CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities
in North Korea

Mi Ae Taylor
Research Associate in Asian Affairs

Mark E. Manyin
Specialist in Asian Affairs
March 25, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.c rs.gov
R41749

Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities in North Korea

Congressional Research Service
Summary
A number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—non-profit, charitable institutions—have
been active in North Korea since the mid-1990s. Although their work is relatively limited in
scope, it is of inter est to U.S. policy-ma kers because of the deep isolation of the regime in
Pyongyang. Several American and international NGOs have provided assistance to North Korea
in humanitarian relief, development, health, informal diplomacy, science, communication and
education. A relatively recent trend is that a growing number of NGOs, particularly in South
Kor ea, are run by or have North Kor ean defectors on staff.
Non-governmental organizations’ activities in North Korea have stirred some controversy. Some
observers believe that NGOs’ projects represent one of the few ways to improve the lives of
ordinary North Koreans, and that their work provides first-hand accounts about social conditions
in North Korea. Some NGOs have a comparative advantage in dealing with North Korea, with
over a deca de’s experience working with North Kor ean officials and institutions. However, others
argue that NGOs’ programs aid North Korea’s regime, and that given the lack of transparency and
tight restrictions imposed on them by the regime, their funds are vulnerable to diversion by North
Korean officials.
Two issues bear consideration: Have NGOs contributed to improving the lives of ordinary North
Korean citizens in sustainable ways? Can NGOs evaluate the impact of their operations and take
steps to minimize diversion of the resources they deliver to North Koreans? In short, are they
effective, and should the Unit ed States welcome t heir work in spit e of the North Kor ean regime’s
treatment of its citizens? This paper will address some of the publicly disclosed activities that
NGOs have undertaken in North Korea.
The role of NGOs in North Korea may re-emerge as a congressional interest, as the Obama
Administration has expressed inter est in restarting humanitarian assistance to North Kor ea.
During the Bush Administration, five large U.S. NGOs were part of a food delivery program that
enjoyed some success. Some believed they were more effective than international organizations at
navigating the North Korea n system to get aid wher e it was needed. But some organizations opted
to cease their operations when North Korean restrictions became too onerous.

Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities in North Korea

Congressional Research Service
Contents
The NGO Dilemma……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 1
Current Status of NGO Humanitarian and Development Activities………………………………………. 2
Background on Humanitarian Aid and Development NGOs…………………………………………… 3
South Korean NGOs…………………………………………………………………………………………. 6
Education and Capacity Building ……………………………………………………………………………………7
The Digital Library at Kim Chaek University ……………………………………………………………… 7
The U.S.-North Korea Science Engagement Consortium ………………………………………………. 7
Pyongyang University of Science and Technology……………………………………………………….. 8
The Hanns Seidel and Friedrich Naumann Foundations ………………………………………………… 8
The U.S. North Korean Tuberculosis Project ………………………………………………………………. 9
Track II Diplomacy ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 10
NGO Radio Broadcasts to North Korea…………………………………………………………………………. 11

