GE.1 3-11075
Human Rights Council
Twenty -second session
Agenda item 2
Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the
High Commissioner and the Secretary -General
W ritten statement * submitted by the Cairo Institute for
Human Rights Studies , a non -governmental organization in
special consultative status
The Secretary -General has received the following written stat ement which is circulated in
accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1996/31.
[11 February 2013 ]

* This written statement is issued, unedited, in the language(s) rece ived from the submitting non –
governmental organization(s).
United Nations A /HRC/22 /NGO/ 72

General Assembly Distr.: General
15 February 2013

English only

A/HRC/22 /NGO/ 72
2
K ey challenges in legislation concerning the right to freedom
of assembly across the Arab region
The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studie s (CIHRS) draws attention to key challenges in
legislation concerning the right to freedom of assembly across the Arab region. Triggered
by continuing waves of mass protests, several new draft laws are currently being discussed
or have recently been passed . These laws, like previously existing legislation, fail to uphold
international standards. The main legal challenges to the exercise of the right to freedom of
assembly across the Arab region are identified below.
1. National legislation in the region freque ntly enacts a system of authorization rather
than notification. Even in the rare cases where a system of notification is adopted,
notification is defined in violation of international standards and usually involves additional
restrictions in practice. A no tification system should inform the entirety of an assembly
law: it is a system in which the right to assemble is presumed and the ability of the
authorities to restrict assemblies sharply limited. In particular, legislation in the region
almost uniformly fails to exempt small or spontaneous protests from the requirement of
notification. This is particularly grave as many of the recent protests in the Arab world may
be considered spontaneous.
Moreover, during the initial submission of information phase, ex traneous
information is often required or overly restrictive demands imposed, with harsh
consequences should the requirements of the law not be met. For instance, article 3 of
Bahrain’s legislative decree 18 of 1973 on public meetings, processions, and gat herings, as
amended, requires that those seeking to hold an assembly be from the place where the
assembly is to be held and that they ‘enjoy a good reputation’. If those submitting the
notification cannot meet such standards or if any other required inform ation is not included,
the authorities treat the notification as if it has not been submitted at all, potentially
increasing the sanctions imposed on organizers if they go forward with an assembly for
which notification has not been acknowledged.
2. Legislati on in the Arab world frequently grants the authorities overly broad power to
condition or prohibit assemblies. It does so by failing to mention or comply with the
principles of necessity and proportionality relative to such impositions and by failing to
require that prohibition only be imposed as a measure of last resort. Provisions allowing for
the imposition of conditions fail to emphasize the importance of allowing protests within
‘sight and sound’ of the target of the protest. Legislation also frequentl y holds up the free
flow of traffic or other uses of public space as more important than assemblies, in contrast
to international standards, and hence grounds upon which assemblies may be sharply
limited or prohibited. Legislation also includes other inapp ropriate grounds for restrictions.
Moreover, the experiences of the region suggest the need to further specify international
standards and the right to freedom of assembly in this area – while restrictions based on
‘public order’ or ‘public morals’ do not infringe international standards per se, the broad
and vague nature of these terms provides an easy basis for rights infringement in practice.
Legislation also frequently fails to stipulate that any conditions must be backed up by clear
and substantiated l egal reasoning and to grant to organizers the right of prompt appeal to an
independent and regularly constituted court. For example, articles 4 and 9 of Egypt’s law
14 of 1923 on public meetings and gatherings allow the authorities to unconditionally
prohi bit or alter the place of any assembly that they deem will create a disturbance to public
order or security, with the possibility of complaint only to the director of police or the
minister of interior.
3. Another frequent challenge to freedom of assembly is the imposition of overly
extensive responsibilities on organizers. Legislation on assemblies in the Arab world

