AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10:
PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING
THE PARIS DECLARATION

This work is published on the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein
do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Organisation or of the governments of its member countries.
Please cite this publication as:
OECD (2011), Aid Effectiveness 2005–10: Progress in implementing the Paris Declaration, OECD Publishing.
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FOREwORD
3
AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
A S MINISTERS , heads of international organisations, civil society actors, private sector representatives and
parliafentarians frof around the world prepare for the Fourth bigh Level Foruf to be held in Busan,
Korea (29 Novefber to 1 Decefber 2011), one central question eferges: have global coffitfents to fake
aid fore effective been ifplefented?
In fost respects, the answer is clear: sofe progress has been fade, but globally, donors and developing
countries have fallen short of the goals that they set thefselves for 2010. Many of the reforfs needed to
reach these goals were understood to be afbitious, though for fost, they are still within reach. The Paris
Declaration and the fonitoring process docufented in this report have fade an ifportant contribution to
developfent partnerships. They have placed greater efphasis on transparency, and helped set out norfs for
defand-driven aid. Many of the efforts fade by developing countries have the potential to change not only
the way aid is fanaged, but can have fuch wider-reaching ifpact on institutions and, in turn, developfent
results. Donors should recognise the progress fade by partner countries and sustain and deepen their support.
While the Fourth bigh Level Foruf profises to forge a new global consensus for developfent co-operation
and the role it will play to accelerate poverty reduction and growth in developing countries, it also needs to reflect
on why progress in ifplefenting existing coffitfents on aid effectiveness has been challenging. A substantial
evidence base points to the ifportance of ifplefenting the sorts of changes agreed in the Paris Declaration and
efphasised in the Accra Agenda for Action. Renewed political leadership will be critical to address the unfin –
ished business that really can fake a difference for the lives of poor people in developing countries.
This report offers the fost cofprehensive assessfent of progress in ifplefenting coffitfents on aid
effectiveness to date. It draws extensively on the findings of the 2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris
Declaration. More countries than ever before have participated in the 2011 Survey, highlighting the value
that they attach to this global fonitoring effort. But the survey goes beyond providing snapshots of progress
over tife to offer a frafework for constructive dialogue – and change – in the way aid is provided and
fanaged in developing countries. Stakeholders in fost of the 78 countries that participated in the 2011
Survey used the process to better understand the opportunities and challenges they face in faking aid fore
effective. This includes a nufber of fragile states, for whof the obstacles to ensuring peace, stability and in
turn developfent and poverty reduction are often profound.
As politicians and leaders gather in Busan, they should draw on past successes and challenges as they shape
the outcofes of the Fourth bigh Level Foruf. Many of the challenges highlighted in this report are
ultifately political – rather than technical – and will require sustained leadership if they are to be overcofe.
As governfents continue to ifplefent their coffitfents on aid volufes, they should not lose sight of the
quality difension: citizens and taxpayers in both developed and developing countries have an interest in
ensuring that aid is effective and contributes to lasting results.
We are confident that this report will fake a substantial contribution to the debates at the Fourth bigh Level
Foruf and will – in turn – inforf a new, refreshed, and inclusive global partnership in the final push to feet
the Millenniuf Developfent Goals by 2015.
Talaat Abdel-Malek Bert Koenders
Co-Chairs, Working Party on Aid fffectibeness

ACKNOwLEDGEMENTS
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AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
T HE REPORT ON PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECLARATION was prepared under the auspices of the
Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, which is hosted by the Developfent Assistance Coffittee (DAC), and
in particular its Cluster on Assessing Progress co-chaired by Ikufufi Tofifoto (Japan) and Benny Kusufo
(Indonesia). It draws extensively on the findings of the 2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration,
which was ifplefented with the guidance of the Task Teaf on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, co-chaired
by Penny Innes (United Kingdof) and Veronica Sackey (Ghana). Ifportant contributions were also fade
by stakeholders frof donor organisations, partner country governfents and civil society organisations
through other work streafs.
The Working Party on Aid Effectiveness would like to coffunicate its special thanks to the governfents
of the 78 countries and territories that participated in the 2011 Survey, and in particular, the National
Co-ordinators who fanaged the survey process and donor focal points who provided support.
1
N ATIONAL CO-ORDINATORS AND DONOR FOCAL POINT ORGANISATIONS
BOLIVIA
Jaife A Garrón
BOSNIA AND H ERzEGOVINA
Dusanka Basta
United Nations
B OTS wANA
A.K. Madikwe
United Nations
Bu RkINA F ASO
Afadou Diallo
European Union
BuRu NDI
Pafphile Muderega
Efile Nifpaye
Belgiuf
CAMBODIA
Chhieng Yanara
Salin Ros
Sweden
United Nations
CAMEROON
Paul Tasong
Dieudonne Takouo
Edith Strafort Pedie
France
CAPE V ERDE
Miryan Vieira
United Nations
CENTRAL A FRICAN REPuBLIC
Bendert Bokia
Firfin Nazaire Mbotche
United Nations
CHAD
Bachar Brahif Adouf
Walngar Sadjinan Deba
Mbaiguedef Mbairo
United Nations
European Union
C OLOMBIA
Sandra Alzate
Juan Sebastian Estrada Escobar
United Nations
COMOROS
Alfeine Siti Sofiat Tadjiddine
Ahfed Sitti Fatoufa
United Nations
CONGO (D EMOCRATIC
R EPu BLIC OF )
Kanene Mukwanga
United Nations
AGHANISTAN
bafid Jalil
Salwa Dastgeer
Ajfal Poya
United Nations
Canada
A LBANIA
Valbona Kuko
Nezir baldeda
United Nations
ARMENIA
Artak Baghdasaryan
Yeva Aleksanyan
United Nations
B ANGL ADESH
Monowar Ahfed
Mohaffad Shafsul Alaf
Rafique Ahfed Siddique
Bijon Kufar Baishya
United Nations
B ENIN
Mohafed S. Gado
Aristide Djossou
United Nations
1 Throughout this document and for ease of reference, the term “countr y” is used to refer to partner countries and territories
participating in the Sur vey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration. Participation in the sur vey and mention of any participant in this
document is without prejudice to the status or international recognition of a given countr y or territor y. 78 countries and territories
participated in the 2011 Sur vey, compared with 55 in 2008 and 34 in 2006.

6AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
ACKNOwLEDGEMENTS
DOMINICAN R EPuBLIC
Aferica Bastides
Teonilde Lopez
Inocencio Garcia
EC uADOR
Alexandra Maldonado
European Union
EG yPT
Talaat Abdel-Malek
United Nations
EL S ALVADOR
Claudia Aguilar Garza
Paula Orsini
Spain
ETHIOPIA
Adfasu Gedafu
Ato Kokeb Misrak
United Nations
FIj I
Filifone Waqabaca
Kelera Vakalolofa
Marica Turaganivalu
Alipate Mataivilia
United Nations
G ABON
Paul-benri Nguefa Meye
Davy Mandza Tsofo
Oufar Tiello
United Nations
GAMBIA
Lafin Bojang
Lafin Jobe
United Nations
GHANA
Mary Anne Addo
United Nations
Gu ATEMAL A
Ana Maria Mendez Chicas
Raul Bolanos
Carfen Marroquin
Italy
Gu INEA B ISSAu
Alfredo Mendes
Ayfar Rafos Da Silva
United Nations
HAITI
Jean-Yves Robert
Gerbier Sfith
United Nations
HOND uRAS
Julio Raudales
Lidia Froff Cea
José Geovany Gófez Inestroza
United States
INDONESIA
Benny Setiawan Kusufo
Priyanto Rohfatullah
United Nations
jAMAICA
Andrea Shepherd Stewart
United Nations
jORDAN
Saleh A. Al-Kharabsheh
Yassar Al-Dughfi
Nada Wer
United Nations
kEN yA
Jackson Kinyanjui
Bernard Masiga
Monica Asuna
United Nations
kOSOVO
Besfort Rrecaj
European Union
k yRG yz R EPuBLIC
Sanjar Mukanbetov
World Bank
LAO PDR
Sofchith Inthafith
European Union
United Nations
LESOTHO
Ntsiuoa Jaase
LIBERIA
Jafes Kollie
Chara Itoka
Princetta Clinton-Varnah
United Nations
M ADAGASCAR
Isaora Zefania Rofalahy
United Nations
MAL A wI
Peter Sifbani
Twaib Ali
United Nations
MALI
Mafadou Defbele
United Nations
MAu RITANIA
Papa Abdoulaye Bocouf
boussein Mejdoub
United Nations
M OLDOVA
Lucretia Ciurea
Iulian Fruntasu
United Nations
MONGOLIA
Dorjkhand Togfid
Tuguldur Baajiikhuu
Degd Dashbal
United Nations
MOROCCO
Youssef Farhat
United Nations
MOzAMBI quE
banifa Ibrahifo
United Nations
NAMIBIA
Michael Mutonga
John Mukwafataba
United Nations
NEPAL
Tilakfan Singh Bhandari
United Nations
NIGER
Zouladaini Malaf Gata
Dankarafi Mafadou
United Nations
NIGERIA
Bassey Akpanyung
United Nations
PA k ISTAN
Muhaffed Asif
Iftikhar Afjad
United Nations
PALESTINIAN
Au THORIT y
Estephan Salafeh
Belgiuf
PAPu A NEw Gu INEA
Joseph Turia
United Nations
PER u
Carlos Pando Sanchez
Jorge Nuñez Butrón
Nancy Silva Sebastián
United States
PHILIPPINES
Rolando G. Tungpalan
Jesse David
Rw ANDA
Ronald Nkusi
John Bosco Ndaruhutse
United Nations
SAMOA
Noufea Sifi
Litara Taulealo
Australia
SAO T OMé
AND P RINCIP é
Nádia Maquisa Pinheiro
Valdefiro Costa Alegre
United Nations
SENEGAL
Thierno Seydou Niane
Bassirou Diop
Awa Guèye Sene
France
United States
SIERRA L EONE
Kawusu Kebbay
Abie Kafara
United Nations

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AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
ACKNO wLEDGEMENTS
SOLOMON I SL ANDS
Cornelious Walegerea
United Nations
SO uTH A FRICA
Robin Toli
Seefa Naran
ST V INCENT AND
THE G RENADINES
Ankie Scott-Joseph
SO uTH Su DAN
Moses Mabio Deu
Joint Donor Teaf
SuDAN
Faisal Gufa Abdelrahfan
Mariaf baider
Mohafed Salih
United Nations
Sw AzIL AND
Shadrack Tsabedze
United Nations
TA jIk ISTAN
United Nations
TAN zANIA
Ngosha Magonya
Philipina Malisa
Alice Matefbele
United Nations
TIMOR L ESTE
belder da Costa
Leigh Mitchell
United Nations
Australia
THE 2011 Su RVEy AND THIS REPORT were prepared under the direction of Marjolaine Nicod and Robin Ogilvy
at the Organisation for Econofic Co-operation and Developfent (OECD) Developfent Co-operation
Directorate (DCD). Rinko Jogo and Stacey Bradbury co-ordinated the ifplefentation of the Survey.
Mark Baldock provided statistical analysis. Sara Fyson, Eduardo Gonzalez, Jenny bedfan, bubert de
Milly, Bathylle Missika, Marjolaine Nicod, Robin Ogilvy and Suzanne Steensen contributed the analysis
contained in this report, which also benefited frof inputs and coffents provided by other DCD staff
and fefbers of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness. The Overseas Developfent Institute (ODI), a
UK-based independent think-tank, co-ordinated the drafting of Volufe 2 (country chapters), drawing on
analysis undertaken by its partner organisations: Initiative Prospective Agricole et Rurale (IPAR, Senegal);
Participatory Developfent Association (PDA, Ghana); Centre for Analysis and Forecast (CAF, Viet Naf);
Association of Scientific and Technical Intelligentsia (ASTI, Tajikistan), and Institute of Applied Research
and Local Developfent (Nitlapan, Nicaragua).
S PECIAL THAN kS are extended to the United Nations Developfent Prograffe (in particular Daša Šilović,
Aidan Cox, Alain Akpadji, Pau Blanquer, Karolien Casaer, Gert Danielsen, Artefy Izfestiev, Magdalena
Kloss, Radka Konderlova and Bettina Woll) for its extensive collaboration and close partnership in supporting
the roll-out of the survey, and the World Bank (Barbara Lee and Yoichiro Ishihara) for contributing
substantial analysis on selected survey indicators. The governfents of Cafbodia, Cape Verde, Guatefala,
Iraq and Jordan hosted a series of five regional survey roll-out workshops attended by over 250 participants
frof 80 countries. The governfents of Canada, France, Japan, the United Kingdof and the United States as
well as the African Developfent Bank and the Organization for Aferican States provided financial support
for the workshops.
T OGO
Mindi Lafboni
United Nations
TONGA
Natalia Palu Latu
Ma’ata Taufu’i Mafi
United Nations
uGANDA
Lawrence Kiiza
Twesiife Fred
African Developfent Bank
u kRAINE
Iryna Korzh
Tetiana Zinchenko
United Nations
VAN uAT u
Johnson Naviti Marakipule
New Zealand
United Nations
VIET N AM
Cao Manh Cuong
Tran Thi Yen Minh
Finland
zAMBIA
Monde Sitwala
Paul Lupunga
Tofohide Uchida
Ireland

TABLE OF CONTENTS
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FOREwORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
ACkNO wLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
ACRONyMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

E xEC uTIVE S u MMAR y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
CHAPTER 1: OVERVIE w OF FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Monitoring the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
bave donors and partner countries delivered on their Paris Declaration coffitfents?
. .20
Donors and partner countries fet 1 out of 13 global targets
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Despite setbacks, progress has been fade
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
bow do countries differ in their ifplefentation of the Paris Declaration?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Fragile states and situations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Middle-incofe countries
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
bow do donors differ in their ifplefentation of the Paris Declaration?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Lifitations to the assessfent of progress
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
References
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
CHAPTER 2: O wNERSHIP OF DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND STRATEGIES . . . . . . . 29
Ifproving partner country leadership over developfent policies and strategies
. . . . . . . . . . 30
Operational developfent strategies (indicator 1)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Gender equality and developfent policies and strategies
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Broad participation in developfent policies
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Local governfents
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Parliafents
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Civil society organisations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
The gap between policy and practice in profoting defand driven
capacity developfent
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Future considerations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
References
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
CHAPTER 3: ALIGNMENT OF AID wITH CO uNTRy PRIORITIES AND S ySTEMS 43
Lifited evidence of progress in aligning to partners’ policy priorities and strategies
. . . . . . 44
Aligning conditions with partner countries’ developfent policies
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Global progress in strengthening country systefs hides wide variations
across countries
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Reliable public financial fanagefent systefs (indicator 2a)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Reliable procurefent systefs (indicator 2b)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Strategic environfental assessfent
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Donors are not relying on partner country fiduciary systefs to the extent foreseen
in Paris and Accra
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Aligning aid flows on national budgets (indicator 3)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Using country public financial fanagefent systefs (indicator 5a)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Using country procurefent systefs (indicator 5b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Untying aid (indicator 8)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Avoiding parallel ifplefentation structures (indicator 6)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Sector experiences in using country systefs: evidence frof health and education
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Future considerations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
References
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
CHAPTER 4: HARMONISATION OF DONOR PRACTICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Moderate progress in ifplefenting coffon arrangefents since Accra
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Strengthening capacity through co-ordinated support (indicator 4)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Prograffe-based approaches (indicator 9)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Co-ordinated donor fissions (indicator 10a) and joint country analytic work (indicator 10b)
. . . . . 65
Efforts to reduce aid fragfentation at country and international levels are fixed
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Aid fragfentation within partner countries
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
International fragfentation and division of labour
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Future considerations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
References
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
CHAPTER 5: AID PREDICTABILIT y AND TRANSPARENC y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Aid is relatively predictable in the short-terf, but fediuf-terf predictability refains a challenge
. . . . . 73
In-year predictability (indicator 7)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Mediuf-terf predictability
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Efforts to fake public all conditions linked to aid disbursefents
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Broader reporting, but aid transparency refains a challenge
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Sofe evidence of progress in the fight against corruption
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Donor efforts to cofbat corruption at hofe
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Efforts fade by developing countries in addressing corruption
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Future considerations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
References
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
CHAPTER 6: RES uLTS AND M uTu AL ACCO uNTABILIT y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Encouraging progress in profoting fanagefent for developfent results
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Transparent and fonitorable perforfance assessfent frafeworks (indicator 11)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Ifprovefent in statistical systefs and statistics
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Using and strengthening country systefs for results fanagefent
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Further progress is needed on futual accountability (indicator 12)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Future considerations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
References
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
CHAPTER 7: ExPERIENCE IN MONITORING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Rationale for fonitoring
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Growing participation afong developing countries
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
A country-led process
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Optional fodules on gender equality and inclusive ownership
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Monitoring aid effectiveness at the sector level
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Internalising and custofising the Paris Declaration fonitoring frafework
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Future considerations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
References
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

11
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATISTICAL APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
A. COuNTRy DATA (ONE TABLE PER INDICATOR) . . . . . . . . . p. . . . . . . . . p. . . . . . . . . p. . . . . . 111
B. DONOR DATA (ONE TABLE PER INDICATOR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
C. DONOR DATA (ONE TABLE PER DONOR ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
D. PARIS DECLARATION INDICATORS OF PROGRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
TABLES Table 1.1 To what extent have global targets been fet? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Table 2.1 Do partner countries have operational developfent strategies?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Table 3.1 Quality of country public financial fanagefent systefs
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Table 3.2 Quality of country procurefent systefs
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Table 4.1 Fragfentation ratio by incofe group
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Table 5.1 bow reliable are donors’ estifates of future aid disbursefents?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Table 6.1 Do partner countries have transparent and fonitorable
perforfance assessfent frafeworks?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Table 6.2 Mechanisfs for futual review
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Table 6.3 bow do futual accountability fechanisfs support behaviour
change at country level?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
FIG uRES Figure 1.1 The Paris Declaration pyrafid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Figure 1.2 To what extent has progress been fade since 2005?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Figure 3.1 Is aid for the governfent sector reflected in partners’ budgets?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Figure 3.2 Progress and setbacks in the use of country public financial
fanagefent systefs
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Figure 3.3 Is there a relationship between the quality of country public
financial fanagefent systefs and their use by donors?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Figure 3.4 Use of partner country procurefent systefs by donors
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Figure 3.5 Progress in untying aid
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Figure 3.6 Nufber of parallel project ifplefentation units
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Figure 4.1 Co-ordinated technical co-operation
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Figure 4.2 Proportion of aid provided in the context of prograffe-based approaches
. . 63
Figure 4.3 Co-ordinated donor fissions
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Figure 4.4 Co-ordinated country analytic works
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Figure 5.1 In-year predictability of aid
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
B O xES Box 1.1 Progress in the ifplefentation of the Principles For Good
International Engagefent in Fragile States and Situations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Box 2.1 The Istanbul CSO Developfent Effectiveness Principles
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Box 4.1 Progress and challenges in using sector-wide approaches in the health sector .64
Box 5.1 Ifproving predictability: donors’ fulti-year frafeworks at country level
. . . . 76
Box 7.1 The Working Party on Aid Effectiveness:
transforfing global partnerships for developfent
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Box 7.2 Use and adaptation of the Paris Declaration fonitoring frafework:
innovative practices
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

ACRONYMS
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AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
A A A Accra Agenda for Action
CPA Country prograffable aid
CPIA Country Policy and Institutional Assessfent (World Bank)
CRS Creditor Reporting Systef
CSO Civil society organisation
DAC Developfent Assistance Coffittee of the Organisation
for Econofic Co-operation and Developfent
EFA FTI Education for All Fast Track Initiative
EU European Union
FY Financial year
bIPC beavily indebted poor country
IATI International Aid Transparency Initiative
IbP+ International bealth Partnership and related initiatives
LDC Least developed country
LIC Low incofe country
MDG Millenniuf Developfent Goal
MIC Middle-incofe country
NGO Non-governfental organisation
ODA Official developfent assistance
OECD Organisation for Econofic Co-operation and Developfent
PBA Prograffe-based approach
PD Paris Declaration
PEFA Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PFM Public financial fanagefent
PIU Project ifplefentation unit
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SWAp Sector-wide Approach
WP-EFF Working Party on Aid Effectiveness of the OECD-DAC
UN United Nations
UNAIDS Joint UN Prograffe on bIV/AIDS
UNDP United Nations Developfent Prograffe
USD United States Dollar

ExEC uTI vE S u MMARY
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AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
I N 2005, over 100 donors and developing countries coffitted to fake aid fore effective in
supporting the achievefent of developfent results when they agreed to the Paris Declaration
on Aid Effectiveness. One of the distinguishing features of the Paris Declaration was the
coffitfent to hold each other to account for ifplefenting its principles at the country level
through a set of clear indicators, with targets to be achieved by 2010. To what extent have the
coffitfents been realised? Is aid being delivered in a fore effective way than five years ago?
This report provides sofe answers to these questions.
Aid fffectibeness 2005-10: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration draws on the results of
the 2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, building on sifilar surveys undertaken
in 2006 and 2008. A total of 78 countries and territories volunteered to participate in the final
round of surveys, which look at the state of play in 2010.
The results are sobering. At the global level, only one out of the 13 targets established for f010
– co-ordinated technical co-operation (a feasure of the extent to which donors co-ordinate
their efforts to support countries’ capacity developfent objectives) – has been met, albeit by a
narrow fargin. Nonetheless, it is ifportant to note that considerable progress has been fade
towards fany of the refaining 12 targets.
Globally, the survey results show considerable variation in the direction and pace of progress
across donors and partner countries since 2005. For the indicators where responsibility for
change lies prifarily with developing country governfents, progress has been significant. For
exafple, ifprovefents have been fade in the quality of tools and systefs for planning and
for financial and results fanagefent in a nufber of developing countries, often requiring deep
reforfs that go beyond aid fanagefent to broader aspects of governfent processes.
While progress against fany indicators requires joint efforts by both developing countries
and donors, in sofe areas it depends fainly on donors’ efforts (e.g. untying aid; donor
co-ordination). Stakeholders at the country level frequently cite constraints ifposed by donor
headquarters as bottlenecks to further progress, suggesting that fany of the challenges are
political in nature.
As well as exafining progress in ifplefenting the Paris Declaration coffitfents, this
report also looks at fany of the recoffendations frof the Accra Agenda for Action. Based
on the progress evidenced by the 2008 Survey, the Accra Agenda for Action set out priorities
for accelerating and deepening the ifplefentation of the Paris Declaration principles. It also
accorded greater recognition to the role played by a range of stakeholders, beyond donor and
developing country governfents.
The first chapter of the present report provides an overview of findings on the ifplefentation
of the Paris Declaration, drawing extensively on the 2011 Survey (Box). Chapters 2 through
6 exafine in fore detail, respectively, the progress in ifplefenting coffitfents related
to: developing country ownership of policies and strategies; alignfent of aid to developing
countries’ priorities and systefs; efforts afong donors to harfonise aid practices; predictability
and transparency; and results and futual accountability. Chapter 7 offers insights and lessons
frof five years of experience in fonitoring the effectiveness of aid. The 78 country chapters
– detailing the evidence of progress and challenges frof each of the countries and territories
participating in the 2011 Survey – are published in Volufe 2 of this report.

16AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
ExEC uTIVE S uMMAR y
Aid effectiveness 2005-10: an overview of progress
Substantial progress
• The proportion of developing countries with sound national development strategies in place has more
than tripled since 2005.
• High-quality results-oriented frameworks to monitor progress against national development priorities
are in place in one-quarter of the developing countries first surveyed in 2005, with statistics related to the
Millennium Development Goals becoming increasingly available.
Moderate or mixed progress
• w hile non-state actors are more involved in the design of national development strategies in many
developing countries, there are still challenges to providing an enabling environment for civil society
activities in some others.
• Efforts to improve support for capacity development have been mixed. while donors met the target on
co-ordinated technical co-operation, support for capacity development often remains supply-driven, rather
than responding to developing countries’ needs.
• Over one-third of all developing countries participating in the 2011 Survey showed an improvement in
the quality of their public financial management systems over the period 2005-10. At the same time,
one-quarter of them saw setbacks in the quality of these systems.
• Donors are using developing country systems more than in 2005, but not to the extent agreed in Paris. In
particular, donors are not systematically making greater use of countr y systems where these systems
have been made more reliable.
• Overall, donors did not make progress in further untying aid across the countries participating in the 2011
Survey.
• There are some promising examples of efforts to improve transparency around aid.
Little or no progress
• Aid for the government sector is not captured systematically in developing country budgets and public
accounts.
• Little progress has been made among donors to implement common arrangements or procedures and
conduct joint missions and analytic works.
• Aid is becoming increasingly fragmented , despite some initiatives that aim to address this challenge.
• The medium-term predictability of aid remains a challenge in developing countries because donor
communication of information on future aid to individual developing country governments remains isolated
rather than being the norm.
• Most developing countries have yet to implement thorough mutual (government-donor) reviews of
per formance that benefit from broad participation.

1 O vER vIE w OF FINDINGS
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AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
Fibe years after the endorsement of the Paris Declaration on Aid fffectibeness – a landmark
agreement to improbe the quality and, in turn, impact of aid – has progress been made in
implementing the Paris Declaration and the subsequent Accra Agenda for Action? Habe donors
and partner countries delibered on their commitments? How do donors and partner countries
differ in their implementation of the Paris Declaration? How is progress assessed, and what
are the limitations to the approach used? This chapter responds to these questions, drawing on
ebidence generated through the 2011 Surbey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration and other
relebant sources to offer a concise oberbiew of the findings that are explained in more detail in
subsequent chapters.
I
n 2005, donors and developing countries (“partner countries”) endorsed the Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness – an afbitious set of coffitfents designed to
fake aid fore effective for developfent. To what extent have they ifplefented these
coffitfents? Is aid being delivered in a fore effective way than five years ago? This
report provides sofe answers to these questions.
For the fost part, the findings are clear: while fany donors and partner country
governfents have fade progress towards the targets that they set thefselves for 2010,
few of thef have been fet. Partner country authorities appear to have gone further in
ifplefenting their coffitfents under the Paris Declaration than donors, though efforts
– and progress – also vary across countries and donor organisations. As the international
coffunity prepares to take stock of what has been achieved at the Fourth bigh Level
Foruf on Aid Effectiveness (Busan, Korea, 29 Novefber to 1 Decefber 2011), this report
sets out evidence of progress and challenges in faking aid fore effective, and should help
to forge a consensus on the way forward in ensuring that aid supports developfent results
beyond Busan. The Fourth bigh Level Foruf on Aid Effectiveness arrives at a crossroads
in a context of developfent cooperation characterised by a wider range of developfent
stakeholders. There is greater recognition that aid – and its effectiveness – are only one
elefent of a broader landscape of developfent finance, and that findings relating to
joint efforts to fake aid fore effective can and should inforf a broader developfent
effectiveness agenda going forward.
MONITORING THE PARIS DECLARATION AND ACCRA AGENDA FOR ACTION
Endorsed by donors and developing countries in 2005, the Paris Declaration on Aid
Effectiveness farked a turning point for developfent co-operation, recognising that
significant efforts would be required by both donors and partner countries to ensure
that aid is effective in helping to feet developfent goals, including the Millenniuf
Developfent Goals (MDGs). The Paris Declaration placed an efphasis on ownership
of the developfent agenda – and aid – by partner countries, and brought with it shared
responsibilities for ifplefenting a set of actions to strengthen ownership, alignfent,
harfonisation, fanaging for developfent results and futual accountability (Figure 1.1). Partner countries and
donors agreed to hold
each other accountable
for mafing progress
against agreed
commitments and
targets by monitoring
their implementation

18AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
CHAPTER 1: OVERVIE w OF FINDINGS
One of the distinguishing features of the Paris
Declaration was the coffitfent by donors and
partner country governfents to hold each other
accountable for ifplefenting the Declaration at
the country level through a set of clear indicators
of progress with targets to be achieved by 2010.
Building on sifilar surveys undertaken in 2006 and
2008, this report draws on the results of the 2011
Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration. A total
of 78 partner countries and territories volunteered to
participate in this round of the survey, which looks
at the state of play in 2010. Between thef, these
countries forf a broad and representative source of
evidence: inforfation relating to over USD 70 billion
of aid – around three quarters of the core aid provided
to developing countries worldwide – is captured in
the 2011 Survey.
The partner countries and donors participating in the
2011 Survey have done so on a voluntary basis, and
fore countries than ever before are taking part in this
unique global process. The survey is co-ordinated at
the country level by partner country authorities, with
the active support of donors and participation frof
civil society, parliafentarians and the private sector.
This process recognises the ifportance of assessing
change at the level of developing countries thefselves
– where aid needs to be provided and used in a way that
responds to developfent challenges, and contributes
to the sustainable and equitable developfent of soci –
eties and econofies. Country chapters – detailing the
evidence of progress and challenges for each of the
78 countries particpating in the 2011 Survey – are
published in Volufe 2 of this report. Each of the indicators of progress agreed in Paris is
accofpanied by a target for 2010 (Appendix D).
Many of these targets were calculated irrespective of
the nufber of countries participating in the survey,
though in a nufber of cases the target depends on
the baseline established by the 2006 Survey (OECD,
2006). The 32 countries that participated in both
the 2006 and 2011 Surveys constitute the “baseline”
group of countries and as such, are often referred to
throughout in order to draw like-for-like cofpari
–
sons over tife. Further inforfation on the Survey
on Monitoring the Paris Declaration and other
related initiatives is provided in Chapter 7.
Inforfed by the findings of the 2008 Survey (OECD,
2008)– which showed that progress towards the
targets established for 2010 had been insufficient – the
Accra Agenda for Action (2008) reflected a deepening
of the coffitfents entered into in Paris. The Accra
Agenda for Action sets out priorities for the ifple –
fentation of the Paris Declaration, and also accords
greater recognition to the role played by a broader set
of stakeholders in developfent. This report looks at
the progress fade in ifplefenting both the coffit –
fents entered into in Paris, and also fany of the rec –
offendations agreed in Accra. It continues to draw
heavily on the results of the survey, but presents other
relevant evidence of progress and challenges along –
side the survey results. This approach to fonitoring
recognises that quantitative fethods of assessfent –
involving feasuring or counting progress – cannot
present a cofplete picture of the efforts undertaken
to fake aid fore effective.
HarmonisationDonors-donors 3
OwnershipPartner countries 1
AlignmentDonors-partners 2
Managing for Results
Partners
set the agenda
Aligning
with partners’agenda Using

partners’ systefs
Sharing inforfation
Sifplifying probedures
Establishing

boffon arrangefents
4
Mutual accountability
5
Figure 1.1 The Paris Declaration pyramid
Five shared principles with actions to make aid more effective

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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIE w OF FINDINGS
Table 1.1 To what extent have global targets been met?
Paris Declaration indicators and targets, 2010
Paris Declaration Indicator
2010 Actual2010

Target d Status
1 Operational Development Strategies
% of countries having a national development strategy rated “A” or “B” on a five-point scale
a 37%
(of 76) 75%
Not met
2a Reliable public financial management (PFM) systems
% of countries moving up at least one measure on the PFM/CPIA scale since 2005
a 38%
(of 52) 50%
Not met
2b Reliable procurement systems
% of countries moving up at least one measure on the four-point scale since 2005 —
No Target
c —
3 Aid flows are aligned on national priorities
% of aid for the government sector reported on the government’s budget
a 41% 85%Not met
4 Strengthen capacity by co-ordinated support
% of technical co-operation implemented through co-ordinated programmes consistent
with national development strategies
a 57% 50%
Met
5a use of country PFM systems % of aid for the government sector using partner countries’
PFM systems
b 48% 55%Not met
5b use of country procurement systems % of aid for the government sector using partner
countries’ procurement systems 44%
No Target
c —
6 Strengthen capacity by avoiding parallel PIus
Total number of parallel project implementation units (PIus)
b 1 158 565Not met
7 Aid is more predictable
% of aid for the government sector disbursed within the fiscal year for which it was scheduled
and recorded in government accounting systems
b 43% 71%Not met
8 Aid is untied
% of aid that is fully untied
a 86% More than
89% Not met
9 use of common arrangements or procedures
% of aid provided in the context of programme-based approaches
a 45% 66%Not met
10a joint missions
% of donor missions to the field undertaken jointly
a 19% 40%Not met
10b joint country analytic work
% of country analytic work undertaken jointly
a 43% 66%Not met
11 Results-oriented frameworks
% of countries with transparent and monitorable performance assessment frameworks
a 20%
(of 44) 36%
Not met
12 Mutual accountability
% of countries with mutual assessment reviews in place
a 38% 100%Not met
Notes:
a. Assessment against 2010 target uses data for all 78 countries participating in 2011 for which data were available. w here data are available for only a subset of these
countries, the sample size is indicated in brackets.
b. Assessment against 2010 target uses data for the 32 countries participating in both the 2006 and 2011 Sur veys, as the indicator target is formulated in relation to
the 2005 baseline. Targets may differ from those published in previous years as baselines have been recalculated, omitting data from two countries (Nicaragua and
Yemen) which formed part of the original panel of 34 countries participating in 2006, but which did not participate in 2011.
c. No targets are presented for indicators 2b (reliable procurement systems) and 5b (use of countr y procurement systems) as the sample of countries for whom data
on the quality of systems are available is too small to allow for meaningful analysis.
d. The targets shown may differ from indicative targets published in previous years as a result of adjustments to historical data (e.g. indicator 8, where final data on
tying led to adjustments to the underlying datasets after publication of reports on the previous sur veys). The target for indicator 5a (use of countr y PFM systems)
has been computed to consider the 2010 scores on the quality of PFM systems (indicator 2a), consistent with the approach agreed in the Paris Declaration and
described in Chapter 3.

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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIE w OF FINDINGS
HAVE DONORS AND PARTNER
CO uNTRIES DELIVERED ON THEIR
P ARIS D ECLARATION COMMITMENTS ?
n Donors and partner countries
met 1 out of 13 global targets
Progress has been fade by both donors and partner
countries towards fany of the targets established for
2010. Despite this, only 1 out of the 13 targets for
which data were available was fet at the global level
(Table 1.1). The 2010 target for co-ordinated tech –
nical co-operation – a feasure of the extent to which
donors provide aid in support of countries’ capacity
developfent objectives in a co-ordinated way –
had already been exceeded by 2007 (Chapter 4).
n Despite setbacks, progress has been made
Although 12 of the 13 targets identified above were
not fet at the global level, it is ifportant to note
that considerable progress has been fade towards
fany of thef. Conversely, while the target for
indicator 4 (technical co-operation) was fet, only
a sfall ifprovefent was observed against this
indicator against the 2005 baseline, and in fact this
indicator showed stronger progress between the 2006
and 2008 Surveys, which has to an extent reversed
since the 2008 Survey. The safple of 32 countries
participating in both the baseline and 2011 surveys
offers sofe insights into the direction and pace of
change over the last five years (Figure 1.2).
For a nufber of coffitfents, progress is not fea –
sured through standard indicators. In these areas
( e.g. the inclusive nature of ownership; transparency;
fediuf-terf predictability), assessfents are based
prifarily on available secondary evidence and fate –
rial of a qualitative nature.
Substantial brogress
– More partner countries have sound national
develobment strategies in place, and these tend to
be fore clearly prioritised than in 2005 (Chapter 2).
– bigher quality results-oriented frameworks are
in place in fany countries, with evidence suggesting
that MDG-related statistics are becofing increas –
ingly available at the country level (Chapter 6). Moderate or mixed brogress
– Evidence on the coffitfents to
broaden owner-
shib – including on the participation of non-state
stakeholders in aid and developfent processes – is at
best partial. Evidence gathered through the survey
suggests that non-state actors are fore involved
in the developfent of national strategies in fany
countries. Evidence on efforts to provide an enabling
environfent for civil society activities suggests
that challenges persist in sofe partner countries
(Chapter 2).
– Efforts to ifprove support for cabacity devel-
obment have been fixed. While donors fet their
targets on co-ordinated technical co-operation, evi –
dence suggests that support for capacity develop –
fent efforts often refains supply-driven rather than
responding to genuine needs (Chapter 2).
– Over one-third of all participating countries
showed an imbrovement in the quality of their
bublic financial management systems (PFM) over
the period 2005-10 – sofe of thef faking consid –
erable progress over this period. At the safe tife,
a notable nufber of countries saw setbacks in the
quality of their systefs (Chapter 3).
– Donors are using partner country systefs fore
than in 2005, but not to the extent agreed in Paris.
In particular, donors are not systematically making
greater use of country systems where these are
more reliable – a finding which was highlighted by
the 2008 Survey (Chapter 3). Fewer barallel broject
imblementation units (PIUs) – structures set up
by donors to ifplefent aid-funded activities, and
which can hinder accountability – are in place than
in previous years, though progress was insufficient to
feet the target (Chapter 3).
– Although donors did not fake progress in
untying aid across the safple of 78 countries par –
ticipating in the 2011 Survey, good progress is being
fade by donors in developing individual plans to
further untie aid. The proportion of aid reported
as untied worldwide by DAC fefbers has risen
slightly (Chapter 3).
Global results shob
considerable variation
in the direction and
pace of progress across
donors and countries

21
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIE w OF FINDINGS
Figure 1.2 To what extent has progress been made since 2005?
Performance across 32 countries participating in both the 2006 and 2011 Surveys
0%
20%
7%
44% 50% 100%
22%
38%
44%
22%
40%
66%
48%
43% 66%89%
>87%
87%
48%
40% 55%
43%
42% 1 696
1 158 565
44%
46%
71% 75%
Target 2010
50%50% 85%
Indicator 12
Mutual accouftabilitoy Indicator 11
besults-oriefted fraomeworks Indicator 10b
Joift couftry afalytic work Indicator 10a
Joift missiofs Indicator 9
Use of commof arrafgeomefts
or procedures Indicator 8
Aid is uftied Indicator 7
Aid is more predictaoble Indicator 6
Strefgthef capacity o
by avoidifg parallel oPIUs Indicator 5a
Use of couftry PFM systems Indicator f
Strefgthef capacity o
by co-ordifated suppoort Indicator 3
Aid ows are aligfed o
of fatiofal priorities Indicator 2a
beliable public fafcoial
mafagemeft (PFM) sysotems Indicator 1
Operatiofal developmoeft
strategies
49% 51%
52%
38%
19%
Figurb 1.2 To what bxtbnt has progrbs5s bbbn madb sincb 20055?
Pbrformancb across 325 countribs particip5ating in both thb 20506 and 2010 survby
s
41%
Ifdicator2005 baselife
2010 actual

22AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
CHAPTER 1: OVERVIE w OF FINDINGS
– There are profising exafples of efforts to ifprove
transbarency around aid, though there is no evi –
dence yet on whether these efforts are leading to
tangible ifprovefents in transparency where it is
needed (Chapter 5).
Little or no brogress on aggregate
– Aid for the government sector is not cabtured
systematically in bartner countries’ budgets and
bublic accounts. The absence of inforfation frof
donors, and partner governfent decisions to include
only sofe aid flows, contribute to this (Chapters 3
and 5).
– Little progress has been fade towards targets on
common arrangements or brocedures and joint
missions and analytic works designed to reduce the
burden on partner countries of often fragfented
donor processes (Chapter 4).
– Aid fragmentation is worsening despite sofe
efforts to reduce it, including exafples of initiatives
to ifprove division of labour at both the country
and global levels (Chapter 4).
– Progress in ifproving the medium-term bredict-
ability of aid at the country level has been limited .
The coffunication of forward-looking indications
of future aid flows to individual partner govern –
fents by donors refains isolated rather than being
the norf (Chapter 5).
– While sofe countries are leading in the pursuit
of opportunities to strengthen mutual account-
ability , including through futual (governfent-
donor) assessfents of perforfance, fost have yet
to ifplefent thorough review processes that benefit
frof broad participation. Efforts are under way
in a nufber of countries to address this challenge
(Chapter 6).
Several of the indicators for which responsibility
for change lies prifarily with partner country gov –
ernfents show ifportant progress. For exafple,
significant efforts – often requiring deep reforfs
going beyond aid fanagefent to broader aspects
of governfent processes – have driven ifprove –
fents in the quality of planning, financial, and
results fanagefent tools and systefs in a nufber
of partner countries. While faking progress against fany indicators
requires joint efforts on the part of both partner
countries and donors, progress in sofe areas depends
largely on donors (
e.g. untying aid; working with
other donors). The lack of progress against several
of these indicators shows the need for sustained
and accelerated efforts. Stakeholders at the country
level frequently cite constraints ifposed by donor
headquarters as bottlenecks to further progress,
suggesting that fany of the challenges are political
in their nature. This is likely to be the case for the
coffitfents around donors’ use of country systefs
and untying aid, for exafple (Chapter 3).
H O w DO CO uNTRIES DIFFER
IN THEIR IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE P ARIS D ECLARATION ?
For international aid efforts to have an ifpact on
the lives of poor people, they need to result in tan –
gible changes in the way in which aid is provided
and used in developing countries, and in turn on the
results that they help achieve. While global head –
line figures are useful in understanding the overall
direction of progress since 2005, they hide consid –
erable variations in progress across countries. Just as
sofe countries fet fany of the targets, others fared
worse than the global average. Although the Survey
on Monitoring the Paris Declaration does not aif
to provide a basis for robust cofparative analysis, it
is possible to identify frof the evidence available –
in a prelifinary way – sofe of the fain differences
between different types of countries.
n Fragile states and situations
Fragile and conflict-affected states present very spe –
cific challenges. In view of this, donors frof OECD
countries coffitted in April 2007 to ten Principles
for Good International Engagefent in Fragile States
and Situations (OECD, 2007). The principles go
beyond developfent co-operation to consider other
aspects of international support in these settings
(peacebuilding, statebuilding, security and peace –
keeping, and whole-of-governfent approaches), and
reflect a growing consensus that fragile states require
responses that are different to those needed in better
perforfing countries. Through the Accra Agenda
for Action, donors and partner countries coffitted
to fonitor the ifplefentation of the Fragile States
Significant progress can
be seen against several
indicators for bhich
responsibility for
change lies primarily
bith partner countries

23
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIE w OF FINDINGS
This overview of the situation hides variations in the state of implementation across the thirteen participating coun –
tries, although as the detailed findings set out in OECD (2011) show, most of the countries share a range of common
challenges to improving international engagement.
Three main conclusions emerge from the Survey on Monitoring the Principles for Good International Engagement
in Fragile States and Situations. First, donor commitments to improve the quality of engagement in fragile states
and situations need to be followed through with sustained efforts to reform policies and practices, ensuring that
they can respond more rapidly and with flexibility to the needs of states emerging from conflict or in situations of
fragility. Second, the evidence suggests that existing frameworks at both global and country levels ( e.g. the MDGs;
poverty reduction strategies) do not provide an adequate framework within which to address the challenges faced by
conflict-affected and fragile states. The political realities of fragile states need to be better recognised, and develop –
ment outcomes, priorities and results defined in more appropriate ways both locally and globally. Finally, while the
principles are viewed primarily as a donor-led framework for engagement, the survey has highlighted the existence of
opportunities for donors and partner countries to negotiate – at the country level – joint accountability frameworks.
Such approaches could help to better prioritise peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts, to facilitate improved and
more co-ordinated financing of activities across development and humanitarian programmes, and to allow stake –
holders at the country level to define jointly how international engagement can be improved.
Box 1.1 Progress in the implementation of the Principles for Good International Engagement
in Fragile States and Situations
A survey of 13 countries shows that making progress against the Principles for Good International Engagement in
Fragile States and Situations has been particularly challenging. The engagement of international stakeholders is
assessed as being partly or fully off-track for eight out of the ten principles.
Source: OECD (2011).
Legen D
Broadly on-track: Good progress in ifplefentation of the Fragile States Prinbiples
Partly on-track: Coffitfent and sofe progress in ifplefentation
Partly off-track: Coffitfent but ifplefentation is insuffibient
Off-track: Lifited boffitfent and poor to non-existent ifplefentation
Broadly on-track
Partly on-track
Partly off-track
Off-track
Level of implementation
6. Profote non-disbrifination as a basis for inblusive and stable sobieties
7. Align with lobal priorities in different ways in different bontexts
1. Take bontrol as the starting point
3. Fobus on statebuilding as the bentral objebtive
4. Prioritise prevention
5. Rebognise the links between politibal, seburity and developfent objebtives
2. Do no harf
8. Agree on prabtibal bo-ordination febhanisfs between international abtors
9. Abt fast…but stay engaged long enough to give subbess a bhanbe
10. Avoid pobkets of exblusion

24AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
CHAPTER 1: OVERVIE w OF FINDINGS
Principles on a voluntary basis. In 2011, this foni –
toring was carried out through a dedicated Survey
on Monitoring the Principles for Good International
Engagefent in Fragile States and Situations, which
was cofbined with the Survey on Monitoring the
Paris Declaration in 12 out of the 13 fragile states
taking part (Chapter 7). Box 1.1 offers an overview
of findings.
The Paris Declaration’s indicators of progress cof –
plefent the broader findings on the effectiveness of
international engagefent in the 12 countries that
participated in both surveys, offering insights into
sofe of the challenges to effective aid:
– The quality of national developfent strategies
(indicator 1) and results-oriented frafeworks (indi –
cator 11) refains low in these countries, with only
one country considered to have an operational devel –
opfent strategy in 2010, and fost of the countries
being assigned low scores for the quality of results-
oriented frafeworks.
– Both the quality and use of country public finan –
cial fanagefent systefs refains challenging in
the countries that participated in the Fragile States
Survey. Four of the nine countries for which his –
torical data were available ifproved their scores on
indicator 2a (reliable PFM systefs) over the period
2005-10 by at least one feasure on the PFM/CPIA
scale. But average scores across this group tend to
be lower than across the full set of 78 countries par –
ticipating in the 2011 Survey. Donors’ use of partner
countries’ PFM systefs in these countries is also
– on average – lower than in the larger group of
78 countries.
– Survey data suggest that donors fake less use of
existing structures, and lifited use of prograffe-
based approaches, in the delivery of aid to the coun –
tries participating in the Fragile States Survey.
Between thef, donors fade use of an average of
11 parallel PIUs (indicator 6) for every USD 100
fillion in aid disbursed for the governfent sector
in these countries, cofpared with a global average
of 4 parallel PIUs per USD 100 fillion of disbursed
aid across all 78 countries that participated in the
2011 Survey. Indicator 9 (use of coffon arrange –
fents and procedures) also suggests that aid in the countries participating in the Fragile States Survey is
less likely to be provided through prograffe-based
approaches in these countries.
– Only one of the countries participating in the
Fragile States Survey reported having in place a
fechanisf for the futual review of perforfance
in ifplefenting coffitfents that fet the criteria
associated with indicator 12 (futual accountability).
n Middle-income countries
While fost of the 34 countries participating in the
2006 baseline Survey were least-developed countries
(LDCs), subsequent surveys – bringing together
evidence frof a larger nufber of countries – have
included fore fiddle-incofe countries (MICs).
Middle-incofe countries – although usually less
dependent on aid than others – display a unique
set of characteristics, and the 2011 Survey shows a
nufber of interesting findings:
– While donors fade slight progress in untying
their aid to LDCs and heavily indebted poor coun
–
tries (bIPCs), tying refains a persistent feature of
aid to fany fiddle incofe countries (Chapter 3).
– Use of country systefs by donors varies consider –
ably across MICs, with sofe countries reporting rel –
atively high use of country PFM and procurefent
systefs by donors ( e.g. Indonesia) while very lifited
use of these systefs is fade in others ( e.g. Colofbia).
There is no clear relationship between the quality of
systefs and their use by donors in MICs.
– Discussions in sofe MICs ( e.g. Morocco) point
to the very different planning and policy-faking
processes in place in these countries. For exafple,
cofprehensive national developfent strategies of
the sorts used in fost low incofe countries ( e.g.
poverty reduction strategy papers – which were
often developed as a condition for debt relief ) are
not always the norf in MICs.
Fragile and conflict-
affected states present
specific challenges

25
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIE w OF FINDINGS
HO w DO DONORS DIFFER IN THEIR
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE P ARIS
D ECLARATION ?
Just as the results of the 2011 Survey show ifportant
variations in the direction and pace of progress in
the ifplefentation of the Paris Declaration across
partner countries, the degree of progress – and the
starting points – of different donors also vary. While
the nature of the survey process feans that there are
lifits to the sorts of cofparisons that can be drawn
across donor organisations, the data offer sofe broad
insights into both the progress fade and challenges
faced by different donors as they have sought to
ifplefent their Paris and Accra coffitfents:
1
– Despite notable differences across donors, fany
have fade progress in aligning their aid with
partner countries’ systefs. Data frof the 2011
Survey suggest that aid channelled through fulti-
lateral organisations fakes greater use of partner
country PFM and procurefent systefs (Chapter 3).
This fay in part reflect efforts the use of fultilateral
channels by bilateral donors at the country level.
– Making progress towards untying aid refains
largely a challenge for bilateral donors. Four DAC
donors reported 100% of bilateral aid in 2009 to the
countries participating in the 2011 survey as untied.
Three DAC donors increased their share of untied
aid to the countries participating in the survey by
ten percentage points or fore over the period 2005-
09, while four saw their shares of untied aid to these
countries decline by ten percentage points or fore
over the safe period (Chapter 3).
– While progress towards fost of the indicators on
harfonisation has been slow, sofe variation across
types of donors is identified in – for exafple – the
use of prograffe-based approaches (Chapter 4). It
is difficult to draw robust cofparisons across donors
in this area as countries and thefatic areas of inter –
vention vary across donors.
– Ifproving the fediuf-terf predictability of aid
appears to be a particular challenge for a nufber
of bilateral donors. While a nufber of donors have
fulti-year prograffing frafeworks in place,
and sofe are able to provide indications of future
aid flows on a rolling basis, fany bilateral donors
refain constrained by annual budgeting processes. Multilateral organisations are usually able to provide
inforfation on indicative future spending, though
such plans tend to be lifited to the duration of their
replenishfent cycles (Chapter 5).
–
Although the evidence on the role of eferging
donors and providers of south-south co-operation
gathered through the Survey on Monitoring the Paris
Declaration is lifited, this report draws on other
evidence where appropriate to exafine the role of a
broader set of actors. For exafple, the particular roles
that south-south and triangular co-operation can
play in supporting capacity developfent are high –
lighted (Chapter 2). The 2011 Survey saw a fodest
increase in the nufber of non-DAC providers of
assistance participating in the process and providing
inforfation on developfent co-operation in sofe
partner countries.
L IMITATIONS TO THE ASSESSMENT
OF PROGRESS
The Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration
provides a fechanisf to support global and
country-level accountability and learning to help
fake aid fore effective. While several countries
and organisations have built on the global process
to deepen their assessfents at the country, donor
or sector level (Chapter 7), the global process does
not aif to offer a cofplete picture of progress and
challenges in faking aid fore effective. Its fain
purpose is to provide conclusions on whether the
commitments entered into in Paris and Accra have
been ifplefented, and if so, to what extent. It does
not consider the relebance of the coffitfents for
developfent in any detail, nor the causes of the
progress or setbacks observed. Where the evidence
gathered supports this, exafples and possible expla –
nations for the trends observed are presented to
inforf further discussion. Rather than offering a
cofplete picture of progress over tife, the surveys
offer three snapshots – with unequal coverage of
countries – over a five-year period.
The indicators of progress and associated targets
were agreed between donors and partner coun –
tries in 2005, and are proxies for assessing progress
around the five principles agreed in Paris (Figure 1.1). Comparison is limited
given that countries
and areas of
intervention vary

across donors

26AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
CHAPTER 1: OVERVIE w OF FINDINGS
This feans that they are indirect – or interfediate
– feasures of progress, and they do not capture the
full range and depth of the principles and actions
agreed in the Paris Declaration. Sofe of thef bring
inevitable fethodological shortcofings, and where
specific challenges to the accuracy of data or the
fethodology are known, efforts are fade to identify
these in the explanations provided. It is possible that
in sofe cases, stakeholders at the country level have
interpreted definitions and criteria slightly differently
in the 2006, 2008 and 2011 Surveys. Feedback frof
sofe countries suggests that national co-ordinators
fay have been fore experienced and increasingly
willing to hold donors to account for accurate
reporting against agreed criteria and definitions
in 2011 – a positive feature that helps strengthen
accountability and ifprove the quality of the
evidence generated.
While the indicators thefselves offer a partial picture
of progress, there is also a risk that they fight in
their own right drive efforts to ifplefent the Paris
Declaration too rigidly – focusing too narrowly on
the attainfent of targets and crowding out oppor –
tunities for innovation and adaptation to context
and real developfent needs. As a result, this report
draws on a broader range of evidence – including
feedback of a qualitative nature gathered through the
survey – and also other sources, including case study
evidence, thefatic assessfents and other evidence
generated through reliable feans. This is also the
case for the assessfent of coffitfents and actions
that are not captured by the indicators, but are
nevertheless relevant to the full ifplefentation of
the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action.
The findings of the in-depth Survey on the Principles
for Good International Engagefent in Fragile States
and Situations further enrich the evidence base.

27
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIE w OF FINDINGS
NOTES
1. While the Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration is designed to facilitate the tracking of progress
across a group of partner countries over tife, producing consistent and cofparable assessfents of progress
for individual donors at the global level is fore challenging, as the country contexts within which different
donors provide aid are often diverse and the coverage of data individual donors’ aid prograffes can vary
significantly across successive surveys. Furtherfore, because donors report on aid activities at the “point
of delivery”, the indicator values of individual donors fay understate efforts – for exafple, where the
donor has provided fore aid through delegated co-operation arrangefents, or joint funding fechanisfs
fanaged by other donors at the country level. The tables provided in Appendix C provide detailed infor –
fation on fany of the donors participating in the 2011 Survey, including estifates of survey coverage
and indicative targets that offer insights into the contribution of individual donors to the achievefent of
global progress shown by the indicators.

28AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
CHAPTER 1: OVERVIE w OF FINDINGS
REFERENCES
OECD (2006), 2006 Surbey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration , OECD, Paris.
OECD (2007), Principles for Good International fngagement in Fragile States and Situations , OECD, Paris.
OECD (2008), 2008 Surbey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration: Making Aid More fffectibe by 2010,
OECD, Paris.
OECD (2011), 2011 Report on International fngagement in Fragile States:
Can’t We Do Better? , OECD, Paris.

2 Ow NERSHIP OF DE vELOPMENT
POLICIES AND STRATEGIES
29
AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
The Paris Declaration on Aid fffectibeness placed partner countries’ ownership of policies and
programmes at the centre of an international reform agenda to make aid more effectibe. The
subsequent Accra Agenda for Action reflected a broadening and deepening of international com –
mitments in this area, considering in greater detail the role of a range of debelopment actors
going beyond the state. Has partner country leadership ober debelopment policies and strate –
gies improbed since 2005? To what extent has the quality of national debelopment strategies
improbed, and are local gobernments, parliaments and cibil society organisations more inbolbed
in policy processes in debeloping countries? Are efforts being made to promote demand-driben
capacity debelopment, and are issues of gender equality better addressed through debelopment
policies and strategies? This chapter draws on a range of ebidence, including the results of the
2011 Surbey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, to answer these important questions.
O
wnership – one of the five pillars of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness – is
a field in which partial progress has been fade but where areas for further progress
have been identified. In 2005, the Paris Declaration placed efphasis on “ownership” as
referring prifarily to developing country governfents’ abilities to “exercise leadership
over their developfent policies and strategies and co-ordinate developfent actions”.
Coffitfents efphasised the articulation of developfent priorities through national
developfent strategies, with partner countries taking “the lead in co-ordinating aid at
all levels in conjunction with other developfent resources”. Since the Paris Declaration,
international dialogue has tended to give increasing recognition to the need for broader
definitions of ownership, and to avoid lifiting the scope for aid efforts only to the executive
branches of central governfents.
The Accra Agenda for Action farked an evolution of this consensus, according greater
recognition to the role of societies fore broadly as owners of developfent efforts, alongside
the executive branches of governfent. In Accra, developing country governfents coffitted
to work fore closely with parliafents and local authorities in the developfent and
ifplefentation of national developfent policies and plans, and also to engage constructively
with civil society. Donors coffitted thefselves to strengthen country ownership by
supporting defand driven efforts to increase the capacity of all developfent actors. This
feans working through representative bodies such as parliafents, as well as civil society
organisations (CSOs), the fedia or political parties, research institutes and the private sector.
Both donors and developing countries agreed that national developfent policies – on which
donors coffit to align their support – fust be consistent with international coffitfents
on gender equality, hufan rights, disability and environfental sustainability.
The explicit recognition of a broader range of stakeholders as developfent actors in their
own right ifplies that donors and partner country governfents have an obligation to
provide an enabling environfent to help faxifise their contributions to developfent.
This inclusive approach also involves a coffitfent frof CSOs to look at how they can
apply relevant aid effectiveness principles in their work. Obnership of
development is about
leadership at the
political level,

as bell as the effective
participation of
a broader range
of stafeholders

30AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
CHAPTER 2: Ow NERSHIP OF DE vELOPMENT POLICIES AND STRATEGIES
Capacity developfent is essential for the achieve –
fent of sustainable developfent results. Developing
countries need an enabling environfent, strong
institutions, systefs and local expertise to fully own
and fanage their developfent processes. While the
Paris Declaration recognises that capacity devel –
opfent is the responsibility of developing coun –
tries with donors playing a support role, the Accra
Agenda for Action identifies a series of actions to
fake country-led capacity developfent a priority
and to fove away frof traditional supply driven
approaches to build capacities or fill capacity gaps.
I MPROVING PARTNER CO uNTR y
LEADERSHIP OVER DEVELOPMENT POLICIES
AND STRATEGIES
n Operational development strategies
(indicator 1)
The Paris Declaration efphasises the ifportance
of partner countries’ efforts to exercise leadership in
developing and ifplefenting high quality devel –
opfent strategies, and in ensuring that these are
results-oriented and inforf resource allocations.
One of the indicators agreed in Paris (indicator 1)
considers the extent to which partner countries have
national developfent strategies with clear strategic
priorities linked to a fediuf-terf expenditure
frafework and reflected in annual budgets. The
target was that at least 75% of partner countries have
operational developfent strategies by 2010. Indicator 1 is scored through an assessfent of quali
–
tative evidence, considering three criteria, nafely
the existence of:
i) an authoritative country-wide developfent
policy ( i.e. a unified strategic frafework);
ii) a realistic developfent strategy that clearly
identifies priorities;
iii) well-costed policies that can be funded
( i.e. linking strategies to budget allocations).
In the 2011 Survey, inforfation was gathered
through a structured questionnaire discussed by
governfent and other stakeholders ( e.g. donors, civil
society) at the country level. This inforfation is
reviewed by the World Bank using established criteria,
and a score is allocated to each country on the basis
of these. Scores range frof A (high – progress is sus –
tainable) to E (low – little action has been taken).
1
For the purpose of assessing progress towards the
global target established for 2010, a country is con –
sidered to have an operational developfent strategy
if it has a score of A or B for indicator 1.
Findings frof the 2011 Survey indicate that the
quality of countries’ national developfent strategies
has increased since both 2007 and 2005. Despite
this progress, the Paris Declaration target – that
75% of countries should have a score of A or B –
has not been fet. The cofparison of scores of coun –
tries over the three subsequent surveys is displayed
in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Do partner countries have operational development strategies?
Indicator 1 (2005-10)
2005 2007 2010
Score No. of countries %No. of countries %No. of countries %
High A 00% 00% 23%
B 511% 817% 2634%
Medium C 2760% 3166% 2533%
D 1227% 817% 2229%
Low E 12% 00% 11%
Number of countries
assessed 45
4776
The proportion of
partner countries
assessed as having
sound national
development strategies
in place has more than
tripled since 2005
Note: data are available for an increasing number of countries over time. w here countries did not participate in previous rounds
of the sur vey, historical data for these countries have been included in the analysis above where it is available.

31
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CHAPTER 2: Ow NERSHIP OF DE vELOPMENT POLICIES AND STRATEGIES
Sector-specific evidence shows encouraging progress
as well. All 32 countries taking part in the 2011 fon –
itoring exercise of the Education for All Fast Track
Initiative (Chapter 7) have education plans in place
that have been forfally endorsed by donors in those
countries (EFA FTI, forthcofing). In the health
sector, prograffe-based approaches (chapter 4)
have fade an ifportant contribution to strength –
ening country ownership through country leader –
ship of the developfent agenda, the health reforf
processes and fanagefent of aid relationships
(OECD, forthcofing a). In the agriculture and
rural developfent sector, the situation is fore chal –
lenging. Despite apparent governfent ownership of
national priorities and policies, evidence based on
the review of 16 projects in 4 countries suggests that
national strategies fay fail to set priorities and actual
sector orientations can be underfined by conflicting
facroeconofic policies ( e.g. Mozafbique) (Global
Platforf for Rural Developfent, forthcofing).
Evidence generated through the 2011 Survey on
Monitoring the Fragile States Principles – conducted
jointly with the Survey on Monitoring the Paris
Declaration – highlights specific challenges relating
to the quality of national developfent strategies in
situations of fragility. In particular, national devel –
opfent strategies were not always found to be the
fost appropriate frafework for articulating devel –
opfent objectives, hindering effective prioritisation
where it is needed fost. Moreover, developfent
strategies often overlook peacebuilding and state –
building objectives which are often a prerequisite to
effective aid and developfent results. Fragile states
are cofplex and rapidly changing environfents,
and dialogue in several countries pointed to the fact
that events can quite quickly fake national develop –
fent strategies outdated or less relevant ( e.g. Central
African Republic, Coforos, Sofalia). The scores
for indicator 1 obtained by the 12 countries partici –
pating in both surveys tend to confirf this finding:
only one of these countries (Togo) obtained a score of
B, with the fajority scoring D.
As Table 2.1 shows, only 37% of the countries par
–
ticipating in the 2011 Survey are considered to have
an operational developfent strategy in place. When
the subset of 32 countries that participated in both
the baseline and 2011 Surveys is considered, the pro –
portion of countries feeting the target increases to
52%. balf of the countries participating in the 2011
Survey are located in Africa. In this region, 41% of
countries were considered to have operational devel –
opfent strategies, cofpared with 33% of countries
frof other regions. The fore successful countries
have prepared and ifplefented the second or third
generations of fediuf-terf national developfent
strategies that are better linked to sectoral and sub-
national strategies where the latter exist and have
prioritised targets linked to the MDGs and cross-
cutting issues. These strategies serve as a point of
reference for policy and sector planning, budgeting
and fonitoring and are linked closely with the
budgeting process through various feans that
aif to encourage perforfance orientation and an
alignfent of resources with goals.
When looking at how individual countries’ scores
have evolved over tife, the data show that 14 of the
32 countries participating in both the baseline and
2011 Surveys ifproved their perforfance against
indicator 1 between 2005 and 2010. Three countries
frof the safe group experienced setbacks against
this indicator over the safe period. Two countries
(Rwanda and Tanzania) ifproved their scores frof
B to A on this indicator – the first tife countries
covered by the Survey have received the highest
score on the five-point scale. Kenya has also shown
considerable progress since 2005, evolving frof
a score of D in 2005 to B in 2010; Sudan’s score
ifproved frof D to B over the period 2007 to 2010.
Closer exafination of the three criteria underpinning
indicator 1 shows that the third criterion – linking
strategies to budget allocations – is the fost chal –
lenging for fany countries. Of the countries partici –
pating in the 2011 Survey, 72% scored C or below
(cofpared with 59% and 61% respectively for the
first two criteria). This elefent of the planning process
is crucial in ensuring that resources are allocated to
developfent priorities, and in turn contribute to the
realisation of developfent goals at the country level. Linfing strategies

and budget allocations
remains challenging

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CHAPTER 2: Ow NERSHIP OF DE vELOPMENT POLICIES AND STRATEGIES
n Gender equality and development policies
and strategies
The Accra Agenda for Action fakes specific refer –
ence to gender equality in the design of policies.
While no indicator for assessing the gender difen –
sion of national policies and strategies was agreed
in Paris, the 2011 Survey saw an optional survey
fodule rolled out to participating countries to assess
the extent to which gender equality and wofen’s
efpowerfent are grounded in national develop –
fent strategies. The fodule also sought to generate
qualitative evidence on whether donors were feeting
their coffitfents on gender equality. The gender
equality fodule was piloted on a voluntary basis by
24 partner countries in 2011.
Responses to the qualitative questions indicate that
all partner countries’ national developfent strategies
address gender equality. Most often, it is considered
as a “cross cutting” issue in a few or several areas or
sectors. In sofe countries, a nufber of sector strat –
egies also include the profotion of gender equality
( e.g. Peru’s Transport Sector Strategy). Around half
of the countries state that they have also identified
at least sofe gender equality objectives or targets.
bowever, very few have allocated specific budgets to
help feet these targets. Nearly all countries note that
gender equality is a national priority, but that little or
no financial resources are allocated for ifplefenting
specific activities and fonitoring progress.
Evidence on the extent to which donors allocate suf –
ficient hufan and financial resources to ifplefent
their Accra coffitfents on gender equality is at
best lifited. Joint donor-partner country gender
equality working groups are in place in several
countries. bowever, a nufber of countries note
that donors often have lifited resources to support
initiatives to profote gender equality, sofetifes
resulting in insufficient consideration of the gender
equality difension in certain donor-supported
activities ( e.g. road construction). Stakeholders in
sofe countries also noted the lifited use of national
technical expertise on gender equality as a challenge. In addition to the collection of qualitative inforfa
–
tion on progress and challenges, the optional fodule
on gender equality (Chapter 7) invited countries to
propose an overall perforfance score for a pilot indi –
cator: “Gender equality and wofen’s efpowerfent
are grounded in a systefatic fanner in national
developfent strategies”. Using a sifilar approach to
indicator 1 of the Survey on Monitoring the Paris
Declaration, respondents were provided with criteria
and invited to propose a score for their country on a
five-point scale. Most countries (17 out of 24) rated
their efforts as “C – action taken”.
B ROAD PARTICIPATION
IN DEVELOPMENT POLICIES
As outlined above, the Accra Agenda for Action
placed increased efphasis on the participation of a
fuch broader range of developfent actors in policy
dialogue in developing countries. Evidence of efforts
in this area is relatively scarce, or often very subjec –
tive in its nature, faking systefatic fonitoring of
progress challenging.
In response to these feasurefent challenges, the
2011 Survey piloted an optional fodule on “inclu –
sive ownership”, developed to allow countries to
provide inforfation on national policy processes
and the extent of stakeholder participation at the
country level (Chapter 7). Despite lifitations to the
process (cofpletion by a lifited nufber of coun –
tries; self-reporting) the responses frof the 14 par –
ticipating countries offer interesting insights into
issues of participation in policy processes:
– Respondents in all participating countries stated
that national developfent strategies were forfu –
lated through a participatory process involving
– at least to sofe extent – parliafent, local
governfent actors and non-state stakeholders
( e.g. civil society, private sector stakeholders,
unions and donors).
– Although there fay have been broad and effec –
tive stakeholder participation at sofe stages of
the developfent and ifplefentation of national
developfent strategies, none of the respondents
identified ongoing, systefatic, and unified fech –
anisfs to support the continuous engagefent
of these stakeholders in the policy process.
The design of national
development strategies
involves consultation
bith a broader range of
actors in many
countries

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CHAPTER 2: Ow NERSHIP OF DE vELOPMENT POLICIES AND STRATEGIES
Furtherfore, the countries that responded lack
fechanisfs to assess the effectiveness of the
participatory process in a systefatic fanner.
– Responses suggest that participatory approaches
tend to efphasise inforfation sharing and con –
sultation with a range of stakeholders. Most
respondents pointed to the engagefent of actors
beyond the governfent in the forfulation of
national developfent strategies, though very few
pointed to the safe level of engagefent in ifple –
fentation and fonitoring activities. In a few
instances, a participatory process was reported
to have covered the whole policy cycle, frof for –
fulation through approval, ifplefentation,
fonitoring and evaluation ( e.g. Mali).
– Most respondents described the role of the fedia
with regard to the national developfent strategy
as being focused on the dissefination of infor –
fation. Most of the responses suggested a very
lifited role played by the fedia in generating
critical analysis, and in one case respondents
attributed this to fear of reprisals. Only one
response suggested that the fedia had played
a fajor role in stifulating debate around the
national developfent strategy.
– There are divergent views on the effectiveness
of participatory processes around the forfula –
tion and fonitoring of national developfent
strategies. In fost countries that undertook the
optional fodule, respondents felt that the views
and needs of a broad range of stakeholders were
taken into consideration and that the develop –
fent strategy reflects a coffon vision which
builds on consensus. In sofe countries, however,
respondents felt that consultation refained a for –
fality providing few opportunities to help shape
national developfent strategies, either because
the level of participation of sofe stakeholders was
insufficient, or because the outcofes of consulta –
tions did not result in changes to policy decisions.
Respondents to the optional survey fodule also
provided views on the nature and quality of donor
support for participatory policy-faking processes. Stakeholders in these countries noted that donors
contributed to the developfent and fonitoring of
national developfent strategies both as participants
in consultations around the strategies and as pro
–
viders of technical cooperation in the forfulation
and ifplefentation stages. This includes exafples
of assistance to civil society organisations in support
of their role in these processes. While sofe respon –
dents noted the benefits of donor engagefent in these
ways, others pointed to what they see as excessive
pressure exercised by donors in consultations and
negotiations.
Efforts to support dofestic accountability in devel –
oping countries aif at broadening participation
and bolstering the ways in which citizens hold gov –
ernfents to account. This is done through institu –
tions such as parliafents, civil society organisations,
the fedia, political parties, audit institutions, and
processes such as elections, budgeting and service
delivery. Over the last two decades, support for
dofestic accountability has been a growing cofpo –
nent of donor support in partner countries through
a range of aid fodalities, but it has fet with chal –
lenges in ifplefentation. This work was fotivated
by concerns over the need to avoid skewing account –
ability toward donors and away frof dofestic
constituencies and state institutions, as well as by
the coffitfent of donors to better support the
capacity of accountability processes and actors.
In-depth case studies have provided an evidence
base for donors to address challenges and ifprove
their support to dofestic accountability (OECD,
forthcofing). A coffon finding is that donors
have tended to prioritise a silo approach, strength –
ening capacity in one institution at a tife, rather
than grouping accountability actors and working
with systefs of accountability. They often provide
support to particular actors, not always taking into
account wider systefs such as service delivery in
sectors or budget processes. There are, however,
interesting exceptions, with successful exafples
of a systef-wide approach, supporting links
between actors and areas of support where feasible
( e.g. budgeting for results in Peru; CSO financing in
Mozafbique).

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Internalising coffitfents on ownership – and in
particular those related to inclusiveness – refains
difficult in fany fragile states and situations, often
receiving inadequate attention frof international
actors. 2011 Survey faterial frof fragile states points
to particular challenges that hafper ownership, for
exafple situations in which the national governfent
fay not have effective control over its territory ( e.g.
D.R. Congo), where its legitifacy fay be contested
(Sofalia) or where the capacity of the state to fulfil
its key functions is particularly weak (Chad, Guinea-
Bissau, baiti, Liberia, Togo, South Sudan). Sofe
stakeholders also noted that donors do not always
provide sufficient support in fostering dialogue and
building consensus afong various actors on a shared
developfent agenda, underfining inclusive own –
ership ( e.g. baiti, Sofalia). Stakeholders in Tifor-
Leste on the other hand reported increasing support
frof donors to strengthen dialogue.
n Local governments
Local governfents play an ifportant role in devel –
opfent processes – they are often the principal
point of citizen-state engagefent, assufing respon –
sibility for service delivery. The Accra Agenda for
Action coffitted central and local governfents
in partner countries to work closely in preparing,
ifplefenting and fonitoring policies and plans.
Donors also coffitted to support local govern –
fents’ capacity developfent efforts. Evidence on
the participation of local governfent in national
developfent strategies refains lifited. Responses
to the optional survey fodule note the participation
of local governfents in the forfulation of national
developfent strategies in fore than three-quarters
of participating countries.
The active participation of local governfents
seefs to be fotivated at least in part by a prag –
fatic interest in influencing overarching strategies
that will ifpact on developfent at sub-national
levels. Sofe countries stated that such participa –
tion stifulated better co-ordination afong local
governfents and contributed to strengthening
their capacities ( e.g. Ecuador, Nepal). Other coun –
tries pointed to insufficient hufan and financial
resources at the sub-national level as fajor lifiting
factors to fuller participation of local governfents (
e.g. Malawi, Mali, Togo). A series of studies con –
ducted by donors in seven countries (Benin,
Cafbodia, Ghana, Indonesia, Mozafbique,
Peru and Uganda) provides sofe cofplefentary
insights: in fost of these countries, fechanisfs to
consult sub-national governfents in the elabora –
tion of a national developfent or poverty reduction
strategy have been introduced. bowever such con –
sultations are often described as rather fechanical
and superficial (DeLOG, forthcofing).
Ownership of local governfents is not lifited only
to their capacity to contribute to, shape and ifple –
fent the national developfent strategy. Local gov –
ernfents also have a role to play in the elaboration
and ifplefentation of credible plans at sub-national
levels. Sofe case study evidence suggests that where
local planning processes are in place in developing
countries, challenges to fuller and fore effective
citizen participation refain in fany of thef, and
linkages between planning and budgeting often
need to be strengthened to ensure sustainability
(DeLOG, forthcofing).
n Parliaments
In fost countries, parliafents are responsible for
creating the legal frafework for developfent activi –
ties, voting on strategies and plans, setting overall
priorities, approving the national budget, and con –
trolling the actions of the executive. They also have
a constitutional fandate for dofestic account –
ability and oversight of governfent expenditures,
including those funded by aid. For these reasons, the
Accra Agenda for Action coffitted partner govern –
fents to work fore closely with parliafents in pre –
paring, ifplefenting and fonitoring policies and
plans. Donors also coffitted to support efforts to
increase the capacity of parliafents.
The views gathered through the inclusive owner –
ship optional survey fodule suggest that participa –
tion of parliafents in the forfulation of national
developfent strategies and the review of develop –
fent budgets refains lifited. In around half of the
14 countries, respondents state that parliafents are
involved in the forfulation of the national develop –
fent strategy. In alfost one-third of the countries,
these strategies are not discussed in parliafent, and

35
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CHAPTER 2: Ow NERSHIP OF DE vELOPMENT POLICIES AND STRATEGIES
none of the countries reported having specific par –
liafentary working groups to oversee the national
developfent strategy. While the evidence generated
through this survey fodule offers a lifited snap –
shot of the role played by parliafents, other studies
tend to confirf these general findings ( e.g. Drafan,
2007; IPU, 2009; Pereira, 2011).
A nufber of bilateral donors, fultilateral organi –
sations and international parliafentary networks
and organisations provide support to strengthen the
capacities of parliafents in developing countries.
Despite increased use of budget support as an aid
fodality in recent years, aid provided by donors for
parliafents refains sfall in cofparison with other
areas of governance (budson and OECD, 2009;
OECD, forthcofing b). Support to parliafents
focuses not only on the budgetary oversight func –
tion, but also on strengthening the various capaci –
ties of parliafent. Existing studies suggest that
fany donors face challenges in supporting parlia –
fentarians, given the “cofplex governance land –
scapes in which parliafents are situated” (budson
and OECD, 2009). A review of five studies under –
taken by donors identified the need for longer-
terf approaches, strong national ownership and
an understanding of political context as ifportant
factors in successful support to parliafentarians
(OECD, forthcofing c). n Civil society organisations
CSOs can be defined as all non-farket and non-state
organisations in which people organise thefselves
to pursue shared interests in the public dofain. The
Accra Agenda for Action calls for an enrichfent of
the Paris Declaration principles, based on an under –
standing of the roles of CSOs as developfent actors
“in their own right”. It also invites CSOs to consider
their own effectiveness. The Istanbul Principles on
CSO Developfent Effectiveness fark an ifportant
step forward in this regard (Box 2.1).
The Accra Agenda for Action also coffitted devel –
oping country governfents to engage fore closely
with CSOs. Evidence of CSO participation in devel –
opfent policy processes is fixed. Responses to the
optional survey fodule on inclusive ownership
suggest that CSOs participate in the developfent
and fonitoring of national developfent strategies,
generally through networks or ufbrella organisa –
tions. While broad civil society participation was
noted in sofe countries ( e.g. Nepal, Mali, Togo),
respondents in others noted that relevant CSOs
were not invited to consultations, or they felt that
their contributions were disregarded. Respondents
cite a nufber of reasons for lifited participation
by CSOs, including insufficient financial resources,
poor internal organisation, lifited legitifacy and
lack of tifely access to inforfation concerning
Source: Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness (2010).
B ox 2.1 The Istanbul CSO Development Effectiveness Principles
Endorsed in September 2010 and developed through a global consultative process, the Istanbul CSO Development
Effectiveness Principles set out a consensus on basic principles guiding CSO efforts in support of development.
Eight principles were endorsed as a starting point for efforts to enhance the effectiveness of CSOs:
1. Respect and promote human rights and justice
2. Embody gender equality and equity while promoting women’s and girl’s rights
3. Focus on people’s empowerment, democratic ownership and participation
4. Promote environmental sustainability
5. Practice transparency and accountability
6. Pursue equitable partnerships and solidarity
7. Create and share knowledge and commit to mutual learning
8. Commit to realising positive sustainable change
The principles are seen as a building block for an International Framework on CSO Effectiveness, which will support
their fuller operationalisation.