Figures
Figure 1. North Korean Provinces …………………………………………………………………………………..3

Tables
Table 1. DPRK and ROK Radio Broadcasters ………………………………………………………………… 11

Appendixes
Appendix. List of Related CRS Reports ………………………………………………………………………… 13

Contacts
Author Contact Information …………………………………………………………………………………………13

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Congressional Research Service 1
The NGO Dilemma 1
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been active in North Korea since the 1990s. Their
work has raised debates about what role NGOs should play in countries ruled by repressive
regimes like North Korea’s. NGOs and other providers of aid face an ethical dilemma in such
countries: How does one provide assistance to a population without inadvertently supplying aid to
groups such as the North Kor ean military or others who will try to profit from it? In the North
Korean case, NGOs have been viewed by many as providing aid, technical advice, and resources
at little or no cost to a despotic regime. Many NGOs as well as other relief and development
providers believe that aid should go to those in the grea test need and should be non-political. At
the same time, the NGOs insisted on transparent delivery of aid. North Korean officials have
failed to comply with requirements for transparency and ha ve diverted significa nt amounts of
huma nitarian aid.
2
On the other hand, there is evidence that several NGOs have had successes, albeit limited, in a
wide range of activities, from providing food aid to sponsoring informal diplomacy. By the late
1990s, several NGOs had set up programs geared toward enhancing capacity and boosting
agricultural production in North Kor ea. Relief agencies offer ed projects that ranged from
alternative types of farming including wider use of greenhouses and hydroponics, hospital
renovations, mobile diagnostic clinics, water and sanitation projects, to disaster management
training. In food assistance programs, according to several sources, in spite of initial North
Korean efforts to hamper NGOs by limiting movements by their staff and refusing to allow
Korean speakers to accompany them, over time some NGOs have obtained as good or better
access and monitoring than much larger international organizations. Many NGOs felt this gave
them some assurance that aid was reaching the right recipients.
Congress may wish to consider the role of NGOs in North Korea as part of its oversight of the
U.S.-North Korean relationship, and also because of their potential role in delivering
humanitarian assistance. Recently, the Obama Administration has been considering whether to
restart an earlier aid program begun under the Bush Administration in 2008.
3 The South Korean
and U.S. gover nments have received several requests from North Kor ea for large-scale food aid
since late 2010. In February 2011, the spokesperson for the Department of State stated that future
food aid would depend on a needs assessment, and whether the U.S. government could ensure
that the program would be effectively mana ged to ensure that no aid would be diverted from its
targets.
4 In March, the U.S. Special Envoy for North Korea Policy, Ambassador Stephen
Bosworth, also noted that the United States would “provide food aid when we see a perceived
1 The term “non-governmental organizations” is used in this report to encompass a wide range of actors, including non-
profit organizations, foundations, and universities.
2 Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2007), p. 121. Haggard and Noland estimate that from the mid-1990s to 2002, North Korean officials
probably diverted enough food sufficient to feed 3%-15% of North Korea’s population.
3 From 2008-2009, under President Bush the United States donated 400,000 metric tons of food to North Korea through
the U.N. World Food Programme. Five U.S. NGOs distributed an additional 100,000 metric tons directly. For
additional information, see CRS Report R40095, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, by Mark E. Manyin and Mary
Beth Nikitin.
4 State Department Daily Press Briefing by Philip J. Crowley, Assistant Secretary, February 9, 2011.

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need and in a situation in which we can monitor.” 5 It is possible that the Administration could use
NGOs for aid delivery, as the Bush Administration did from 2008 to 2009.
Some have argued that through the implementation of their work NGOs may have promoted at
least some degree of transparency and a measure of accountability for the aid recipients.
6 It is,
however, difficult to assess such effects, given North Korea’s isolation.
Current Status of NGO Humanitarian and
Development Activities
As of 2010, a few NGOs have remained active in North Korea, most from European aid
agencies. 7 Other active but non-resident NGOs include the Mennonite Central Committee
(Canada), First Steps (Canada), the Eugene Bell Foundation (United States/South Korea),
Christian Friends of Kor ea (United States), the Canadian Food Grains Bank, and the Hanns Seidel
and the Friedrich Naumann Foundations (Germany). Several European NGOs can expect
consular protection from embassies based in Pyongyang, except for Canada, France, and Ireland
which ha ve embassies in S eoul.
8 U.S. NGOs rely on the Swedish Embassy in Pyongyang.
South Korea has cut off nearly all bilateral food and fertilizer aid and curbed South Korean NGO
contacts with North Korea since the election of President Lee Myung-bak in December 2007. The
South Korean government imposed especially tight restrictions after sinking of the South Korean
naval corvette Cheonan in March 2010
9 and North Kor ea’s shelling of a South Korea n isla nd in
November 2010. Both incidents resulted in the loss of South Korean lives. Many South Korean
NGOs criticized the Lee government’s restrictions. Several NGOs, among them the Korean
Sharing Movement and Good Friends, asked the government to allow them send food to North
Korea. These offers were rejected.
10
In 2010, the South Korean and U.S. governments made small donations of aid, some of which
NGOs distributed. In January 2010, South Korea donated 10,000 tons of food through the South
Korean Red Cross.
11 In March 2010, South Korea sent 20 tons of milk powder. In September
5 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing Transcript, “Breaking the Cycle of North Korean Provocations,”
Federal News Service. March 1, 2011.
6 Hazel Smith, Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance, and Social Change in North Korea
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), p. 116.
7 The agencies are CESVI (Italy), Welthungerhilfe (Germany), Concern (Ireland), Triangle Generation Humanitaire
(France), Premiere Urgence (France), and Save the Children (United Kingdom), from Directory of Development
Organizations, 2010 Edition, Vol. ILA, and “Current NGO projects in North Korea,” by Miranda Weingartner.
8 “North to Sever Ties with the South.” Associated Press, May 25, 2010, https://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2010/05/25/
north-korea-ship-retaliation.html.
9 An international investigation found that the most likely cause of the ship’s sinking was a torpedo fired by a North
Korean submarine. https://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/northkorea/articles/cheonan_joint_investigation_report/
10 “N Korea Seeks Private Good Aid, Silent to Seoul’s Offer: Report,” Agence France Presse, November 5, 2009.
“Good Friends Planned to Send 50 Tons,” Agence France Presse, November 5, 2009.
11 “N. Korea Accepts S. Korean Food Aid: Seoul Official,” Agence France Presse, January 15, 2010.

