Club de Paris et le Nigéria. (Sommaire) )*%-)&-(+,%-+)(-& +'$ ,&$$ Mutual Interests – mutual bene!ts Evaluation of the ,&&( debt relief agreement between the Paris Club and Nigeria. (Summary report) )*%-)&-(+,%-+)'-+ +'& ,&$$ Mutual Interests – mutual bene!ts Evaluation of the ,&&( debt relief agreement between the Paris Club and Nigeria. (Main report) )*%-)&-(+,%-+)+-# ++% ,&$$ Consulaire Dienstverlening Doorgelicht ,&&*-,&$& )*%-)&-(+,%-'&&-$ ++* ,&$$ Evaluación de las actividades de las organizaciones holandesas de co!nanciamiento activas en Nicaragua | 58 | ++# ,&$$ Facilitating Resourcefulness. Synthesis report of the Evaluation of Dutch support to Capacity Develop - ment. )*%-)&-(+,%-+),-) ++( ,&$$ Evaluation of Dutch support to Capacity Develop - ment. The case of the Netherlands Commission for Environmental Assessment (NCEA) )*%-)&-(+,%-+)$-, ,&$$ Aiding the Peace. A Multi-Donor Evaluation of Support to Con0ict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan ,&&( - ,&$& )*%-)&-(+,%-+%)-) +++ ,&$$ Evaluación de la cooperación holandesa con Nicaragua ,&&(-,&&% )*%-)&-(+,%-+)&-( ++, ,&$$ Evaluation of Dutch support to Capacity Develop - ment. The case of PSO )*%-)&-(+,%-+%%-, ++$ ,&$$ Evaluation of Dutch support to Capacity Develop - ment. The case of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) )*%-)&-(+,%-+%*-( ++& ,&$& Evaluatie van de activiteiten van de mede!nancie - ringsorganisaties in Nicaragua )*%-)&-(+,%-+%#-% +,) ,&$& Evaluation of General Budget Support to Nicaragua ,&&(-,&&% )*%-)&-(+,%-+%(-$ +,% ,&$& Evaluatie van de Nederlandse hulp aan Nicaragua ,&&(-,&&% )*%-)&-(+,%-+%'-' +,* ,&$& Impact Evaluation. Drinking water supply and sanitation programme supported by the Nether - lands in Fayoum Governorate, Arab Republic of Egypt, $))&-,&&) )*%-)&-(+,%-+%$-+ +,# ,&&) Evaluatie van de Atlantische Commissie (,&&#-,&&)) )*%-)&-(+,%-+%&-# +,( ,&&) Beleidsdoorlichting van het Nederlandse export - controle- en wapenexportbeleid )*%-)&-(+,%-+*)-& - ,&&) Evaluation policy and guidelines for evaluations No ISBN +,' ,&&) Investing in Infrastructure )*%-)&-(+,%-+*%-+ - ,&&) Synthesis of impact evaluations in sexual and reproductive health and rights )*%-)&-(+,%-+*#-) +,+ ,&&) Preparing the ground for a safer World )*%-)&-(+,%-+**-# +,, ,&&) Draagvlakonderzoek. Evalueerbaarheid en resultaten )*%-)&-(+,%-+*(-, +,$ ,&&) Maatgesneden Monitoring ‘Het verhaal achter de cijfers’ )*%-)&-(+,%-+*'-( +,& ,&&% Het tropisch regenwoud in het OS-beleid $)))-,&&( )*%-)&-(+,%-+*+-% +$) ,&&% Meer dan een dak. Evaluatie van het Nederlands beleid voor stedelijke armoedebestrijding )*%-)&-(+,%-+#(-+ +$% ,&&% Samenwerking met Clingendael )*%-)&-(+,%-+#*-* Annexes Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis | 59 | +$* ,&&% Sectorsteun in milieu en water )*%-)&-(+,%-+#)-$ +$# ,&&% Be our guests (sommaire) )*%-)&-(+,%-+*,-$ +$# ,&&% Be our guests (summary) )*%-)&-(+,%-+*$-' +$# ,&&% Be our guests (Main report English) )*%-)&-(+,%-+*$-' +$# ,&&% Be our guests (samenva-ing) )*%-)&-(+,%-+*&-* +$# ,&&% Be our guests (hoofdrapport) )*%-)&-(+,%-+*&-* +$( ,&&% Support to Rural Water Supply and Sanitation in Dhamar and Hodeidah Governorates, Republic of Yemen )*%-)&-(+,%-+#%-' +$' ,&&% Primus Inter Pares; een evaluatie van het Neder - landse EU-voorzi-erschap ,&&' )*%-)&-(+,%-+#'-# +$+ ,&&% Explore-programma )*%-)&-(+,%-+#,-, +$, ,&&% Impact Evaluation: Primary Education Zambia )*%-)&-(+,%-+#&-% +$$ ,&&% Impact Evaluation: Primary Education Uganda )*%-)&-(+,%-+#$-( +$& ,&&% Clean and Sustainable? )*%-)&-(+,%-+(#-$ +&) ,&&% Het vakbondsmede!nancieringsprogramma – Sum - mary English )*%-)&-(+,%-+(*-% +&) ,&&% Het vakbondsmede!nancieringsprogramma Resumen Español )*%-)&-(+,%-+(*-% +&) ,&&% Het vakbondsmede!nancieringsprogramma )*%-)&-(+,%-+(*-% +&% ,&&% Het Nederlandse Afrikabeleid $))%-,&&#. Evaluatie van de bilaterale samenwerking )*%-)&-(+,%-+()-, +&% ,&&% Het Nederlandse Afrikabeleid $))%-,&&#. Evaluatie van de bilaterale samenwerking (Samenva-ing) )*%-)&-(+,%-+()-, +&* ,&&% Beleidsdoorlichting seksuele en reproductieve gezondheid en rechten en hiv/aids ,&&'-,&&# )*%-)&-(+,%-+(%-( If you want to receive a publication in printed form, please send an e-mail to IOB@minbuza.nl, mentioning the title and ISBN-number. The publications can be downloaded at our IOB-website: h"p://www.minbuza.nl/iob Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) 070-348 6498 | 60 | Published by: Ministry of Foreign A!airs of the Netherlands P.O. Box 20061 | 2500 &' The Hague | The Netherlands www.minbuza.nl/iob Photo Cover: Hollandse Hoogte, Marieke van der Velden; NGO signs Layout VijfKeerBlauw, Rijswijk Print: VijfKeerBlauw, Rijswijk ISBN: 978-90-5328-425-4 © Ministry of Foreign A!airs of the Netherlands | June 2012 Facilitating resourcefulness | IOB Rapport | nr. 336 | Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis | IOB Study | no. 368 | Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis | IOB Published by: Ministry of Foreign A!airs of the Netherlands P. O. Box 20061 | 2500 "# The Hague | The Netherlands www.minbuza.nl/iob © Ministry of Foreign A!airs of the Netherlands | June 2012 $%BUZ&$$%'( | E In addition to bilateral and multilateral programs, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play an important role in channeling development aid towards their Southern partners. Rigorous evaluations of programs and projects are scarce and tend to be limited to the analysis of perceived e!ects at local level. Far less a)ention is usually devoted to the aggre - gate e!ect of development aid on global civil society strength and performance. This is, however, considered of utmost importance given the overarching aim of strengthening the role of civil society in the development process. The recently developed database Indices of Social Development (ISD) hosted by the Institute of Social Studies (ISS) of the Erasmus University Ro)erdam o!ers a unique opportu - nity to further analyze the relationships between civil society development and development aid (ODA) over a period of 20 years, making use of cross-country data of multidimensional indicators related to civic activism, intergroup cohesion and club mem - bership. The main *ndings of the study suggest that aid exhibits an ambivalent relation with civil society development. This study was carried out by Prof. dr. Irene van Staveren and Ellen Webbink of the International Institute for Social Studies, Erasmus University Ro)erdam, and commissioned by the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign A!airs.

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Civil society, aid, and development: a cross-country analysis

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