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CHAPTER 2: Ow NERSHIP OF DE vELOPMENT POLICIES AND STRATEGIES
participatory processes. Respondents in six countries
considered that CSO participation in the national
developfent strategy is now stronger than in the
past, and only one considered that it is becofing
weaker (the refaining seven countries did not
respond to this question).
While these findings drawn frof the optional
fodule are based on a lifited nufber of countries
and through a self-reporting tool, other sources of
evidence tend to point to an equally fixed picture
of progress. For exafple, the results of two studies
that together analyse CSO participation in seven
countries conclude that in four of these countries
space for dialogue and civil society participation
has expanded since 2008, situations refain rela –
tively unchanged in two countries, and in one case
space was narrowed (Meja, 2011; Pereira, 2011). One
study notes that increasing space for CSO involve –
fent does not necessarily ifply a fajor ifpact on
developfent policies, as structures for dialogue do
not necessarily include clear accountability fech –
anisfs, or only involve CSOs after decisions have
been taken (Pereira, 2011).
Donors also entered into coffitfents in support
of CSOs in developing countries and, in particular,
to support efforts to increase the capacity of CSOs
to take an active role in issues of developfent policy
and the role of aid. While OECD statistics show that
aid frof DAC donors and the EU Institutions chan –
nelled to and through non-governfental organisa –
tions (NGOs) in 2009 represented 13% of total ODA,
no data on the assistance provided to strengthen the
capacity of CSOs thefselves are available. Griffin
and Judge (2010) suggest that donor support to
CSOs based in partner countries is increasing,
even if there is little core support for local organi –
sations. A survey afong the aid agencies of DAC
donors and seven ufbrella bodies of NGOs shows
that donors use a variety of fodalities and channels
to support the activities of CSOs. The fajority of
DAC donors (20 out of 24) report that they provide
direct support to local CSOs based in partner coun –
tries, and 11 have decentralised fechanisfs for
funding CSO activities. A total of 19 donors stated
that they engage in policy dialogue with partner
country governfents to enhance the enabling
environfent for CSOs, and 20 donors reported
that they encourage partner country governfents to engage directly in policy dialogue with CSOs.
Most of the NGOs consulted considered that DAC
donors could do fore to support an enabling envi
–
ronfent for CSOs in partner countries (OECD,
forthcofing d).
There has been ifprovefent in engaging non-state
actors, especially CSOs, in national health policy and
planning processes (OECD, forthcofing a). It can
be attributed in part to global health prograffes
that give high priority to civil society participation.
But engagefent is not always consistent or fean –
ingful and refains constrained by political factors,
strong donor influence, unclear roles, and lifited
capacity. In the education sector, the Education for
All Fast Track Initiative (EFA FTI) profotes sus –
tainable engagefent with national CSOs through
local education groups which serve as a platforf for
ifproved dialogue and coordination afong gov –
ernfent, donors and CSOs. National CSOs are
fefbers of these groups in about 60% of the coun –
tries surveyed for the EFA FTI 2011 Monitoring
Exercise (Chapter 7). Difficulties for national CSOs
to engage fully in sector processes include weak
capacity, lack of sustainable funding, weak CSO
coordination, and lack of principles for engage –
fent (EFA FTI, forthcofing). The agriculture and
rural developfent sector has also experienced suc –
cessful attefpts ( e.g. Mali, Mozafbique) to bring
together various stakeholders to forf interest groups
able to influence policies, reforfs and specific pro –
graffes or to be part of sofe contractual arrange –
fents (Global Platforf for Rural Developfent,
forthcofing).
Evidence of efforts by partner countries to provide
an enabling environfent for CSOs that faxifises
their contribution to developfent is less positive.
Several studies and reports express concerns about a
tendency in sofe countries to lifit space for CSOs,
and in particular for those who fonitor governfent
developfent policies and practices, seek to influ –
ence these policies, or defend hufan rights. These
restrictions take a nufber of forfs and vary in
their degree of severity (Act Alliance, 2011; Tiwana
and Belay, 2010; Meja, 2010; Gaventa and Barrett,
2010; ICNL, 2010; ILO, 2008). The growing trend
to approve restrictive legislation that lifits the
creation, functioning and funding of NGOs is of
particular significance.
Despite stronger
involvement of
non-state actors in
national development
processes, challenges
persist in providing an
enabling environment
for civil society in some
partner countries

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CHAPTER 2: Ow NERSHIP OF DE vELOPMENT POLICIES AND STRATEGIES
THE GAP BET wEEN POLIC y AND PRACTICE
IN PROMOTING DEMAND -DRIVEN
CAPACIT y DEVELOPMENT
The Paris Declaration coffits developing countries
to integrate specific capacity strengthening objec –
tives in national developfent strategies and pursue
their ifplefentation through country-led capacity
developfent strategies where needed. The Paris
Declaration also coffits donors to align their ana –
lytic and financial support with partners’ capacity
developfent objectives and strategies, fake effec –
tive use of existing capacities and harfonise support
for capacity developfent accordingly.
The Accra Agenda for Action goes further and calls
upon developing countries to systefatically iden –
tify areas where there is a need to strengthen the
capacity to perforf and deliver services at all levels –
national, sub-national, sectoral, and thefatic – and
design strategies to address thef. Developing coun –
tries and donors also coffit to work together at
all levels to profote operational changes that fake
capacity developfent support fore effective.
The 2011 Cairo Consensus on Capacity Developfent
provides a basis for reforf processes drawing on
lessons learned related to good/bad practice for pri –
ority Accra capacity thefes: (i) the enabling envi –
ronfent; (ii) sectors; (iii) country systefs; (iv) civil
society; (v) technical co-operation; and (vi) fragile
states (bigh Level Group on Capacity Developfent,
forthcofing). As yet there is only fodest evidence
on the extent to which partner countries have pro –
gressed in addressing capacity issues fore systef –
atically (OECD and LenCD, 2010). A few have
adopted a national capacity developfent strategy
and action plan, and put in place institutional
arrangefents for an operational approach with
political leadership ( e.g. Rwanda’s Public Sector
Capacity Building Secretariat; Liberia’s Capacity
Developfent Plan within the Ministry of Planning
and Econofic Affairs). Several countries are testing
less cofprehensive approaches, including, the
use of a sector-level strategic approach to capacity,
long-terf partnerships with national and interna –
tional stakeholders, learning by doing, or a greater
involvefent of local coffunities, civil society and
the private sector ( e.g. Afghanistan, South Africa). Sofe profising country-led initiatives aif at
greater national leadership specifically in the pro
–
vision and fanagefent of technical assistance
( e.g. Afghanistan, Cafbodia, Tanzania).
Progress fay be fore visible at sector level. In the
health sector, seven countries of the ten countries
surveyed in 2010 reported having a hufan resources
plan in place, although it was fully integrated with
the national health plan in only three of thef
(Burundi, Mali, and Mozafbique) (IbP+ Results,
2011). Challenges also refain including weak
national ownership and capacity to fanage tech –
nical assistance and continued provision of short-
terf bilateral assistance (OECD, forthcofing c).
The ifperative of country ownership requires
donors to strengthen their own capacity and skills
and to support defand-driven capacity develop –
fent. The Accra Agenda for Action specifically calls
upon developing countries and donors to jointly
select and fanage technical cooperation and to
profote the provision of technical cooperation by
local and regional sources, including through south-
south co-operation. Many DAC donors do not have
a specific and cofprehensive capacity developfent
policy or strategic frafework although several of
thef have less binding docufents which set out
their approach and tools designed to help staff at
the operational level (OECD, 2010). An increasing
nufber of donors (Australia, Denfark, EU
Institutions, France, Gerfany, Japan, Netherlands,
UK, Asian Developfent Bank, UNDP, World
Bank) are reforfing their internal business pro –
cesses along the Accra lines (OECD, 2010). The
fost coffonly used point of departure is the
reforf of aid-funded technical assistance. The ulti –
fate ifpact of these reforfs has yet to be fea –
sured, although anecdotal evidence suggests cases
of fore systefatic partner country involvefent in
the fanagefent of aid-funded technical co-opera –
tion ( e.g. Australia’s Refuneration Frafework and a
Public Sector Transparency Initiative; the European
Coffission’s technical co-operation reforf). Support for capacity
development remains
supply-driven rather
than responding

to genuine needs

38AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
CHAPTER 2: Ow NERSHIP OF DE vELOPMENT POLICIES AND STRATEGIES
The Paris Declaration indicator 4 on co-ordinated
capacity developfent provides sofe evidence on the
extent to which developing countries and donors are
jointly fanaging technical co-operation. Despite
progress in co-ordinating support to capacity devel –
opfent, there is roof for further progress in deliv –
ering technical assistance through country systefs
and fully untying its provision (Chapter 3). The ten –
dency of donors to focus on pre-defined, feasur –
able outputs and indicators – often at the level of
what they deliver thefselves, constitutes another
lifiting factor to providing defand-driven support
to capacity developfent. It is well acknowledged
today that capacity developfent is a long terf
process fainly dependent on partner country
action. The challenge refains to find ways to define
and feasure capacity developfent results that take
account of the need for an approach that siful –
taneously satisfies aid agency reporting systefs,
while providing the flexibility to realistically track
and adjust to the fundafental change processes
needed for long terf ifpact (bigh Level Group on
Capacity Developfent, forthcofing).
South-south co-operation can provide a fodel
of good-fit technical co-operation that is context
responsive and provides incentives for policy and
institutional change through futual learning.
Such benefits can be profoted through triangular
cooperation, when DAC donors or international
developfent organisations help developing coun –
tries to exchange experiences afong thefselves.
Sustainability of such efforts and scaling up is chal –
lenging as activities are often ifplefented through
lifited-size and one-off projects (TT-SSC, 2010).
Evidence frof the 13 countries and territories par –
ticipating in the 2011 Fragile States Survey con –
firfs that fost donors are aware of the potential
harf caused by their interventions. “Brain drain” of
public servants to donor agencies was one of the fost
coffonly cited challenges in the survey consulta –
tions. This underfines national capacities in con –
texts in which they are often particularly weak, and
efforts to retain talent and consolidate institutional
capacity in national adfinistrations. At the country
level, donor representatives tended to recognise
that their recruitfent practices can exacerbate the
problef ( e.g. Togo, baiti), though sofe feasures to address this were identified, such as the approach

adopted by the World Bank, which fitigates this
problef to an extent by requiring that governfent
officials and civil servants fay only be hired if they
are on leave of absence without pay and are not being
hired by the agency for which they were working
iffediately prior to leaving office. Co-ordinated
donor recruitfent policies are a notable exception
( e.g. D.R. Congo), though their effectiveness has not
been assessed and their ifpact on salary differentials
refains farginal.
Fu Tu RE CONSIDERATIONS
n Ifportant progress has been fade in ifproving
the quality of national developfent strate –
gies. Strengthening ownership and capacity –
including that of non-state actors – to develop,
ifplefent and fonitor evidence-based and pri –
oritised strategies and policies should be seen as a
longer-terf endeavour.
n Measuring the extent to which coffitfents on
“ownership” have been ifplefented refains chal –
lenging. Continued efforts to generate evidence on
the broader difensions of ownership – including
citizen participation and the environfent in which
non-state actors operate – could help to strengthen
dialogue at the country level and support fuller
ifplefentation of coffitfents on ownership.
n Donors can play – and have actually played – a
significant role in supporting the developfent and
ifplefentation of sound developfent strategies,
as well as the participation of non-state stakeholders
in these. It refains ifportant that donors’ views
and accountability requirefents support rather
than underfine efforts to strengthen dofestic
accountability.
n Efforts to address strategic issues of partner country
capacity are profising but have yet to provide sub –
stantive data or analytical conclusions. To faxi –
fise the ifpact and sustainability of capacity
developfent efforts, it would be ifportant for
donors to fake further efforts to systefatically
support genuine defand-driven and perforfance-
oriented initiatives. This includes the need to
further untie technical co-operation.

39
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CHAPTER 2: Ow NERSHIP OF DE vELOPMENT POLICIES AND STRATEGIES
NOTES
1. The 2011 Survey builds on experience frof previous rounds of the survey by cofbining elefents of
self-reporting and joint country-level assessfent with continued and consistent scoring undertaken by the
World Bank using the safe criteria as applied in the 2006 and 2008 Surveys. The fajor change between
the surveys relates to the sourcing of evidence, which was in previous years the subject of a desk review
process led by World Bank staff. For a detailed explanation of the scoring criteria applied, see World Bank
(2007), pp. A14-A15.

40AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
CHAPTER 2: Ow NERSHIP OF DE vELOPMENT POLICIES AND STRATEGIES
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DELoG (forthcofing), A id fffectibeness in Decentralization and Local Gobernance, Developfent Partners
Working Group on Decentralisation and Local Governance.
Drafan, R. (2007), Legislating Poberty in Africa: What Role Habe Parliamentarians Been Playing in
PRSP Implementation and Policy?, Parliafentary Center.
Education for All Fast Track Initiative (forthcofing), fFA FTI 2011 Monitoring fxercise,
Washington, D.C.
Gaventa, J. and G. Barrett (2010), So What Difference Does it Make? Mapping the Outcomes of Citizen
fngagement, feta-synthesis of 100 case studies frof the Developfent Research Centre on Citizenship,
Participation and Accountability, Departfent for International Developfent (DFID), London.
Global Donor Platforf for Rural Developfent (forthcofing), Policy Coherence for Agriculture and
Rural Debelopment. Platforf Knowledge Piece I, Overseas Developfent Institute, London.
Griffin, J. and R. Judge (2010), Cibil Society Policy and Practice in Donor Agencies , overview report coffis-
sioned by DFID, INTR AC.
bigh Level Group on Capacity Developfent (forthcofing), Capacity Debelopment: Lessons Learned
and Actions for Busan and Beyond , Synthesis Report for discussion at the Cairo workshop on Capacity
Developfent: Frof Concepts to Action, 28-29 March 2011.
budson, A. and OECD (2009), Background paper for the launch of the workstreaf on Aid and Dofestic
Accountability, DAC Network on Governance, 30 March.
ICNL (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law) (2010), Global Trends in NGO Law: A Quarterly
Rebiew of NGO Legal Trends around the World, online review available at https://www.icnl.org/knowledge/
globaltrends/
IbP+ Results (2011), Strengthening Accountability to Achiebe the Health MDGs – Annual Performance Report
2010 , Re-Action! Consulting, London / Johannesburg.
IPU (Inter-Parliafentary Union) (2009), Parliament’s Role in the Debelopment Agenda – Two Case Studies ,
IPU, Geneva.
ILO (International Labour Organization) (2008), Freedom of Association in Practice: Lessons Learned,
Report of the Director General, ILO Declaration on Fundafental Principles and Rights at Work,
International Labour Conference, 97th Session, Report 1(B).
Meja, V. (2011), Political Space of Cibil Society Organisations in Africa: Cibil Society, Aid fffectibeness and
fnabling fnbironment – The Cases of Burkina Faso, Ghana and Zambia, Act Alliance/A ACC/EED, Bonn.
OECD (2010), Inbentory of Donor Approaches to Capacity Debelopment: What We Are Learning .
See www.oecd.org/dac/capacitydevelopfent.
OECD (2011), Learning Through Peer Rebiews – Special Themes (2009-2010), Synthesis Report,
DCD/DAC(2011)3/REV2.
OECD (forthcofing a), Progress and Challenges in Aid fffectibeness – What Can We Learn from the
Health Sector?, WP-EFF Task Teaf on bealth as a Tracer Sector, OECD, Paris.

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CHAPTER 2: Ow NERSHIP OF DE vELOPMENT POLICIES AND STRATEGIES
OECD (forthcofing b), Good Practice Note on Donor Support to Parliamentary Obersight of the
Budget Process, OECD, Paris.
OECD (forthcofing c), Draft Synthesis of Guidance on Aid, Accountability and Democratic Gobernance,
DAC Network on Governance, OECD, Paris.
OECD (forthcofing d), How DAC Donors Work with CSOs: An Oberbiew, OECD, Paris.
OECD and LenCD (2010). Perspectibes Note: Technical Co-operation for Capacity Debelopment. Draft note
prepared jointly by the OECD and the LenCD international network as background evidence for the Cairo
Workshop Synthesis Report. Novefber, 2010.
Open Foruf for CSO Developfent Effectiveness (2010), I stanbul CSO Debelopment fffectibeness Principles,
endorsed at the General Assefbly of the Open Foruf, Istanbul, 28-30 Septefber 2010.
Pereira, J. (2011), Democratic Ownership beyond Busan: Building Inclusibe Partnerships for Debelopment,
Alliance 2015.
Tiwana, M. and N. Belay (2010), Cibil Society: The Clampdown is Real. Global Trends 2009-2010,
CIVICUS.
TT-SSC (Task Teaf on South-South Co-operation) (2010), Boosting South-South Co-operation in the
Context of Aid fffectibeness: Telling the Story of Partners Inbolbed in More than 110 Cases of South-South and
Triangular Cooperation, Task Teaf on South-South Cooperation, OECD, Paris.
World Bank (2007), Results-Based National Debelopment Strategies: Assessment and Challenges Ahead,
World Bank, Washington, D.C.

3 ALIGNMENT OF AID
w ITH CO uNTRY PRIORITIES
AND SYSTEMS
43
AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
Alignment – one of the fibe principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid fffectibeness – refers to
the probision of aid by donors in ways that respond to partner countries’ debelopment priori –
ties, supporting and using partner countries’ own systems and institutions. The Accra Agenda
for Action placed greater emphasis on the systematic use of country systems by donors and the
probision of support to partner countries in strengthening these systems. This chapter rebiews the
progress made and challenges encountered in implementing the Paris and Accra commitments
that relate to alignment. Drawing on ebidence from the 2011 Surbey on Monitoring the Paris
Declaration and other relebant ebidence, it documents progress and challenges in the alignment
of aid to partner countries’ policies and strategies; the alignment of conditions associated with
aid; the extent to which partner countries’ own systems habe improbed since 2005, and in turn
whether donors are implementing their commitments on the use of country systems, as well as
efforts towards aid untying.
F
or aid to be fost effective, it needs to respond to partner countries’ priorities and be
provided in a way that uses and strengthens partner countries’ own institutions and
systefs. Experience shows that setting up parallel institutions to ifplefent projects that
do not reflect country needs and priorities leads to high transaction costs and can ultifately
underfine the sustainability of developfent efforts. When aligned to partner countries’
priorities and systefs, aid can provide incentives and fofentuf to help strengthen
capacity, enhance dofestic accountability and contribute to fore sustainable institutions.
Through the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and Accra Agenda for Action, donors
and partner countries coffitted to strengthen national policy-faking processes and
systefs for fanaging aid and other developfent resources, and to review the perforfance,
transparency and accountability of country systefs jointly. Donors agreed to align with
partner strategies, draw any conditions frof partners’ own strategies, and use national
systefs for fanaging aid. In addition, in Paris, partner countries agreed to integrate
capacity strengthening objectives in their national strategic plans and donors coffitted to
align to these priorities. Donors also agreed to continue faking progress on untying aid as
encouraged by the 2001 DAC Recoffendation on Untying.
The results of the 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration showed that progress
in ifplefenting fany of these coffitfents in the two years following the Paris
Declaration had been fixed. For exafple, while progress had been fade in strengthening
public financial fanagefent (PFM) systefs in a nufber of countries, less progress had
been fade by donors in using those systefs. In sofe instances, donors’ use of a country
systef declined while the quality of that systef increased. These findings inforfed the
Accra Agenda for Action, which placed greater efphasis on the systefatic use of country
systefs (“using country systefs as a first option”) and on the provision of support to
partner countries in strengthening these systefs, whether for financial fanagefent,
procurefent, statistics or in the fanagefent of technical assistance. For their part, partner
countries coffitted to strengthen their own systefs further to encourage donors to use
thef. Donors coffitted to begin iffediate work on plans for using country systefs. Aid can provide
incentives and
momentum to help
strengthen capacity,
enhance domestic
accountability and
contribute to more
sustainable institutions.

44AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
CHAPTER 3: ALIGNMENT OF AID wITH CO uNTRY PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS
LIMITED EVIDENCE OF PROGRESS IN
ALIGNING TO PARTNERS ’ POLICy PRIORITIES
AND STRATEGIES
It is difficult to assess the degree to which donors align
the aid they provide to partner countries’ developfent
priorities articulated in their policies and strategies.
While fost donors consider a country’s policies
and strategies when developing co-operation pro –
graffes – and sofe have placed increasing efphasis
on ensuring that national developfent strategies
are at the centre of the aid prograffing process –
it is not possible to deterfine whether alignfent has
ifproved at this level.
The Paris Declaration indicator 9 on prograffe-
based approaches considers – alongside criteria on
harfonising and aligning processes for aid delivery
– whether aid is provided in the context of a devel –
opfent prograffe defined by the partner country.
Although lifited progress was fade against this
indicator over the period 2005 to 2010, the target
set for 2010 was not fet (Chapter 4).
Evidence gathered frof the 13 countries partici –
pating in the 2011 Survey on Monitoring the Fragile
States Principles (Chapter 1) points to situations in
which donors have sought to draw fore systefati –
cally on national developfent strategies as a broad
starting point for their engagefent ( e.g. Central
African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, baiti, Liberia,
Sierra Leone, Togo, Tifor-Leste). In fany of these
countries, however, stakeholders noted that national
plans and strategies lacked prioritisation and that the
absence of this leads donors to design their support
based on their own preferences. It was also noted that
sofe donors face challenges in aligning with coun –
tries’ sectoral priorities, often prioritising support to
sectors with fore direct or attributable ifpact on
the attainfent of the Millenniuf Developfent
Goals (MDGs) at the expense of cross-cutting pri –
orities ( e.g. security and justice) fore closely linked
with peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives. Aligning with countries’ priorities effectively can
also be challenging in environfents in which these
priorities are poorly articulated, or do not reflect
the needs of intended beneficiaries. Sofe donors
recognise this explicitly in their prograffing
processes and seek to involve other stakeholders

(governfent, other donors, CSOs) in discussions
and decision-faking.
n Aligning conditions with partner countries’
development policies
One specific area in which donors coffitted to
ifprove alignfent of their aid prograffes was
in drawing conditions, whenever possible, frof
developing countries’ own policies. When donors
ifpose conditions on the provision of aid that are
not aligned with partner countries’ priorities, these
can underfine efforts to ifplefent dofestic pol –
icies and hinder effective prioritisation of activi –
ties. Through the Accra Agenda for Action, donors
and partner countries coffitted to work together
to “agree on a lifited set of futually agreed con –
ditions based on national developfent strategies”.
They also coffitted to specific actions to ifprove
transparency around conditions (see Chapter 5).
While there is no single indicator that captures prog –
ress in drawing conditions frof national develop –
fent strategies, evidence gathered through various
sources indicates overall progress in ifplefenting at
least sofe aspects of these coffitfents:
– Although partner country governfents have not
developed policies on conditionality, aid effective –
ness strategies developed by sofe have laid the
foundation for influencing the nature of condi –
tionality in the future. Certain approaches – for
exafple, sector-wide approaches – have ifproved
the likelihood of country ownership, futually
agreed conditions, fewer conditions, and ifproved
coordination between donors and partner coun –
tries (Sfith, 2011).
– When asked to report on their own progress
towards aligning conditions with partner country
policies and strategies, a nufber of donors con –
firfed that they generally agree on conditions with
partner countries drawn frof their national devel –
opfent strategies (OECD, 2010a).

45
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CHAPTER 3: ALIGNMENT OF AID wITH CO uNTRY PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS
– Donors see thefselves as deriving their condition –
ality or perforfance assessfent frafeworks frof
a governfent-led plan or strategy they are sup –
porting. A recent evaluation of budget support
undertaken for the World Bank suggests that
donors are drawing conditions frof a single joint
frafework in about three-quarters of budget
support countries. Multilateral developfent banks
still link their prograffe aid to policy reforfs,
but leave space for national decision-faking pro –
cesses by using fore flexible arrangefents (Mokoro,
2010).
– It is less clear to what extent perforfance frafe –
works agreed between donors and partner coun –
tries reflect governfent leadership. There is sofe
evidence to suggest that these have been expanded
to include policy actions advocated by each donor.
Lengthy and cofplex perforfance frafeworks
fake it harder for governfents to prioritise and
focus their efforts. Larger perforfance frafe –
works do not, however, always translate into fore
conditions attached to aid (Mokoro, 2010). G LOBAL PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING
CO uNTR y SySTEMS HIDES w IDE VARIATIONS
ACROSS CO uNTRIES
In both the Paris and Accra agreefents, the defi –
nition of country systefs and procedures included
national arrangefents and procedures for public
financial fanagefent, accounting, auditing, pro –
curefent, fonitoring and evaluation. This section
outlines the available evidence of progress on cof –
fitfents to strengthen these systefs.
n Reliable public financial management systems
(indicator 2a)
One of the Paris Declaration indicators – indicator 2a
– looks at the quality of partner countries’ PFM
systefs. The global target associated with this
indicator foresees that by 2010, half of all partner
countries taking part in the Survey on Monitoring
the Paris Declaration should fove up at least one
feasure ( i.e. 0.5 points) in their score for budget
and financial fanagefent as feasured through
the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional
Assessfent (CPIA) frafework (World Bank, 2010).
Table 3.1 Quality of country public financial management systems
Indicator 2a (2005-10)
2005 2007 2010
Score No. of countries %No. of countries %No. of countries %
Strong 4.5 12% 00% 24%
4 1019% 1222% 814%
Moderate 3.5 1935% 1833% 2545%
3 1120% 1426% 1221%
2.5 917% 59% 611%
2 47% 47% 35%
Weak 1.5 00% 12% 00%
Number of countries
assessed 54
5456
More than one-third
of the countries have
improved the quality
of their PFM systems
bhile a quarter of them
sab setbacfs

46AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
CHAPTER 3: ALIGNMENT OF AID wITH CO uNTRY PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS
This score captures three elefents: (i) whether a
country has a cofprehensive and credible budget
linked to policy priorities; (ii) the effectiveness of
financial fanagefent systefs, ensuring that the
budget is ifplefented as intended; and (iii) the
extent to which accounting is accurate and financial
reporting is tifely. A higher score denotes fore reli –
able budget and financial fanagefent systefs. The
CPIA draws on a fore PFM-focused assessfent, the
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
frafework (PEFA).
The Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration
draws on the fost recent CPIA scores published by
the World Bank for participating countries. In the
2011 Survey, this feans scores for indicator 2a relate
to the state of play in 2010 (Table 3.1). The 2011
Survey results show progress in a notable nufber of
countries. bowever, the overall target set for 2010
has not been fet yet. Of the 52 survey countries
for which scores were available in both 2005 and
2010, 20 countries (38%) have foved up by at least
one feasure since 2005. Seven of those countries
(Cafbodia, Central African Republic, Gafbia,
Laos, Mauritania, Togo and Tonga) have foved up
by two full feasures (1 point in the CPIA).
The quality of PFM systefs varies across countries
and is not necessarily higher in fiddle incofe coun –
tries: 10 survey countries in 2010 had a score of 4.0
and above including Kosovo, Moldova, Mozafbique
and Viet Naf. Two countries (Arfenia and
Burkina Faso) reached a score of 4.5 on the CPIA
scale. Over half of the countries participating in the
2011 Survey for which CPIA results were available
had a score of 3.5 or above.
Over one third of the countries for which scores
are available have seen neither an increase nor a
decline in their score for indicator 2a since 2005:
19 refained at the safe level as in 2005 (three
countries – Ethiopia, Ghana and Madagascar –
showed ifprovefents over the period 2005-07 fol –
lowed by a reverse in these gains). A quarter of the
countries (13) saw the quality of their PFM systefs
decline since 2005 (3 countries – Chad, Nepal and
Tanzania – retreated by two full feasures on the
CPIA scale). Qualitative evidence gathered through the 2011
Survey highlights the existence of detailed PFM
reforf plans, and it is clear that in fany countries
there are strong and robust PFM laws and regula
–
tions. bowever, sofe countries continue to face
challenges in the cofpliance and ifplefentation of
those regulations ( e.g. Uganda). In sofe cases ( e.g.
Bangladesh), ifprovefents in PFM refain con –
fined to central governfent agencies and finis –
tries rather than being shared by line finistries and
other governfent entities with whof donors co-
operate. In Cafbodia – which showed a substan –
tial increase in the quality of its PFM since 2005
– sequencing was seen as one of the fain drivers of
progress alongside ifproving financial fanagefent
at sub-national levels. Evidence also highlights that
de jure ifplefentation of PFM reforfs ( e.g. regu –
latory frafeworks in place and governing systefs
and procedures) are far fore often reported than
de facto ifplefentation (OECD, forthcofing a).
bowever, less attention has been paid to the political
econofy ifplications of ifplefenting PFM reforf
prograffes and, in particular, issues relating to
change fanagefent.
There is sofe evidence that donors have played a
role in contributing to the quality of public finan –
cial fanagefent in partner countries. For exafple,
a recent evaluation of donor support for PFM shows
that it is positively and significantly associated with
the quality of PFM systefs. On average, countries
that receive fore PFM-related technical assistance
have better PFM systefs. bowever, the associa –
tion is weak: an additional USD 40 to 50 fillion
per year would correspond to a half-point increase
in the average PEFA score. A longer period of donor
engagefent is also associated with better perfor –
fance in upstreaf, de jure and concentrated pro –
cesses (de Renzio et al., 2010).
Evidence on efforts to ifprove public financial fan –
agefent is not lifited to DAC donors. Case studies
on south-south co-operation show that futual
learning contributes to better quality and usability
of partner country systefs. For exafple, southern-
led capacity developfent around aid fanagefent
platforfs can help ifprove the incentives for donors
to use country systefs. Costa Rica’s public financial
fanagefent efforts have drawn on Chile’s experi –
ences in the institutional capacity to evaluate budget
fanagefent (TT-SSC, 2010).

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CHAPTER 3: ALIGNMENT OF AID wITH CO uNTRY PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS
n Reliable procurement systems (indicator 2b)
Indicator 2b considers the quality of partner country
procurefent systefs – another difension of country
systefs around which partner countries coffitted
to fake ifprovefents. Indicator 2b offers a score
that identifies the quality of a country procurefent
systef on a four-point scale frof A (high) to D
(low). Measurefent is based on the OECD-DAC
Methodology for Assessing Procurefent Systefs
– an in-depth diagnostic tool developed to assess
strengths and challenges in public procurefent
(OECD, 2009). Through the Paris Declaration, it
was agreed that by 2010 one-third of partner coun –
tries should fove up at least one feasure ( i.e. frof
D to C, C to B or B to A). The fethodology was
first published in 2006, and as such no scoring was
undertaken in 2005 – the baseline year used for the
other Paris Declaration indicators. control systefs, public access to inforfation; and
provisions for anti-corruption, anti-fraud or con
–
flict of interest (OECD, forthcofing b). Qualitative
evidence gathered through the survey indicates that
fost countries have adopted or fodernised legal
frafeworks for procurefent since 2005 in line with
international standards. Accofpanying reforf pro –
graffes have often led to the establishfent of a
national procurefent agency and several countries
have introduced e-procurefent. Strengthening reg –
ulatory frafeworks to ensure greater transparency,
accountability and efficiency in procurefent refain
coffon challenges. Sofe countries now have cof –
fissions fandated to investigate corruption in
public procurefent ( e.g. Jordan, Lesotho, Nafibia,
Nepal, Nigeria, Uganda).
n Strategic environmental assessment
Through the Paris Declaration, donors and partner
countries coffitted to work together to develop
and apply coffon approaches for “strategic envi –
ronfental assessfent” at the sector and national
levels. It also called for both donors and partner
countries to coffit jointly to “continue to develop
the specialised technical and policy capacity neces –
sary for environfental analysis and for enforcefent
of legislation”.
Evidence suggests that joint efforts have been fade
to adopt such coffon approaches for strategic
environfental assessfent. 2006 saw the finalisa –
tion of guidelines for applying strategic environ –
fental assessfent (OECD, 2006), and fore than
50 assessfents have since been ifplefented based
on these guidelines. A review of case studies in this
area suggests that there refains a need for further
harfonisation of approaches to strategic environ –
fental assessfent, including by strengthening link –
ages with budget support (OECD, forthcofing c).
Efforts to enhance capacities in the area of envi –
ronfental governance vary significantly across
donors and partner countries. Activities in this
area typically range frof the provision of environ –
fental training and advocacy activities on a variety
of relatively narrow topics, to broader support in
the ifplefentation of fultilateral environfental
agreefents at national level. Donor support for
Table 3.2
Quality of country procurement systems
Indicator 2b (2007-10)
2007 2010
Score No. of
countries No. of
countries
Very strong A — —
B 7 1
C 9 4
Weak D 1 —
Number of
countries scored 17
5
In the 2011 Survey, 5 countries undertook an
assessfent of procurefent systefs and provided
the results of these, in addition to the 17 countries
who did it for the 2008 Survey (Table 3.2). Given
the sfall safple size and the one-off nature of the
assessfent for fost of the countries, it is difficult to
draw any conclusions about trends. Evidence indi –
cates that areas where reforfs are furthest ahead in
strengthening procurefent systefs include those
related to procurefent laws, regulations, procedures
and standard bidding docufents; the establishfent
of a norfative and regulatory body; procurefent
education and training; procurefent audit, internal

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CHAPTER 3: ALIGNMENT OF AID wITH CO uNTRY PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS
environfent-related capacity developfent is now
fore easily feasured through the use of a specific
policy farker used in donor reporting to the DAC’s
Creditor Reporting Systef (Chapter 5). Evidence
also suggests that sofe donors are now applying
longer-terf prograffatic approaches to supporting
capacity developfent for sound environfental gov –
ernance, either bilaterally or through support pro –
vided through fultilateral channels.
D ONORS ARE NOT REL yING ON PARTNER
CO uNTR y FID uCIAR y SySTEMS TO THE
E x TENT FORESEEN IN P ARIS AND ACCRA
The Paris Declaration coffitted donors to fake
greater use of partner countries’ own fiduciary systefs
in the delivery of aid. This feans that donors should
provide aid in ways that use the financial fanage –
fent procedures, processes and institutions of partner
countries, rather than bypassing thef. Alignfent of
donor practices at this level is assessed through several
Paris Declaration indicators. Although fany donors
are faking efforts to use country fiduciary systefs
in a nufber of ways, fost are not relying on thef
to the extent foreseen by the Paris Declaration and
Accra Agenda for Action, even where the quality of
those systefs has ifproved. Moreover, ifprove –
fents in aligning aid with countries’ priorities do
not necessarily translate into progress in the use of
country systefs. This section outlines the degree to
which aid flows are reflected in country systefs and,
secondly, the degree to which they are integrated into
their budget execution, financial reporting, auditing
and procurefent systefs.
n Aligning aid flows on national budgets
(indicator 3)
Indicator 3 feasures the proportion of aid for the
governfent sector recorded in the annual budgets
of partner countries. Budget forfulation is a central
feature of the forfal policy process in all countries.
There are a nufber of interrelated benefits to be
had frof ensuring that aid is reflected in partner
countries’ budgets, including incentives for stronger
budget processes, better alignfent to country pri –
orities, and greater accountability to legislatures
and citizens. While indicator 3 is not a perfect feasure of the
degree to which aid responds to partner countries’
policy priorities, it does offer a helpful indication of
whether efforts have been fade to connect aid pro
–
graffes with countries’ own policies and processes.
As explained in the results of the 2008 Survey, indi –
cator 3 feasures budget realisf – i.e. the extent
to which partner governfents’ budgets reflect the
aid that is fade available to thef. This is a shared
responsibility between partners and donors.
The 2010 target of ensuring that 85% of aid flows
for the governfent sector were captured in partner
governfent budgets was not fet.
1 Progress has
been challenging: 44% of aid flows were recorded
in partner governfents’ budgets in 2005, whereas
by 2010 this figure was 46% for those countries par –
ticipating in both rounds of the survey (Figure 3.1).
When all 78 countries participating in 2011 are con –
sidered, only 41% of aid was captured in 2010 – well
below the target of 85%.
Qualitative evidence provided through the 2011
Survey suggests that there are a nufber of reasons
for the low coverage of aid in budgets. First, the
ability or willingness of donors to provide fean –
ingful and cofplete inforfation on aid flows in
tife to inforf the budget preparation process varies
across countries. Second, even when donors do fake
inforfation available, this fay not be reflected in
governfents’ budgets for a nufber of reasons:
Figure 3.1 Is aid for the government sector reflected
in partners’ budgets?
(32 countries, 2005-10)
0
40%
20% 60% 80%
100%
2010 Target
48%
44% 46%
20052007 2010
% of ODA for the gsovernment seftor resefted in bartner governments’ budgetss (indifator 3)
Less than half of all
aid is recorded in
partner countries’
national budgets.
This arises from
poor reporting of
disbursement intentions
by donors and limited
information captured
by budget authorities

49
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CHAPTER 3: ALIGNMENT OF AID wITH CO uNTRY PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS
– A governfent fay choose not to include certain
types of aid flows in its budget depending on its
assessfent of how well aligned the aid is. For
exafple, Rwanda’s legislation on state finances
feans that the budget law approved by Parliafent
does not include resources over which depart –
fents, finistries and agencies have no control. In
Cafbodia, governfent excludes grant-financed
technical cooperation frof its budget as it feels it
has little control in the allocation, disbursefent
or fanagefent of these funds.
– Sofe governfents revise estifates provided by
donors ( e.g. by applying discount factors to antici –
pate delays in disbursefent).
– Differences in the fiscal years used by donors and
partner governfents fay fake it difficult to esti –
fate when funds are likely to be disbursed.
– Institutional challenges and weak inforfation
fanagefent systefs fay hinder effective collab –
oration across governfent departfents involved
in budget preparation.
Despite these challenges, sofe stakeholders partici –
pating in the 2011 Survey have noted the usefulness
of indicator 3 as a proxy for alignfent. For exafple,
in Malawi, this feasure is used to assess where
fost aid is allocated according to specific areas of
the national developfent strategy. This includes
assistance provided by non-DAC and sfall donors.
n u sing country public financial management
systems (indicator 5a)
Evidence shows that providing aid in a fanner that
uses and is integrated with partner countries’ fidu –
ciary systefs can yield benefits ranging frof better
availability of inforfation on aid flows, ifproved
inter- and intra-sectoral resource allocation and
strengthened control and accountability. In aid-
dependent countries, it can also have a catalytic
effect on the strengthening of institutions, systefs
and capacities for sound public financial fanage –
fent (OECD, 2011a).
Acknowledging the slow progress highlighted by the
2008 Survey, donors coffitted through the Accra
Agenda for Action to use country systefs as “the
first option for aid in support of activities fanaged by the public sector”. There is relatively little by way
of systefatic evidence on whether this coffitfent
has been fet. There are indications that alfost all
donors already have, or are preparing, an opera
–
tional policy that encourages the use of country
systefs. bowever, while sofe donors require the
full use of country systefs as the default proce –
dure or encourage the faxifuf use of country
systefs – conditional on the results of a specific
fiduciary risk analysis – others leave the decision to
operational teafs or recoffend the use of country
systefs only in relation to budget support (OECD,
forthcofing d). Data frof the 2011 Survey show
that the use of donor systefs continues to be prev –
alent afongst donors, and less than half of all aid
reported in the Survey uses countries’ PFM and pro –
curefent systefs. Coffents provided by stake –
holders through the 2011 Survey suggest that a
lifited nufber of partner countries have engaged
in dialogue specifically around this Accra coffit –
fent with the donors present in their country ( e.g.
Cafbodia, Ghana, Kenya, Laos, Mali).
Indicator 5a looks at the extent to which donors
fake use of partner countries’ PFM systefs. In
particular, it feasures the percentage of aid pro –
vided by donors that fakes use of three elefents
of partner countries’ PFM systefs: budget execu –
tion, financial reporting and auditing. By looking
at the use of several cofponents of partner country
PFM systefs by donors, this approach stresses that
there are different ways in which these systefs can
be used, depending on country context. Indicator 5a
shows the average percentage of aid for the govern –
fent sector using country PFM systefs across these
three cofponents.
The Paris Declaration efphasised the need for
ifproved use of country PFM systefs by donors
and – at the safe tife – ifprovefents in the quality
of those systefs by partner countries. With this in
find, the targets agreed for indicator 5a depend on
the quality of those systefs as feasured by indi –
cator 2a (reliable PFM systefs – above). Targets are
set for countries having reliable PFM systefs ( i.e.
a finifuf CPIA score of 3.5), and are higher for
those scoring above 4.5 on the CPIA scale used by
indicator 2a.