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2010, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) made $600,000 available to fund
flood assistance via Samaritan’s Purse, Global Resource Services and Mercy Corps. 12
Background on Humanitarian Aid and Development NGOs
The North Korean government has tightly controlled and monitored NGO activities. Its officials
have frequently resisted NGO demands to monitor the distribution of aid. North Korean officials
initially blocked NGO efforts to visit the northeast provinces of Chagang, South Hamgyong,
North Hamgyong, and Ryanggang, as well as portions of Kangwon, South Hwanghae, and North
and South Pyongan
13 (see map at Figure 1).
Figure 1. North Korean Provinces

Source: University of Texas Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, https://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/
12 “U.S. Offers Flood Aid to N. Korea,” VOA News, September 2, 2010; Remarks of Ambassador Robert R. King to
Stanford University, November 5, 2010, https://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/6381/010Nov05AmbassadorKingRemarks.pdf.
13 Haggard and Noland, op. cit., p. 93.

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Officials also tried to curb NGOs’ ability to monitor by excluding Korean speakers from their
groups. International organizations and NGOs were not permitted to conduct random site visits. 14
Finally, DPRK officials insisted that NGOs use the government’s Public Distribution System to
transmit aid. The Public Distribution System is the primary means by which the state allocates
food according to the social importance of groups.
15 Between 1998-2000, citing these restrictions
on monitoring, some NGOs, notably Doctors without Borders and Oxfam, withdrew from North
Korea.
16 Two U.S.-based NGOs, CARE and Catholic Relief Services, left for similar reasons. By
2005, restrictions on NGO travel had dropped substantially but still included smaller portions of
the northeast provinces, North and South Pyonga n, and Kangwon.
17 North Korean officials ruled
out visits to these areas citing security reasons. 18
The North Korean government has assigned government contacts to NGOs, to serve as a conduit
for their aid and provide the regime with buffers between the organizations and the public. These
wer e assigned on the basis of national origin or residency, and have shifted fr equently over the
years that NGOs have worked in the country. Some NGOs have sought to strengthen their hand
by coordinating their own work through these North Korean government entities, with varying
degrees of success.
Beginning in 1995, U.S. NGOs, some European NGOs, and international groups such as the
World Food Programme fell under North Korea’s Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee’s
(FDRC) purview. A few U.S. NGOs, the American Friends Service Committee and World Vision
International, as well as all South Korean NGOs were assigned to the Asia-Pacific Peace
Committee (APPC). In 2005, North Korean officials reassigned the U.S. NGOs to the Korean
American Private Exchange Society (KAPES). One European NGO noted that the new North
Korean arrangements under KAPES effectively reduced the number of NGOs on the ground and
reassigned them with new contacts.
19 T he FDRC/KAPES staff are drawn from t he North Kor ean
Foreign Ministry or local authorities.20 The APPC reports to the central committee of the Kor ean
Worker ’s Party. The APPC also has responsibility for Asian-Pacific states that lack diplomatic
relations with North Korea.
21 Generally speaking, North Kor ean officials refused to grant U.S. or
South Korean NGOs residency in order to limit their range of movement in North Korea. 22
In 1996, InterAction, a U.S. NGO consortium comprising more than 150 U.S. NGOs, initiated a
process of facilitating and coordinating huma nitarian relief with its members in North Kor ea.
Participating NGOs in InterAction also formed the North Korea Working Group to advocate for
assistance to North Korea.
23 To facilitate work further, InterAction recommended the
14 Flake and Snyder, op. cit., p. 37, and Haggard and Noland, op. cit., 104. 15 For a detailed analysis of the Public Distribution System, please see Haggard and Noland (2007), op. cit., chapter 3. 16 The NGOs which withdrew were Doctors without Borders (Medecins sans Frontières), Doctors of the World
(Medecins du Monde), Action against Hunger (Action Contre la Faim), and Oxfam.
17 Haggard and Noland, op. cit., p. 93-95. 18 L. Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder, eds., Paved with Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), p. 52.
19 Bernhard Seliger, “North Korea’s Economic Development and External Relations,” Korea’s Economy 2009
(Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute of America, 2009) p. 69.
20 Flake and Snyder, op. cit., pp. 5, 71. 21 Flake and Snyder, op. cit., p. 102. 22 Flake and Snyder, op. cit., p. 38, 114. 23 The Working Group included Adventist Development and Relief Agency International (ADRA), American Friends
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establishment of the Food Aid Liaison Unit (FALU), which operated from WFP’s office in
Pyongyang. 24 WFP and NGOs worked within the system of national food rationing mentioned
earlier, referred to as the Public Distribution System. 25
A year later, other non-resident NGOs created the Private Voluntary Organization Consortium
(PVOC), which included Amigos Internacionales, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Mercy Corps,
and World Vision. The aim of PVOC was to monitor distribution of over 150,000 MT of U.S.
government food aid and ensure delivery to workers in cities where factories were closed or idle.
Analysts describe the formation of the PVOC as a period of close cooperation between U.S.
agencies and NGOs. USAID and United States Department of Agriculture funded the PVOC
group’s food assistance programs. This permitted some NGOs to move beyond the original food
assistance programs and towards development-oriented programs. In 2000, the General
Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office) reported that the initiative
yielded “mixed results.” The Consortium reported that the North Korean government’s
restrictions made it difficult to adequately monitor the distribution of the food.
26 The PVOC
withdrew from North Korea shortly after June 2000 after difficulties in its seed potato project.
North Korean officials also began granting several European NGOs residency, among them
Doctors Without Borders.
27 European NGOs negotiated residency in North Korea as a condition
for their assistance. Some argue that this newly for med community of active and inquiring
resident NGOs promoted a new dynamic in North Korean society. North Korean officials
encountered NGO representatives who operated on the basis of transparency, and had diverse
experiences operating in other countries. As a result, North Korean officials and aid recipients had
to adapt to each other.
28
Responding to the U.N. World Food Programme and the U.N. Food and Agricultural
Organization’s (FAO) calls for aid to North Korea in 2008, the United States pledged to donate
500,000 MT of food aid to North Korea for one year. The Bush Administration declared at the
time that North Korea had made substantial concessions in monitoring and access which would
permit confirmation of aid to the intended targets. The U.S. government arranged to send a
portion of that aid, 100,000 MT, through five U.S. NGOs.
The U.S. Department of State selected
World Vision, Mercy Corps, Samaritan’s Purse, Global Resource Services, and Christian Friends
of Korea to distribute this aid. The NGO aid consortium operated in two northwest provinces
until the North Korea government ordered them to leave the country in March 2009. North Korea
offer ed no explanation for the dismissal.
29