A/HRC/22 /NGO/ 72
3
generally includes a requirement that a bureau be created. This bureau is given security
responsibilities and potentially held accountable should public order be infringed, the
assembly deviate from the stipulations provided in its notification, or those involved engage
in inappropriate speech. For instance, Article 6 of Bahrain’s law requires the bureau to
maintain public security, public order, a nd good morals; to prevent any infractions of the
law; to prohibit any acts which take the assembly outside the purpose of the notification
submitted, such as carrying signs or banners which don’t clearly conform to that purpose; to
prohibit chants or slog ans which insult the state or national leaders or others; to prohibit
disruption of any sort; to prohibit behavior which contravenes social norms; to prohibit
speech which constitutes incitement to crime or damage to property; to prevent the political
part icipation of non -Bahraini citizens; to prevent the carrying of weapons; to ensure all the
conditions provided in the notification are complied with; and to prevent the use of
vehicles. The intent of this clause, added to the law by decree 57 of 2011, is cl ear: to
suppress freedom of assembly by exposing organizers to unreasonable obligations which
are impossible to fulfill in practice.
While some in the international community have suggested creating bureaus vested
with such power and responsibility, experi ence from the region suggests this would
severely violate the right to freedom of assembly. While encouraging informal cooperation
between organizers and authorities is positive, legislation should clearly stipulate that it is
the responsibility of the sta te, not of organizers, to ensure public safety. In practice,
imposition of excessive responsibility and accountability on organizers allows authorities to
punish them based on weak pretexts, exposing those who organize assemblies to uncertain
liability and thereby deterring the organization of assemblies and chilling the right in
practice.
4. Legislation in the region frequently infringes the right to freedom of expression
during assemblies by prohibiting or sanctioning speech on certain protected topics or
banning the carrying of certain symbols such as flags or signs. For example, article 9 of
Algeria’s law 89 -28 on public meetings and demonstrations, as amended, forbids
opposition to ‘national constants’ or to the November 1 Revolution. Article 15 of a draft
law on the organization of the right to demonstrate in public places mooted in Egypt in
January 2013 would similarly infringe freedom of expression in the context of assemblies
by banning any banner, statement, or song that might be taken as defamatory, d isparaging
towards an Abrahamic religion, that might raise sedition, or that is an insult to any organ of
the state (a provision which mirrors, incidentally, the violations of freedom of expression
included in Egypt’s new constitution).
5. Recent years have witnessed the frequent excessive and arbitrary use of force
against protestors, with far too little accountability. The problem is one of legislation as
well as practice, as laws in the region fail to limit dispersal of assemblies by police forces
only as a measure of last resort and to ensure accountability for excessive force. For
instance, article 9 of Yemen’s presidential decree 29 of 2003 on the organization of
demonstrations and marches allows for dispersal based on any of the following: the
occurrenc e of an action considered a crime or considered to obstruct state authorities from
carrying out their activities; any departure from the terms of the notification; speech or
slogans calling for sedition; or any actions provoking dissention or disturbing th e peace.
Legislation in the Arab world also generally fails to require the removal of individual
violent actors before allowing dispersal of the protest itself, as the Yemeni provision
illustrates.
6. Excessive punitive measures are often included in laws go verning assemblies in the
Arab world. Punishments are generally overly broad both in terms of the situations in which
they may be applied, and the extent of the sanction they impose. Several laws impose
accountability on some individuals for the actions of others, in clear violation of basic rules

A/HRC/22 /NGO/ 72
4
of due process. Overly burdensome financial penalties are often levied against assembly
organizers and participants based on potentially minor or unintentional infractions of the
law. For instance, article 24 of T unisian law 69 -4, regulating public meetings, processions,
parades, demonstrations and gatherings, allows punishment of up to 2 years in prison for
individuals who hold or make premises available for a meeting prohibited under article 7
(which grants autho rities an essentially unlimited degree of discretion to ban assemblies).
Article 27 of the same law allows similar punishment for anyone who participates in any
demonstration during which incitement to certain acts forbidden by the penal code occurs –
rega rdless of whether the individual concerned committed the incitement. Article 10 of
Libya’s new assembly law, law 65/2012, also allows for penal sanctions against individuals
who participate in an assembly that does not fully comply with the law.
The above comments are based on studies of the laws enacted and/or in draft form in
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain, all of which are in clear and
major need of reform. In some cases, such as that of Bahrain, the law exhibits signs of
car eful drafting – unfortunately, the clear intent behind its provisions is to suppress, rather
than support, freedom of assembly. Other countries have no assembly law at all: Sudan, for
instance, regulates assemblies primarily through the provisions of its c riminal law. Finally,
Saudi Arabia’s approach is perhaps the simplest, as they have issued an outright ban on all
assemblies. In all cases examined, significant reforms are needed.