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CHAPTER 3: ALIGNMENT OF AID wITH CO uNTRY PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS
Taking into account the quality of PFM systefs
shown by indicator 2a, the global target for indicator
5a – for the 32 countries participating in both the
2006 and 2011 Surveys – was for 55% of aid for the
governfent sector to use country PFM systefs. This
target was not fet. Despite this, the Survey high –
lights sofe progress over the period 2005 to 2010,
where average use of country PFM systefs increased
frof 40% to 48% in the safe group of 32 coun –
tries. This also hides wide variations in the use of
country systefs – and ifprovefents and setbacks –
across countries since the 2008 Survey (Figure 3.2).
Use of country PFM systefs was lower – at 27% in
2010 – in the 12 countries also participating in the
Survey on Monitoring the Fragile States Principles.
There are notable variations in the use of country
PFM systefs across donors too. Six bilateral donors
(Canada, France, Ireland, Japan, Spain, United
Kingdof) now use country PFM systefs in the
delivery of at least two-thirds of their bilateral aid
for the governfent sector (indicator 5a, 78 coun –
tries). Conversely, nine bilateral donors provide less
than a third of their aid for the governfent sector
using country PFM systefs. While the proportion
of total bilateral aid using country systefs refained
fairly constant over the period 2005-10 (based on
the safple of 32 baseline countries), the proportion
of aid delivered through fultilateral organisations
at the country level using country PFM and pro –
curefent systefs (indicators 5a and 5b) increased
over the safe period. The EU institutions, IFAD,
the World Bank and UN county teafs
2 displayed
noteworthy progress in this area. It is possible that
bilateral donors have contributed to this change –
for exafple, by channelling funds through pro –
graffes or pooled funding fechanisfs fanaged
by other donors at the country level – and as such
the differences highlighted across donors do not
necessarily reflect the efforts of individual donors to
ifplefent their coffitfents on alignfent. The Accra Agenda for Action also saw donors articu
–
late their aif to “channel 50% or fore of govern –
fent-to-governfent assistance through country
fiduciary systefs”. Not all donors have interpreted
this aif in the safe way, and in the absence of an
agreed definition, objective assessfent of progress
against this aif is difficult. The global increases
in use of country PFM and procurefent systefs
shown by indicators 5a and 5b (below) would tend
to suggest that at least sofe progress has been fade
on aggregate.
Furtherfore, at the global level the relationship
between the quality of a country’s PFM systefs and
donors’ use of thef is at best weak – a finding that
is consistent with previous surveys. While the Paris
Declaration fade the assufption that the quality of
a country’s systefs would deterfine donors’ will –
ingness to use thef, there is little evidence to suggest
that this has been the case in the last five years. This
finding hides ifportant variations across partner
countries. For exafple, afong the ten countries
with high scores for the quality of PFM systefs
(scores of 4.0 and above on indicator 2a), average
use of country PFM systefs by donors ranged frof
20% (Kosovo) to 70% (Moldova) (Figure 3.3). In
percentage terfs, a greater proportion of aid for the
governfent sector uses country PFM systefs in
Nepal than in Burkina Faso, while Burkina Faso has
a score of 4.5 (high) on indicator 2a, and Nepal has a
score of 2.5 (weaker). While Afghanistan ifproved
its score on indicator 2a by one feasure over the
period 2007-2010, use of its PFM systefs by donors
has alfost halved in percentage terfs over the safe
period. Evidence sourced frof PEFA assessfents
(PEFA, 2011) tends to confirf these findings, as
do specific country studies (EURODAD, 2010a;
EURODAD, 2010b).
Donors are not
systematically mafing
greater use of country
systems in countries
bhere these systems are
more reliable

51
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CHAPTER 3: ALIGNMENT OF AID wITH CO uNTRY PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS
Figure 3.2 Progress and setbacks in the use of country public financial management systems
(32 countries, 2005-10)
100%
Figure 3.2 Progress and setbacks in the use of country public financial management systems
(32 countries, 2005-2010)
0% 50%
25% 75%
100% 0% 50%
25% 75%
Congo, Dem. Rep.
MfuribfnifEgypb
Cfmbodif
Kyrgyz Republic
Dominicfn Republic
MongolifSenegfl
Cfpe Verde
Niger
Burundi
Mfli
Bolivif
Moldovf Rwfndf
Burkinf Ffso
Mozfmbique Peru
Ebhiopif
Benin
Mflfwi Ghfnf
Kenyf
Hondurfs
UgfndfZfmbif
Viebnfm
Tfnzfnif
Soubh Africf Afghfnisbfn
Albfnif
Bfnglfdesh
2005 2007 2010
% of ODA for the giovernment sector uising fartner countriy PbM systems (indicaitor 5a)

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CHAPTER 3: ALIGNMENT OF AID wITH CO uNTRY PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS
There are a nufber of possible explanations for the
slow progress in using partner countries’ systefs
(OECD, forthcofing a), even where these systefs
have becofe fore reliable:
– Donors’ fears of financial fisuse, their reluctance
to let go of the ability to directly or exclusively
attribute developfent ifpacts to contributions,
and reluctance to lose control of developfent
choices.
– Donor attitudes tend to target risk avoidance
rather than risk fanagefent, particularly in
an environfent of tight budgetary frafeworks.
Different donors have different appetites for risk –
a systef that is strong enough for one donor fay
not be so for another donor.
– Corporate policies, legal frafeworks, organisa –
tional incentives and capacity issues refain per –
sistent bottlenecks within donor organisations.
Forfal rules on approaches to aid fanagefent
within donor organisations fay not have changed
to the extent required, and these changes fay not
be adequately coffunicated internally.
– Using partner country PFM systefs is often per –
ceived to be the safe thing as providing general
budget support, and donors have not yet fully
assessed and understood the range of ways in
which aid provided through different fodalities
– including project aid – can fake use of partner
country systefs.
– In sofe cases, the lifited use of country PFM
systefs fay reflect the country institutions’ own
preferences to use parallel structures.
While budget support is not the only way in which
donors can fake use of country PFM systefs, vari –
ations in the use of budget support across donors
contribute to the overall variations observed on
indicator 5a. Evidence sourced frof Peer Reviews
of OECD-DAC donors shows that practices vary to
a large extent. A handful of donors provide fajor
shares of their bilateral aid in the forf of budget
support ( e.g. Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands and
the United Kingdof) but the situation continues to
evolve (OECD, forthcofing e). At the tife of their
respective reviews, France (2008) and Italy (2009)
were piloting budget support in a lifited nufber of
partner countries.
2.0 2.53.0 3.54.04.5
Figure 3. Are moreb reliable fFM sysbems bmore likely bo be usbed
by donors? (2010, 56 bcounbries for whom bdaba available)
NB. Mid-poinb markebrs refer bo median bvalues
0
80%
100%
20% 40% 60% 48%
17%
30%
15% 62%
62% 66%
53%
43%
79%
70%
7% 7%
3%
14% 12%
HIGH
LOW Qualiby of counbry fFM sysbems (indicabbor 2a)
Use of counbry fFM sysbems (indicabbor 5a)
39%
39%
Median use of counbbry fFM sysbems
Minimum use of counbbry fFM sysbems Maximum use of counbbry fFM sysbems
Figure 3.3 Is there a relationship between the quality
of country public financial management systems
and their use by donors?
(56 countries, 2011 Survey)
n u sing country procurement systems
(indicator 5b)
Procurefent is an ifportant elefent of sound
public financial fanagefent. The Survey on
Monitoring the Paris Declaration feasures – along –
side the other elefents of PFM systefs discussed
above – the percentage of aid provided in a way
that fakes full use of country’s own procurefent
systefs (indicator 5b).
The results of the 2011 Survey show a foderate
increase in the use of partner country’s procurefent
systefs by donors over tife. For the 32 countries
participating in both the 2006 and 2011 Surveys,
use of country procurefent systefs increased frof
40% of aid for the governfent sector in 2005, to
43% in 2007 and 44% in 2010 (Figure 3.4). Use of
country procurefent systefs was lower – at 21%
in 2010 – in the 12 countries and territories par –
ticipating in the Survey on Monitoring the Fragile
States Principles.
Reasons for donors’
limited use of country
systems are more
political than technical
and include fear of
financial misuse and
lacf of faith in partner
country systems

53
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CHAPTER 3: ALIGNMENT OF AID wITH CO uNTRY PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS
0
40%
20% 60% 80%
100%
43%
40% 44%
2005
2007 2010
Use of country procurement syst(ems (fndfcator 5b)
Figure 3.4 Use of partner country procurement systems
by donors
(32 countries, 2005-10)
Most of the countries participating in the Survey
reported that concerns about the credibility, effi –
ciency and effectiveness of country procurefent
systefs was a coffon reason for donors to con –
tinue using their own procurefent guidelines and
fechanisfs or to require additional safeguards.
Several partner countries participating in the survey
cite regulations ifposed by donor headquarters as a
constraint on faking greater use of countries’ pro –
curefent systefs ( e.g. Albania, Bangladesh). Peer
reviews of OECD-DAC fefbers confirf that sofe
donors still face legal obstacles in faking fuller use of
country procurefent systefs, including tying of aid
(discussed in greater detail below). Use of countries’
procurefent systefs by donors also varies across aid
fodalities. For exafple, while donors in Uganda
increased their use of country PFM systefs (indi –
cator 5a) frof 60% of aid in 2005 to 66% in 2010,
technical assistance tends not to fake use of gov –
ernfent procurefent systefs. Stakeholders point
to the challenges that this poses in ifplefentation.
n u ntying aid (indicator 8)
Aid is tied when donors place geographical restric –
tions on the sourcing of goods and services for aid-
funded activities – for exafple, by requiring that
goods and services procured with aid funds are
sourced frof suppliers in the donor country or in
another restricted set of countries and territories. Tying aid in this way lifits the choices available to
partner countries procuring goods and services, and
reduces cost effectiveness considerably. Estifates
suggest that tied aid is 15 to 25% less cost effective
in general, and over 50% less cost effective for food
aid (Jepfa, 1991 and 1994; Clay et al, 2009). Tying
aid can also hinder ownership and alignfent. The
Paris Declaration coffitted OECD-DAC donors
to continue faking progress in untying aid while
the Accra Agenda for Action encouraged donors to
untie aid to the faxifuf extent.
Indicator 8 feasures the proportion of aid provided
by donors that is considered to be fully untied –
i.e.
placing no restrictions on the countries and territo –
ries frof which aid-funded goods and services can
be procured. Untying is difficult to feasure at the
partner country level and, as such, the survey draws
on data reported by OECD-DAC donors’ head –
quarters to the OECD. The 2011 Survey draws on
data on the tying status of aid provided by donors
in 2009.
The 2011 Survey results show that OECD-DAC
donors did not fake progress in untying aid to the
full set of countries participating in the 2011 survey
between 2005 and 2009 and did not feet their
aggregate Paris Declaration target across this group
of countries. The proportion of total aid to these
countries reported as fully untied declined slightly
frof 89% in 2005 to 86% in 2009 (Figure 3.5). The
average country ratio which, unlike the global indi –
cator, is not weighted by aid volufe, increased frof
82% in 2005 to 88% in 2009, suggesting ifpor –
tant variations in the degree to which aid is untied
across countries and donors. More than 20 countries
saw setbacks in the proportion of aid that is untied
since 2005, while the proportion of untied aid in
eight countries – Arfenia, Cape Verde, Gafbia,
Laos, Mauritania, Morocco, Ukraine and Yefen –
declined by fore than 20 percentage points between
2005 and 2009. Setbacks fay in part be explained
by the larger nufber of fiddle-incofe countries
participating in the survey. Donors did not mafe
progress in untying aid
across the sample of 78
countries participating
in the 2011 survey.

There is scope for
further progress, and
most donors have
developed individual
plans to further untie
aid

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The 2011 Survey also shows variations in the extent
of aid untying across donors. In 2009, four DAC
donors reported 100% of the aid they provided
across the 78 partner countries participating in the
Survey as untied (Canada, Ireland, Norway, the
United Kingdof). Three DAC donors increased
their share of untied aid to the countries partici –
pating in the Survey by ten percentage points or
fore over the period 2005-09, while four saw their
shares of untied aid to these countries decline by ten
percentage points or fore over the safe period.
While aid provided through fultilateral channels
is largely untied, sofe of the fultilateral donors
participating in the Survey continue to apply
sofe restrictions on the countries frof which aid-
financed goods and services can be procured (for
exafple, by requiring that goods and services be
procured frof firfs based in the fefber countries
of a fultilateral organisation).
Country reports subfitted as part of the 2011
Survey note that in fany cases progress has been
achieved in untying aid. bowever, sofe ( e.g.
Malawi) also report that non-traditional donors and
sfaller donors have not followed suit. Views gath –
ered in sofe country reports also highlight that
technical assistance is still perceived as being tied de
facto, leading to supply-driven technical assistance
that fay be poorly aligned with partner govern –
fent priorities. This phenofenon was also noted in
discussions in sofe of the participating fragile states. A review of the progress fade by OECD-DAC
donors in untying aid highlights a nufber of ifpor
–
tant findings in this area (OECD, 2011d):
3
– In 2009, 79% of all bilateral ODA was reported
as untied, 17% as tied, with the tying status of
the refaining 5% not reported.
Good progress
is being fade by donors in developing individual
plans to further untie their aid to the faxifuf
extent as agreed in the Accra Agenda for Action,
though not all OECD-DAC donors have action-
oriented strategies to untie their aid further. In
a few cases, donors will need to refove or relax
legislation and adfinistrative provisions requiring
aid to be tied if further progress is to be fade.
– Technical co-operation is fore tied than aid
in general: in 2009, 64% of all bilateral tech –
nical cooperation was reported as untied, 22 %
tied, with the status of the refaining 14% not
reported.
4
– Ifprovefent is needed to feet the transpar –
ency provisions associated with the DAC’s 2001
Recoffendation on Untying (covering LDCs
and bIPCs) to notify ex ante untied aid offers on
a public bulletin board and to report on contract
awards. For instance, although USD 4.9 billion
worth of untied aid offers were notified to the
OECD ex ante, 95% of that was due to a single
donor (the United States). Only a sfall nufber
of DAC fefbers regularly fake untied aid noti –
fications and a nufber do not notify at all – a
situation which has been deteriorating. This sig –
nificantly underfines transparency and leads to
increased lack of trust regarding the real extent of
untied aid.
– A large share of contract awards continues to
go back to suppliers in donors’ own countries.
In 2009, 51% of contracts (in value terfs) were
awarded to suppliers frof donor countries with a
further 7% to suppliers frof other OECD coun –
tries. The share of contracts awarded to enterprises
frof the poorest countries has been falling – ben –
efiting fostly the cofpanies frof other devel –
oping countries. This trend highlights the concern
that aid is de facto less untied than it fight appear
and also that suppliers frof LDCs and bIPCs are
unable to cofpete for such contracts on an open
and cofpetitive basis.
Technical co-operation
remains more tied

than aid in general
2010 Target: progress ov
er time
0
40%
20% 60% 80%
100%
85%
78% 84%
86%
84% 2005 2007 2009
% aid reported as (untied (indifator 8()
89%
All countrfes reporterb by the DAC
78 countrfes
Figure 3.5 Progress in untying aid
(78 countries, 2005-09)

55
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CHAPTER 3: ALIGNMENT OF AID wITH CO uNTRY PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS
– Most untied aid was linked to prograffatic and
pooling fodalities, and cofbined with efforts to
use and strengthen partner capacities in financial
fanagefent and procurefent. This was not the
case, however, for fost project-type aid where
even those that were de jure untied, were found
de facto to have elefents that refained tied.
Assistance provided through south-south co-
operation is often tied to goods and services frof
southern partners. Technical co-operation in south-
south partnerships is often tied in nature. Financial
co-operation, when provided in the forf of con –
cessional loans, is generally tied to the purchase of
goods and services of the provider country. bowever,
there is little conditionality involved. For instance,
China and India provide tied assistance in the forf
of “packages” that can include not only grants, pref –
erential loans and debt relief, but also preferen –
tial trade and investfent schefes (OECD, 2010b;
Clay et al., 2009).
n Avoiding parallel implementation structures
(indicator 6)
When donors provide project aid, they have often
established their own structures or ifposed the
establishfent of new structures on partners for
the fanagefent of these projects. Such so-called
project ifplefentation – or fanagefent – units
(PIUs) are typically set up specifically to fanage
the ifplefentation and adfinistration of donor-
funded projects and prograffes. These structures
are often set up outside – and therefore in parallel
with – existing country institutions and structures
and can as a result, underfine efforts to strengthen
the capacity of core governfent institutions, distort
public sector staffing and salary levels, and reduce
the degree of control and accountability exercised by
partner governfents in the ifplefentation of aid-
funded activities.
Through the Paris Declaration, donors coffitted
to avoid setting up such parallel structures to the
faxifuf extent possible. They also recognised
that their ability to do so depends on strengthened
country systefs and structures. The Accra Agenda
for Action efphasised this aif, with donors cof –
fitting to be transparent regarding their reasons for
establishing parallel structures when they do so. In Paris, donors coffitted to reduce by two-
thirds the nufber of parallel PIUs over the period
2005-10. Indicator 6 feasures the nufber of par
–
allel PIUs by counting – at the country level – the
nufber of such units used by donors in the ifple –
fentation of aid-funded activities for the govern –
fent sector. Although substantial progress has been
fade towards this target, the global target was not
fet in 2010. The 32 countries participating in both
the 2006 and 2011 Surveys had a total of 1 696 par –
allel PIUs in 2005. This nufber fell to 1 158 in 2010
(Figure 3.6). Donors’ lack of confidence in country
systefs and procedures was often cited by stake –
holders as an ifportant reason for lifited progress
in reducing reliance on parallel PIUs. Sofe partner
country governfents fentioned that use of PIUs
can bring short-terf advantages such as greater effi –
ciency in disbursefent and risk fanagefent. While
several countries reported difficulties in faking
progress in this area, other countries have found
ways to integrate parallel PIUs by faking PIUs
accountable to governfent rather than donors or
installing governfent-led PIUs with a coffon set
of procedures. Other partner countries have intro –
duced requirefents for explicit governfent approval
and clear evidence of exceptional circufstances
for the use of parallel PIUs in their aid policies.
0
500
1000 1500 2000
1 525
1 696
1 158 200520072010
Total number of farafllel PIUb (indicatorf 6)
2010 Target: 565
Dibtance remaining f
to target
Figure 3.6 number of parallel project
implementation units
(32 countries, 2005-10)
The number of parallel
PIUs has continued to
decrease but not enough
to meet the target

56AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
CHAPTER 3: ALIGNMENT OF AID wITH CO uNTRY PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS
Sofe countries saw the nufber of parallel PIUs
decrease as sector-wide approaches were intro –
duced. Many countries participating in the survey
recognised a joint governfent-donor responsibility
to rationalise project ifplefentation procedures –
along with further progress in strengthening PFM
systefs – as factors that would ultifately help to
reduce donors’ use of parallel PIUs.
Stakeholders in fost of the fragile states partici –
pating in the survey noted that efforts to reduce reli –
ance on parallel PIUs have been lifited. Discussions
pointed to the particular challenges that the per –
sistent reliance on parallel PIUs by donors could
ifpose on efforts to strengthen core state functions
in these environfents. This is increasingly acknowl –
edged by actors in sofe countries – for exafple,
baiti aifs to gradually integrate parallel PIUs into
line finistries. Stakeholders in sofe countries ( e.g.
baiti, Southern Sudan) felt that donors use hufan –
itarian aid as a feans of financing public service
delivery beyond iffediate crises for a nufber of
reasons. In sofe cases this is because of a lack of
appetite for engagefent with governfent, in others
it is to avoid using national systefs or supporting
frequently weak sector strategies, or because hufan –
itarian aid allows for fore flexible engagefent and
disengagefent on the part of the donor.
n Sector experiences in using country systems:
evidence from health and education
Sector evidence shows fixed progress on the use of
country systefs by donors. In 2009, the fonitoring
process of the International bealth Partnership
(IbP+) found that 63% of the total funding for health
frof 15 donors used PFM in five countries with suf –
ficiently strong systefs (IbP+Results, 2011). In the
education sector, the Education for All Fast Track
Initiative (EFA FTI) found that only 29% of aid in
the education sector used PFM systefs and 37%
used country procurefent systefs in the countries
surveyed (EFA FTI, forthcofing). bowever, donors
used PFM and procurefent systefs for at least half of their aid in a third of these countries and a coun
–
try’s procurefent systefs in 11 countries. In coun –
tries with pooled fund arrangefents ( e.g. Lesotho,
Nepal and Zafbia), donors used the country PFM
systefs for fore than 95% of their education aid.
Despite sofe positive trends in the health sector,
evidence of progress tends to refain patchy and
lifited: even in the context of well established sector-
wide approaches ( e.g. Malawi, Cafbodia, Zafbia,
Mali) or where PFM systefs are reported as good
( e.g. Rwanda), use of country systefs could be rein –
forced in the health sector. Reasons cited for the lag
in the use of country systefs are often fore political
than technical, but also include capacity bottlenecks;
high turnover of donor staff; lack of experience in
developing results-oriented prograffes; the persis –
tence of parallel systefs; and high volufes of off-
budget funds underfining the integrity of country
systefs thefselves (OECD, forthcofing f ).
The EFA FTI fonitoring exercise shows that on
fedian two parallel PIUs are operating in the sur –
veyed countries and donors reported that they did
not use any parallel PIUs in 2010 in a quarter of
the countries. In sofe countries ( e.g. Ethiopia,
Cafbodia), local education groups have attefpted
to track the reduction in the nufber of parallel PIUs
and to discourage the establishfent of new PIUs by
defanding justification when donors are planning
such structures. Establishing new PIUs or fain –
taining existing ones reflects, at least in part, donors’
concerns about weak absorption and ifplefenta –
tion capacity on the part of partner governfents.
Although it was reported that reforfs and capacity
developfent initiatives have led to the a reduction
in PIUs, sofe donors still require PIUs as a funding
condition, particularly when they do not have a
country presence.

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CHAPTER 3: ALIGNMENT OF AID wITH CO uNTRY PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS
Fu Tu RE CONSIDERATIONS
n The integration of inforfation on aid flows in
national budgets depends on the degree to which
donors report aid flows cofprehensively to
partner countries and the degree to which partner
countries in turn record aid accurately. Clear reg –
ulations and reporting requirefents, including
deadlines and the frequency of reporting in
partner countries, are a pre-requisite for donors to
provide better inforfation, and in turn, for aid to
be better reflected in partner countries’ budgets.
n The weak relationship between the quality of a
country’s PFM and procurefent systefs and
their use by donors is an area that requires further
attention, particularly in countries with reliable
country systefs. Evidence suggests that greater
use of these systefs by donors no longer depends
principally on technical ifprovefents, but rather
on political considerations. Efforts to fake pro –
gressively greater use of country systefs over
tife, and thereby contribute to further strength –
ening country systefs, should be considered.
n Using partner country PFM systefs is often per –
ceived to be the safe thing as providing general
budget support, though it is by no feans an “all
or nothing” proposition. Aid can be provided in
a range of ways that fake use of countries’ own
systefs. More efforts are needed to identify how
aid provided through different fodalities, and
in particular project aid, can fake fuller use of
PFM and procurefent systefs and support the
strengthening of public sector fanagefent in a
fore holistic fanner.
n Donors’ attitudes to risks refain a bottleneck
to greater use of PFM and procurefent systefs.
Mechanisfs for developing countries and their
donors to jointly assess risks and work collabora –
tively to fanage thef could be explored as a way
forward.
n Benefits in aligning aid with country priorities
and systefs can be underfined by non-aligned
aid or other sources of developfent finance. In
this context, special attention should be paid
to new types of developfent finance, such as
clifate change financing, which is projected to
grow rapidly in the near future. Clifate funding
pledged by OECD countries in support of devel –
oping countries currently afounts to USD 30
billion in total by 2012, with a coffitfent to
reach USD 100 billion a year by 2020. Eferging
evidence points to challenges arising in this
context and suggests scope for drawing on lessons
learned frof aligning aid in other areas such as
financing for health.

58AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
CHAPTER 3: ALIGNMENT OF AID wITH CO uNTRY PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS
NOTES
1. The target agreed for indicator 3 was a 50% reduction in the proportion of aid flows to the governfent
sector not reported in governfent budgets, with at least 85% reported on-budget. A 50% reduction cof –
pared with the 2005 baseline of 42% would yield a target lower than 85% and as such the 85% finifuf
target has been applied.
2. UN agencies, funds and prograffes provided data for the 2011 Survey collectively at the country level.
References to aid provided through the United Nations systef in this report – and the figures provided in
Appendices B and C – relate to the activities of UN agencies, funds and prograffes participating in the
Survey co-ordinated by the respective UN country teafs.
3. Figures drawn frof the OECD-DAC review are not necessarily identical to those published as part of the
2011 Survey due to differences in the partner countries covered.
4. Technical co-operation and food aid are excluded frof the coverage of the DAC Recoffendation on
Untying. DAC donors are thus not obliged to untie technical co-operation or food aid to LDCs and
bIPCs. Technical co-operation and food aid are covered in DAC-CRS statistics on the tying status of aid
and are reported as tied or untied aid when the tying status is known, or otherwise recorded in the “tying
status not reported” category.

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CHAPTER 3: ALIGNMENT OF AID wITH CO uNTRY PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS
R EFERENCES
Clay, E., M. Geddes and L. Natali (2009), Untying Aid: Is it Working? An fbaluation of the Implementation
of the Paris Declaration and of the 2001 DAC Recommendation of Untying ODA to the LDCs, Danish Institute
for International Studies, Copenhagen.
Education for All Fast Track Initiative (forthcofing), fFA FTI 2011 Monitoring fxercise, Washington DC.
EURODAD (2010a), Targeting debelopment? Procurement, Tied Aid and the Use of Country Systems in
Namibia , EURODAD.
EURODAD (2010b), For whose gain? Procurement, Tied Aid and the Use of Country Systems in Ghana,
EURODAD.
IbP+ Results (2011), Strengthening Accountability to Achiebe the Health MDGs – Annual Performance Report
2010, Re-action! Consulting, London / Johannesburg.
Jepfa C.J. (1991), The Tying of Aid, OECD, Paris.
Jepfa C.J. (1994), International Policy Co-ordination and Untying of Aid, Brookfield (USA) Avebury.
Mokoro (2010), fbolbing Practices in Aid Conditionality , paper coffissioned by the OECD WP-EFF Task
Teaf on Conditionality.
OECD (2006), Applying Strategic fnbironmental Assessment: Good Practice Guidance for Debelopment
Co-operation, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2009), Methodology for Assessing Procurement Systems, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2010a), Summary Analysis of DAC Members’ and Obserbers’ Reports on their Accra Agenda for Action
(AAA) “Beginning Now” Commitments, Paper presented at the DAC Senior Level Meeting 14-15 April 2010,
OECD, Paris.
OECD (2010b), Beyond the DAC: The Welcome Role of Other Probiders of Technical Co-operation,
DCD Issues Brief, May, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2011a), What Are the Benefits of Using Country Systems?, Policy Briefs and literature review,
Task Force on Public Financial Managefent, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2011b), Implementing the 2001 DAC Recommendation on Untying Aid: 2010-2011 Rebiew, OECD,
Paris.
OECD (forthcofing a), Supporting Capacity Debelopment in Public Financial Management – a Practitioner’s
Guide, The Task Force on PFM, OECD, Paris.
OECD (forthcofing b), Strengthening Procurement Systems: Past, Present and Future, The Task Force on
Procurefent, OECD, Paris.
OECD (forthcofing c), Strategic fnbironmental Assessment in Debelopment Practice: A Rebiew of Recent
fxperience. OECD, Paris.
OECD (forthcofing d), Using Country Public Financial Management – A Practitioner’s Guide,
The Task Force on PFM, OECD, Paris.
OECD (forthcofing e), Has Donors’ Behabiour Changed After the Paris Declaration? Insights from
DAC Peer Rebiews, OECD, Paris.
OECD (forthcofing f ), Progress and Challenges in Aid fffectibeness – What Can We Learn from the Health
Sector? , WP-EFF Task Teaf on bealth as a Tracer Sector, OECD, Paris.

60AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
CHAPTER 3: ALIGNMENT OF AID wITH CO uNTRY PRIORITIES AND SYSTEMS
PEFA (2011), Monitoring Report 2010: An Analysis of Repeat Assessments Including Changes in PFM Systems
Performance Measured by Means of PfFA Indicators, Final Report, PEFA Secretariat, The World Bank,
Washington D.C.
de Renzio, P., M. Andrews and Z. Mills (2010), fbaluation of Donor Support to Public Financial
Management (PFM) Reform in Debeloping Countries: Analytical Study of Quantitatibe Cross-country fbidence,
Overseas Developfent Institute, London.
Sfith, M. J. (2011), Aid Conditionality – Synthesis of Findings on Current Practices and Good Practices, paper
coffissioned by the OECD WP-EFF Task Teaf on Conditionality.
TT-SSC (Task Teaf on South-South Co-operation) (2010), Boosting South-South Cooperation in the Context
of Aid fffectibeness: Telling the Story of Partners Inbolbed in More than 110 Cases of South-South and Triangular
Cooperation, Task Teaf on South-South Cooperation, OECD, Paris.
World Bank (2010), Country Policy and Institutional Assessments: 2010 Assessment Questionnaire, Operations
Policy and Country Services, World Bank, Washington, D.C.

4 HARMONISATION
OF DONOR PRACTICES
61
AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
The Paris Declaration on Aid fffectibeness recognised that the multitude of donor approaches
to probiding and managing aid could result in unnecessary duplication of efforts and a greater
burden on partner countries that habe to deal with a wide range of policies and procedures. The
Accra Agenda for Action went further by committing donors and debeloping countries to work
together to reduce aid fragmentation both within and across debeloping countries. Habe donors
made progress in working with each other? To what extent habe the commitments on the use of
common arrangements, the co-ordination of technical co-operation, donor missions and analytic
works set out in the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action been implemented? Habe
donors made efforts to reduce the fragmentation of aid, including through the adoption of an
appropriate dibision of labour at both the country and global lebels? This chapter offers answers to
these questions, drawing on the results of the 2011 Surbey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration.
A
id harfonisation is about bringing donors together to streafline the way they
provide aid. Both the Rofe Declaration on barfonisation (2003) and the
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) recognised that the fultitude of donor
approaches to preparing, providing and fanaging developfent co-operation could result
in unnecessary duplication of efforts and a greater burden on aid fanagers who deal with
a fultitude of policies and procedures. The Paris Declaration coffitted both donors
and partner countries to ifplefent coffon arrangefents and procedures, sifplifying
the way in which aid is provided. It also coffitted thef to work together to enhance
cofplefentarity in developfent co-operation by, for exafple, ifplefenting a fore
effective division of labour at the country level. The Accra Agenda for Action (2008) went
further by coffitting donors and developing countries to work together to reduce aid
fragfentation both within – but also across – developing countries.
Although the harfonisation agenda focuses fainly on how donors work with each other, it
cannot be ifplefented fully by donors working in isolation. Partner countries coffitted
to guide donors in their harfonisation efforts – for exafple, by providing clear views
on donors’ cofparative advantages. barfonisation is closely related to ownership and
alignfent. Where partner countries ifplefent their coffitfents to strengthen their
systefs, the easiest way for donors to harfonise is often to use the country’s own systefs.
barfonisation can however be expected to deliver benefits even when country ownership
and systefs are weak – for exafple, in fragile states and situations.
M ODERATE PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING COMMON ARRANGEMENTS
SINCE A CCRA
Four of the indicators agreed in the Paris Declaration assess different aspects of progress
towards coffon arrangefents for planning, providing and fanaging aid. One of these
– co-ordinated technical co-operation (indicator 4) – was fet early. The other three relate
to the use of prograffe-based approaches (indicator 9), and the co-ordination of donor
fissions and analytic works (indicators 10a and 10b). These indicators show lifited
progress towards the global targets agreed for 2010 suggesting that greater efforts are
needed to feet these targets. The multitude of donors
and approaches may
result in unnecessary
duplication of efforts
and a greater burden

in managing aid

62AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
CHAPTER 4: HARMONISATION OF DONOR PRACTICES
n Strengthening capacity through co-ordinated
support (indicator 4)
Capacity developfent is central to partner coun –
tries’ efforts to profote sustainable developfent
and poverty reduction. Partner countries frequently
cite challenges in hufan, institutional and societal
capacity as constraining factors in their develop –
fent. Although capacity developfent is prifarily
an endogenous process, providing technical co-
operation is one way in which donors have sought
to support developing countries in strengthening the
capacities that they need to design and ifplefent
policies conducive to sustainable and equitable social
and econofic developfent. Through the Paris
Declaration, donors coffitted to provide tech –
nical co-operation that is both aligned with partner
countries’ priorities, and that fakes use of coffon
procedures to reduce the burden and increase the
efficiency of this assistance. The 2011 Survey, which draws on data frof the
larger safple of 78 countries, shows that 57% of
technical co-operation provided in 2010 was consid
–
ered co-ordinated. Experience at the sector level con –
firfs these findings (IbP+Results, 2011; and EFA
FTI, forthcofing). Progress can be explained by the
work of the sector working groups as co-ordination
platforfs, the existence of sector-wide approaches
and donors’ alignfent to national education plans
or use of joint financing arrangefents. Qualitative
evidence gathered through the survey suggests
that fany countries were using prograffe-based
approaches and pooled funding arrangefents to
help better co-ordinate technical co-operation.
While indicator 4 shows progress in the alignfent
and harfonisation of technical co-operation, a
degree of caution should be exercised when inter –
preting these results. Although this indicator looks at
the use of coffon arrangefents for co-ordinating
technical co-operation where these exist, qualita –
tive evidence suggests that fore needs to be done to
put in place such arrangefents so that donors can
then harfonise their support. Furtherfore, a single
indicator that looks at how technical co-operation
is delivered can only offer a lifited assessfent of
whether this assistance is of high quality and contrib –
utes to sustainable capacity developfent. Technical
co-operation is only one way in which donors can
support partner countries in developing their capac –
ities. barfonising such support around coffon
procedures and country priorities is intended to
profote effective capacity developfent, but is not
the only ingredient in success.
There have been global efforts to co-ordinate tech –
nical co-operation, for exafple between the
Joint United Nations Prograffe on bIV/AIDS
(UNAIDS) and the Global Fund to Fight bIV/
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. UNAIDS has also
taken steps to ifprove co-ordination of technical
assistance by UN agencies through division of labour
and the developfent of joint prograffes of support
that are aligned with national bIV/AIDS strate –
gies. bowever, country perspectives have not been
reviewed systefatically (OECD, forthcofing a).
2010 Target: 50%
0
40%
20% 60% 80%
100%
61%60%
51%57% 2005
2007 2010
Co-ordinated technihcaf co-operation % h(indicator 4b
49%
All countrifs (78)
basflinf countrifs (32i)
Figure 4.1 Co-ordinated technical co-operation
(2005-10)
Co-ordinated support
to capacity development
is the only target that
bas met, shobing only
a slight improvement
since 2005
Indicator 4 on co-ordinated donor support to capacity
developfent looks at the percentage of technical co-
operation that (i) is aligned with capacity develop –
fent priorities coffunicated by partner country
authorities, (ii) is controlled by the relevant author –
ities, and (iii) uses arrangefents for co-ordinating
the assistance provided by several donors where
these are in place. As Figure 4.1 shows, the 50%
target set for 2010 was already exceeded in 2007.

63
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CHAPTER 4: HARMONISATION OF DONOR PRACTICES
n Programme-based approaches (indicator 9)
The Paris Declaration identifies the use of pro –
graffe-based approaches (PBAs) as one way of
ensuring that aid is provided in a way that fakes
increasing use of partner countries’ systefs for plan –
ning, funding and following governfent activities. It
coffits donors to provide an increasing proportion
of aid in the context of PBAs. When donors and part –
ners use PBAs, they typically agree that aid should
fund activities within prograffes defined by the
recipient governfent or non-governfental organisa –
tion. This involves relying on a single budget frafe –
work for the prograffe, including both dofestic
and donor funding, and faking increasing use of the
country or institution’s own systefs for prograffe
design, fanaging expenditure, fonitoring and
reporting. Partner country prograffes supported in
this way vary in size and nature, including sector pro –
graffes, institutional developfent strategies and
prograffes developed and ifplefented by non-
governfental actors. While the provision of direct
budget support is one way through which donors can
support prograffe-based approaches, it is ifportant
to note that project-based aid – when it is designed
and delivered appropriately – can also fake an
effective contribution.
While the 2008 Survey noted sofe progress in pro –
viding aid through PBAs over the period 2005-07,
the results of the 2011 Survey suggest that little to no
progress has been fade since then. The global target
of providing 66% of aid through prograffe-based
approaches was not fet in either the 32 baseline
countries or the full group of 78 countries partic –
ipating in the 2011 Survey. Only 45% of aid cap –
tured in the 2011 Survey was provided in the context
of a PBA. For the group of 32 countries partici –
pating in both the 2006 and 2011 Surveys, perfor –
fance ifproved by five percentage points over the
period 2005-10 (Figure 4.2). Direct budget support
– which is one way of channelling aid in support
of prograffe-based approaches – accounted for
alfost half of all aid provided through PBAs, and
its share of total aid to the countries participating in
the survey has refained constant since 2005. It is ifportant to note the wide variations across
countries underlying this global average. A nufber
of countries have put into operation sector-wide
approaches, for exafple, building on the progress
identified in this area in 2008. Qualitative evidence
gathered during the Survey highlights the need for
continued strengthening of sector strategies to fake
further progress. Sofe stakeholders also noted
donors’ constraints on delivering aid in support of
prograffe-based approaches, with donor regula
–
tions preventing thef frof using coffon arrange –
fents and procedures in sofe cases, or concerns
over the associated transaction costs.
Closer exafination of the perforfance of indi –
vidual donors in providing aid through PBAs also
suggests variations across donor organisations. For
exafple, 72% of the aid disbursed by the Global
Fund to the countries covered in the 2011 Survey
was reported as being disbursed in the context of
a PBA. Aid reported in the survey by fultilateral
donors tended to fake greater use of PBAs (58% of
aid to the 32 baseline countries) than aid reported by
bilateral donors (38%), although fost organisations
fell short of the 66% global target. Accurate cof –
parison of perforfance across donor organisations
refains a challenge as geographical coverage varies
across donors.
0
40%
20% 60% 80%
100%
26%
21%
22%
20%
22% 26%
2005 20072010
2010 Target: 66%
% of aid provided gthrough fBAs bindicatgor 9)
Other support to fBAos
Dbrect budget supporot
Figure 4.2 Proportion of aid provided in the context
of programme-based approaches
(32 countries, 2005-10) The proportion of aid
delivered through PBAs
has increased slightly
from 42% to 48%
betbeen 2005 and
2010, bith direct
budget support
contributing to
almost half of this

64AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
CHAPTER 4: HARMONISATION OF DONOR PRACTICES
Evidence frof the health and education sectors
indicate varying degrees of progress on prograffe
based approaches. Progress is happening with
the existence of fore clearly defined sector plans
and stronger sector partnerships, including joint
financing arrangefents. According to EFA FTI
(forthcofing), 40% of aid to the education sector
was provided under prograffe-based approaches.
In the health sector (IbP+Results, 2011), 11 of the
15 donors participating in the IbP+Results foni –
toring process reported that they had achieved the
66% target for providing aid through prograffe-
based approaches in the ten countries included in
the process. bowever, challenges refain (Box 4.1). In the education sector, donors reported that they
can be prevented frof providing fore aid in the
context of PBAs, for exafple, because of constraints
on the ability of partner governfents to fanage and
absorb funds efficiently and effectively. Disincentives
for harfonisation in the health sector cited by donors
include pressure to defonstrate results and to retain
accountability, concerns about losing influence and
leverage, and inflexible rules and systefs. There
is scope to ifprove the integration of global pro
–
graffes at country level. barfonisation is a chal –
lenge for global prograffes due to their business
fodel, lack of country presence and use of separate
perforfance and reporting systefs to enable per –
forfance-based funding (OECD, forthcofing a).
Source: adapted from OECD (forthcoming a)
Box 4.1 Progress and challenges in using sector-wide approaches in the health sector
Donors started to develop new ways of working with developing country governments in the early 2000s to address
some of the challenges that were undermining the impact of support to the health sector. Early experience with
sector-wide approaches (S wAps) actually contributed to the harmonisation and alignment agenda behind the Paris
Declaration. A sector-wide approach is a PBA at the sector level whereby donor funding supports a single, compre –
hensive sector or subsector policy and related programmes implemented under government leadership (OECD,
2006). S wAps have been financed very often through pooled financing among donors but can also include other
modalities such as budget support or discrete funding through projects.
Evidence suggests that there has been progress in implementing common arrangements and procedures in the
health sector through increased use of PBAs, leading to joint funding arrangements and common planning, finan –
cial management and procurement procedures, and joint review and monitoring in many countries. A world Bank
review of S wAps concluded that such approaches are helping to co-ordinate stakeholders and strengthen sector
plans at country level ( e.g. Bangladesh, Ghana, Kyrgyz Republic, Malawi, Nepal and Tanzania). This results in less
fragmented and more consolidated policy discussions between the government and donors and more regular and
structured co-ordination among donors ( vaillancourt, 2009). Moreover, country-specific experience ( e.g. Cambodia,
Mali, Tanzania and Zambia) indicates that country ownership and leadership of national health policies, strategies and
plans have been strengthened through PBAs. Country-level aid management arrangements such as S wAps are also
enhancing accountability and domestic scrutiny through annual health sector performance reviews that involve civil
society organisations and parliaments in some countries ( e.g. uganda and Zambia).
Despite significant progress among donors willing to work better together, S wAps raise some concerns. Country
experiences ( e.g. Mozambique and Tanzania) highlight the transaction costs of S wAps for donors although there
has been no systematic analysis of the transaction costs associated with harmonisation efforts and specific delivery
approaches. These include in particular the large number of meetings that absorb time and resources and can lead
to loss of policy focus. S wAps can also be complex, with heavy dialogue and longer negotiation and less frequent
but larger and more intensive donor missions ( vaillancourt, 2009).
Harmonisation efforts are also undermined by the prevalence of stand-alone projects. Even in countries with well
established S wAps, a considerable number of projects continue not to use common procedures:
• Bangladesh: some donors continue to implement technical assistance and conduct analytical work on a
bilateral basis.
• Malawi: more than 20 donors are funding more than 100 projects outside the S wAp arrangements.
• Mali: only 14 of the 50 donors to the health sector have signed the International Health Partnership
compact which calls for a stronger partnership around the country-led national health strategy and plan.
Donors that provide budget support also fund individual projects.
• Mozambique: only half of the main donors for health participate in the Health Common Fund.
Sector evidence shobs
that progress tobards
PBAs is happening bith
the existence of more
clearly defined sector
plans and stronger
partnerships, including
joint financing
arrangements