(…continued)
Service Committee, Catholic Relief Services, Church World Service, Heifer Project International, Holt International
Children’s Services, International Aid, Latter-day Saints Charities, Mercy Corps International, United Methodist
Committee on Relief, and the U.S. Fund for UNICEF.
24 Flake and Snyder, op. cit., p. 6. 25 For more on North Korea’s Public Distribution System, see Haggard and Noland, op. cit., Chapter 3. 26 United States General Accounting Office (GAO), U.S. Bilateral Food Assistance to North Korea Had Mixed Results,
GAO/NSIAD-00-175, June 2000, https://www.gao.gov.
27 The NGOs were Campus for Christus (Switzerland), Children’s Aid Direct (United Kingdom), Concern Worldwide
(Ireland), Cooperazione e Sviluppo (Italy), Medecins du Monde (France), Medecins sans Frontières (France), and
Welthungerhilfe (“German Agro Action”).
28 Smith, op. cit., p. 109. 29 “North Korea Refuses US Food Aid,” BBC News, March 18, 2009. https://news.bbc.co.uk/go/em/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/
(continued…)

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South Korean NGOs
Many South Korean NGOs participating in North Korean assistance programs are faith-based,
privately run charities. They emphasize confidence-building through fr equent contacts. Feelings
of patriotism and a desire for national reconciliation motivate many of them.
30 Prominent among
these NGOs are Good Friends South Korea/Peace Foundation and the Korean Sharing
Movement.
31
Until 1999, the South Korean government had South Korean NGOs contribute through its Red
Cross organization.
32 South Kor eans also had to obtain the approval of the Ministry of Unification
to travel to North Korea. To expedite deliveries, some South Korean NGOs delivered aid through
their affiliates. The NGO World Vision Korea, for instance, shipped rice via World Vision
International. The U.S. NGO Eugene Bell Foundation shipped aid on behalf of several South
Korean Christian NGOs. Other NGOs took advantage of the porous North Korea-China border.
Some NGOs ran small cooperative farms in Chinese border states to deliver food to their
recipients.
33 Under the “sunshine” policy of engaging North Korea, the administrations of
President Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003) and President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2007) lifted many of
these restrictions on NGOs.
34 After the June 2000 inter-Korean summit, the South Kor ean
government’s aid programs grew substantially. While other NGOs pressed for strict monitoring to
minimize the possibility of diversion of aid, the South Korean government delivered large
quantities of aid, with less stringent monitoring and fewer follow-up reporting requir ements.
35
With the election of President Lee Myung-bak, the South Korean government withheld most
bilateral aid and restricted private visits to North Korea.
During the “sunshine policy era,” South Korean NGOs set up a variety of food security programs
to plant high-yield corn, provide fertilizer, propagate seed potatoes, develop goat milk production,
and sponsor greater use of greenhouses and alternative growing techniques. These programs were
introduced to offer sustainable food sources. Some NGOs also began programs to supplement
nutrition or curb disease, such as providing vita mins, tuberculosis controls, pest control, and
developing pharmaceutical firms.
36 By 2000, the South Korean Ministry of Unification supported
NGOs whose programs included aid to flood survivors, children, and the elderly. NGOs also
initiated programs in medicine and hygiene programs, and aid in natural disaster prevention.
37