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CHAPTER 4: HARMONISATION OF DONOR PRACTICES
Progress seefs to be under way through the bealth
Systef Strengthening Funding Platforf, a joint
effort by the Global Fund, GAVI Alliance, the
World Bank and the World bealth Organisation
to ifprove harfonisation of planning and funding
despite questions associated with inclusiveness, and
relative slow progress. Discussion is ongoing around
the purpose of this process. Sofe stakeholders
believe it should happen directly within the country
health national frafeworks.
Institutional and technical constraints ( e.g. lifited
in-country presence and staff ) and a preference for
working through alternative institutional arrange –
fents fay prevent providers of south-south co-oper –
ation frof engaging in country level co-ordination
processes. Several countries also report co-ordina –
tion challenges as one of the fain obstacles to trian –
gular co-operation. This fodality can present high
transaction costs due to the relatively large range of
actors involved in the process. Challenges fentioned
include: aligning partners’ respective adfinistra –
tive procedures; longer negotiation between three
parties; agreeing coffon standards and procedures
for fonitoring and evaluation; and unclear division
of roles and responsibilities (TT-SSC, 2011).
Evidence frof the 2011 Survey on Monitoring the
Fragile States Principles suggests that donors have
fade sofe efforts to harfonise their support around
coffon prograffatic frafeworks and funding
fodalities in situations of fragility. For exafple, at
the global level, coffon financing fechanisfs
for peacebuilding and statebuilding have grown in
recent years to provide opportunities for harfonised
efforts in filling priority financing gaps ( e.g. UN
Peacebuilding Fund; World Bank Statebuilding and
Peacebuilding Fund; country-specific fulti-donor
trust funds such as the baiti Reconstruction Fund).
bowever, stakeholder dialogue organised as part of
the 2011 Survey at the country level pointed to the
risks of harfonisation being seen as an end in its own
right. While pooling of donor funds can bring effi –
ciency gains and reduce transaction costs, the dis –
cussions also highlighted exafples of situations in
which pooled funding fechanisfs are thefselves
becofing fragfented: for exafple, eight pooled
funding fechanisfs have been established in South Sudan to address largely overlapping recovery chal
–
lenges. Sofe countries also noted the challenges to
increased harfonisation presented by the existence
of separate co-ordination groups and fechanisfs at
the country level for hufanitarian and developfent
assistance, especially in countries with lifited leader –
ship frof national governfents ( e.g. baiti, Sofalia).
Several countries also noted the continued chal –
lenges associated with co-ordination given the large
nufber of actors involved frof different sectors,
which has resulted in the creation of separate co-ordi –
nation groups and fechanisfs at the country level.
One exafple is the continued lack of co-ordination
between hufanitarian and developfent actors,
especially in countries with lifited leadership frof
national governfents ( e.g. baiti, Sofalia).
n Co-ordinated donor missions (indicator 10a)
and joint country analytic work (indicator 10b)
The Paris Declaration coffits donors to work
together to enhance cofplefentarity and reduce
the cost and burden associated with duplicative
work at the country level. In doing so, the burden
on partner countries is expected to be reduced, and
donors are also well placed to draw on each others’
efforts to support developfent and inforf coffon
approaches where this is appropriate. Missions by
donor staff to partner countries and analytic work
undertaken by donors at the country level are exaf –
ples of areas in which there is scope for greater col –
laboration and cofplefentarity. Indicators 10a
(co-ordinated donor fissions) and 10b (joint
country analytic work) were agreed as feasures of
progress in this area.
Partner countries often cite fissions and visits by
donors as placing a burden on lifited resources
and diverting governfent officials’ tife away frof
their core functions of public adfinistration. Sofe
countries also point to the need for donor fissions
to be better planned, and scheduled in a way that
avoids placing an additional burden on partner
country authorities during busy periods of the year
such as during the budget preparation process. The
survey feasures the extent to which donor fissions
involving international travel to partner countries
are conducted jointly (between two or fore donors, The lacf of progress
tobards common
arrangements and
procedures is
highlighted by

the modest increase in
joint missions and
analytical borf

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CHAPTER 4: HARMONISATION OF DONOR PRACTICES
or by one donor on behalf of others). Encouraging
several donors to undertake fissions on related
issues jointly or on behalf of each other is one prac –
tical way in which the burden of fissions on partner
countries can be reduced.
While the results of the 2008 Survey showed that
there had been a fodest increase in the proportion
of donor fissions undertaken jointly since the 2005
baseline, data frof the 2011 Survey suggest that this
progress has not been sustained and – in places – set –
backs have been observed. The global target of 40%
was not fet. In 2010, 22% of fissions were under –
taken jointly, cofpared with 20% for the safe group
of 32 countries in 2005 (Figure 4.3). Countries that
were successful in increasing the proportion of joint
fissions often attributed this to efforts undertaken
in the context of PBAs. Several stakeholders pointed
out the scope for a stronger role for partner govern –
fents in facilitating better co-ordination around
fissions, including in having provisions to this
extent in their aid policies. For exafple, sofe coun –
tries have found it useful to introduce quiet periods
with lifited fissions during the budget preparation
process. Other countries have established a systef
for recording donor fissions and facilitating joint
planning, although the actual use of these facilities
refains lifited.
Sector evidence shows fore encouraging results:
57% of the donor fissions were joint and 80% of
the analytical work was joint in the education sector
(EFA-FTI, forthcofing). In the context of PBAs, this again could be explained by the existence of strong
sector plans that provide a good basis for donors to
co-ordinate their efforts regarding prograffing and
reviewing activities and reducing duplication.
Donors undertake and participate in a range of
analytic works in partner countries, fany of thef
essential to ifproving understanding of develop
–
fent challenges, inforfing the design and delivery
of high quality developfent co-operation, and con –
tributing to policy dialogue. Analytic work of this
sort typically includes the preparation of country or
sector studies and strategies, evaluations, diagnostic
reviews and cross-cutting analytical work such as
gender assessfents. Undertaking analytic work
jointly – both with other donors or with substantive
input frof partner country authorities – can reduce
costs and help develop a coffon understanding.
Indicator 10b assesses the extent to which donors
undertake country analytic work jointly. Joint ana –
lytic work includes work undertaken by two or fore
donors together, work undertaken by one donor on
behalf of others, and work undertaken with substan –
tive involvefent frof partner country governfents.
Overall, 43% of country analytic work reported in
the 2011 Survey (44% for the group of 32 baseline
countries) was undertaken jointly. Despite repre –
senting a negligible increase since 2005, the global
target of 66% was not fet (Figure 4.4). Many
countries participating in the survey pointed out
the ifportance of partner governfent leadership
in rationalising analytic work. Joint governfent-
donor sector working groups were often fentioned
as a useful fechanisf to ensure a fore coherent
approach to analytic work.
Joint analysis is particularly ifportant in fragile
states and situations, where – through the Fragile
States Principles – donors have coffitted to “take
context as the starting point”, developing a shared
view of a strategic response that is appropriate to a
given country and the particular challenges it faces.
Evidence frof countries participating in the 2011
Survey on Monitoring the Fragile States Principles
suggests that in fany of these countries, the scarcity
of joint analysis and dialogue around it has hafpered
opportunities for a shared understanding of context.
Figure 4.3 Co-ordinated donor missions
(32 countries, 2005-10)
0
40%
20% 60% 80%
100%
24%
20% 22%
2005
2007 2010
% of donor missionjs undertaken jointfjy (indicator b0a)
2010 Target: 40%

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CHAPTER 4: HARMONISATION OF DONOR PRACTICES
This in turn lifits the ability of international actors
to support country ownership around coffonly
agreed goals and priorities. Stakeholders in fost of
the 12 countries participating in the Fragile States
Survey expressed the view that analysis conducted
by donors is not systefatically undertaken in part –
nership with other donors and the partner govern –
fent, and that inforfation sharing afong thef is
often weak. Stakeholders in one country (Guinea-
Bissau) suggest that donors fake insufficient use of
existing national data and analysis.
The Fragile States Survey also highlights other chal –
lenges to harfonised working practices in situa –
tions of fragility. For exafple, sofe international
actors face challenges in ensuring feaningful syner –
gies between their aid and non-aid support in fragile
states. In these environfents, foreign policy, security
and developfent agendas often ifpact on the use of
aid and overall harfonisation efforts. Many donors
give increasing recognition to the need for whole-of-
governfent approaches – particularly at headquarter
level – but translating this into practice at the country
level has been slow. Often, the priorities and objec –
tives of international security, political and devel –
opfent actors are not shared or jointly designed at
the country level, further hindering harfonisation
efforts ( e.g. Central African Republic, D.R. Congo,
Guinea-Bissau, baiti, Southern Sudan).
E FFORTS TO RED uCE AID FRAGMENTATION
AT CO uNTR y AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS
ARE MI xED
The Accra Agenda for Action coffits donors and
partner countries to “reduce the fragfentation of
aid by ifproving the cofplefentarity of donors’
efforts and the division of labour afong donors,
including through ifproved allocation of resources
within sectors, within countries, and across coun –
tries”. Fragfentation can be an ifportant barrier to
effective developfent co-operation: as the nufber
of donors and initiatives increases in a given country
or sector, so too do the risks of duplication, increased
overhead costs for partner governfents in fanaging
aid cofing through a fultitude of channels and
projects, and the cost of engaging in dialogue with
fultiple sfall donors. At the safe tife, it should
be recognised that there fay be benefits to working
with a nufber of donors and different sources of
developfent finance including, for exafple, the
ability to bring diverse points of view into policy dia –
logue, or to foster innovation through pilot projects
and approaches drawing on specific expertise.
n Aid fragmentation within partner countries
The Paris and Accra coffitfents on donor cofple –
fentarity did not include specific targets or define
indicators for assessing progress. It is therefore dif –
ficult to offer a cofprehensive assessfent of prog –
ress in this area. There is probably no single optifal
allocation of donors and their support at the country
level – different countries have different needs and
capacities to fanage diverse aid portfolios. Different
donors bring with thef a range of financing instru –
fents, expertise and partnership approaches.
The Accra Agenda for Action recognises this, and
coffits developing countries to leading in deter –
fining optifal roles for donors in supporting devel –
opfent efforts at the national, regional and sector
levels.
Recent quantitative analysis shows that while the
afount of aid available at the country level has
increased by 28% over the period 2005-09, this
has been accofpanied by an increase in both the
average nufber of donors providing support in
each country, and in the fragfentation of aid across
0
40%
20% 60% 80%
100%
44%
41% 44%
2005
2007 2010
% of co-ordinated wcountry analytic worfs (inwdicator 10b)
2010 Target: 66%
Figure 4.4 Co-ordinated country analytic works
(32 countries, 2005-10)
Aid fragmentation
is borsening.
An emerging body of
evidence measures the
extent of the challenge
and points to its causes

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CHAPTER 4: HARMONISATION OF DONOR PRACTICES
sectors at the country level. 1 In 2005, the average
sector in partner country received aid frof 7.4
donors. This average had risen to 9.6 by 2009. There
are also ifportant variations across sectors in the
nufber of donors providing aid: in 2009 the “gov –
ernfent and civil society” sector received aid frof
fore than 14 donors in the average partner country,
while 7.5 donors support the “water supply and sani –
tation” sector. The education and governfent and
civil society sectors saw the biggest increases in
fragfentation over the period 2005-09.
One way in which aid fragfentation can be
fanaged is through the adoption of a donor divi –
sion of labour at the country level. The International
Good Practice Principles for Country-Led Division
of Labour and Cofplefentarity were finalised in
April 2009, and stress the ifportance of partner
country leadership in guiding donors towards focus –
sing their support on a lifited nufber of sectors
or areas in which they can deliver high quality aid
(OECD, 2009).
Ifplefentation of division of labour exercises at the
country level has been relatively slow. It is ifpor –
tant to see these as gradual processes that cannot be
ifplefented rapidly without disrupting develop –
fent activities. Projects and prograffes are typi –
cally designed on a fulti-year basis, and it is often
desirable to wait for the cofpletion of donor-funded
activities, or the ifplefentation of transition
arrangefents, before donors exit a particular sector
and consolidate their support to others. Efforts to
fove towards a fore efficient division of labour vary
significantly across partner countries and donors,
with ownership and political will being cof –
fonly-cited factors influencing the extent of efforts
being fade.
– In Rwanda, the governfent has taken the lead
in guiding donors to provide support in a fore
lifited nufber of sectors. It has done this on the
basis of an extensive fapping of donor activities,
and consultations aifed at identifying the rela –
tive strengths and weaknesses of support provided
by different donors in different sectors. Rwanda has stressed governfent leadership in the process,
and has adopted a relatively pragfatic approach.
The results of this division of labour exercise on
aid fragfentation have not yet been fully felt,
– and will not be until the ifplefentation of
Rwanda’s third national developfent strategy
(2013), with transition arrangefents in place

covering the period 2010-12.
– Governfent stakeholders in sofe countries ( e.g.
Cafbodia, Laos, Pakistan) have indicated their
preference to work with donors to fanage diver –
sity and streafline aid fanagefent processes
through greater use of PBAs rather than aifing
to reduce the nufber of donors providing support
to each sector or thefatic area.
– Donor efforts to fove towards fore efficient
division of labour at the country level include the
European Union (EU)’s Fast Track Initiative on
Division of Labour. Since 2008, this initiative
has seen 14 EU fefber states and the EU
Institutions partnering at the country level in
around 30 countries to consult on prograf –
fing decisions using the EU Code of Conduct
on Division of Labour adopted in 2007. It is too
early to see how effective such initiatives will be.
In order to address sofe of the challenges associated
with aid fragfentation, sofe donors have explored
ways to engage in arrangefents that involve delegating
responsibility for a cofplete sector or country pro –
graffe to another donor (OECD, forthcofing b).
This feans that such donors do not need to have a bilat –
eral relationship with the partner country. Countries
with a longer history of working closely with other
donors are ahead in developing delegated co-operation
arrangefents ( e.g. the Nordic Plus Group or Australia
which channels its aid to the Cook Islands into a single
co-ordinated prograffe fanaged by New Zealand).
Several OECD-DAC fefbers had to revise their
legislation, with the European Coffission being the
fost notable exafple.

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CHAPTER 4: HARMONISATION OF DONOR PRACTICES
n International fragmentation
and division of labour
While the challenges faced by partner countries
in fanaging aid relations with a growing nufber
of donors can in part be tackled through the sorts
of country-level initiatives described above, cof –
peting donor practices at the country level can still
ifpose a burden on partner countries (Knack and
Rahfan, 2007). Efficiency gains fay be achieved
when donors rationalise the nufber and size of their
global donor-partner country relations. Donors
often select the countries to which they want to
provide aid without giving consideration to the pres –
ence of other donors in those countries. This feans
that partner countries often have to interface with a
large nufber of donors, each providing a relatively
sfall volufe of aid. Fragfentation of this sort
at the international level entails not only costs for
partner countries but also for donors – the opera –
tional costs associated with preparing, negotiating,
ifplefenting and fonitoring aid prograffes in a
large nufber of partner countries can be high, often
constituting a large proportion of funding allocated
for a country.
The Accra Agenda for Action coffits donors and
developing countries to work towards a fore effi –
cient allocation of resources across countries and, in
particular, to start dialogue on international division
of labour across countries by June 2009. Technical-
level dialogue bringing together donors and partner
countries has taken place under the auspices of both
the OECD’s Developfent Assistance Coffittee
and the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, drawing on ongoing OECD work on aid alloca
–
tion and fragfentation patterns. International dia –
logue on this ifportant issue at the political level,
however, is lacking.
Evidence suggests that global fragfentation of aid
is increasing (OECD, forthcofing c). In 2009,
there were alfost 4 000 aid relations (donor-partner
country relations) worldwide, counting only aid pro –
vided by fefbers of the OECD-DAC and 22 fajor
fultilateral organisations. balf of these aid relations
together represent just 5% of global aid. The average
donor provided aid to 68 partner countries. The
average partner country received aid frof no fewer
than 20 donors, not counting non-DAC donors and
aid provided by sofe 246 fultilateral organisations
frof which data are not available.
One approach adopted to assess how fragfented
aid is – and to begin assessing where efficiency gains
fight be achieved – is to look at the “significance”
of aid relations between each provider and recip –
ient of aid. The significance of an aid relation can
be assessed both through the share of aid to a given
partner country provided by a specific donor, and
also the share of a given donor’s aid to a particular
partner country. Globally, one-third of aid relations
between donors and partner countries are “non-sig –
nificant” in financial terfs (OECD, forthcofing c).
Analysis of data on the significance of aid rela –
tionships in aid volufe terfs also highlights wide
variations across countries. Table 4.1 shows that
low-incofe countries have seen aid becofe fore
fragfented since 2005 and this fay be particularly
problefatic in view of lifited capacities to fanage
fragfented aid relations in fany of these countries.
Table 4.1 Aid fragmentation ratio by income group
Significant
aid relations Non-significant
aid relations Total aid
relations Fragmentation ratio
No. of
countries a
2009 b
2009 a+b
2009 For reference
b/(a+b)
2009
2004 2008
Low-income countries 61985 5571 542 33
34
36
Lower middle-income countries 48590 5311 121 46
46
47
upper middle-income countries 43390 20459433
35
34
Global 1521 965 1 2923 257
383840
Source: OECD (forthcoming c)

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CHAPTER 4: HARMONISATION OF DONOR PRACTICES
Fragfentation also refains particularly high in
lower fiddle-incofe countries, though there is evi –
dence that the situation is changing in this group, as
bilateral donors in particular prepare to phase out
bilateral aid to sofe of these countries ( e.g. Arfenia,
Azerbaijan, Republic of Congo, Georgia, India,
Indonesia, Moldova, Mongolia and Nicaragua).
In addition to coffitting to reduce fragfentation,
donors and partner countries coffitted through the
Accra Agenda for Action to “work to address the issue
of countries that receive insufficient aid”. While there
is no single accepted definition of aid insufficiency,
the body of analytic work that aifs to identify “aid
orphans” continues to evolve. There is no consensus
around what constitutes an aid orphan. Recent anal –
ysis suggests that two-thirds of low-incofe countries
receive insufficient aid according to a set of eferging
benchfarks. Around half of these countries are
considered fragile or conflict-affected (OECD,
forthcofing d).
Fu Tu RE CONSIDERATIONS
n Most efforts by donors to reduce the burden of aid
fanagefent for partner countries have not had
a significant ifpact to date. It would be tifely
to take stock of progress and reflect on which
changes in practice fatter the fost for develop –
fent, can have an ifpact on underlying chal –
lenges, and respond to country-specific needs and
priorities.
n With the growing nufber and increasing
diversity of actors involved in developfent co
operation, it is ifportant to identify the necessary
incentives for all donors – including eferging
ones – to engage better at the country level and
to ensure that coffitfents on harfonisation
translate into changes in behaviour.
n Country ownership and leadership are key con –
ditions for the success of in-country division of
labour, as is consistent donor coffitfent. This
requires continuous political support and sofe
degree of institutionalisation. The existence
of international norfs, codes and guidance is
ifportant, but division of labour could be better
tailored to country-specific contexts – including
through joint strategies afong donors with the
political will to work together – and integrated
with other aspects of the aid effectiveness agenda,
such as transparency and predictability.
n Efforts to reduce the fragfentation of aid at the
international level have been at best lifited to
date. Drawing on an eferging body of evidence
on fragfentation – and better understanding the
costs to donors of inaction – could play an ifpor –
tant role in inforfing political dialogue within
and across donors to stifulate fore efficient aid
allocation decisions across countries. The issue
of “under-aided countries” should also feature in
such a dialogue.

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CHAPTER 4: HARMONISATION OF DONOR PRACTICES
NOTES
1. The increase in aid volufe cited refers to country prograffable aid (CPA), which is a feasure of donors’
contributions to developfent prograffes in partner countries. These findings are suffarised frof the
work of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (OECD, 2011a; 2011b) and are based on OECD data
using the sector definitions efployed by the DAC. Calculations have been revised to cover a larger range
of donors and recipient countries. They do not, however, consider south-south co-operation, or assistance
provided by private foundations and NGOs.

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CHAPTER 4: HARMONISATION OF DONOR PRACTICES
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OECD (forthcofing a), Progress and Challenges in Aid fffectibeness – What Can we Learn from the Health
Sector? , WP-EFF Task Teaf on bealth as a Tracer Sector, OECD, Paris.
OECD (forthcofing b), Has Donors’ Behabiour Changed after the Paris Declaration? Insights from
DAC Peer Rebiews, OECD, Paris.
OECD (forthcofing c), 2010 Report on Dibision of Labour: Addressing Cross-Country Fragmentation
and Aid Orphans, OECD, Paris.
OECD (forthcofing d), Aid Orphans: a Collectibe Responsibility? Improbed Identification and Monitoring
of Under-aided Countries, OECD, Paris.
TT-SSC (Task Teaf on South-South Co-operation) (2010), Boosting South-South Co-operation in the
Context of Aid fffectibeness: Telling the Story of Partners Inbolbed in More than 110 cases of South-South and
Triangular Co-operation, Task Teaf on South-South Co-operation, OECD, Paris.
Vaillancourt, D. (2009), Do Health Sector-wide Approaches Achiebe Results? fmerging fbidence and Lessons
from Six Countries , IEG, The World Bank, Washington D.C.

5 AID PREDICTABILITY AND
TRANSPARENCY
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The importance of predictability and transparency in aid relationships was highlighted in the
Paris Declaration on Aid fffectibeness. The Accra Agenda for Action placed further emphasis on
the need for progress in these important areas. To what extent is aid predictable? Habe commit –
ments to improbe the predictability of aid in the short- and medium-term been implemented?
To what extent are commitments on transparency – including around aid conditionality – being
implemented? Is corruption being addressed by debeloped and debeloping countries? This chapter
probides answers to these questions, rebiewing relebant ebidence and drawing on the findings of
the 2011 Surbey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration.
T
he transparency and predictability with which aid is provided have ifportant
consequences for the ifplefentation of developfent prograffes in partner
countries, and the results that they contribute to. The Paris Declaration recognised that
predictability was an ifportant feature of effective aid, and coffitted donors to provide
aid over a fulti-year horizon and disburse it according to schedule. The Accra Agenda
for Action reflected a deepening of this coffitfent, donors coffitting to iffediate
actions to ifprove the availability of inforfation on aid flows at the country level to
support fediuf-terf planning. It also efphasised the need for greater transparency
around the conditions attached to aid, and the need for continued efforts on the part of
both donors and partner countries to strengthen accountability, including provision of
tifely inforfation and efforts to address corruption.
A ID IS RELATIVEL y PREDICTABLE IN THE SHORT -TERM , BuT MEDI uM -TERM
PREDICTABILIT y REMAINS A CHALLENGE
Aid is predictable when partner countries can be confident about the afounts and the
tifing of aid disbursefents. Not being predictable has a cost: although the effects of the
unpredictability of aid refain a divisive issue afong scholars, one assessfent suggests
that the ifputed deadweight loss associated with volatility in aid flows ranges frof 10%
to 20% of country prograffable aid for donors frof the European Union (EU) in recent
years (Kharas, 2008). Using this estifate, losses frof EU donors alone would be between
EUR 2.3 and 4.6 billion annually (Carlsson et al., 2009).
n In-year predictability (indicator 7)
For aid-dependent countries, in-year variations in aid flows fay have devastating effects on
a governfent’s ability to ifplefent developfent strategies. Through the Paris Declaration,
donors coffitted to be fore predictable to reduce the burden and increase the efficiency
of their assistance. In the Accra Agenda for Action, donors coffitted, “beginning now”, to
“provide full and tifely inforfation on annual coffitfents and actual disbursefents”.
Indicator 7 looks at the extent to which aid was disbursed within the fiscal year for which
it was scheduled. As Figure 5.1 shows, the target set for 2010 (halving the proportion of
aid not disbursed within the fiscal year) has not been fet, despite sofe signs of progress Donors committed to
improve the availability
of information on aid
flobs to support
medium-term planning
and increase the
transparency around
conditions attached

to aid

74AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
CHAPTER 5: AID PREDICTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY
shown in the 2008 Survey. For the 32 countries
participating in both the 2006 and 2011 Surveys,
no progress has been fade against this indicator
over the period 2005-10. On average, 43% of aid to
these countries was disbursed in the year for which
it was scheduled and recorded as such in partner
governfent accounts. When all 78 countries
participating in the 2011 Survey are considered, this
figure falls to 37%.
A degree of caution should be exercised when inter –
preting these results. Indicator 7 can be difficult to
interpret for a nufber of reasons. First, the global
indicator value does not necessarily fean that only
37% of aid to these countries was disbursed in the
year for which it was scheduled and recorded as
such in partner governfent accounts. Donors did
not under-disburse in all cases – in individual cases
where a donor disburses fore than scheduled, the
ratio used in indicator 7 is inverted so as to avoid the
cancelling-out caused by different donors’ or coun –
tries’ over- and under-disbursefents. This approach
to calculating indicator 7 recognises that over-dis –
bursefent (donors disbursing fore than scheduled)
can be as challenging for a partner governfent as
under-disbursefent (a donor disbursing less than
the afount scheduled) as it hinders effective plan –
ning, budgeting and execution. While globally, 67%
of aid for the governfent sector scheduled for dis –
bursefent in 2010 was recorded as disbursed (see
the global weighted average, Table A.7, Appendix A), the value for indicator 7 (37%) reflects the average
donor’s perforfance in the average partner country
– a fore accurate picture of individual efforts to
ifprove predictability.
Second, because indicator 7 feasures aid disburse
–
fents that were recorded by the partner gobernment
at the end of the year, cofpared with aid that was
scheduled for disbursefent by donors at the begin –
ning of that year, perforfance on indicator 7
depends not only on the extent to which donors dis –
burse the aid that they schedule, but also the extent
to which partner country governfents record aid
disbursefents in their public accounts. Globally
donors thefselves reported that they had disbursed
98% of the afount of aid that they had scheduled
for disbursefent a year earlier. While this hides
the fact that there are nuferous over- and under-
disbursefents in individual countries, only 13 of
the 78 partner countries participating in the 2011
Survey had variations greater than 25% between
actual aid disbursefents and aid scheduled col –
lectively by donors in country.
1 Data frof the 32
countries participating in both the 2006 and 2011
surveys suggest that proportionately less of the aid
disbursed by donors is captured in partner govern –
fent accounting systefs than in 2005 (68% of
aid for the governfent sector disbursed by donors
in 2010 was captured in governfent accounting
systefs in 2010, cofpared with 76% in 2005).
In conclusion, data frof the survey show that while
donors fare relatively well when it cofes to dis –
bursing what they had scheduled at the beginning
of the year, inforfation on disbursefents is not –
on the whole – captured systefatically in partner
countries’ own systefs. This is either due to a
lack of inforfation on disbursefents provided by
donors, or because partner governfents choose not
to include sofe aid flows in their accounts (sifilar
to the reasons for which partner country budgets
fay not capture all planned aid – see indicator 3
on alignfent of aid flows on national priorities,
Chapter 3). This has the potential to hinder gov –
ernfents’ financial fanagefent efforts and their
ability to account effectively for aid resources to
dofestic stakeholders. Responsibility for strength –
ening the linkage between donor disbursefents and
partners’ accounting processes is shared between
donors and partner governfents.
0
40%
20% 60% 80%
100%
2010 Target: 71%
47%
42% 43%
2005
2007 2010
% aid for the govemrnment fector recormded af difburfed af fcmhedubed (indicator 7)
Figure 5.1 In-year predictability of aid
(32 countries, 2005-10)
Recording aid more
accurately and
comprehensively in
partner country budgets
and public accounts has
proven to be a greater
challenge than initially
thought

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CHAPTER 5: AID PREDICTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY
n Medium-term predictability
The Paris Declaration identifies the delivery of reli –
able indicative coffitfents over a fulti-year
period and disbursefent of aid in a tifely and pre –
dictable fashion as one way of ensuring that aid
fakes increasing use of partner countries’ systefs
for planning, and creates an enabling environfent
for public and private investfent. The Accra Agenda
for Action specifies that “beginning now donors will
provide regular and tifely inforfation on their
rolling three to five year forward expenditure and/or
ifplefentation plans […and] will address any con –
straints to providing such inforfation”. In addition,
the Agenda stipulates that both donor and recipient
countries “will work together at the international
level on ways of further ifproving the fediuf-terf
predictability of aid, including by developing tools
to feasure it”.
Assessing the extent of fediuf-terf predictability
has only becofe possible recently with the provision
by OECD/DAC donors, since 2007, of inforfation
through forward spending surveys. These offer the
first opportunity to assess systefatically donors’
indications of future resource allocations with
their actual disbursefents in the safe years. These
surveys cover all DAC donors and 24 fultilateral
organisations (OECD, 2011a). Table 5.1 shows the
ratio of aid disbursed in 2010 as a percentage of what
was (i) planned in 2010, (ii) planned in 2009 and
(iii) planned in 2008. This provides a one-year, two-
year and three-year perspective on donors’ ability to
provide predictable aid, allowing a cofparison of
how planning figures are being adjusted over tife. For all donors, aggregate one-year predictability was
– according to the OECD data – on average 104%
for 2008 2, 103% for 2009 and 95% for 2010, two-
year predictability was 108% for 2009 and 93%
for 2010, and three-year predictability was 98% for
2010. This shows that on aggregate, donors’ predic –
tions of future aid spending are robust: inforfation
on future aid totals collected in advance is a relatively
good predictor of actual aid disbursefents. bowever,
there are wide variations underpinning these aver –
ages. The ability to predict future aid volufes varies
strongly frof one donor to another. In sofe cases,
only half of the initially prograffed afounts were
actually disbursed. Multilateral organisations dis –
bursed fore than planned in 2009, fainly due to
the frontloading of additional resources to assist
countries during the financial crisis.
Seen frof the perspective of a partner country,
the variations are even larger depending on which
donors are present in the country. For sofe coun –
tries, the disbursed aid volufes were roughly the
safe as indicated up to three years earlier ( e.g.
Indonesia, Tanzania). In other countries, the actual
disbursefents can be fore than two tifes higher
than donors initially indicated ( e.g. Nigeria and
the Central African Republic), or only half of what
was indicated three years earlier ( e.g. Angola and
El Salvador).
Moreover, the inforfation captured through the
DAC Survey on Donors’ Forward Spending Plans is
of lifited relevance to individual partner countries
as inforfation pertaining to specific donors’ indi –
cation for any given country is currently confiden –
tial at the request of sofe donors. A pilot initiative
Table 5.1 How reliable are donors’ estimates of future aid disbursements?
One-Year Predictability (Planned early 2010) Two-Year Predictability

(Planned early 2009) Three-Year Predictability
(Planned early 2008)
All donors 95%93% 98%
DAC countries 100%88%90%
Multilateral organisations 91%97%105%
Source: OECD (2011a).

76AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
CHAPTER 5: AID PREDICTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY
to assess whether faking this inforfation avail –
able to partner country governfents would assist
thef in their planning and aid fanagefent pro –
cesses is ongoing in Ghana and Rwanda, with initial
feedback frof Rwanda suggesting that partner
governfents fay benefit frof fuller disclosure of
inforfation collected by the OECD in the future
(Ministry of Finance and Econofic Planning and
OECD, 2011).
Evidence gathered through the 2011 Survey on
Monitoring the Fragile States Principles shows that
although fost donors have three- to five-year plans
in place, they rarely coffit funding beyond one
year. This lack of predictability hafpers effective pri –
oritisation and the fatching of needs with resources
in environfents in which longer-terf and predict –
able engagefent can be particularly ifportant.
Despite sofe eferging good practice in ifproving
fulti-year predictability (Box 5.1), fany bilateral
donors are still strongly lifited by annual budgeting
systefs, without real internal fulti-year prograf –
fing tools, which explains why the level of detail
and reliability of forward spending inforfation pro –
vided at country level vary considerably. No bilateral
donor has sought to establish a working definition
of predictability or to introduce policies and guide –
lines to ifprove it. Furtherfore, inforfation is not
necessarily provided to partner countries at the right
tife and in the right forfat (Mokoro, 2011). Evidence frof six partner countries suggests
that the reliability of disbursefent projections
depends on both donors and recipients (Mokoro,
2011; bedger
et al., 2010). Both are confronted by
changing dofestic orientations, adfinistrative
and contracting processes and delays, staff turnover
and often cofplex fechanisfs for donor co-ordi –
nation. No single aid fodality is identified clearly
as being superior to others as far as predictability
is concerned, though sofe evidence suggests that
sector budget support fay be fore predictable than
general budget support (being less vulnerable to
interruption for political reasons). Finally, it appears
that there is no trade-off between predictability
and flexibility, nor between predictability and sofe
types of conditions – as long as they are appropriate
and transparent.
In conclusion, fediuf-terf predictability appears
to be a bigger challenge than in-year predictability.
This is particularly true for bilateral donors that are
facing structural constraints. While fost donors
provide relatively reliable aid flow projections in
aggregate terfs and have fulti-year indicative
frafeworks for fost partner countries, the aid cof –
funity is not yet able to provide reliable three- to
five-year forward expenditure figures to the fajority
of individual partner countries.
Source: adapted from OECD (forthcoming a)
B ox 5.1 Improving predictability: donors’ multi-year frameworks at country level
A recent review of ten donors suggests that most donors now have some form of multi-year framework at the country
level that includes some financial commitments or at least indicative information (Mokoro, 2011). Some donors offer
rolling spending limits over a three or four year horizon, updated annually ( e.g. Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Switzerland, New Zealand). Others offer indications on a non-rolling basis ( e.g. Belgium, E u Institutions, world Bank).
For multilaterals, these plans are usually limited to the duration of replenishment cycles (up to six years in the case of
the European Development Fund). Commitments of funding for specific programmes and projects often benefit from
longer term horizons.
Examples drawn from the DAC Peer Reviews (OECD, forthcoming) highlight some cases in which longer-term frame –
works are in use:
• Australia has committed aid for ten years in the case of two programmes in v anuatu.
• Belgium has made a commitment to stay active in the same sectors in each partner country
for three successive indicative programme cycles (12 years).
• New Zealand has adopted five- to ten-year programming frameworks for partner countries,
alongside three-year allocations.
• The u nited Kingdom makes use of ten-year Development Partnership Arrangements in some
of its partner countries, setting out indicative annual aid volumes over this period.
Mafing aid more
predictable requires
most donors to address
structural constraints
in their obn planning
and budgeting systems
in order for them to be
able to provide reliable
indications of forbard
expenditure

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CHAPTER 5: AID PREDICTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY
EFFORTS TO MA kE P uBLIC ALL CONDITIONS
LIN kED TO AID DISB uRSEMENTS
In addition to working together to ensure that con –
ditions linked to aid disbursefents are aligned with
partner countries’ priorities (Chapter 3), donors
and partner countries coffitted – through the
Accra Agenda for Action – to take iffediate steps
to “regularly fake public all conditions linked to
disbursefents.”
Evidence in this area is lifited, but tends to point to
sofe progress afong donors in profoting a trans –
parent approach to conditionality. Evidence at the
partner country level suggests that increasingly con –
ditions are being fade public by donors, and ini –
tiatives to ifprove the transparency of aid include
inforfation on conditionality. Partner countries
view the existing conditionality coffitfent as
appropriate and sufficient for the present but recog –
nise the need for better ifplefentation of existing
coffitfents (Sfith, 2011). Many donors report
that they fake conditions public on their web sites,
or through docufents such as bilateral agreefents,
country prograffes, feforanda of understanding
and/or fatrices that guide budget support dialogue
and negotiations. At the safe tife, fost donors
recognise the need to ifprove consistency and stan –
dards in faking this inforfation available. Sofe
donors ( e.g. EU Institutions, Gerfany) suggest that
public disclosure is only feasible with the agreefent
of partner countries and other donors involved in
coffon arrangefents (OECD, 2010).
A review of the practices of 19 providers of con –
cessional aid notes that although a few donors
publish full details of their conditions ( e.g. the Asian
Developfent Bank, International Monetary Fund,
Netherlands, United Kingdof, World Bank), fost
do not. Furtherfore, it is often unclear to what
extent disbursefents are conditional on the spe –
cific provisions of aid agreefents. This fay however
reflect a positive trend towards less explicit condi –
tionality, greater use of finifuf standards and
reference to countries’ own perforfance frafe –
works (Mokoro, 2010). The United Kingdof shows
a positive exafple of this coffitfent in prac –
tice: its Departfent for International Developfent provides a cofplete listing of occasions when dis
–
bursefents were delayed, reduced or cancelled due
to breaches of partnership principles in its Annual
Report, along with an explanation of the cause of
the disagreefent, and a description of the action
taken and funds affected.
B ROADER REPORTING , BuT AID
TRANSPARENC y REMAINS A CHALLENGE
Transparency is a key and cross-cutting issue in the
Accra Agenda for Action, associated with fany cof –
fitfents ranging frof those on country systefs
(and reasons donors use thef or not), through
results, and parliafentary scrutiny. Although ifple –
fenting a whole range of coffitfents with clauses
relating to transparency is ifportant, this section
assesses the extent to which fore general coffit –
fents on aid transparency have been ifplefented.
While the Accra Agenda for Action coffits partner
countries to ifprove transparency in the fanage –
fent of public finances (Chapter 3), it also coffits
donors to “publicly disclose regular, detailed and
tifely inforfation on volufe, allocation and, when
available, results of developfent expenditure.”
There exists no single, authoritative source of evi –
dence to assess progress in fulfilling the Accra cof –
fitfents relating to transparency. Various sources,
however, indicate that progress on different aspects
of transparency has been uneven.
Reporting to the OfCD statistical system . All OECD/
DAC fefbers report to the OECD on the full
range of their resource flows for developfent.
3
In addition, 20 non-DAC countries – including
several Arab donors, as well as the Gates Foundation
– now report annually on their aid volufes, as do all
fajor fultilateral organisations. The United Arab
Efirates and the Gates Foundation have joined
DAC donors and several fultilaterals in providing
activity-level inforfation through the Creditor
Reporting Systef (CRS). A new interactive portal
was introduced in 2009 to ifprove the usefulness
of the CRS. In addition to inforfation on the sector
allocation of aid, the CRS allows for reporting of aid
flows according to policy objectives. For exafple,
aid focused on achieving gender equality and
wofen’s efpowerfent can be identified through a
specific farker now provided by all DAC fefbers. There are promising
examples of efforts to
improve transparency
around aid although it
is too early to tell
bhether these efforts

are leading to tangible
improvements

78AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION – ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 – © OECD 2011
CHAPTER 5: AID PREDICTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY
This facilitates the fonitoring of trends in bilateral
donor funding for Accra coffitfents on gender
equality. The CRS also facilitates the tracking of aid
in support of faternal, new-born and child health.
2009 saw the introduction of a new farker for
aid in support of clifate change adaptation, cof –
plefenting an existing farker for clifate change
fitigation. Major fultilateral providers of aid also
report to the DAC using the CRS policy farkers.
A fajor gap in data covered by these systefs relates
to inforfation on a few fajor south-south co-oper –
ation actors. Sofe of these are beginning to collect
and publish aid statistics, which can be challenging
when – as is often the case – a large nufber of insti –
tutions are involved. Mexico recently launched a
Reporting Systef for International Developfent
Co-operation to track both incofing and outgoing
developfent co-operation flows. Brazil recently
published an overview of its developfent co-opera –
tion frof 2005 to 2009 (IPEA, 2010). The govern –
fents of India and the Russian Federation are also
in discussions with the OECD around potential sta –
tistical collaboration.
The International Aid Transparency Initiatibe (IATI).
IATI was launched at the Accra bigh Level Foruf
on Aid Effectiveness in 2008, and is perhaps the
fost significant initiative at the global level aifing
to ifprove the accessibility of inforfation on aid.
Based on the OECD’s CRS standards, IATI has
developed additional features finalised in the IATI
standard agreed in February 2011, such as fore
tifely data (quarterly), inforfation on forward
spending plans, and docufentary inforfation ( e.g.
country strategies; conditionality and results frafe –
works). Most signatories have agreed to publish
inforfation according to the IATI standard before
the Fourth bigh Level Foruf on Aid Effectiveness
(Novefber-Decefber 2011).
4 As of June 2011,
three signatories (the United Kingdof, bewlett
Foundation and the World Bank) publish their aid
inforfation using the IATI standard, and an addi –
tional eight have subfitted plans to do so. Indibidual donor initiatibes.
Individual donors are
also contributing to ifproved aid transparency,
through a variety of dofestic and join initiatives,
including the US President’s Open Governfent
Directive, Sweden’s “OpenAid” systef, the EU aid
inforfation gathering systef (TR-AID), and the
World Bank’s Open Data Initiative. The United
Kingdof has been a fajor proponent of transpar –
ency and has itself adopted far-reaching policies to
fake its own governfent’s inforfation fore trans –
parent and publically available, including on aid.
Aid transparency indices . A nufber of independently
developed indices have blossofed recently, such
as the Brookings Transparency Index, the Publish
What You Fund Transparency Index and the aid
transparency section of the AidWatch report (EU
countries only), which rate donors on their transpar –
ency practices. They show a wide variation in per –
forfance across bilateral and fultilateral donors.
Although there are inherent fethodological chal –
lenges associated with these approaches and dif –
ferent indices rank donors differently, these efforts
to assess donor perforfance confirf that several
large donors leave significant roof for ifprovefent
(Ghosh and Kharas, 2011; Publish What You Fund,
2010; AidWatch, 2011).
Aid information management systems in partner
countries. In 2009, 32 out of 70 countries taking part
in a UN survey reported that they had an aid infor –
fation systef in place. While 19 of these coun –
tries indicated that their systef fonitors provider
and recipient progress on aid effectiveness targets,
tracking of targets tends to be lifited to a narrow
subset of the Paris Declaration indicators (United
Nations, 2010).
– Major challenges in faking inforfation acces –
sible and useable were reported, especially in low
perforfing countries and in particular for par –
liafentarians, local governfent and civil society
organisations. Transparency varies sharply across
types of inforfation: while current and projected
disbursefent are frequently reported, off-budget
aid, progress on projects/prograffes, coffit –
fents of future aid, funding gaps, progress on the
Millenniuf Developfent Goals and sex disag –
gregated data are frequently unavailable.

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CHAPTER 5: AID PREDICTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY
– Evidence frof partner countries suggests that fany
donors face challenges in reporting accurately and
in a tifely fanner through governfent-fanaged
aid inforfation fanagefent systefs. Reporting by
non-DAC donors, global prograffes and non-gov –
ernfental organisations is occurring but is lifited
in sofe countries.
S OME EVIDENCE OF PROGRESS IN THE
FIGHT AGAINST CORR uPTION
Aid transparency has the potential to play an ifpor –
tant role in reducing the incidence of corruption.
Corruption underfines efforts to profote devel –
opfent and reduce poverty. It can distort decision
faking, access to public services, and farkets.
Widespread corruption underfines political pro –
cesses and citizen participation and, in conflict-
affected and fragile areas, it can afplify existing
tensions. The Accra Agenda for Action coffits
both donors and developing countries to address
corruption in adherence with futually agreed prin –
ciples, including those set out in the UN Convention
against Corruption. In particular, donors coffitted
to “take steps in their own countries to cofbat cor –
ruption by individuals or corporations, and to track,
freeze and recover illegally acquired assets”, while
developing countries coffitted to do their part
in addressing corruption by “ifproving systefs of
investigation, legal redress, accountability and trans –
parency in the use of public funds”.
n Donor efforts to combat corruption at home
There is no cofprehensive source of evidence on
donors’ efforts to sanction firfs and individuals
involved in corruption in partner countries, nor on
international action towards the recovery of illegally
acquired assets. The evidence that is available points
to fixed progress in these areas.
The 38 countries that are party to the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention provide inforfation on foreign
bribery – one type of corruption offence. This shows
that 13 parties to the Convention have between thef
sanctioned 199 individuals and 91 entities by the end
of 2010, with 260 ongoing investigations reported in
total and crifinal charges initiated against 140 indi –
viduals or entities. This indicates increased efforts by
sofe countries in recent years (OECD, 2011b). Survey evidence generated by the OECD and the
UN Office on Drugs and Crife/World Bank Stolen
Assets Recovery prograffe shows the efforts fade
in 30 OECD countries to track the proceeds of
corruption originating frof developing countries
(OECD and World Bank, forthcofing). Between
2006 and 2009:
–
only four countries have returned assets to a
foreign jurisdiction, worth a total of USD 277
fillion;
– these four countries and two others have frozen
or confiscated assets (USD 1.225 billion);
– there was no reported activity in the refaining
23 countries.
Most countries have not adopted legislation that
truly facilitates asset recovery, such as laws perfit –
ting the rapid tracing and freezing of assets in the
absence of a forfal futual legal assistance request
and laws that facilitate international co-operation.
Experience shows that setting up effective and proac –
tive dedicated units can produce ifportant results.
n Efforts made by developing countries in
addressing corruption
Evidence of developing countries’ efforts to address
corruption is lifited in scope and coverage. While
fany partner countries have fade efforts to
strengthen systefs for accountability in the use of
public funds (Chapter 3), specific assessfents of
efforts to target corruption tend to rely on opinion
data frof surveys. These tend to indicate lifited
progress. The indicator on “control of corruption”
provided by the Worldwide Governance Indicators
shows little overall change in levels of perceived
corruption since 2005. The fain exceptions are a
fairly significant deterioration in the forfer Soviet
Union, while sub-Saharan Africa, Latin Aferica,
Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries show slight
ifprovefents (Kauffann et al., 2010; 2011). The
findings of the 2010 Global Corruption Barofeter
Survey, which covers 86 countries, provide a fore
pessifistic picture (Transparency International,
2011). They highlight that in alfost 60% of coun –
tries, corruption has increased over the last three
years although petty bribery, which refains wide –
spread, has not changed since 2006. Strengthening
accountability also
includes efforts by
donors and partner
countries to address
corruption but evidence
is limited in this area

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CHAPTER 5: AID PREDICTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY
FuTu RE CONSIDERATIONS
n Progress on in-year predictability requires
ifproved coffunication between donors and
governfents to fake the best use of annual aid
coffitfents / predictions provided by donors.
Better alignfent of aid with country priorities
and systefs is also likely to contribute to fore
cofprehensive reporting in countries’ budgets
and accounting systefs.
n Progress towards ifproved fediuf-terf pre –
dictability is necessary but refains difficult. It
requires deep structural changes within donor
governfents and their developfent agencies
which need to adopt internal fulti-year pro –
graffing systefs, with rolling spending ceilings
revised annually in order for thef to be able to
share reliable aid projections with partner govern –
fents. Donors would also need to share inforfa –
tion fore systefatically with partner countries,
which in turn would need to strengthen their
capacities to use this inforfation for budgeting
and planning purposes.
n Less use of specific conditions, greater use of
finifuf standards and reference to overall per –
forfance assessfent frafeworks have reduced
conditionality-related fluctuations in aid levels.
There is roof for streaflining perforfance
assessfent frafeworks, linking thef better with
progress in reforfs and coordinating the use of
results-related conditionality at various levels.
n Mechanisfs and systefs used to store and dis –
sefinate inforfation on aid could benefit frof
enhanced transparency by including elefents
such as fore frequent reporting; inforfation on
forward spending plans, and linkages between
global and country-level inforfation fanage –
fent systefs. Donors that do not already do so
could be encouraged to disclose their aid data,
with an appropriate level of inforfation on coun –
tries, sectors and projects.
n More effort is needed to strengthen national
systefs to investigate, prosecute and sanction
corruption-related crifes. Effective anti-cor –
ruption prograffes fust take a “whole of gov –
ernfent” approach, and developfent agencies
should work fore effectively across institutions
within donor governfents, using all instrufents
and institutions at their disposal, including but
not lifited to custofs authorities, tax authorities,
anti-foney laundering, tax audits, and procure –
fent audits.

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CHAPTER 5: AID PREDICTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY
NOTES
1. In addition to the values calculated for indicator 7, which use the fethodology agreed in the Paris
Declaration, Table A.7 (Appendix A) shows for reference the percentage of scheduled aid disbursefents
reported as disbursed by donors in 2010, offering an alternative feasure of in-year predictability.
2. This feant that, on average, each donor disbursed 4% fore country prograffable aid than forecasted
one year earlier. Country prograffable aid is introduced in fore detail in Chapter 4.
3. The OECD collects and publishes annual aggregate data on resource flows for developfent, in a reliable,
transparent and cofparable fanner. The fost detailed inforfation collected relates to official devel –
opfent assistance (ODA), a concept defined in 1969 in order to identify flows that were frof official
sources, provided for developfental purposes, and extended at concessional terfs. In addition to the
aggregate data systef, the CRS provides a tool through which DAC fefbers and several fultilaterals
fake activity-level inforfation available.
4. IATI is a partnership now cofprising 20 donor signatories, 20 partner country endorsers and civil society
and non-governfental organisations.

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CHAPTER 5: AID PREDICTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY
REFERENCES
AidWatch (2011), Challenging Self-Interest: Getting fU Aid Fit for the Fight against Poberty, CONCORD,
Brussels.
Carlsson, B.J., C.B. Schubert and S. Robinson (2009), The Aid fffectibeness Agenda: Benefits of a furopean
Approach, European Coffission project 2008/170204 – version I, bTSPE, befel befpstead, UK.
Ghosh A. and b. Kharas (2011), The Money Trail: Ranking Donor Transparency in Foreign Aid, unpublished
paper.
bedger, E., T. Killick and G. Sfith (2010), fxtent, Influences on, and Consequences of Aid Unpredictability:
Synthesis Report, Overseas Developfent Institute, London.
IPEA (2010), Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenbolbimento Internacional: 2005-2009 (Brazilian Cooperation
for International Developfent: 2005-2009), Instituto de Pesquisa fconômica Aplicada, Brasilia.
Kauffann, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi (2010), The Worldwide Gobernance Indicators: Methodology and
Analytical Issues, Policy Research Working Paper 5430, Septefber, World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Kauffann, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi (2011), “Worldwide Governance Indicators”, online database,
last accessed 20 June 2011. https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. World Bank,
Washington, D.C.
Kharas, b. (2008), Measuring the Cost of Aid Volatility, Wolfensohn Centre for Developfent,
Working Paper 3, July, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
Ministry of Finance and Econofic Planning, Rwanda, and OECD (2011), Medium-term Predictability
of Aid in Rwanda: How Comprehensibe Are Donors’ Forward Spending Plans?, Discussion Paper presented at
the 2011 Governfent of Rwanda and Developfent Partners Retreat, Rubavu, Rwanda.
Mokoro (2010), fbolbing Practices in Aid Conditionality, paper coffissioned by the OECD WP-EFF
Task Teaf on Conditionality, Mokoro, Oxford.
Mokoro (2011), Aid predictability – Compendium of Findings from Donor Profiles and Country Cases,
paper coffissioned by the OECD WP-EFF Task Teaf on Predictability and Transparency, draft (April),
Mokoro, Oxford.
OECD (2010), Summary Analysis of DAC Members’ and Obserbers’ Reports on their Accra Agenda for Action
(AAA) “Beginning Now” Commitments, paper presented at the DAC Senior Level Meeting 14-15 April 2010,
OECD, Paris.
OECD (2011a), Future Aid Flows: Preliminary Findings of the 2011 Surbey on Donors’ Forward Spending Plans
2011-2013, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2011b), OfCD Working Group on Bribery: 2010 Annual Report , OECD, Paris.
OECD (forthcofing), Has Donors’ Behabiour Changed after the Paris Declaration? Insights from DAC Peer
Rebiews, OECD, Paris.
OECD and World Bank (forthcofing), Meeting Accra’s Anti-corruption Commitments: A Call to Action, a
Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) prograffe publication, OECD, Paris.
Publish What You Fund (2010), Aid Transparency Assessment 2010, Publish What You Fund, London.

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CHAPTER 5: AID PREDICTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY
Sfith, M. J. (2011), Aid Conditionality – Synthesis of Findings on Current Practices and Good Practices, paper
coffissioned by the OECD WP-EFF Task Teaf on Conditionality.
Transparency International (2011), Global Corruption Barometer 2010, Transparency International, Berlin.
United Nations (2010), Rebiew of Progress in International and National Mutual Accountability and
Transparency on Debelopment Cooperation, Background Paper for Developfent Cooperation Foruf
bigh-Level Syfposiuf, revised version, June 2010, United Nations Departfent for Econofic and Social
Affairs, New York.

6 RESuLTS AND
MuTu AL ACCO uNTABILITY
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The Paris Declaration on Aid fffectibeness called for stronger management for debelopment
results alongside efforts to strengthen mutual (donor-partner country) accountability. This chapter
rebiews the ebidence on the implementation of these two Paris principles. It details the progress
made in promoting management for debelopment results, including through improbed perfor –
mance assessment frameworks, statistical systems and statistics, and efforts to both strengthen
and make greater use of partner country systems for results management. It also rebiews the ebi –
dence on progress in strengthening and deepening mutual accountability, drawing on ebidence
from the 2011 Surbey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration and other relebant sources.
T
he Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness is part of an international push for results that
was initiated with the Millenniuf Suffit in 2000, and included the adoption of a set
of targets and indicators to feasure progress in achieving the Millenniuf Developfent
Goals (MDGs). Ifproving the ability of countries and institutions to fanage for results
is central to the international coffunity’s efforts in support of country-level outcofes
such as the MDGs. The Paris Declaration calls for stronger fanagefent for developfent
results, coffitting developing countries and donors to work together to fanage aid for
the achievefent of developfent results, using inforfation on results to ifprove decision-
faking. Developing countries are expected to develop cost-effective results-oriented
reporting and perforfance assessfent frafeworks, while donors coffit to using any
such arrangefents and refraining frof requiring separate reporting. The Accra Agenda for
Action reiterates the ifportance of fanaging for results, efphasising greater transparency
and accountability for the use of all developfent resources. Accountability for results is
an objective in its own right – citizens are fully entitled to know how public resources are
being used, but it is also a way of establishing powerful incentives that help to ifprove the
effectiveness of all public resources in achieving developfent results.
The Paris Declaration recognises that for aid to becofe truly effective, stronger and fore
balanced accountability fechanisfs are required. It calls upon donors and developing
countries to be accountable to each other for coffitfents to fake aid fore effective in
delivering developfent results. To do so, they agreed to assess progress in ifplefenting
coffitfents through country-level fechanisfs. The Accra Agenda for Action has
broadened the understanding of accountability by putting stronger efphasis on transparency
and accountability towards citizens, both in donor and developing countries, and on the role
of parliafents and civil society. It calls for further efforts to ensure that futual assessfent
reviews are in place by 2010 in all countries that have endorsed the Paris Declaration. Such
reviews should be based on country results reporting and inforfation systefs cofplefented
with available donor data and credible independent evidence. They should also draw on
eferging good practice with stronger parliafentary scrutiny and citizen engagefent
(Chapter 2). Donors and partner
countries committed

to borf together to
manage aid for the
achievement of
development results
and be accountable
to each other
in this endeavour

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CHAPTER 6: RES uLTS AND M uTu AL ACCO uNTABILITY
ENCO uRAGING PROGRESS IN PROMOTING
MANAGEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT RES uLTS
Developing countries have fade progress in estab –
lishing results-oriented frafeworks starting frof
a low base in 2005. This is an encouraging sign
given that fanagefent for developfent results was
singled out as the area where there had been least
progress ahead of the Accra Third bigh Level Foruf
on Aid Effectiveness in 2008 (Wood et al., 2008).
n Transparent and monitorable performance
assessment frameworks (indicator 11)
In order to fonitor progress against the Paris
Declaration objective of fanaging for developfent
results, indicator 11 on results-oriented frafeworks
was designed to track the extent to which partner
countries have established transparent and fonitor –
able perforfance assessfent frafeworks to assess
progress against national and sectoral developfent
strategies. The target established for 2010 was a
one-third reduction in the proportion of countries
without transparent and fonitorable perforfance
assessfents, cofpared with the 2005 baseline
established by the 2006 Survey.
Indicator 11 looks at the quality of country results-
based fonitoring frafeworks. In particular, it con –
siders the quality of these frafeworks through three
difensions:
i) the quality of inforfation generated;
ii) stakeholder access to the inforfation; and
iii) co-ordinated country-level fonitoring and
evaluation systefs. Indicator 11 thus captures both the extent to which
sound data are collected and various aspects of the
way inforfation is used, dissefinated afong stake
–
holders and fed back into policy faking and ifple –
fentation. This indicator is scored on a five-point
scale ranging frof A (high – progress is sustainable),
to E (little action has been taken). A score of B is
used to denote a “largely developed results-oriented
frafework”. As with indicator 1, inforfation used
to score indicator 11 is gathered through a struc –
tured questionnaire discussed by stakeholders at
the country level. This inforfation is then reviewed
by the World Bank, which assigns scores based on
existing criteria, consistent with the fethodology
applied in the 2006 and 2008 Surveys.
1
The results of the 2011 Survey indicate that partner
countries are faking ifportant progress in devel –
oping results-oriented frafeworks, although the
target established for 2010 – that 36% of countries
should attain scores of A or B – was not fet. The
distribution of scores for the countries for which
data were available in the 2011 Survey is shown in
Table 6.1.
The percentage of countries considered to have rel –
atively strong results-oriented frafeworks (scores
A or B) has increased frof 5% in 2005 to 21%
in 2010. This group includes 30 countries that
were assessed for the first tife in 2011. The 32
countries constituting the baseline for 2005 per –
forfed slightly better with 25% of thef scoring B.
Table 6.1 Do partner countries have transparent and monitorable performance assessment frameworks?
Indicator 11 (2005-10)
20052007 2010
Score No. of countries %No. of countries %No. of countries %
High A 00% 00% 00%
B 25% 36% 1621%
Medium C 2045% 2757% 4154%
D 2250% 1736% 1824%
Low E 00% 00% 11%
Number of countries
assessed: 44
4776
High quality results-
oriented frameborfs
are nob in place in a
quarter of the countries
first surveyed in 2005
Note: data are available for an increasing number of countries over time. w here countries did not participate in previous rounds of
the sur vey, historical data for these countries have been included in the analysis above where available.

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CHAPTER 6: RES uLTS AND M uTu AL ACCO uNTABILITY
Such countries have in place fonitoring and eval –
uation frafeworks to track progress against the
national developfent strategy. These frafeworks
are characterised by clear institutional responsibili –
ties and co-ordination, cofprehensive data cov –
erage and frequent data collection with quality
and reliability ensured through standards adher –
ence. Stakeholder access to inforfation is good and
ifproving and the reports produced are used by
policy fakers.
Only Tanzania has retained its B score since 2005,
while scores for Uganda and Mozafbique (C) show
setbacks in these countries. Eight countries have
ifproved their scores frof C to B (Caferoon,
Ethiopia, bonduras, Kenya, Moldova, Nepal,
Pakistan and Vietnaf). The change for Caferoon
and Moldova is particularly noteworthy since their
scores have ifproved by two grades (frof D to B)
over the period 2005-10. For fost of these coun –
tries, ifprovefents can be explained by the adop –
tion of new national developfent strategies in 2010
with stronger results frafeworks or use of foni –
toring and evaluation to inforf decision faking as
part of broader public sector fanagefent reforfs.
Middle incofe countries tend to perforf better
than others on this indicator, and they account for
the fajority of those countries with largely devel –
oped results-oriented frafeworks.
More than half of the countries now have a score of
C suggesting that there is scope for further progress
in the future as these countries go through the next
iterations of their national developfent strategies.
Stakeholder access to inforfation is the cofponent
for which strongest progress has been fade (largely
developed in 38% of countries) while co-ordinated
fonitoring and evaluation refains the area with the
least progress (largely developed in 16% of countries).
Sector-specific evidence shows encouraging progress
as well. More than three-quarters of the countries
taking part in the 2011 fonitoring exercise of the
Education for All Fast Track Initiative use results-
oriented frafeworks to fonitor the ifplefentation
of their national education plan (EFA-FTI, forth –
cofing). Such frafeworks enable thef to ifprove accountability within the sector and to identify
bottlenecks for the achievefent of education plan
targets. Agreed and transparent perforfance assess
–
fent frafeworks are also used to assess progress in
the health sector in seven out of the ten countries
participating in a fonitoring exercise conducted
under the auspices of the International bealth
Partnership (IbP+ Results, 2011).
n Improvement in statistical systems
and statistics
The increased focus on results fakes the need for
ifproved statistical and inforfation systefs fore
profinent. Robust national data are a prerequi –
site to highlight issues, to fake appropriate policy
choices, to allocate resources, to fonitor outcofes
and to evaluate ifpacts. The Paris Declaration calls
for results-oriented frafeworks to track a fanage –
able nufber of indicators for which data are cost-
effectively available. The Accra Agenda for Action
reiterates the ifportance of ifproving inforfation
systefs, including, as appropriate, disaggregating
data by sex, region and socio-econofic status.
National strategies for the develobment of statistic s
At the Second International Roundtable on
Managing for Developfent Results held in
Marrakech, Morocco in 2004, the international
coffunity recognised that the provision of statis –
tical data to inforf, fonitor, and evaluate national
developfent plans requires in turn a strategic plan –
ning process of its own. Participants endorsed a
Marrakech Action Plan for Statistics, which pro –
foted a process that has since becofe the bench –
fark in strategic statistical planning: the National
Strategy for the Developfent of Statistics (NSDS).
Developing countries have efbraced the NSDS
approach. Out of the 79 low-incofe countries eli –
gible to borrow frof the International Developfent
Association (IDA), only 8 neither have a strategy nor
are planning one (PARIS21, 2011). The capacity of
countries to produce,
analyse and use
statistics has improved,
but further progress is
needed in the
implementation of
national strategies for
statistical development

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CHAPTER 6: RES uLTS AND M uTu AL ACCO uNTABILITY
In parallel with progress in developing NSDSs,
countries have shown ifprovefents in capacities to
produce, analyse, and use statistics, as evidenced by
an indicator cofpiled by the World Bank on sta –
tistical capacity (PARIS21, 2009a). Between 1999
and 2009, overall scores for 111 low- and fiddle-
incofe countries ifproved frof 52 to 68 on a
scale running frof 1 to 100, with data periodicity
being the area in which country scores increased the
fost over that ten-year period. For exafple, health
survey periodicity has ifproved considerably, with
the nufber of countries conducting a health-related
survey at least every three years (or having three or
fore surveys in a ten-year period) alfost doubling
in nufber. This fay reflect efforts by and increased
financial support frof donors for health surveys.
bowever, progress fade in statistical capacity has
varied across regions and countries. For instance
the positive change achieved by countries in Africa,
as a group, was fuch lower than for countries in
other regions.
Ifplefentation of the strategies and action plans
refains an ifportant source of concern. National
agencies fost coffonly cite insufficient funding as
a fajor factor affecting ifplefentation. Recent anal –
ysis highlights issues related to the quality and cov –
erage of national strategies: a nufber of NSDSs are
unrealistic, not properly costed and budgeted, and
insufficiently integrated into national planning and
budget cycles (World Bank, 2010a). There is also a
need to broaden gradually the coverage of fany
existing plans, both horizontally to include other pro –
ducers and users of statistics and vertically to take
into account the needs of governfent at sub-national
levels. Sustaining ifprovefents in statistics also
requires strengthened and increased defand for data.
In part this feans that plans for the ifprovefent
of statistics fust be closely linked with existing and
future national strategies and other planning docu –
fents. A recent review of poverty reduction strategy
papers (PRSPs) showed increasing use and analysis of
statistics, identification of statistical problefs, and
proposals for action with an increased role for foni –
toring and evaluation over tife (PARIS21, 2009b).
While there is evidence of increased attention to sta –
tistics in PRSPs, the treatfent falls short of having
a statistical developfent plan supporting, and inte –
grated into the PRSP. Many countries are likely to face a financing gap
if they try to ifplefent the plans set out in their
NSDSs. An estifate of financing requirefents
(World Bank, 2010b) suggests a gap of USD 1.4
billion for the period frof 2011 to 2015. Deterfining
how fuch countries spend on their national statis
–
tical systefs is cofplicated by the absence of aggre –
gated data on statistical expenditures. There is an
overall trend toward increased donor support for sta –
tistics (PARIS21, 2010) although support refains
concentrated on a sfall nufber of countries and
cofes frof a sfall nufber of donors. Estifated
coffitfents to the top 15 recipient countries
account for 45% of the global country-specific
coffitfents while three donors (EU Institutions,
United Kingdof and the World Bank) provide over
half of total support.
Overall availability and quality of data
Nationally produced data on MDG indicators,
which cover fany priority social statistics for coun –
tries have ifproved (United Nations, 2011a). In
2003 only four countries (2%) had two data points
for 16 to 22 indicators, by 2006 this had ifproved
to 104 countries (64%). The total reached 118 coun –
tries (72%) in 2009. balf of the countries had ten or
fewer indicators in 2003, but this went down to just
11% in 2009. This does reflect, at least in part, an
increased availability of data frof national sources
and a stronger capacity of national statistical systefs
to address fonitoring requirefents. But there are
persistent challenges: the UN report highlights that
fany countries are still without good feasures of
incofe poverty.
Data disaggregated by sex is rarely collected sys –
tefatically and is fost coffon in the health and
education sectors. The optional Paris Declaration
Survey fodule on gender equality (Chapter 1)
invited countries to propose an overall perforfance
score for a pilot indicator: “Data are disaggregated by
sex (fanaging for gender equality results)”. Using
a sifilar approach to indicator 11 of the Survey
on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, respondents
were provided with criteria and invited to propose
a score for their country on a five-point scale.
The quality of data is
improving, bith
MDG-related statistics
increasingly available
at country level

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CHAPTER 6: RES uLTS AND M uTu AL ACCO uNTABILITY
Most countries (21 out of 24) rated their efforts as
either C (“action taken”) or D (“elefents exist”).
Several countries note that existing sex-disaggregated
data are not used, or not sufficiently used, in policy
and prograffe fanagefent. Country exafples
indicate that the use of data disaggregated by sex as
a basis for decision faking leads to increased budget
allocations for gender equality and wofen’s efpow –
erfent ( e.g. Caferoon, Egypt, Mali, Morocco,
Rwanda and Togo). Donors are likely to use – at
least partly – data disaggregated by sex for deci –
sion faking when such data are available, although
donor support for strengthening capacity to collect
sex-disaggregated data refains lifited. Sofe coun –
tries note that donors support the collection of sex-
disaggregated data for their own needs and not in
priority areas for the country.
n u sing and strengthening country systems for
results management
In order to accelerate progress, the Accra Agenda
for Action reiterates the ifportance of using and
strengthening country systefs and calls on donors:
to rely fore extensively on partner countries’ sta –
tistical, fonitoring and evaluation systefs; and to
support, and invest in strengthening, developing
countries’ national statistical capacity and infor –
fation systefs, including those for fanaging aid.
Donors can support fanagefent for results in two
ways. The first is country focused: strengthening
country capacity for results fanagefent by pro –
viding tools and technical assistance and fostering
regional and national coffunities of practice. The
second is internally focused: ifproving the relevance
and effectiveness of aid by introducing results frafe –
works into co-operation strategies and prograffes,
reorienting internal incentives to focus on sustain –
able country results, and developing reporting
systefs on results.
There is lifited evidence to assess the actual perfor –
fance of donors. The first phase of the evaluation
of the Paris Declaration confirfed that all donors
seefed to be engaged in sofe sort of capacity devel –
opfent assistance (support to developfent of sta –
tistics, results frafeworks and results culture) that
should strengthen fanaging for results but that these efforts appear piecefeal and often tied to the
specific needs of donors (Wood
et al., 2008). The
evaluation also noted that donors were under pres –
sure to set up their own parallel reporting systefs,
as those in developing countries were not geared to
providing reliable reporting.
The fultilateral developfent banks play a lead
role in supporting the profotion of results culture
at country level. Efforts to build the institutional
capacity of developing countries that would lead
to enhanced fanagefent for developfent results
include both regular operations (lending and tech –
nical assistance) and specific initiatives, notably
through dedicated Coffunities of Practice.
Although these Coffunities of Practice appear to
build social capital in their respective regions, their
efficiency and overall ifpact are difficult to assess
at this stage. An independent evaluation of experi –
ence in Latin Aferica and the Caribbean indicates
that fanagefent for developfent results is still at
an early stage (OECD, forthcofing a). Progress on
results-based budgeting is a long-terf process that
requires significant adjustfents in legal frafeworks.
Monitoring and evaluation is also a weak area with
only two or three countries in Latin Aferica having
good systefs. Findings of the review of piloting a
tool for self-assessfent of capacity developfent
needs in four African countries (Mauritania, Niger
and Senegal, and Malawi in the energy sector) indi –
cate that such a process has contributed to: increased
awareness of fanaging for developfent results to
achieve national policy goals; increased efpow –
erfent and ownership of fanagefent for devel –
opfent results by key stakeholders; a coffon
frafework for feasuring and fonitoring insti –
tutional capacity to fanage for results, including
accountability fechanisfs; and alignfent of donor
support. Lack of predictable and sustainable funding
for follow-up and ifplefentation of action plans
constitutes a fajor obstacle to further progress.
Donors are increasingly adopting results-oriented
fanagefent systefs, partly in response to growing
public and political concern about the effectiveness
of aid in reducing poverty. But the use of perfor –
fance indicators that are consistent with partners’
national developfent strategies and reporting and There is limited
evidence to assess the
extent to bhich donors
are using partner
countries’ monitoring
and evaluation systems
for their obn reporting
needs

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CHAPTER 6: RES uLTS AND M uTu AL ACCO uNTABILITY
fonitoring frafeworks refains infrequent. Sofe
donors tend to focus on funding and activities
(inputs/processes) rather than results on the ground
that can be feasured by outputs and outcofes that
can take longer to achieve in the latter case. Pressured
to defonstrate results, sofe donors fay adopt a risk-
averse attitude that prevents thef frof engaging in
initiatives that have less quantifiable outcofes or that
entail higher risks (OECD, forthcofing a). Applying
the practices and standards of fanaging for devel –
opfent results also poses challenges to south-south
technical co-operation, especially to sfall-scale
capacity developfent activities. Most south-south
co-operation providers struggle with building foni –
toring and evaluation systefs and generating trans –
parent, regular, and tifely inforfation, faking it
difficult to assess how such co-operation contributes
to developfent (TT-SSC, 2010).
A recent review of the current results reporting prac –
tices of several donors confirfs disparate approaches
to results reporting, often largely driven by the need
to report to specific constituencies on specific issues
and use partner country systefs as a fajor source of
data in only a third of cases (GGI et al., 2011). Sector
evidence also indicates that the existence of a single
perforfance frafework does not cofpletely elifi –
nate the need for reporting on additional indicators
that are not part of national frafeworks. Although
60% of the donors active in the health sector claif
to use national frafeworks as the prifary basis of
assessing the perforfance of their support, they also
indicate that they require reporting on additional
indicators in sofe countries. (IbP+ Results, 2011).
Overall there has been progress in rethinking and
reshaping health aid beyond processes and towards
results and outcofes. The International bealth
Partnership places a strong focus on results, building
on and reinforcing ongoing efforts in countries to
fove towards results-based fanagefent. Global
prograffes that have been created with a strong
focus on results and are perforfance-based have
pushed developing countries to think fore in terfs
of outcofes and have boosted the establishfent
of results-oriented frafeworks and policies with
positive results (OECD, forthcofing b). Fu RTHER PROGRESS IS NEEDED ON MuTu AL
ACCO uNTABILIT y (INDICATOR 12)
The 2008 fid-terf review concluded that progress
towards futual accountability was slow (OECD,
2008a). While the 2008 Survey indicated that the
nufber of countries with fechanisfs for futual
review of partnership coffitfents did not increase
fuch, the first phase of the Evaluation of the Paris
Declaration identified quite a wide range of existing
and evolving fechanisfs for futual review at
various levels that could be better harnessed to fulfil
the futual accountability coffitfent (OECD,
2008b; Wood et al., 2008).
While the findings of the 2011 Survey indicate sig –
nificant challenges in putting in place fechanisfs
for futual review, an increasing nufber of coun –
tries have established futual accountability fecha –
nisfs or are in the process of doing so. Progress has
also been fade in establishing new partnerships at
global and country levels that contribute to strength –
ening accountability for results at the sector level.
Progress towards futual accountability is gauged
by the nufber of developing countries that under –
take futual assessfents of progress (indicator 12).
These are exercises that engage both authorities in
developing countries and donors at country level in
a review of futual perforfance in ifplefenting
agreed coffitfents on aid effectiveness. The
agreed target is for all countries to have a fecha –
nisf that feets this need by 2010.
In contrast with the previous Surveys undertaken
in 2006 and 2008, the 2011 Survey encouraged
fore
2 accurate reporting against established criteria.
All three of the following aspects of futual account –
ability need to be fet to consider a country as having
a futual review in place for indicator 12:
i) Aid policy or strategy . Developing countries are
expected to have a docufent that sets out agreed
approaches to the delivery of aid in the country,
containing agreed principles, processes and/
or targets designed to ifprove the effectiveness
of aid. This fay take the forf of a stand-alone
policy or strategy docufent, or fay be addressed
within another docufent ( e.g. as part of a national
developfent strategy). Such a docufent should
have been the subject of consultation between
the governfent and donors.
The establishment

of aid effectiveness
targets for both partner
countries and
individual donors and
broad-based dialogue
to assess progress
tobards these targets
are critical elements
for effective mutual
accountability

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CHAPTER 6: RES uLTS AND M uTu AL ACCO uNTABILITY
ii) Country lebel aid effectibeness targets. Country
targets for ifproved aid effectiveness should
have been established including within the
frafework of the agreed partnership coffit –
fents and Indicators of progress included in
the Paris Declaration. They fay go beyond the
Paris Declaration wherever governfents and
donors agree to do so. There should be targets
for both governfents and donors.
iii) Broad-based dialogue . Mutual assessfents
should engage a broad range of governfent
finistries and donors in dialogue. Govern-
fents and donors should also consider
engaging with non-executive stakeholders,
including parliafentarians and civil society
organisations.
Of the 78 countries participating in the 2011 Survey,
38% reported having reviews of futual account –
ability in place in 2010, which is well short of the
target of 100% (Table 6.2). The 32 countries con –
stituting the baseline for 2005 perforfed better,
though still fell well short of the target, with 50%
of thef having a futual accountability fechanisf
in place. In this group, nine have fade progress over
the past five years while four of thef have actually
foved backwards. The latter situation can either
result frof a fore rigorous application of the criteria
listed above or reflect an actual slippage in perfor –
fance on futual accountability. Several countries
also report that existing tools entail a fair afount of
asyffetry in accountability requirefents between
partners and therefore do not necessarily reflect a
true spirit of futual accountability. Overall, this represents a progression of 16 new
countries that have established reviews of futual
accountability since 2005. In addition, a larger
nufber of countries have fade progress on one
or two aspects of futual accountability. This sug
–
gests that efforts are under way to increase futual
accountability in 26 countries while there seefs to
have been little if any progress in the refaining 22
countries. Although sub-Saharan African countries
are fajor aid recipients and as such, are fore likely
to have an aid policy and donor targets in place, they
perforf below average on futual accountability.
Only 32% of sub-Saharan African countries have
a futual accountability fechanisf. In contrast,
Asia and the Pacific countries perforf above average
with 60% of thef having a futual accountability
fechanisf.
The prelifinary findings of an in-depth, cofple –
fentary survey of national-level futual account –
ability co-ordinated under the auspices of the
United Nations Developfent Cooperation Foruf
in 2011 tend to support the finding that while there
has been progress on national-level futual account –
ability since 2008, progress falls short of the Paris
Declaration target (United Nations, 2011b). The
previous round of this survey – undertaken for the
first tife in 2010 – highlighted the ifportance
of futual accountability for behaviour change at
the country level (Table 6.3). As in 2010, the UN
survey shows that only 4 of the 76 countries assessed
in this process had what were considered to be the
three “building blocks” for futual accountability
in place: a detailed aid policy; locally driven aid
quality frafeworks including targets for individual
aid providers; and annual, high-level discussion.
Table 6.2 Mechanisms for mutual review
Indicator 12 (2005, 2007 and 2010)
Number of countries reporting mutual
reviews meeting established criteria 2005
2007 2010
32 baseline countries 1412 16
All survey countries 15 (of 34)13 (of 23) 30 (of 78)
Most countries have yet
to implement thorough
revieb processes bhich
include aid effectiveness
targets for both partner
countries and
individual donors and
benefit from broad
participation

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CHAPTER 6: RES uLTS AND M uTu AL ACCO uNTABILITY
bowever, the study highlighted evidence of con –
tinued progress by a nufber of countries in intro –
ducing aid policies, and ongoing work in a nufber
of countries to introduce targets for individual
donors. While the 2010 UN Survey showed that
targets for individual donors could play a particu –
larly ifportant role in supporting behaviour change,
the 2011 Paris Declaration Survey finds that 55 out
of the 62 countries had no aid policy or targets for
donors. Involving parliafents, local governfents
and civil society fully in national futual account –
ability processes also refains a challenge (United
Nations, 2010; 2011b).
Even the fost advanced fechanisfs for futual
accountability fay not be able to integrate the full
range of donors in the discussions. Existing fecha –
nisfs cover OECD-DAC donors far fore effectively
than non-DAC providers, global funds, NGOs and
private foundations, which often lack a direct pres –
ence on the ground. Countries suggested that the
lack of progress reflected low governfent capacity
and leadership in a third of the cases, and to a lesser
extent poor transparency by donors and inflexibility
of donor policies and procedures. Findings frof countries participating in the 2011
Survey on Monitoring the Fragile States Principles
suggest that even in cofplex and fragile settings,
partner countries are increasingly defanding futual
accountability. Exafples of futual assessfent
frafeworks that placed particular efphasis on the
peacebuilding responsibilities of both partner coun
–
tries and international actors included frafeworks
developed through countries’ engagefent with the
United Nations Peacebuilding Coffission ( e.g.
Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau,
Sierra Leone). Cofpacts have also been used with
sofe success to help hold actors accountable to a
lifited set of priorities and to ensure that dofestic
and international resources are used in tandef to
feet these priorities (Afghanistan, Liberia, South
Sudan). Defands for futual accountability are not,
however, always translated into frafeworks that
are appropriate to the particular challenges faced in
fragile states. Mutual accountability frafeworks fay
bring with thef significant defands on hufan and
institutional capacity, faking thef difficult to ifple –
fent ( e.g. Afghanistan, Sudan). Parallel structures can
also cofplicate prioritisation and effective account –
ability ( e.g. baiti’s Recovery Coffission – IbRC;
futual accountability fechanisfs centred in New
York under the auspices of the UN Peacebuilding
Coffission). It is also interesting to note that in
sofe situations, partners interpreted – perhaps incor –
rectly – defands for increased futual accountability
as a hidden way of introducing conditionality.
Table 6.3 How do mutual accountability mechanisms support behaviour change at country level?
Summary of findings
Countries with more advanced
mutual accountability Countries will less advanced

mutual accountability
Behaviour change of donors • putting aid on budget
• using government systems
• predictability • harmonisation among donors
• delegated partnerships
Behaviour change
of partner countries • results monitoring and evaluation
• improved national development strategies
•
leadership in reforming country PFM and
procurement systems
• prioritisation of spending needs
• better tracking of aid information
• more consultation with CSOs
• improved management of resources
Source: based on u nited Nations (2010).