(…continued)
7949785.stm. Kirit Radia, “North Korea Rejects US Food Aid, Kicks Out US NGOs,” ABC News, March 17, 2009,
https://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalradar/2009/03/north-korea-can.html.
30 See Chung Oknim, “The Role of South Korea’s NGOs: the Political Context,” from Paved with Good Intentions: The
NGO Experience in North Korea, edited by Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003).
31 Other active groups include the Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights (NKNet), the Free North
Korea Coalition, the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, Life Funds for North Korean Refugees, and the
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR).
32 Flake and Snyder, op. cit., p. 87. 33 Ibid, p. 86. 34 Ibid, p. 88. 35 Ibid, p. 91. 36 Ibid, p. 97-98. 37 Ibid, p. 89.

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Education and Capacity Building
NGOs have offered programs oriented to build capacity in agriculture and health, sponsoring
projects on water and sanitation, seed improvement, anima l husbandry, and la nd management.
Other NGOs have promoted programs for study abroad, and courses in English language,
banking, and trade.
38 Specific examples include founding a digital library at a North Korean
university; establishing of a U.S.-DPRK Scientific Engagement Consortium; creating a privately
run foreign university in Pyongyang, sponsoring exchange programs on economics, urban
development, and technology; and establishing a reference laboratory for the diagnosis and
treatment of multidrug resistant tuberculosis.
The Digital Library at Kim Chaek University
Members of Syracuse University, the Korea Society, and North Korea’s Permanent Mission to the
United Nations discussed the prospect of a digital library in spring 2001. 39 Syracuse University
and the Korea Society sought to improve the opportunities of North Korea students and promote
science education. The Per manent Mission selected Kim Chaek University as the project partner.
Researchers at Syracuse and Kim Chaek Universities identified the necessary standards to catalog
information and develop software from open sources.
40 The sponsors’ contact in North Korea was
the FDRC. The program relied on private grants from the Korea Society, the Henry Luce
Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and Syracuse University. Kim Chaek University bore the cost
of constructing the library facility.
41 The digital library opened in 2006. In 2008, journalists
accompanying the New York Philharmonic Orchestra on its visit to Pyongyang said they visited
the digital library and had accessed their Facebook accounts there.
42 In 2005, as an offshoot of the
digital library project, the partners agreed to develop twin integrated information technology
laboratories (“the Twin Labs project”) as well as support exchanges of Syracuse and Kim Chaek
Universities’ junior faculty. This program has met dela ys; no North Korean faculty members have
enrolled at Syracuse yet.
The U.S.-North Korea Science Engagement Consortium
The U.S.-North Korea Science Engagement Consortium (officially known as the U.S.-DPRK
Science E ngagement Cons ortiu m) repr es ents an effort to foster science coop eration bet ween t he
U.S. and North Korean scientific communities, primarily between academic institutions. The U.S.
consortium cor e members (the Amer ican Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS),
the Civilian Research & Development Foundation Global (CRDF Global), the Pacific Century
Institut e and Syracuse Universit y) wer e insp ir ed b y the exa mp le of the bilat eral collaboration
38 See “Evaluation Report, AS 1356 / PRK 1035-06,” Welthungerhilfe, https://www.welthungerhilfe.de/fileadmin/
media/pdf/Evaluationen/Korea_1035.pdf, and Bernhard Seliger, “North Korea’s Economic Development and External
Relations,” Korea’s Economy 2009 (Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute of America, 2009), p. 70.
39 Hyungjin Seo and Stuart Thorson, “Academic Science Engagement with North Korea,” On Korea (Washington, DC:
Korea Economic Institute of America, 2010).
40 Ibid, p. 109. 41 Ibid, p. 112-113. 42 Ken Stier, “Americans Long into Hermit Kingdom,” Miller-McCune, May 18, 2009, https://www.miller-mccune.com/
politics/americans-log-into-hermit-kingdom-3710/#.