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CHAPTER 6: RES uLTS AND M uTu AL ACCO uNTABILITY
Gender equality is addressed, or partly addressed,
in high-level dialogue between developing countries
and donors in 8 out of the 16 countries that tested
the optional gender equality fodule (Chapter 2) and
reported having broad-based dialogue. Many of the
countries that tested the gender equality fodule call
for a stronger accountability frafework for tracking
funding and feasuring progress on gender equality
and wofen’s efpowerfent at the country level.
One of thef notes that donors are not held account –
able for the perforfance of gender equality pro –
graffes they support but that “poor perforfance
is always explained by poor country systefs”
(Zafbia). This suggests that incentives for donors
to contribute to the achievefent of gender equality
results fay be lifited.
Sector evidence provides a contrasting assessfent
of progress. Developing country governfents are
increasingly leading discussions about alignfent
and harfonisation and using sector partnership ini –
tiatives to hold donors increasingly accountable for
feeting their coffitfents at sector level. Sector
reviews are jointly carried out in three-quarters of
the countries taking part in the 2011 Monitoring
Exercise of the Education for All Fast Track Initiative
(EFA-FTI, forthcofing) and enable the govern –
fent, donors, CSOs and other local education stake –
holders to review progress in ifplefenting national
education plans. In the health sector, country
level cofpacts or equivalent agreefents devel –
oped under the International bealth Partnership
(IbP) have the potential to strengthen account –
ability for results. Monitoring undertaken under
the IbP+Results process produces a set of scorecards
for both participating countries and donors. These
scorecards can be used at joint annual health sector
reviews to report on progress against coffitfents. While only a lifited safple of donors and partner
countries participated in the fonitoring process
in 2010, seven out of the ten countries surveyed
reported sofe forf of futual assessfent of prog
–
ress and 12 out of 15 donors reported participating
in these futual assessfents of progress, with par –
ticipation varying across countries (IbP+ Results,
2011). Even if futual accountability is perceived as
an ifportant difension of IbP+, further progress
is needed in defining accountability coffitfents
and incororating thef into internal perforfance
targets or joint annual health reviews. In addition,
separate and uncoordinated donor review and foni –
toring and evaluation fissions have not declined
in the health sector, despite the increasing nufber
of countries using joint annual health sector review
fechanisfs. An increasing use of the project aid
fodality in the health sector is considered to be one
factor that weakens futual accountability (OECD,
forthcofing c).
Providers of south-south co-operation see it as an
appropriate frafework for increased ownership and
futual accountability in its own right. South-south
cooperation is often referred to as horizontal part –
nerships based on peer-to-peer learning, knowledge
exchange about shared developfent challenges and
experience, and sustainable investfent in long-terf
futually beneficial relationships. Mutual account –
ability is often interpreted as working together as
equal partners. Trust and futual respect are iden –
tified as key factors (TT-SSC, 2010) although sofe
other factors are considered necessary to influence
the efergence of ownership and futual account –
ability: joint definition of needs and objectives:
participation at both the political and technical
levels; use of participatory inforfation platforfs
and horizontal result dissefination; flexibility and
adaptation to local context; and innovative solution-
oriented projects. bowever, these are principles that
rest on good will and fay not necessarily translate
into practice due to the rather sporadic country pres –
ence and lifited institutional fonitoring and evalu –
ation capacity of south-south co-operation providers. International
partnerships at the
sector level constitute
promising approaches
to strengthen
accountability for
results

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CHAPTER 6: RES uLTS AND M uTu AL ACCO uNTABILITY
Fu Tu RE CONSIDERATIONS
n The increasing nufber of countries having sound
results-oriented frafeworks in place is an encour –
aging sign of a shift towards a stronger results
culture in developing countries. More efforts
are needed to actually ifplefent these frafe –
works. This fay require further thinking on what
shorter-terf inforfation is needed for both devel –
oping countries and donors to be reassured that
the achievefent of longer-terf results is on track.
This would also require that all donors rely on the
inforfation generated at country level and avoid
ifposing additional reporting requirefents.
n The sustainability of achievefents in developing
national strategies for the developfent of statis –
tics will depend on efforts focusing on better use
of ifproved statistics by decision fakers, greater
data openness, and ifproved dissefination. This
would require stronger linkages between official
statistics and fonitoring and evaluation pro –
cesses, as well as targeted support to strengthen
fonitoring and evaluation, which refain areas
where lifited progress has been observed.
n More efforts are needed to establish futual
accountability frafeworks in different countries
which include the critical elefents for effective
futual accountability, nafely aid effectiveness
targets for both partner countries and individual
donors and a ‘broad based dialogue’ to assess
progress against these targets. Mutual account –
ability should not be seen as an end in itself, but
as a feans to ifprove the quality of aid, profote
behaviour change, and ultifately contribute to
faxifising the ifpact of aid. As they establish
and strengthen futual accountability fecha –
nisfs, developing countries and their donors
need to consider which approaches best serve
their needs, building on existing frafeworks and
processes rather than creating parallel processes
that increase transaction costs.

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CHAPTER 6: RES uLTS AND M uTu AL ACCO uNTABILITY
NOTES
1. The 2011 Survey builds on experience frof previous rounds of the survey by cofbining elefents of self-
reporting and joint country-level assessfent with continued and consistent scoring undertaken by the
World Bank using the safe criteria as applied in the 2006 and 2008 Surveys. The fajor change between
the Surveys relates to the sourcing of evidence, which was in previous years the subject of a desk review
process led by World Bank staff. For a detailed explanation of the scoring criteria applied, see World Bank
(2007), pp. A14-A15.
2. While the focus of the criteria refains unchanged frof those used in previous surveys, three questions were
introduced, drawing on clearer definitions to guide a fore accurate assessfent of progress. Methodological
ifprovefents in this area have been inforfed by the findings of the 2010 UN Developfent Cooperation
Foruf Survey on Mutual Accountability (United Nations, 2010).

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CHAPTER 6: RES uLTS AND M uTu AL ACCO uNTABILITY
REFERENCES
EFA-FTI (Education for All Fast Track Initiative) (forthcofing), fFA FTI 2011 Monitoring fxercise.
GGI (Goss Gilroy Inc.) and MDF Training and Consultancy B.V. (2011), Results Reporting by Donor
Agencies – A report, paper coffissioned by the Global Partnership on Managing for Developfent Results
(unpublished).
IbP+ Results (2011), Strengthening Accountability to Achiebe the Health MDGs – Annual Performance Report
2010, Re-action! Consulting, London / Johannesburg.
OECD (2008a), Aid fffectibeness: A Progress Report on Implementing the Paris Declaration , OECD, Paris.
OECD (2008b), 2008 Surbey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration: Making aid More fffectibe by 2010,
OECD, Paris.
OECD (forthcofing a), General fbaluation of IDB’s Program to Implement the fxternal Pillar of the Medium
Term Action Plan for Debelopment fffectibeness, PRODEV.
OECD (forthcofing b), b as Donors’ Behabiour Changed after the Paris Declaration? Insights from
DAC Peer Rebiew s, OECD, Paris.
OECD (forthcofing c), Progress and Challenges in Aid fffectibeness – What Can We Learn from the Health
Sector?, WP-EFF Task Teaf on bealth as a Tracer Sector, OECD, Paris.
PARIS21 (2009a), PARIS21 at Ten – Improbements in Statistical Capacity since 1999, PARIS21, Paris.
PARIS21 (2009b), fbaluation of PARIS21 – Final Report, PARIS21, Paris.
PARIS21 (2010), Partner Report on Support to Statistics (PRfSS) – 2010 Round, PARIS21, Paris.
PARIS21 (2011), National Strategies for the Debelopment of Statistics Progress Report: NSDS Summary Table f
or IDA and Lower Middle Income Countries , PARIS21, Paris.
TT-SSC (Task Teaf on South-South Co-operation) (2010), Boosting South-South Cooperation in the Context
of Aid fffectibeness: Telling the Story of Partners Inbolbed in more than 110 Cases of South-South and Triangular
Cooperation, Task Teaf on South-South Cooperation, OECD, Paris.
United Nations (2010), Key Findings of the 2010 Mutual Accountability Surbey, ECOSOC Developfent
Cooperation Foruf, United Nations, New York.
United Nations (2011a), Indicators for Monitoring the Millennium Debelopment Goals – Report of the Secretary
General, ECOSOC, Statistical Coffission, 22 -25 February 2011.
United Nations (2011b), Progress on National-Lebel Mutual Accountability: Findings of the DCF Analysis,
paper presenting prelifinary findings of the 2011 DCF Survey, OESC/UNDESA, New York.
Wood, B., D. Kabell, F. Sagasti and N. Muwanga (2008), Synthesis Report on the First Phase of the fbaluation
of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration , Kabell Konsulting ApS / Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Denfark, Copenhagen.
World Bank (2007), Results-based National Debelopment Strategies: Assessment and Challenges Ahead,
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
World Bank (2010a), Trust Fund for Statistical Capacity Building at 10: Annual Report 2009/2010,
Developfent Data Group, World Bank, Washington, D.C.
World Bank (2010b), Dribing Debelopment Results: Strengthening fbidence-based Decision Making in
Debeloping Countries – Statistics for Results Facility Catalytic Fund Annual Report, World Bank,
Washington, D.C.

7 ExPERIENCE IN MONITORING
THE EFFECTI vENESS OF AID
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Why monitor aid effectibeness? How was the 2011 Surbey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration
conducted, and who participated in the process? What other initiatibes habe contributed to a
growing global ebidence base of what works and what does not to help make aid more effectibe?
This chapter answers these questions, highlighting the importance of monitoring the effectibeness
of aid as a means of strengthening learning and supporting accountability. Since its inception in
2005, the international framework used to monitor the Paris Declaration on Aid fffectibeness
has been applied in a growing number of countries, and has also informed the debelopment of a
number of complementary initiatibes which are outlined in this chapter.
R ATIONALE FOR MONITORING
T
he coffitfent to fonitor progress through 12 internationally accepted indicators
was a distinguishing feature of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The Survey
on Monitoring the Paris Declaration farked the first attefpt at the international level to
put in place a frafework for fonitoring and global accountability for the ifplefentation
of coffitfents fade by both donors and developing country governfents. The aifs of
the survey are two-fold:
– First, the survey offers a frafework – adopted by developing countries and donors on a
voluntary basis – for collecting evidence of progress in the ifplefentation of the Paris
Declaration at the country level. This in turn supports developing countries, donors
and other stakeholders in identifying challenges and opportunities to fake aid fore
effective at the country level. It can play a role in strengthening futual accountability at
the country level.
– Second, the survey allows the international coffunity to assess whether – at the global
level – donors and partner countries have fet the targets established for 2010 by the
Paris Declaration. This profotes global accountability and joint learning, and in turn
efphasises individual incentives for the ifplefentation of the coffitfents entered
into in the Paris Declaration.
The first survey was undertaken in 2006 and aifed to generate an accurate picture of
existing aid practices and provide a baseline for assessing progress. A fid-terf survey
was conducted in 2008 ahead of the Accra Third bigh Level Foruf on Aid Effectiveness
and inforfed the assessfent of progress and challenges underpinning the Accra Agenda
for Action. A third and final survey round was conducted in 2011 to deterfine whether
the targets set in the Paris Declaration for 2010 have been fet. The survey has generated
significant evidence to inforf the debates at the Fourth bigh Level Foruf on Aid
Effectiveness (Busan, Korea, 29 Novefber – 1 Decefber 2011). The increasing number
of countries
participating in the
survey suggests that
there are benefits from
the monitoring process,
bhich supports learning
and accountability

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CHAPTER 7: ExPERIENCE IN MONITORING THE EFFECTI vENESS OF AID
B ox 7.1 The working Party on Aid Effectiveness: transforming Global Partnerships for Development
The working Party on Aid Effectiveness, which is hosted at the OECD, started as a donor-only grouping in 2003 and
evolved into a joint partnership of donors and developing countries in 2005. This mirrors the shift in focus from donor
harmonisation during the First High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Rome, 2003) to a broader aid effectiveness
agenda encompassing the five principles of the Paris Declaration adopted during the Second High Level Forum on
Aid Effectiveness (Paris, 2005). It has now become the international partnership for aid effectiveness with 80 partici –
pants drawn from bilateral and multilateral donors, aid recipients, emerging providers of development assistance, civil
society organisations, global programmes, the private sector and parliaments.
After the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Accra, 2008), the shape of the working Party changed to
address the call for strengthening the partnership for effective aid. Since 2009, the working Party has been led by
two co-chairs: one from a developing country, another from a donor organisation. Its participants included 24 aid-
recipient countries, 8 countries which both provide and receive aid, 31 bilateral donors, 9 multilateral development
organisations, 6 civil society and other institutions (including one representing parliamentarians).
The working Party on Aid Effectiveness has volunteered to take forward work in key areas where more progress was
needed in order to meet the Paris Declaration target by 2010. To that end, it has hosted several working groups to
bring in the necessary knowledge and expertise and network with other relevant international forums on the following
topics: ownership and accountability; country systems; aid transparency and predictability; managing for develop –
ment results; south-south co-operation; innovative financing; and health as a tracer sector.
The Working Party on Aid Effectiveness is respon –
sible for fonitoring progress in ifplefenting the
Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action
(Box 7.1). It is supported by the OECD, which
co-ordinates the Survey on Monitoring the Paris
Declaration at the international level in partner –
ship with the World Bank and UNDP. A working
group on fonitoring the Paris Declaration cof –
prising experts frof the various constituencies of the
Working Party on Aid Effectiveness has provided
guidance to the OECD on fethodological aspects
and the actual survey roll-out process.
G RO wING PARTICIPATION AMONG
DEVELOPING CO uNTRIES
In 2006, 34 countries participated in the survey. Out
of these, 32 countries repeated the process in 2011,
constituting a panel of countries for which prog –
ress in achieving the 2010 targets can be assessed.
bowever, a broader assessfent of progress is also
derived frof a larger group of countries that partici –
pated in the survey for the first tife in 2008 or 2011.
Participation increased to 55 countries in 2008 and
then 78 countries in 2011. This represents about 80%
of the developing and transition countries which have
endorsed the Paris Declaration. In 2011, the fajority
of the low-incofe countries that are on the DAC
list of ODA recipients participated in the survey. Participation of fiddle-incofe countries has grown
over tife, frof 25% of participating countries in
2006 to 40% in 2011. In 2011, 12 countries and ter
–
ritories jointly conducted the Survey on Monitoring
the Paris Declaration and that on Monitoring the
Principles for Good International Engagefent in
Fragile States and Situations (the “Fragile States
Principles”). This cofbined process allowed these
countries to assess progress in ifplefenting coffit –
fents both on aid effectiveness, and on the effective –
ness of broader international engagefent in situations
of fragility.
The fact that an increasing nufber of partner
country governfents have chosen to participate
in successive rounds of the survey suggests that
they attach value to the benefits of participating in
country and global-level efforts to fonitor the Paris
Declaration. Feedback received during the 2011
Survey process highlighted in particular the use –
fulness of the global fonitoring process in creating
incentives for country-level data collection.
Coverage of the survey in terfs of global aid volufes
is quite cofprehensive. Data are available for 57
donors, including OECD-DAC donors, UN enti –
ties, international financial institutions, and several
global prograffes. In 2006, the 34 countries sur –
veyed accounted for 38% of core aid provided by
DAC fefbers in 2005. By 2008, fore than half
of core aid was covered by the survey, and in 2011,
Participation in the
survey has increased
over time and the 78
countries participating
in the 2011 Survey
accounted for 78% of
global core aid

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CHAPTER 7: ExPERIENCE IN MONITORING THE EFFECTI vENESS OF AID
this afount reached 78%. The 2011 Survey saw a
fodest increase in the nufber of non-DAC pro –
viders of assistance participating in the process and
providing inforfation on developfent co-opera –
tion in sofe countries. Approxifately 15 non-DAC
bilateral providers of assistance provided data in a
lifited nufber of countries (typically one to four
partner countries each). This included a nufber of
countries involved in south-south co-operation ( e.g.
China, Chile, Colofbia, Thailand). The increased
participation of the Czech Republic and Turkey is
particularly noteworthy: the Czech Republic pro –
vided data on its co-operation in 7 partner countries
through the 2011 Survey (up frof 3 in the 2008
Survey), and Turkey reported in 12 partner coun –
tries (cofpared with 2 in 2008).
A CO uNTR y-LED PROCESS
Participation in the survey process is voluntary. It
is a country-based process, with authorities in par –
ticipating countries nofinating a national co-ordi –
nator to lead the process. National co-ordinators
are typically senior officials in finistries of finance,
planning or foreign affairs responsible for aid fan –
agefent and co-ordination. Donors actively support
the process at country level by providing the nec –
essary data and in fany places, in appointing a
donor focal point to provide practical help to the
national co-ordinator. Civil society organisations
(CSOs), parliafentarians and other stakeholders
play ifportant roles in the survey. National co-ordi –
nators have been encouraged to include CSOs and
parliafentarians in relevant discussions and feet –
ings regarding the 2011 Survey although CSOs do
not provide ODA and, for the purpose of the survey,
did not subfit data on their activities. The level of
engagefent of different national stakeholders in the
dialogue around the survey varied across countries.
A detailed description of the process is provided in
the Survey Guidance (OECD, 2010a).
The Accra Agenda for Action encouraged donors
and developing countries to fonitor, at country level
and on a voluntary basis, the ifplefentation of the
Fragile States Principles. For the 12 countries par –
ticipating in both the Paris Declaration and Fragile
States Principles Surveys, fonitoring efforts were
streaflined by bringing the two processes together.
1 This was done through cofbined survey guidance
and questionnaires, data collection, dialogue around
findings and validation of data. Findings frof both
surveys were synthesised in a single country report.
These efforts are feant to reduce transaction costs
for both donors and partner countries, and to gen
–
erate fore holistic dialogue on the challenges faced
in these countries. A detailed description of the
process is provided in the joint Survey Guidance
(OECD, 2010b).
The survey process can be burdensofe, particularly
for countries participating for the first tife and not
having well-established aid fanagefent inforfa –
tion systefs and co-ordination processes. bowever,
several countries fentioned that the benefits of par –
ticipating in the process outweighed the costs associ –
ated in terfs of obtaining the evidence and having
an inforfed dialogue at the country level. Drawing
on reviews of lessons learned, the process has been
enhanced over tife with a view to facilitating the
task of national co-ordinators and ensuring greater
accuracy and credibility of data (OECD, 2008;
baffond, 2010). This has included refinefents
to the Survey Guidance to encourage consistent
reporting against agreed criteria, a series of survey
launch workshops organised by the OECD, UNDP
and partner countries to help prepare national co-
ordinators for the effective roll-out of the survey, and
a global helpdesk facility.
O PTIONAL MOD uLES ON GENDER E quALIT y
AND INCL uSIVE O wNERSHIP
The qualitative assessfents in the 2011 Survey
were deepened to ensure that evidence of progress
across key coffitfents set out in both the Paris
Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action would
be captured. For exafple, questions relating to divi –
sion of labour, fediuf-terf predictability, condi –
tionality and futual accountability were added to
the guidelines for qualitative inputs. In addition, two
optional survey fodules were proposed to countries
interested in carrying out a fore in-depth analysis
of inclusive ownership and gender equality. In 12 countries, the
process also assessed the
effectiveness of broader
international
engagement through the
Principles for Good
International
Engagement in Fragile
States and Situations

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CHAPTER 7: ExPERIENCE IN MONITORING THE EFFECTI vENESS OF AID
The optional gender equality fodule supplefents
the core survey and aifs to provide a starting point
for dialogue on aid effectiveness and gender equality
at the country level, generating evidence on efforts
to address gender equality in the context of the Paris
and Accra coffitfents. National co-ordinators
for the 2011 Survey were invited to cofplete the
fodule in consultation with finistries, donors, civil
society and parliafentarians. A total of 24 countries
opted to test the fodule.
2 This process facilitated an
exchange about progress fade and country own –
ership of gender equality and wofen’s efpower –
fent afongst governfent officials, civil society and
donors. The three gender equality indicators used
in the fodule link directly to the Paris Declaration
fonitoring indicators: (i) ownership – gender equality
and wofen’s efpowerfent are grounded in a sys –
tefatic fanner in national developfent strategies,
(ii) results – data are disaggregated by sex, and (iii)
futual accountability for gender equality and
wofen’s efpowerfent.
The optional fodule on inclusive ownership pro –
vided an opportunity for countries participating in
the 2011 Survey to engage in a deeper discussion on
the participation of national stakeholders in the dia –
logue on developfent policy and the contribution
that aid can fake to this dialogue. This optional
fodule was designed to cofplefent indicator 1
(operational developfent strategies) by analysing
the fechanisfs for and extent of participation of
different stakeholders ( e.g. parliafent, local govern –
fents, social partners, CSOs) in the forfulation,
ifplefentation and fonitoring of developfent pol –
icies and strategies. A total of 14 countries responded
to the optional fodule on inclusive ownership.
3
The process of answering the questionnaire was not
uniforf across countries, but in fore than half of
cases the process of answering the optional fodule
questionnaire has itself been a participatory process,
involving partner country governfent officials,
donors, representatives of CSOs and acadefics.
M ONITORING AID EFFECTIVENESS
AT THE SECTOR LEVEL
Cofplefentary fonitoring initiatives have
also drawn on elefents of the Paris Declaration
Monitoring Frafework. These include efforts to
fonitor aid effectiveness in the health and edu –
cation sectors under the responsibility of the
International bealth Partnership and other related
initiatives (IbP+) and the Education for All Fast
Track Initiative (EFA FTI).
The IbP+ brings together donors and developing
countries that have – through the IbP+ Global
Cofpact – coffitted to provide resources in
an effective fanner to support the achievefent
of results set out in partner countries’ own health
sector plans. This agreefent is backed by a foni –
toring frafework cofprising a set of Standard
Perforfance Measures. While the IbP+ Results
frafework goes beyond a sifple sector application of
the Paris Declaration indicators, the standards, con –
cepts and definitions used were drawn on extensively
in defining the Standard Perforfance Measures. Of
the 22 feasures, 11 are Paris Declaration indica –
tors or adaptations of thef. Monitoring of the IbP+
Global Cofpact is co-ordinated by an international
consortiuf, IbP+Results. Visual scorecards are
published for every participating donor and partner
country, offering a user-friendly overview of prog –
ress and challenges. In 2010, the process covered 10
countries and 15 of their donors.
The EFA FTI is a global partnership of donors,
developing countries, fultilateral organisations,
civil society organisations, private foundations and
private sector organisations dedicated to ensuring
that all children receive quality basic education.
Through the EFA FTI Partnership, developing coun –
tries and their donors co-ordinate at both national
and international levels to ensure greater donor
harfonisation, knowledge sharing and resource
fobilisation. At country level, EFA FTI supports
the developfent and the ifplefentation of cof –
prehensive sector-wide education plans or interif
education plans in fragile states. A fonitoring
and evaluation strategy is under developfent and
includes a results frafework that defines the objec –
tives and the targets of the EFA FTI Partnership.
In 2011, qualitatibe
assessments were
deepened to assess
progress against key
commitments of the
Accra Agenda for Action,
such as inclusibe
ownership and gender
equality

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CHAPTER 7: ExPERIENCE IN MONITORING THE EFFECTI vENESS OF AID
B ox 7.2 use and adaptation of the Paris Declaration monitoring framework: innovative practices
Cambodia: real-time monitoring of aid effectiveness through the Cambodia ODA Database
The Cambodia ODA Database was set up by the Royal Government of Cambodia to act as a repository for infor –
mation on aid flows to Cambodia (https://cdc.khmer.biz). It captures project-level information on aid commitments
and disbursements, and acts as the main tool through which donors in Cambodia provide information on aid flows
to national authorities. It is publically accessible, and includes information on non-DAC providers of development
co-operation.
In addition to capturing financial data and information on the nature of aid-funded activities, the Cambodia ODA
Database captures – at the project level – data against most of the Paris Declaration indicators. For example, data on
the use of country PFM systems (indicator 5a) is reported by donors for each project disbursement at the same time
as other financial data. This approach to integrating the Paris Declaration indicators in the national aid management
system facilitates:
• Real-time reporting on implementation of the Paris Declaration and Cambodia’s own action plan –
instead of waiting for the next round of the global monitoring process, stakeholders have up-to-date
aggregates on most of the Paris indicators.
• Tracking of progress at a range of levels – for example, Paris Declaration indicators can be applied to the
analysis of aid flows to a given sector or geographical area.
• Accessibility – donors, government, non-state actors and the general public have access to recent
country-level information on progress in the implementation of an important international agreement.
Rwanda: Donor Per formance Assessment Framework
Rwanda’s Aid Policy (2006) builds on and makes explicit reference to the Paris Declaration, its monitoring framework,
and the global targets agreed in it. In their efforts to strengthen mutual accountability, the Government of Rwanda and
its donors finalised two complementary performance assessment frameworks in 2009 – the Common Performance
Assessment Framework used by most donors as a basis for assessing Rwanda’s performance in implementing its
national development strategy, and the Donor Performance Assessment Framework, which assesses individual and
collective donor performance towards agreed goals for the quality of development co-operation.
Rwanda’s Donor Performance Assessment Framework includes all of the Paris Declaration indicators, going further
than these by proposing a number of innovations:
• Annual assessment – government and donor performance assessments are conducted annually and
are timed to coincide with the joint review of performance in implementing the national development
strategy. Both government and donor performance feature in discussions at an annual two-day meeting,
leading to agreement on policy actions where improvements are needed.
• Country-specific and “augmented” Paris indicators – 27 indicators of donor performance are included,
some of them designed to respond to country-specific needs ( e.g. an indicator of the quality and timeli –
ness of data provided by donors to government). Others are modifications of the global Paris Declaration
indicators ( e.g. number of donor missions per u SD million of aid provided).
• Clear, easily understood “traffic light” scoring – donor performance is summarised as red (targets not met),
amber (insufficient information) or green (targets met), simplifying communication.
• Monitoring of donors’ policy actions – in addition to proxies for the quality of aid provided, donors are
assessed against their implementation of policy actions and practices that contribute to aid effectiveness at
the country level.

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CHAPTER 7: ExPERIENCE IN MONITORING THE EFFECTI vENESS OF AID
A Mutual Accountability Matrix will describe the
roles and responsibilities of all partners – govern –
fents, donors, civil society, international non-
governfental organisations (NGOs) and the private
sector – that work towards achieving quality educa –
tion for all. Monitoring the effectiveness of all aid to
education is included in the regular fonitoring of the
EFA FTI Results Frafework and draws upon selected
Paris Declaration indicators. Progress is also tracked
on the following aspects: three-year predictability
of dofestic financing and donor coffitfents;
fonitoring learning outcofes; and participation of
civil society in education sector processes. To conduct
fonitoring, the EFA FTI Secretariat works with local
education groups which bring together the education
finistries, donors, international NGOs and national
CSOs under the leadership of the governfent and/
or a donor. At the country level, one donor has been
tasked with co-ordinating the exercise on behalf of
the Local Education Group and working closely with
the Ministry of Education. The 2011 Monitoring
Exercise covers 42 developing countries and 30 of
their bilateral and fultilateral donors.
4
I NTERNALISING AND C uSTOMISING
THE P ARIS D ECLARATION MONITORING
FRAME wOR k
Since the endorsefent of the Paris Declaration in
2005 and the finalisation of its fonitoring frafe –
work in 2006, a nufber of exafples of innovative
practices in the use and adaptation of elefents of the
Paris Declaration fonitoring frafework have been
identified involving a broad range of stakeholders.
These applications recognise the value that a set of
global standards and norfs on the quality of devel –
opfent co-operation – along with publicly available
tife series data – can bring to a range of existing
activities and processes. Such initiatives can be cat –
egorised as follows:
i) Partner country or context-specific frafeworks
and tools for assessing perforfance and pro –
foting futual accountability e.g. Cafbodia
and Rwanda – Box 7.2).
5
ii) Sector, thefatic or other mezzo-level diagnostic
and futual review processes ( e.g. IbP+Results
and the EFA-FTI).
iii) Donor-specific initiatives to strengthen corpo –
rate perforfance and accountability to taxpayers
( e.g. Asian Developfent Bank and the UK’s
Departfent for International Developfent).
iv) Non-governfental initiatives aifing to generate
knowledge, foster transparency and profote
dofestic accountability ( e.g. the Quality of
Official Developfent Assistance Assessfent
developed by the Brookings Institution and the
Centre for Global Developfent).
Fu Tu RE CONSIDERATIONS
n The increasing coverage of the Survey on
Monitoring the Paris Declaration over successive
rounds – cofbined with strong partner country
leadership over the process in fany countries –
suggests that there are continued benefits to be
had frof a process which supports fonitoring
and accountability on developfent co-opera –
tion issues at both the country level and inter –
nationally. The Fourth bigh Level Foruf on
Aid Effectiveness should consider how efforts to
fonitor existing coffitfents on aid effective –
ness should be sustained over tife, drawing on
the lessons learned through periodic fonitoring
of the Paris Declaration.
n Global norfs and benchfarks can offer a helpful
starting point for the developfent of fore
detailed fonitoring frafeworks within partner
countries and donor organisations. Future efforts
to fonitor coffitfents on aid and developfent
effectiveness should balance the need for both a
degree of standardisation to support international
cofparability and accountability with the need for
sufficient flexibility to adapt concepts and targets
to feet country- and context-specific needs.
The Paris Declaration
monitoring frameborf
has been used and
adapted to serve
country-specific
accountability and
performance assessment
needs and monitor
global health and
education initiatives

103
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CHAPTER 7: ExPERIENCE IN MONITORING THE EFFECTI vENESS OF AID
The experiences of countries that have successfully
internalised and adapted the Paris Declaration
fonitoring frafework to their needs and priori –
ties can offer valuable lessons, as can existing ini –
tiatives to fonitor aid effectiveness at the sector
level, and efforts to fonitor the ifplefentation
of coffitfents on international engagefent in
fragile states and situations.
n Any future fonitoring frafework should draw
on lessons learned to date in the selection of appro –
priate indicators and targets. While the indicators
of progress agreed in Paris aifed to offer a range
of proxies through which progress against the
five principles could be assessed, sofe offer fore
relevant insights into the sorts of behaviour that
fatter for aid effectiveness than others. While the
Accra Agenda for Action reflected a deepening of
the Paris Declaration, fonitoring sofe of the
coffitfents set out in it has been challenging
in the absence of agreed norfs and indicators.
The optional fodules on inclusive ownership
and gender equality piloted as part of the 2011
Survey could be drawn on as exafples to inforf
the developfent of indicators and assessfent
fethods covering a wider range of coffitfents.
n The 2011 Survey sought to ensure broader par –
ticipation in the survey process at the country
level, including parliafentarians and civil society
organisations. Future initiatives should build on
efforts fade to date to support the active par –
ticipation of a broader set of stakeholders in the
fonitoring of coffitfents relating to aid and
developfent. The involvefent of eferging
donors and south-south co-operation actors in
the design of future fonitoring initiatives should
support the developfent of better inforfation
on developfent co-operation at the country
level, providing opportunities for fore inclusive
dialogue and futual learning.

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CHAPTER 7: ExPERIENCE IN MONITORING THE EFFECTI vENESS OF AID
NOTES
1. The following countries and territories participated in both processes: Burundi, Central African Republic,
Chad, Coforos, D.R. Congo, Guinea Bissau, baiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Togo, Tifor-
Leste. Sofalia is the only participant in the Fragile States Principles survey not taking part in the Survey
on Monitoring the Paris Declaration.
2. The optional fodule on gender equality and aid effectiveness was developed under the auspices of the
DAC Network on Gender Equality. Countries piloting the optional gender equality fodule in 2011
included: Albania, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Caferoon, Cape Verde, Coforos, D.R. Congo, Dofinican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, bonduras, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Moldova, Morocco, Mozafbique,
Nepal, Niger, Peru, Rwanda, Togo and Zafbia.
3. The optional fodule on inclusive ownership was developed under the auspices of the WP-EFF, and was
cofpleted with – in sofe cases – active involvefent of representatives of partner country governfents,
donors and CSOs. The following countries volunteered to pilot the optional fodule: Albania, Colofbia,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, bonduras, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Moldova, Nepal, Niger, Togo and Zafbia.
Countries piloting the optional fodule on inclusive ownership in 2011: Albania, Colofbia, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Gabon, bonduras, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Moldova, Nepal, Niger, Togo and Zafbia.
4. This progress report draws on the data available for 32 countries by end-July 2011.
5. Several other countries are now conducting the survey on an annual basis ( e.g. Morocco, Philippines). Sofe
countries participating in the survey for the first tife in 2011 conducted a survey in 2010 to establish a
baseline ( e.g. Bosnia-berzegovina, Guatefala).

105
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CHAPTER 7: ExPERIENCE IN MONITORING THE EFFECTI vENESS OF AID
REFERENCES
baffond, B. (2010), Rebiew of Lessons from the 2008 Surbey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration,
paper prepared for the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2008b), 2008 Surbey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration: Making Aid More fffectibe by 2010,
OECD, Paris.
OECD (2010a), 2011 Surbey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration: Surbey Guidance, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2010b), 2011 Surbey Guide for Monitoring the Implementation of the Fragile States Principles,
OECD, Paris.
Wood, B. et al. (2011), The fbaluation of the Paris Declaration, Final Report, The Danish Institute for
International Studies, Copenhagen, May 2011.

STATISTICAL APPENDI CES
107
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A PPENDICES A, B AND C provide data for all of the 12 indicators measfred throfgh the
2011 Sfrveb on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, along with data drawn from the 2006
and 2008 Sfrvebs to facilitate comparison. The charts contained in the bodb of the report
are based on this data.
Appendix A provides a breakdown of the data for each of the indicators on a cofntrb-bb-
cofntrb basis, while Appendix B covers all sfrvebed indicators on a donor-bb-donor basis.
Appendix C sfmmarises each donor’s data in a single table containing the sfrvebed indica –
tors. Appendix D oftlines the indicators of progress agreed in the Paris Declaration, and
the means throfgh which 2010 targets are established.

STATISTICAL APPENDICES
TA b LE of CoNTENTS

109
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A. COUNTRY DATA (ONE TABLE PER INDICATOR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Table A.0: Coverage of the sfrveb: aid reported in the sfrveb
vs. Core aid reported to the DAC
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Table A.1: Do cofntries have operational development strategies?
. . . . . . . . . . 116
Table A.2a: How reliable are cofntrb pfblic financial
management sbstems?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Table A.2b: How reliable are cofntrb procfrement sbstems?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Table A.3: Are government bfdget estimates comprehensive
and realistic?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Table A.4: How mfch technical assistance is co-ordinated with
cofntrb programmes?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Table A.5: How mfch aid for the government sector fses
cofntrb sbstems?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Table A.6: How manb PIUs are parallel to cofntrb strfctfres?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Table A.7: Are disbfrsements on schedfle and recorded bb government?
. . . . 128
Table A.8: How mfch bilateral aid is fntied?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Table A.9: How mfch aid was programme-based?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Table A.10a: How manb donor missions were co-ordinated?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Table A.10b: How mfch cofntrb analbsis was co-ordinated?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Table A.11: Do cofntries have monitorable performance
assessment frameworks?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
Table A.12: Do cofntries have reviews of mftfal accofntabilitb?
. . . . . . . . . . . . 139
B. DONOR DATA (O NE TABLE PER INDICATOR ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Table B.3: Are government bfdget estimates comprehensive and realistic? . .144
Table B.4: How mfch technical assistance is co-ordinated with
cofntrb programmes?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Table B.5: How mfch aid for the government sector fses cofntrb sbstems? .148
Table B.6: How manb PIUs are parallel to cofntrb strfctfres?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Table B.7: Are disbfrsements on schedfle and recorded bb government?
. . . . 152
Table B.8: How mfch bilateral aid is fntied?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Table B.9: How mfch aid was programme-based?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
Table B.10a: How manb donor missions were co-ordinated?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Table B.10b: How mfch cofntrb analbsis was co-ordinated?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

110
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C. DONOR DATA (ONE TABLE PER DONOR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Table C.1: African Development Bank
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Table C.2: Asian Development Bank
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . m. . . . . . . . 166
Table C.3: Afstralia
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Table C.4: Afstria
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
Table C.5: Belgifm
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Table C.6: Canada
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
Table C.7: Denmark
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
Table C.8: EU Institftions
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Table C.9: Finland
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
Table C.10: France
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
Table C.11: GAVI Alliance
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Table C.12: Germanb
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
Table C.13: Global Ffnd
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Table C.14: IFAD
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Table C.15: IMF
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Table C.16: Inter-American Development Bank
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
Table C.17: Ireland
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Table C.18: Italb
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
Table C.19: Japan
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Table C.20: Korea
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
Table C.21: Lfxembofrg
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
Table C.22: Netherlands
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
Table C.23: New Zealand
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Table C.24: Norwab
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
Table C.25: Portfgal
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Table C.26: Spain
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
Table C.27: Sweden
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Table C.28: Switzerland
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
Table C.29: Tfrkeb
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Table C.30: United Kingdom
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
Table C.31: United Nations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Table C.32: United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
Table C.33: World Bank
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
D. PARIS DECLARATION INDICATORS OF PROGRESS . . . 199

APPENDIX A: COUNTRY DATA
AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION — ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 — © OECD 2011111
A Co UNTRY DATA
o NE TA bLE PER INDICAT oR
THE FOLLOWING TABLES provide the data for all 12 of the indicators on a cofntrb-bb-
cofntrb basis. Data are presented for the 78 cofntries and territories that have taken part
in the 2011 Sfrveb.
H OW TO USE A PPENDIX A
Progress over the period 2005-2010 is measfred for a set of 32 cofntries that participated
in both the 2006 Baseline Sfrveb and the 2011 Sfrveb. The fpper part of the following
tables shows the data for this grofp of cofntries. All available data for all other cofntries
are then shown in the lower part of each table, thofgh becafse not all cofntries partici –
pated in everb rofnd of the Sfrveb, these data do not form a basis for accfrate comparisons
over time.
Table A.0 provides information on the coverage of the 2011 Sfrveb. The amofnts reported
in the Sfrveb eqfate to over 100% of core aid in 2009 – that is, aid programmed for
spending in partner cofntries – which members of the Development Assistance Committee
reported for 2009.
D ATA SOURCES
The tables in Appendix A draw on a nfmber of different sofrces:
• Indicator 1 (operational development strategies) and Indicator 11 (resflts-oriented
frameworks) draw on an assessment fndertaken bb World Bank staff on the basis of
information provided bb stakeholders in each partner cofntrb throfgh a Government
Qfestionnaire. The criteria for assessment are the same as those fsed in the 2006 and 2008
Sfrvebs, and are pfblished in World Bank (2007) Results-based National Development
ftrategies: assessment and bhallenges ahead, World Bank, Washington, D.C.
• Indicator 2a (reliable pfblic financial management sbstems) is drawn from the World
Bank’s Cofntrb Policb and Institftional Assessment (CPIA), criterion 13 (Qfalitb of
Bfdgetarb and Financial Management).
• Indicator 2b (reliable procfrement sbstems) is – where available – based on the
OECD-DAC Methodologb for Assessing Procfrement Sbstems.
• Indicator 8 (fntbing aid) is based on reporting bb OECD-DAC members on the tbing
statfs of aid throfgh the Creditor Reporting Sbstem.
• Data for the remaining indicators are drawn from the 2011 Sfrveb on Monitoring the
Paris Declaration, and are collected at the cofntrb level throfgh government and donor
qfestionnaires.

112AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION — ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 — © OECD 2011
APPENDIX A: COUNTRY DATA
GLOBAL INDICATORS AND AVERAGE COUNTRY RATIOS
Where indicators are calcflated on the basis of data collected throfgh qfestionnaires, the
colfmn headings of the tables in Appendix A are labelled to show the formfla fsed in the
calcflation of each indicator. For most of these indicators, global valfes are the weighted
averages of the cofntrb valfes. The average cofntrb ratio is presented fnder each total
for reference pfrposes onlb. This is an fn-weighted average of all of the individfal donor-
partner cofntrb calcflations; i.e. it gives eqfal weight to each donor / partner cofntrb ir –
respective of the volfme of aid involved.
Indicators 3 (aid flows are aligned on national priorities) and 7 (aid is more predictable) are
notable exceptions to the approach described above. For these indicators, the individfal
cofntrb valfes presented in tables A.3 and A.7 tend to overstate the extent to which aid is
captfred in government bfdgets and accofnting sbstems as within a given cofntrb, over-
and fnder-estimates bb different donors cancel each other oft. Consistent with the meth –
odologb fsed in 2008, the global valfes presented for indicators 3 and 7 are an fn-weighted
average of all of the individfal donor-partner cofntrb calcflations. These individfal cal –
cflations address the challenge presented bb over- and fnder-estimation bb inverting the
nfmerator and denominator to ensfre that the ratio presented is alwabs less than or eqfal
to 100%. This offers a more realistic – albeit fn-weighted – indicator of progress.
A DDITIONAL INFORMATION
The provision of final data for indicator 8 (aid fntbing) bb donors for 2005 and 2007 after
pfblication of reports on the previofs sfrvebs means that the historical figfres provided in
table A.8 mab differ from those pfblished previofslb.
Softhern Sfdan became the Repfblic of Softh Sfdan in Jflb 2011. All data for the 2011
Sfrveb were collected in the first half of 2011 and relate to aid activities in 2010, prior to in –
dependence. In order to avoid dofble cofnting, the calcflation of global valfes for some in –
dicators exclfdes data sfbmitted bb Softhern Sfdan where the cofntrb sfbmission for the
Repfblic of the Sfdan was known to inclfde data on activities in Softhern Sfdan. Where
this is the case, data for Softhern Sfdan are shown at the end of each table for reference.

APPENDIX A: COUNTRY DATA
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114
APPENDIX A: COUNTRY DATA
AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION — ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 — © OECD 2011
Aid reported
in the
2011 Survey (fSD m) bore aid

reported to the
DAb for 2009
x
(fSD m) Ratio
Gross ODA reported
to the DAb for2009
y
(fSD m) Ratio
Aid disbursed
through other donors 2010 (fSD m)
2005
20072010 200520072010
a b(for reference)
(for reference) c = a / b
d(for reference)
(for reference) e = a / d
2006/2011
Survey Countries (32)
Afghanistan 5 8075 66195%79%103% 6 23686%73%93% 1 186
Albania 372 402100%86%93% 403100% 85%92% 12
Bangladesh 2 1371 774106%90%120% 1 868103%81%114% 262
Benin 658 68968%81%95% 69763%79%94% 39
Bolivia 708 731111%87%97% 741104% 29%96% 23
Burkina Faso 9741 074 83%87%91% 1 11378%84%88% 39
Burundi 595 47562%78%125% 1 55536%59%38% 32
bambodia 884 73386%106% 121% 74585%104%119% 83
bape Verde 344 21462%85%161% 21662%84%159% 5
bongo, Dem. Rep. 1 6441 82491%123% 90% 2 552 48%69%64% 103
Dominican Republic 394 199104%167%198% 210103%158%188% 2
Egypt 1 8241 42772%90%128% 1 55664%81%117% 14
Ethiopia 3 2283 16799%88%102% 3 81862%77%85% 374
Ghana 1 4891 59291%95%94% 1 645 63%93%91% 31
Honduras 821 45478%101% 181% 46432%25%177% 19
Kenya 1 0251 62783%55%63% 1 991 75%48%51% 86
Kyrgyz Republic 370 35663%75%104% 37061%74%100% 7
Malawi 942 760108%72%124% 77093%29%122% 17
Mali 1 0931 00184%89%109% 1 03177%77%106% 3
Mauritania 284 27485%107% 104% 28972%102%98% 19
Moldova 448 26087%83%173% 26182%80%172% 24
Mongolia 357 41772%44%86% 42170%44%85% 19
Mozambique 1 8542 00396%90%93% 2 035 93%89%91% 26
Niger 511 43688%82%117% 48470%76%105% 39
Peru 1 055 64690%56%163% 69980%52%151% 6
Rwanda 1 096 920105%109%119% 93791%107%117% 31
Senegal 6811 039 76%78%66% 1 065 60%76%64% 42
South Africa 1 2221 11178%0%110% 1 11477%0%110% 1
Tanzania 2 7632 87894%88%96% 2 954 87%66%94% 80
fganda 1 5041 65398%83%91% 1 791 83%72%84% 44
Viet Nam 3 9774 15494%97%96% 4 17493%96%95% 98
Zambia 8821 240 92%98%71% 1 267 37%90%70% 58
Sub-Total 41 94241 190 91%84%102% 45 474 73%
70%92% 2 826
TABLE A.0 Coverage of the Survey: Aid reported in the Survey vs. Core aid reported to the DAC

APPENDIX A: COUNTRY DATA
AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION — ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 — © OECD 2011115
Aid reported
in the
2011 Survey (fSD m) bore aid

reported to the
DAb for 2009
x
(fSD m) Ratio
Gross ODA reported
to the DAb for2009
y
(fSD m) Ratio
Aid disbursed
through other donors 2010 (fSD m)
2005
20072010 200520072010
a b(for reference)
(for reference) c = a / b
d(for reference)
(for reference) e = a / d
All Other Countries (45)
Armenia 367 569 —-64% 570 —-64% 0
Bosnia-Herzegovina 358 430 —-83% 437 —-82% 43
Botswana 72 291 —-25% 292 —-25% 0
bameroon 431 738 –77%58% 797 –24%54% 8
bentral African Rep. 180 203 –98%89% 779 –72%23% 23
bhad 246 296 –68%83% 598 –37%41% 34
bolombia 6701 030 –58%65% 1 117 –51%60% 140
bomoros 57 57—-100% 60—-95% 9
Ecuador 183 296 —-62% 306 —-60% 18
El Salvador 431 322 —-134% 347—-124% 19
Fiji 66 72—-92% 74—-89% 6
Gabon 135 82–60%164% 113–60%119% 2
Gambia 97 141 —-69% 142 —-68% 0
Guatemala 247 424 —-58% 430 —-57% 0
Guinea-Bissau 132 151 —-88% 165 —-80% 9
Haiti 1 664 975–107% 171% 1 949 –90%85% 89
Indonesia 6 4363 383 –158% 190% 3 676 –142% 175% 278
Jamaica 1 013 216—-468% 218—-466% 3
Jordan 583 781 –72% 75% 812 –63%72% 0
Kosovo 381 767 —-50% 784 —-49% 23
Laos 426 462 –82%92% 472 –82%90% 35
Lesotho 295 144 —-205% 147—-201% 1
Liberia 402 362 –108% 111% 527–92%76% 16
Madagascar 442 437 –86%101% 455–77%97% 32
Morocco 1 5511 400 –108% 111% 1 402 –107% 111% 6
Namibia 199 330 —-60% 333 —-60% 4
Nepal 875 901 –96% 97% 969 –87%90% 27
Nigeria 2 1011 697 –51%124% 1 703 –32%123% 31
Pakistan 2 9442 926 —-101% 3 454 —-85% 127
Papua New Guinea 599 440 –102% 136% 447–101%134% 4
Philippines 1 8991 137 –160% 167% 1 212 –157%157% 52
Samoa 180 80—-224% 83—-217% 0
Sao Tome & Principe 43 31—-139% 31—-138%
1
Sierra Leone 451 441 –89%102% 450–26%100% 15
Solomon Islands 203 210 —-97% 211 —-96% 205
St.Vincent & Grenadines 4 35 —-13% 36—-13% 1
Sudan 1 2931 035 –97%125% 2 330 –39%55% 301
Swaziland 132 67—-196% 69—-192% 5
Tajikistan 387 418 —-93% 436 —-89% 35
Timor-Leste 341 211 —-161% 216—-158% 37
Togo 146 262 –67%56% 541 –62%27% 20
Tonga 54 39—-138% 41—-132% 7
fkraine 566 674 –80% 84% 675 –80%84% 127
Vanuatu 114 106 —-108% 106—-108% 2
West Bank and Gaza 1 5891 848 —-86% 2 569 —-62% 291
Sub-Total 30 98526 918 –71%115% 32 580 –54%95% 2 087
TOTAL 72 92768 109 91%79%107% 78 054 73%64%93% 4 913
For reference: Global coverage of the Survey
Total for the Survey (77 countries) 72 92768 109 91%79%107% 78 054 73%64%93%
All other countries (79 countries) –25 732 —— 29 967 ——
TOTAL(z) 72 92793 840 35%55%78% 108 021 23%43%68%
(x): "Core aid" matches closely the definition of aid used in the Survey; it excludes debt reorganisation and humanitarian aid.
(y): "Gross ODA" includes all types of ODA reported to the DAC for the calendar year 2009.
(z): The total includes country allocable aid only; it excludes regional and global activities.
TABLE A.0 Coverage of the Survey: Aid reported in the Survey vs. Core aid reported to the DAC

116
APPENDIX A: COUNTRY DATA
AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION — ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 — © OECD 2011
Indicator 1
2005
(for reference) 2007
(for reference) 2010
Rating
2006/2011
Survey Countries (32)
Afghanistan N/ADb
Albania bbB
Bangladesh bbb
Benin bbB
Bolivia bbb
Burkina Faso bBb
Burundi DbD
bambodia bbB
bape Verde bbD
bongo, Dem. Rep. DDD
Dominican Republic N/AN/AD
Egypt N/AN/AB
Ethiopia bBB
Ghana bBB
Honduras bbB
Kenya DbB
Kyrgyz Republic bbD
Malawi bbB
Mali bbb
Mauritania Bbb
Moldova Dbb
Mongolia Dbb
Mozambique bbB
Niger bbb
Peru N/AN/AD
Rwanda BBA
Senegal bbb
South Africa N/AN/AB
Tanzania BBA
fganda BBB
Viet Nam BBB
Zambia bBB
Indicator 1
2005
(for reference) 2007
(for reference) 2010
Rating
All Other Countries (45)
Armenia bbb
Bosnia-Herzegovina bbD
Botswana N/AN/AB
bameroon bbb
bentral African Rep. DDD
bhad bbD
bolombia N/AN/AB
bomoros N/AN/AD
Ecuador N/AN/AB
El Salvador N/AN/Ab
Fiji N/AN/Ab
Gabon N/AN/AD
Gambia Dbb
Guatemala N/AN/AD
Guinea-Bissau EDD
Haiti DDD
Indonesia N/AN/AB
Jamaica N/AN/AB
Jordan N/AN/AB
Kosovo N/AN/AE
Laos bbB
Lesotho bbb
Liberia DDD
Madagascar bbD
Morocco N/AN/AN/A
Namibia N/AN/Ab
Nepal bbD
Nigeria N/AbB
Pakistan bbB
Papua New Guinea N/AN/Ab
Philippines N/AN/AB
Samoa N/AN/Ab
Sao Tome & Principe DDD
Sierra Leone Dbb
Solomon Islands N/AN/Ab
St.Vincent & Grenadines N/AN/AD
Sudan DDB
Swaziland N/AN/AD
Tajikistan bbb
Timor-Leste N/AN/Ab
Togo N/AN/AB
Tonga N/AN/AD
fkraine N/AN/AD
Vanuatu N/AN/Ab
West Bank and Gaza N/AN/AN/A
For reference:
Southern Sudan N/AN/AN/A
TABLE A.1 Do countries have operational development strategies?

APPENDIX A: COUNTRY DATA
AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION — ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 — © OECD 2011117
Indicator 2a
2005
(for reference) 2007
(for reference) 2010
Rating
2006/2011
Survey Countries (32)
Afghanistan N/A 3.0 3.5
Albania 4.0N/A N/A
Bangladesh 3.0 3.0 3.0
Benin 4.0 3.5 3.5
Bolivia 3.5 3.5 3.5
Burkina Faso 4.0 4.0 4.5
Burundi 2.5 3.0 3.0
bambodia 2.5 3.0 3.5
bape Verde 3.5 4.0 4.0
bongo, Dem. Rep. 2.5 2.5 2.5
Dominican Republic N/AN/A N/A
Egypt N/AN/A N/A
Ethiopia 3.5 4.0 3.5
Ghana 3.5 4.0 3.5
Honduras 4.0 4.0 3.5
Kenya 3.5 3.5 3.5
Kyrgyz Republic 3.0 3.0 3.5
Malawi 3.0 3.0 3.0
Mali 4.0 3.5 3.5
Mauritania 2.0 2.5 3.0
Moldova 3.5 4.0 4.0
Mongolia 4.0 4.0 4.0
Mozambique 3.5 3.5 4.0
Niger 3.5 3.5 3.5
Peru N/AN/A N/A
Rwanda 3.5 4.0 4.0
Senegal 3.5 3.5 3.5
South Africa N/AN/A N/A
Tanzania 4.5 4.0 3.5
fganda 4.0 4.0 3.5
Viet Nam 4.0 4.0 4.0
Zambia 3.0 3.5 3.5
Indicator 2a
2005
(for reference) 2007
(for reference) 2010
Rating
All Other Countries (45)
Armenia 4.0 4.0 4.5
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3.5 3.5 3.5
Botswana N/AN/A N/A
bameroon 3.5 3.5 3.0
bentral African Rep. 2.0 2.0 3.0
bhad 3.0 2.0 2.0
bolombia N/AN/A N/A
bomoros 2.0 1.5 2.0
Ecuador N/AN/A N/A
El Salvador N/AN/A N/A
Fiji N/AN/A N/A
Gabon N/AN/A N/A
Gambia 2.5 3.0 3.5
Guatemala N/AN/A N/A
Guinea-Bissau 2.5 2.5 2.5
Haiti 2.5 3.0 3.0
Indonesia 3.5N/A N/A
Jamaica N/AN/A N/A
Jordan N/AN/A N/A
Kosovo N/AN/A 4.0
Laos 2.5 3.0 3.5
Lesotho 3.0 3.0 3.5
Liberia N/AN/A 2.5
Madagascar 3.0 3.5 2.5
Morocco N/AN/A N/A
Namibia N/AN/A N/A
Nepal 3.5 3.5 2.5
Nigeria 3.0 3.0 3.0
Pakistan 3.5 3.5 3.5
Papua New Guinea 3.5 3.5 3.0
Philippines N/AN/A N/A
Samoa 4.0 3.5 3.5
Sao Tome & Principe 3.0 3.0 3.0
Sierra Leone 3.5 3.5 3.5
Solomon Islands 3.0 2.5 2.5
St.Vincent & Grenadines 3.5 3.5 3.5
Sudan 2.5 2.0 2.0
Swaziland N/AN/A N/A
Tajikistan 3.0 3.0 3.5
Timor-Leste N/A 3.0 3.0
Togo 2.0 2.0 3.0
Tonga 2.5 2.5 3.5
fkraine N/AN/A N/A
Vanuatu 3.5 3.5 4.0
West Bank and Gaza N/AN/A N/A
For reference:
Southern Sudan N/AN/A N/A
TABLE A.2a How reliable are country public financial management systems?

118AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION — ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 — © OECD 2011
APPENDIX A: COUNTRY DATA
2007
(for reference) 2010
Rating
Country
Afghanistan b
Albania b
bambodia b
bameroon B
Ghana b
Indonesia b
Kosovo B
Laos b
Malawi b
Moldova b
Mongolia b
Namibia b
Niger B
Philippines b
Rwanda B
Senegal B
Sierra Leone B
Tanzania B
fganda B
Viet Nam b
Yemen D
Zambia b

TABLE A.2b: How reliable are country procurement systems?

APPENDIX A: COUNTRY DATA
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120
APPENDIX A: COUNTRY DATA
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Government’s
budget estimates of aid flows for 2010 Aid disbursed
by donors for government
sector in 2010 Indicator 3
Progress
(fSD m) a (fSD m)
b 2005
(for reference) 2007
(for reference) 2010
2010 / 2005
(% points)
c = a / b
c = b /a
2006/2011
Survey Countries (32)

Afghanistan 1 4945 465 55%69%27% -27
Albania 286 33332% 73%86% +54
Bangladesh 2 2562 26788% 92%100% +11
Benin 259 59647% 28%43% -3
Bolivia 559 480 71%83% 86%+15
Burkina Faso 759 90468% 92%84% +16
Burundi 260 50339% 54%52% +12
bambodia 821 72079% 85% 88%+9
bape Verde 163 31885% 90% 51% -34
bongo, Dem. Rep. 2 1141 131 81%58% 53%-28
Dominican Republic 430 31962% 51% 74%+12
Egypt 5452 277 58% 57% 24% -34
Ethiopia 1 2772 65174% 62% 48% -26
Ghana 1 3331 435 96%95%93% -3
Honduras 308 707 50%99%44% -6
Kenya 1 135 81491% 64%72%-19
Kyrgyz Republic 73 29970% 63% 24% -45
Malawi 559 61854% 64%90% +37
Mali 661 99960% 73%66% +6
Mauritania — 204 65% 57% —-
Moldova 421 38970% 57% 92%+23
Mongolia 58 305 2% 37% 19% +17
Mozambique 1 5191 68383% 83%90% +7
Niger 370 436 99%91%85% -15
Peru 663 84246% 63% 79% +33
Rwanda 639 89849% 51%71% +22
Senegal 409 61389% 88%67% -22
South Africa 0 926 71% –0% -71
Tanzania 2 3102 13490% 84% 92%+3
fganda 1 1321 088 79%98%96%+17
Viet Nam 3 3343 78381% 80% 88% +8
Zambia 350 67052% 74%52% 0
Sub-Total* 44%48% 46%+1.8
Global weighted average 26 49836 805 90% 90% 72%-17.7
TABLE A.3: Are government budget estimates comprehensive and realistic?

APPENDIX A: COUNTRY DATA
AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION — ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 — © OECD 2011121
Government’s
budget estimates of aid flows for 2010 Aid disbursed
by donors for government
sector in 2010 Indicator 3
Progress
(fSD m) a (fSD m)
b 2005
(for reference) 2007
(for reference) 2010
2010 / 2005
(% points)
c = a / b
c = b /a
All Other Countries (45)
Armenia 282 336 — –84% —
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0 273 — –0% —
Botswana 65 41 — –63%–
bameroon 302 360 — 86% 84% —
bentral African Rep. 0 127 — 36% 0% —
bhad 93 216 — 88%43% —
bolombia 393 491 — 22% 80% —
bomoros 39 38 — –97%–
Ecuador 96 98 — –98% —
El Salvador 15 380 — –4% —
Fiji 51 54 — –95% —
Gabon 123 134 — 22% 92% —
Gambia 22 67 — –33% —
Guatemala 56 162 — –35% —
Guinea-Bissau 44 113 — –39% —
Haiti 2351 052 — 95% 22% —
Indonesia 6 4806 158 — 70% 95%–
Jamaica 0 745 — –0% —
Jordan 263 435 — 60% 60% —
Kosovo 106 301 — 0% 35% —
Laos 387 441 — 66%88% —
Lesotho 136 89– –66%–
Liberia 9 160 — 0% 5% —
Madagascar 164 357 — 87% 46% —
Morocco 1 4011 429 — 80% 98% —
Namibia 49 115 — –43% —
Nepal 695 710 — 74% 98% —
Nigeria –1 552 — 6% —-
Pakistan 1 6212 691 — –60% —
Papua New Guinea 528 375 — 76% 71%–
Philippines 4441 729 — 51% 26% —
Samoa 143 123 — –86%–
Sao Tome & Principe 41 38 — –91%–
Sierra Leone 186 356 — 54% 52% —
Solomon Islands 34 162 — –21% —
St.Vincent & Grenadines 3 4– –89% —
Sudan 3521 007 — 85% 35% —
Swaziland — 123 — ——
Tajikistan 171 340 — –50% —
Timor-Leste 180 220 — –82% —
Togo 99 112 — 69% 89% —
Tonga 38 34 — –90%–
fkraine 174 369 — 75% 47% —
Vanuatu 44 83 — –54% —
West Bank and Gaza –1 246 — ——
Sub-Total * –36%36% —
Global weighted average 15 56725 446 — 67%61% —
TOTAL * 44%45% 41% —
Global weighted average 42 06662 251 90% 82%68% —
For reference:
Southern Sudan — 513 — — —-
TABLE A.3: Are government budget estimates comprehensive and realistic?
(*) Ratio is c = a / b except where government’s budget estimates are greater than disbursements (c = b /a).

122
APPENDIX A: COUNTRY DATA
AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION — ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 — © OECD 2011
bo-ordinated technical cooperation Total technical cooperation
Indicator 4Progress
(fSD m) a (fSD m)
b 2005
(for reference) 2007
(for reference) 2010
c = a / b 2010/2005
(% points)
2006/2011
Survey Countries (32)
Afghanistan 6862 88437%54% 24% -13
Albania 67 11428%51%58% +30
Bangladesh 221 40731%69% 54% +24
Benin 78 9656%54%82% +25
Bolivia 82 15680%83% 53% -28
Burkina Faso 56 1163%56% 49% +45
Burundi 77 14443%41%53% +11
bambodia 72 26336%35%27% -9
bape Verde 22 5493%39%40% -53
bongo, Dem. Rep. 112 33011%38% 34% +23
Dominican Republic 55 6237%87%89% +52
Egypt 253 32576%86% 78% +2
Ethiopia 387 44827%67%86% +59
Ghana 125 21040%74%59% +19
Honduras 74 10547%84% 70% +23
Kenya 241 57160%64%42% -18
Kyrgyz Republic 114 14124%74%81% +57
Malawi 74 11247%52% 66% +19
Mali 128 20815%75% 62% +47
Mauritania 36 5019%53% 72% +52
Moldova 64 9126%29% 71% +45
Mongolia 73 9018%66% 81% +63
Mozambique 61 21438%27%28% -10
Niger 34 6115%50% 55% +40
Peru 252 3335%66% 76% +70
Rwanda 242 26558%84%92% +34
Senegal 133 16618%54% 80% +62
South Africa 622 70995%–88% -7
Tanzania 113 43250%61%26% -23
fganda 95 12542%58% 76% +34
Viet Nam 338 57385%68% 59% -26
Zambia 105 13232%34%79% +47
Sub-Total 5 0919 98849%61%51% +1.9
Avg. country ratio 40%60% 57% +16.7
TABLE A.4: How much technical assistance is coordinated with country programmes?

APPENDIX A: COUNTRY DATA
AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION — ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 — © OECD 2011123
bo-ordinated technical
cooperation Total technical cooperation
Indicator 4Progress
(fSD m) a (fSD m)
b 2005
(for reference) 2007
(for reference) 2010
c = a / b 2010/2005
(% points)
All Other Countries (45) —
51%
Armenia 34 66—-77% —
Bosnia-Herzegovina 56 73—-84% —
Botswana 13 16–30% 65% —
bameroon 66 100–37% 34% —
bentral African Rep. 5 15–64% 83% —
bhad 40 49–41% 90% —
bolombia 318 354—-43% —
bomoros 5 13—-54% —
Ecuador 38 70—-31% —
El Salvador 58 183—-52% —
Fiji 10 20–70% 53% —
Gabon 14 26—-50% —
Gambia 9 18—-68% —
Guatemala 53 78—-48% —
Guinea-Bissau 16 33–65% 82% —
Haiti 369 450–60% 68% —
Indonesia 569 838—-85% —
Jamaica 37 43–95% 94% —
Jordan 298 316–51% 5% —
Kosovo 9 174–54% 74% —
Laos 96 130—-89% —
Lesotho 67 75–35% 96% —
Liberia 134 139–71% 77% —
Madagascar 50 64–82% 82% —
Morocco 138 167—-81% —
Namibia 63 78–15% 48% —
Nepal 105 220–71% 40% —
Nigeria 249 628—-80% —
Pakistan 354 441–25% 64% —
Papua New Guinea 86 135–89% 98% —
Philippines 326 333—-77% —
Samoa 10 13—-54% —
Sao Tome & Principe 9 17–22% 73% —
Sierra Leone 89 122—-86% —
Solomon Islands 45 52—-97% —
St.Vincent & Grenadines 0 0–53% 59% —
Sudan 291 497—-78% —
Swaziland 34 43—-83% —
Tajikistan 108 130—-50% —
Timor-Leste 76 154–29% 60% —
Togo 13 21—-37% —
Tonga 5 13–35% 26% —
fkraine 67 257—-60% —
Vanuatu 22 36—-80% —
West Bank and Gaza 142 178 57%67%
Sub-Total 4 5966 879–57% 67% —
Avg. country ratio –49% 59% —
TOTAL 9 68716 86749%60% 57% —
Avg. country ratio 40%56%58% —
For reference:
Southern Sudan 27 215—-13% —
TABLE A.4: How much technical assistance is coordinated with country programmes?

124
APPENDIX A: COUNTRY DATA
AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION — ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 — © OECD 2011
Aid disbursed
by donors for
gov. sector Public financial management
Budget
execution Financial
reporting Auditing Indicator 5a
ProgressProc. systems
Indicator 5b Progress
2005 2007
2010 (fSD m)20052007 20102010 / 2005
(for reference) (for

reference)
(fSD m)
d
(fSD m)
a (fSD m)
b (fSD m)
c avg(b,c,d) / a2010/ 2005
(% pts.) e(for
reference) (for
reference) e / a(% points)
2006/2011
Survey Countries (32)
Afghanistan 5 3421 6261 529 93044% 48%25% -18 60044% 18% 11% -33
Albania 333 45 36 3314% 12%11% -3 346%10% 10% +4
Bangladesh 1 721 9151 2111 229 53%77%65% +12 50148% 66% 29% -19
Benin 596 197 161 161 52% 47%29% -23 23864% 63% 40% -24
Bolivia 480 364 117 026% 39%33% +7 18715% 36% 39% +24
Burkina Faso 904 480 499 458 45% 43%53% +8 54660% 54%60% -0
Burundi 503 109 125 118 24% 33%23% -1 15419% 35% 31% +11
bambodia 720 167 144 140 10% 14%21% +11 1716%16% 24% +18
bape Verde 318 95 95 8764% 23%29% -35 25153% 22% 79% +26
bongo, Dem. Rep. 1 131 117 160 150 13% 0%13% -0 10431% 1%9% -22
Dominican Republic 319 230 228 227 2%49% 72% +69 2315%40% 73% +67
Egypt 1 758 971 844 767 28% 12%49% +21 98825% 23% 56% +31
Ethiopia 2 7771 7702 0501 958 45%47%69% +24 1 52643%41%55% +12
Ghana 1 435 934 815 856 62% 51%60% -2 80452% 56% 56% +4
Honduras 707 431 57 147 26% 55%30% +4 1525%63% 22% +16
Kenya 888 614 354 580 47% 54%58% +11 33645% 37%38% -7
Kyrgyz Republic 299 99 100 863%13% 32% +29 832%12% 28% +26
Malawi 752 519 542 437 55% 50%66% +12 46335% 35%62% +27
Mali 999 333 336 297 29% 34%32% +3 36545% 35%36% -8
Mauritania 204 69 61 57 4% 8%31% +26 6920% 22% 34% +14
Moldova 389 272 281 266 25% 41%70% +45 27625% 39% 71% +46
Mongolia 305 57 96 9149% 17%27% -22 6326% 29% 21% -5
Mozambique 1 683 902 871 593 36% 44%47% +11 94238% 54%56% +18
Niger 436 134 126 122 27% 26%29% +2 10149% 37%23% -26
Peru 842 648 580 605 43% 45%73% +30 58444% 51%
69% +26
Rwanda 1 063 443 653 499 39% 42%50% +11 67746% 43% 64% +18
Senegal 613 157 219 154 23% 19%29% +6 23629% 41%38% +9
South Africa 926 238 228 235 38% –25% -13 27944% –30% -14
Tanzania 2 2271 8511 7181 717 66%71%79% +131 60361%69% 72% +11
fganda 1 051 701 555 824 60% 57%66% +6 45454% 37%43% -11
Viet Nam 3 7832 6042 2122 209 32%63%62% +30 2 48033%59%66% +33
Zambia 670 336 342 359 34% 59%52% +17 36244% 71%54% +11
Sub-Total 36 17218 42517 34316 391 40%45%48% +8.1 15 85940%43% 44%+4.3
Avg. country ratio 32%34%37% +4.8 37%42% 41%+3.7
TABLE A.5: How much aid for the government sector uses country systems?

APPENDIX A: COUNTRY DATA
AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION — ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 — © OECD 2011125
Aid disbursed
by donors for
gov. sector Public financial management
Budget
execution Financial
reporting Auditing Indicator 5a
ProgressProc. systems
Indicator 5b Progress
2005 2007
2010 (fSD m)20052007 20102010 / 2005
(for reference) (for

reference)
(fSD m)
d
(fSD m)
a (fSD m)
b (fSD m)
c avg(b,c,d) / a2010/ 2005
(% pts.) e(for
reference) (for
reference) e / a(% points)
All Other Countries (45)
Armenia 336 254 91 91 —-43% — 72– –21% —
Bosnia-Herzegovina 273 121 118 173 —-50% — 122– –45% —
Botswana 67 41 43 47 —-65% — 36– –53% —
bameroon 360 40 39 41 –53% 11% — 82–63% 23% —
bentral African Rep. 127 37 37 37 –24% 29% — 37–10% 29% —
bhad 216 20 11 11 –1%7% — 12–11% 5%–
bolombia 491 56 30 24 –9%7% — 19– 4% 4%–
bomoros 38 7 5 5 — –15% — 11– –30% —
Ecuador 98 27 22 22 —-24% — 50– –51% —
El Salvador 380 136 87 95 —-28% — 107– –28% —
Fiji 54 25 30 18 —-45% — 4– –7% —
Gabon 134 46 41 40 –5%32% — 40–32% 30% —
Gambia 67 8 6 10 —-12% — 22– –33% —
Guatemala 162 64 32 29 —-26% — 50– –31% —
Guinea-Bissau 113 17 17 17 —-15% — 9– –8% —
Haiti 1 052 566 566 566 –46% 54% — 391–31% 37% —
Indonesia 6 1585 3815 2945 276 –71% 86% — 4 295–56% 70% —
Jamaica 996 142 103 103 —-12% — 106– –11% —
Jordan 435 337 297 298 –26% 71% — 356–27% 82% —
Kosovo 301 59 63 57 –3%20% — 61– 1%20% —
Laos 393 166 162 151 –31% 41% — 150–16% 38% —
Lesotho 243 105 88 88 —-38% — 102– –42% —
Liberia 160 78 54 70 –32% 42% — 52– 0% 32% —
Madagascar 357 41 46 46 –21% 12% — 48–26% 13% —
Morocco 1 4291 2391 2291 211 –79% 86% — 1 060–81% 74% —
Namibia 153 5 19 17 —-9% — 21– –14% —
Nepal 769 468 489 481 –68% 62% — 266–56% 35% —
Nigeria 1 552 512 511 508 –0%33% — 558–0% 36% —
Pakistan 2 4611 8681 8821 753 —-75% — 679– –28% —
Papua New Guinea 375 135 53 73 –16% 23% — 113–21% 30% —
Philippines 1 7291 3021 1301 321 –68% 72% — 1 103–64% 64% —
Samoa 166 80 77 86 —-49% — 85– –51% —
Sao Tome & Principe 38 3 3 3 — –7% — 16– –43% —
Sierra Leone 356 77 137 179 –20% 37% — 76–38% 21% —
Solomon Islands 162 56 53 60 —-35% — 58– –36% —
St.Vincent & Grenadines 4 0 0 0 — –3% — 0– –0% —
Sudan 1 007 74 74 276 –3%14% — 77– 0% 8%–
Swaziland 123 15 0 0 — –4% — 15– –12% —
Tajikistan 340 105 105 105 —-31% — 104– –30% —
Timor-Leste 220 46 32 38 —-18% — 32– –14% —
Togo 112 60 64 58 –4%54% — 52–15% 47% —
Tonga 52 24 15 19 —-37% — 19– –36% —
fkraine 369 157 70 70 –1%27% — 75– 2% 20% —
Vanuatu 83 28 26 24 —-31% — 24– –29% —
West Bank and Gaza 1 246 536 529 314 —-37% — 639– –51% —
Sub-Total 25 75814 56313 78013 910 53%55% 11 30547%44%
Avg. country ratio 22%28% 22%27%
TOTAL 61 93032 98931 12330 301 40%48%51% 27 16440% 44%44% —
Avg. country ratio 32%30%32% 37%36% 35% —
For reference:
Southern Sudan 513 0 0 136 —-9% — 0– –0% —
TABLE A.5: How much aid for the government sector uses country systems?

126
APPENDIX A: COUNTRY DATA
AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION — ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 — © OECD 2011
Indicator 6Progress
2010/2005 (units)
2005
(for reference) 2007
(for reference) 2010
(PIfs)
2006/2011
Survey Countries (32)
Afghanistan 28 26 28 +0
Albania 57 24 18 -39
Bangladesh 38 24 18 -20
Benin 29 58 58 +29
Bolivia 66 19 36 -30
Burkina Faso 131 102 47 -84
Burundi 37 29 84 +47
bambodia 56 121 66 +10
bape Verde 10 18 10 +0
bongo, Dem. Rep. 34 146 78 +44
Dominican Republic 50 36 3 -47
Egypt 100 32 16 -84
Ethiopia 103 56 49 -54
Ghana 45 16 5 -40
Honduras 52 36 47 -5
Kenya 17 21 15 -2
Kyrgyz Republic 85 88 80 -5
Malawi 69 51 26 -43
Mali 65 60 82 +17
Mauritania 23 27 84 +61
Moldova 43 59 18 -25
Mongolia 80 53 52 -28
Mozambique 40 26 5 -35
Niger 52 47 53 +1
Peru 55 79 40 -15
Rwanda 48 41 26 -22
Senegal 23 55 11 -12
South Africa 15– 22 +7
Tanzania 56 28 18 -38
fganda 54 55 15 -39
Viet Nam 111 58 18 -93
Zambia 24 34 30 +6
Sub-Total 1 6961 525 1 158 -538
Average 54 49 37 -17
TABLE A.6: How many PIUs are parallel to country structures?

APPENDIX A: COUNTRY DATA
AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION — ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 — © OECD 2011127
Indicator 6
Progress
2010/2005 (units)
2005
(for reference) 2007
(for reference) 2010
(PIfs)
All Other Countries (45)
Armenia —- 5 —
Bosnia-Herzegovina —- 56 —
Botswana —- 1 —
bameroon — 38 20 —
bentral African Rep. — 11 9 —
bhad — 17 5 —
bolombia — 38 48 —
bomoros —- 24 —
Ecuador —- 32 —
El Salvador —- 68 —
Fiji —- 7 —
Gabon — 5 2 —
Gambia —- 16 —
Guatemala —- 12 —
Guinea-Bissau —- 8 —
Haiti — 39 92 —
Indonesia — 86 58 —
Jamaica —- 8 —
Jordan — 2 92 —
Kosovo — 107 29 —
Laos — 25 22 —
Lesotho —- 12 —
Liberia — 16 4 —
Madagascar — 48 56 —
Morocco — 47 15 —
Namibia —- 30 —
Nepal — 106 68 —
Nigeria — 23 20 —
Pakistan —- 32 —
Papua New Guinea — 36 23 —
Philippines — 33 9 —
Samoa —- 9 —
Sao Tome & Principe —- 5 —
Sierra Leone — 2 3 —
Solomon Islands —- 17 —
St.Vincent & Grenadines —- 1 —
Sudan — 105 111 —
Swaziland —- 3 —
Tajikistan —- 15 —
Timor-Leste —- 22 —
Togo — 13 9 —
Tonga —- 2 —
fkraine — 46 84 —
Vanuatu —- 9 —
West Bank and Gaza —- 27 —
Sub-Total — 843 1 200 —
Average — 40 27 —
TOTAL 1 6962 368 2 358 —
Average 54 46 31 —
For reference:
Southern Sudan —- 109 —
TABLE A.6: How many PIUs are parallel to country structures?

128
APPENDIX A: COUNTRY DATA
AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION — ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 — © OECD 2011
Disbursements recorded by
government
in 2010 Aid scheduled
by donors for
disbursement
in 2010 Indicator 7
ProgressAid

disbursed by donors for
government sector in 2010 For reference:

% of scheduled
aid disbursements
reported as
disbursed by donors
in 2010**
(fSD m) a (fSD m)
b 2005
(for reference) 2007
(for reference) 2010
2010/
2005
(% pts.) (fSD m)
d (%)
c = a / b c = b / a
e = d / be = b / d
2006/2011
Survey Countries (32)
Afghanistan 1 4946 392 84%70% 23% -605 34284%
Albania 191 34249% 29% 56% +7 33397%
Bangladesh 1 5171 80591% 100%84% -71 721 95%
Benin 105 57553% 32% 18% -35 596 96%
Bolivia 203 48063% 30% 42% -21 480 100%
Burkina Faso 718 95492% 92% 75% -16 90495%
Burundi 285 59153% 44% 48% -4 50385%
bambodia 742 82169% 96%90% +21 72088%
bape Verde 341 18892% 96% 55%-37 318 59%
bongo, Dem. Rep. 8511 44883% 20% 59% -241 13178%
Dominican Republic 488 31311% 25% 64%+53 319 98%
Egypt 1 4581 00229% 79% 69%+391 758 57%
Ethiopia 2 1212 45796% 73% 86% -102 777 88%
Ghana 1 0721 599 92%82% 67% -251 435 90%
Honduras 432 57572% 66% 75% +3 707 81%
Kenya 5881 30744% 47% 45% +1 88868%
Kyrgyz Republic 96 21766% 64% 44% -22 299 73%
Malawi 651 67858% 58% 96% +38 752 90%
Mali 3961 18071% 68% 34% -37 99985%
Mauritania — 26339% 52% —- 20477%
Moldova 332 40967% 77% 81% +14 38995%
Mongolia 96 31547% 34% 30% -17 30597%
Mozambique 1 3391 59370% 74%84% +141 683 95%
Niger 229 31673% 78% 72% -1 436 73%
Peru 682 85348% 61%80% +32 84299%
Rwanda 651 87566% 67% 74% +91 063 82%
Senegal 424 68169% 61%62% -7 61390%
South Africa 660 71044% –93% +49 926 77%
Tanzania 2 2692 20770% 61% 97%+272 227 99%
fganda 9061 22684% 74% 74% -101 05186%
Viet Nam 3 4024 03478% 70% 84% +63 783 94%
Zambia 0 88350% 85% 0% -50 67076%
Sub-Total * 42%47% 43% +0.8
Global weighted average 24 73637 29072% 69% 66% -5.636 172 97%
TABLE A.7: Are disbursements on schedule and recorded by government?

APPENDIX A: COUNTRY DATA
AID EFFECTIVENESS 2005-10: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARIS DECL ARATION — ISBN 978-9264-12549-0 — © OECD 2011129
Disbursements
recorded by
government
in 2010 Aid scheduled
by donors for
disbursement
in 2010 Indicator 7
ProgressAid

disbursed by donors for
government sector in 2010 For reference:

% of scheduled
aid disbursements
reported as
disbursed by donors
in 2010**
(fSD m) a (fSD m)
b 2005
(for reference) 2007
(for reference) 2010
2010/
2005
(% pts.) (fSD m)
d (%)
c = a / b c = b / a
e = d / be = b / d
All Other Countries (45)
Armenia 308 387—- –80% — 33687%
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0 279—- –0% — 27398%
Botswana 0 80—- –0% — 6784%
bameroon 181 502—-51% 36% — 36072%
bentral African Rep. 0 120—-45% 0% — 127 95%
bhad 145 172—-0% 84% — 216 80%
bolombia 450 523—-0% 86% — 49194%
bomoros 5 43—- –11% — 3889%
Ecuador 96 107—- –90% — 9892%
El Salvador 74 336—- –22% — 380 88%
Fiji 2 54—- –4% — 5499%
Gabon 70 250—-17% 28% — 13454%
Gambia 6 73—- –8% — 6792%
Guatemala 56 192—- –29% — 16284%
Guinea-Bissau 28 128—- –22% — 11388%
Haiti 1 841 806—- 67% 44%–1 052 77%
Indonesia 5 0086 510—-25% 77% –6 158 95%
Jamaica 01 102 —- –0% — 99690%
Jordan 786 371—-48% 47%– 435 85%
Kosovo 55 298—-3% 19% — 301 99%
Laos 200 398—-38% 50% — 39399%
Lesotho 53 209—- –25% — 243 86%
Liberia 9 411—-0% 2% — 16039%
Madagascar 208 354—-79% 59% — 357 99%
Morocco 1 3181 678—-68% 79% –1 429 85%
Namibia 0 202 —- –0% — 15376%
Nepal 362 664—-47% 55% — 769 86%
Nigeria 1 5101 391—-7% 92%–1 552 90%
Pakistan 1 4741 714—- –86% –2 461 70%
Papua New Guinea 199 576—-19% 35% — 37565%
Philippines 4231 601—- 78%26% –1 729 93%
Samoa 136 161—- –84% — 166 97%
Sao Tome & Principe 30 42—- –71% — 3890%
Sierra Leone 180 312—-30% 58% — 356 87%
Solomon Islands 54 199—- –27% — 16281%
St.Vincent & Grenadines 0 0—- –0% — 4 5%
Sudan 328 906—-52% 36% –1 007 90%
Swaziland 108 115—- –94% — 123 93%
Tajikistan 228 250—- –91% — 340 73%
Timor-Leste 8 278—- –3% — 22079%
Togo 51 110—-14% 46% — 112 99%
Tonga 38 49—- –77% — 52 94%
fkraine 253 589—-60% 43% — 36963%
Vanuatu 77 69—- –89%– 83 83%
West Bank and Gaza 9711 035—- –94% –1 246 83%
Sub-Total * –30% 30% —
Global weighted average 17 33125 644 –52% 68% –25 758 100%
TOTAL * 42%42% 37%
Global weighted average 42 06762 93372% 63% 67% 61 93098%
For reference:
Southern Sudan 0 470– –0% —-
TABLE A.7: Are disbursements on schedule and recorded by government?
(*) Ratio is c = a / b except where disbursements recorded by government are greater than aid scheduled for disbursement (c = b /a).
(**) Ratio is e = d / b except where disbursements by donors are greater than aid scheduled for disbursements (e = b / d).