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between Syracuse University and Kim Chaek University of Technology in the development of the
latter ’s digital library. The digital library project has been ongoing for almost ten years. In May
2007, several university and NGO representatives met to examine participants’ experiences with
respect to scientific collaboration with North Korea. This resulted in the formation of the
Consortium, which has since sent a Nobel Laureate science delegation to Pyongyang in 2009
43
and hosted a DPRK State Aca demy of Sciences (SAOS ) delegation in Atlanta in February 2011
where scientists from Emory, Georgia Institute of Technology, the University of Georgia,
Stanford, Johns Hopkins, Syracuse University, and the University of Missouri attended. The
Consortium, which maintains a secretariat at CRDF Global, has signed two agreements with the
SAOS and plans to implement a few initiatives including English language training for scientists
in 2011 and 2012 contingent upon receiving funding and securing legal approvals.
Pyongyang University of Science and Technology
In late October 2010, an American educator of South Korean origin, James Kim (Kim Chin-
kyung), and a South Korean NGO, the Northeast Asia Foundation for Education and Culture
(NAFEC), opened North Korea’s first and only private university, the Pyongyang University of
Science and Technology (PUST). PUST began as a North Korean proposal in 2000: North Korean
officials approached James Kim eight years after he had founded one of China’s first foreign
university in Jilin province. PUST offers masters and doctorate degree programs in computing,
electronics, and agricultural engineering, as well as a masters degree program in Business
Administration.
Construction on the campus began in March 2001. North Korean education officials accepted
Kim as PUST president, and acknowledged his right to hire faculty of any nationality. PUST
intends to create an industrial park on the campus. Kim and NAFEC have raised funds from
private and public sources. The South Korean Ministry of Unification contributed close to $1
million. NAFEC raised nearly $32 million, mostly from South Korean churches and foreign
donors. Kim and NAFEC also obtained the advice of business investors and a former president of
Rice University. PUST expects to spend about $4 million in its first year of operation. North
Korea’s education ministry selects the students. Since the university’s opening,160 graduate
students have enrolled. James Kim and the PUST faculty hope to add undergraduate programs
later, and eventually enlarge the university to 250 faculty members, 600 graduate students, and
2,000 undergraduates.
44
The Hanns Seidel and Friedrich Naumann Foundations
Several NGOs, in response to North Korean requests, have provided specific technical assistance,
offering courses to candidates selected by the North Korean government in economics,
agriculture, and capacity building. Some have advised North Kor eans on water, sanitation, seed
improvement, and soil erosion prevention projects. Others have offer ed North Kor eans officials
study-abroad opportunities, and/or classes in English language.
45
43 CRDF Global Press Release—CRDF CEO Campbell Participates in Delegation to DPRK, December 2009. 44 Richard Stone, “A Mission to Educate the Elite,” Science, Vol. 316 (April 13, 2007), p. 183; Mark McDonald.
“North Korea to Open School Founded by U.S. Scholars,” International Herald Tribune, October 25, 2010; and “A
Journey from War to Starting College in North,” Joongang Ilbo, November 2, 2010.
45 See “Evaluation Report, AS 1356 / PRK 1035-06,” Welthungerhilfe, https://www.welthungerhilfe.de/fileadmin/
(continued…)

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The Hanns-Seidel-Foundation Korea (HSS), for example, a German NGO associated with the
Christian Social Union, a political party, promotes political dialogue, education, mana gement
training, and institution building.
46 HSS is notable because, among other reasons, it is among the
few Europeans involved in business/economic training. In 2006, HSS partnered with the
Pyongyang International Information Center for New Technology and Economy and the EU-
Kor ea Industrial Cooperation Agency. They sponsored the EU-NK Trade Capacity Project to
introduce mid-level North Korean officials to business and trade practices. Its interlocutor was the
Kor ean European Cooperation Coordinating Agency, created by the North Kor ean Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to serve as its point of contact with European NGOs. Participants attended
seminars on inter national business and trade, and on establishing cha mbers of commer ce, food
safety standards, textile associations, customs procedures, and export strategies.
47 In 2008, HSS
also offered courses in agriculture and forestry management. The North Korean government
ended its participation in the EU-North Korea Trade Capacity Project in 2009. HSS Director
Bernhard Seliger suggested that North Korea’s decision to withdraw stemmed from an
unwillingness to accept the notion of trade. In addition, North Korean officials selected
participants; and those participants were rotated frequently so that in most cases, they were in
their posts no longer than six months, which enfeebled the project as well.
48
The Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNF), like HSS, is a non-profit organization with links to a
political party, the German Free Democratic Party (FDP). The Naumann Foundation’s goals
include the promotion of democratic institutions, human rights, the rule of law and economic
freedom. FNF provides policy consultation, educational programs working with local NGOs,
civic organizations, and educational institutions. As recently as July 2010, FNF hosted a small
delegation of North Kor ean senior officia ls of the ruling Worker ’s Party, as well as some senior
bureaucrats to tour Munich, Dresden, and Berlin, to introduce them to German engineering
practices and sustainable development.
The U.S. North Korean Tuberculosis Project
The U.S.-North Korean Tuberculosis (TB) Project established a national reference laboratory in
North Korea for the identification of multi-drug resistant strains of tuberculosis. It seeks to
improve North Korea’s diagnostic capacity and thereby enhance the health security of the region.
Successful treatment in North Korea would lower the risks of TB exposure to the populations of
neighboring states. North Korea’s rate of infection is high: 345 per 100,000 individuals.
49 For
comparison, the United States rate of infection in 2009 was 3.8 per 100,000. 50 The U.S.-North
Kor ean TB project bega n with meetings between Stanford University faculty and officials of
North Kor ea’s Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) in 2008. The Bay Ar ea TB Consortium, and the

(…continued)
media/pdf/Evaluationen/Korea_1035.pdf, and Bernhard Seliger, “North Korea’s Economic Development and External
Relations,” Korea’s Economy 2009 (Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute of America, 2009), p. 70.
46 Hanns-Seidel Foundation website, https://www.hss.or.kr/projectEnglish.html. 47 Seliger, op. cit., p. 72. 48 Seliger, op. cit., p. 72. 49 Richard Stone, “New Tuberculosis Lab Hailed as Breakthrough in Health Diplomacy,” Science, Vol. 327 (March 12,
2010), p. 1312. Sharon Perry, Heidi Linton, and Gary Schoolnik, “Tuberculosis in North Korea,” Science, Vol. 331
January 21, 2011, p. 263.
50 Centers for Disease Control, “Reported Tuberculosis in the United States, 2009,” https://www.cdc.gov/tb/statistics/
reports/2009/table1.htm.

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Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a Washington-based nonprofit organization devoted to
strengthening global security, were the initial funders. 51 In April 2008, NTI committed $300,000
to cover equipment and training for the national laboratory. 52 Later in 2008, Christian Friends of
Korea, an NGO based in North Carolina, joined the project. The project partners made three trips
to Pyongyang from 2009-2010 to renovate a public health facility designated as the TB reference
laboratory. They shipped laboratory materials and equipment via Beijing to Pyongyang to
complete the laboratory’s installation. According to Christian Friends, the cost of the equipment
and supplies came to approximately $1.7 million.
53 By fall 2010, they had completed laboratory
renovations, including checks of the building facilities and equipment, and had held two
workshops to train staff in TB culturing methods and laboratory practices.
54 The TB reference
laboratory is set to receive some support from funds administered by UNICEF. The Global Fund
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria is a public-private partnership created to respond to
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria.
55 The Global Fund agreed to provide aid for
medication supply and basic testing for multi-drug resistant TB for a two-year period (June 2010-
2012) in North Korea.
56
Track II Diplomacy
One of the fundamental problems in dealing with the North Korean regime is its deep isolation,
which makes traditional diplomatic exchanges difficult. Some NGOs have sought to organize
Track II exchanges—that is, sponsoring informal communications between North Korean
scientists, academics, military officers and private citizens, and their counterparts in the United
States or overseas.
The cr eation of the U.S.-North Kor ean TB project, the Kim Cha ek-S yracuse digital library project
and the U.S.-DPRK Scientific Enga gement Consortium owe much to Track II diplomacy. Other
NGOs seek to address political issues of the Korean Peninsula directly. Some NGOs that have
sponsored Track II exchanges include the Korea Society, Stanford University, Syracuse
University, the National Committee for Amer ican For eign Policy, the University of California
(the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)), and the Asia Society.
Track II dialogues often rely on the participation and reputation of retir ed diplomats or
government officials. For example, the Korea Society, the National Committee on Amer ican
Foreign Policy, and the Asia Society played roles in engaging North Korean diplomats during
moments when the Six-Party Talks appeared to be dea dlocked. The Center for Internationa l
Security and Cooperation at Stanford University and the University of California’s Northeast Asia
Conflict Dialogue (NEACD) have also held meetings with officials participating in Six-Party
Talks. North Korean diplomats last attended a NEACD session in 2009. Diplomats from both the
51 Nuclear Threat Initiative, https://www.nti.org/b_aboutnti/b4_programs.html. 52 Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2008 Annual Report, p. 34, https://www.nti.org/b_aboutnti/annual_report_2008.pdf. 53 Christian Friends of Korea Newsletter, https://www.cfk.org/Newsletters/2010/June2010view2.pdf. 54 Christian Friends of Korea Newsletter, https://www.cfk.org/Newsletters/2010%20Nov%20final%20pdfs/CFK-
AR.pdf.
55 See CRS Report R41363, The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria: U.S. Contributions and Issues
for Congress, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther.
56 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, https://portfolio.theglobalfund.org/Grant/Index/PRK-810-
G02-T?lang=en.

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North Korean Permanent Mission to the United Nations and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
Pyongyang, rather than academics or scientists, have attended. 57 By virtue of their experience as
either past negotiators with North Korea or their expertise, some U.S. representatives have also
opened doors for diplomacy, for example former President Jimmy Carter, former New Mexico
Governor Bill Richardson, and retired Dir ector of Los Ala mos National Laboratory Dr. Siegfried
Hecker. Some observers oppose public exchanges that involve prominent figures, because the
North Korean regime frequently uses such events for its own propaganda purposes. Others
believe they are relatively “low-cost” tools of diplomacy, in which the North Korean regime
sometimes is encouraged to make concessions in exchange for the opportunity to publicize a visit.
NGO Radio Broadcasts to North Korea
Within the last decade, South Korean activists and North Koreans who successfully defected to
South Kor ea have developed independent radio broadcast organizations. Some of these
orga nizations ha ve mana ged to smuggle cell phones to North Kor ean citizens as a means to gain
information. NGOs have received some funding from the National Endowment for Democracy, as
well as the U.S. Department of State. South Kor ean and North Korea n defectors have been
broadcasting via short- and medium-wave radio since 2004. The broadcasts include news briefs,
particularly about the Kor ean P eninsula, interviews with North Korea n defectors, and
international commentary on events occurring in North Korea. Defectors interviewed in South
Kor ea confirmed that they wer e able to listen to these broadcasts after doctoring radios that are
locked onto official frequencies by North Korea n authorities. The U.S. Broadcasting Board of
Governors cited a recent survey in which defectors interviewed in China and South Kor ea
indicated that they had listened to foreign media. One representative of Radio Free Chosun
suggested that the transmissions offered hope, saying: “Radios must let North Korean people
know that, if personal farming, market[s] are legalized, [the] economy opened and cooperation
with South Korea, China, and the United States start, the North Korean economy can revive, and
their hunger can end.”
58
Table 1. DPRK and ROK Radio Broadcasters
Broadcaster From Intended
Audience Frequency/Hours
on air daily
Organization
Open North
Korea 2005 General 7480, 11570 kHz /
2 hrs Formed in U.S.;
defectors/ROK
activists
Free North
Korea April 2004 General 530, 12155 and
15645 kHz / 5 hrs Defectors and
ROK activists
Radio Free
Chosun Dec 2005 General 7515, 11560 kHz/ 3
hrs Defectors and
ROK activists
North Korean
Reform Radio Jan 2008 DPRK elite 7590 kHz/one hour Defectors and
ROK activists
57 See https://igcc.ucsd.edu/regions/asia_pacific/NEACD/NEACDpolicyseminar.php for additional history and reports
of each dialogue session.
58 Gwang Baek Lee, “Impact of Independent Radio Broadcasts in North Korea,” National Endowment for Democracy,
https://www.ned.org/events/north-koreas-shifting-political-landscape/gwang-baek-lee.

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Source: “North Korea’s Shifting Political Landscape?” published by the Network for North Korean Democracy
and Human Rights, the Sejong Institute, and the National Endowment for Democracy, October 2010.

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Appendix. List of Related CRS Reports
CRS Report R40095, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, by Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth
Nikitin
CRS Report R41259, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation,
by Emma Chanlett-Aver y and Mi Ae Taylor
CRS Report RS22973, Congress and U.S. Policy on North Korean Human Rights and Refugees:
Recent Legislation and Implementation, by Emma Chanlett-Avery
CRS Report R41438, North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E.
Rennack
CRS Report R41481, U.S.-South Korea Relations, coordinated by Mark E. Manyin
CRS Report R41363, The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria: U.S.
Contributions and Issues for Congress, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther

Author Contact Information

Mi Ae Taylor
Research Associate in Asian Affairs

Mark E. Manyin
Specialist in Asian Affairs
mmanyin@crs.loc.gov, 7-7653

Acknowledgments
This report was written by Mi Ae Taylor, who worked as a Research Associate with CRS until March
2011. For questions on this topic, please contact Mark Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, at 7-7653 or
mmanyin@crs.loc.gov.