research for a fairer world
From Aid to
Development
Effectivenessf
A Working baper
Shannon Kindornay
The views expressed in this research paper are the author’s afone
and are not necessarify the views of The North bouth Institute
or the funders of this research project.
January 2011

From Aid to Development Effectiveness: A Working Paper
Shannon Kindornay
The North -South Institute
January 2011

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Contents
Acknowledgements ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. .2
Acronyms ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. …………….. 3
1. Introduction ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ……… 5
2. Methods ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ………….. 6
3. Context ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ……………. 7
3.1 Development and Aid in a Changing World ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………… 7
3.2 From Paris to Busan ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………….. 8
4. From Aid to Development Effectiveness ………………………….. ………………………….. ……………………….. 10
4.1 Comparison of Aid and Development Effectiveness ………………………….. ………………………….. …… 10
4.2 Devel opment Effectiveness as Organizational Effectiveness ………………………….. ……………………. 11
4.2.1 Implications ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ……………………… 12
4.3 Development Effectiveness as Coherence ………………………….. ………………………….. ……………….. 13
4.3.1 General Implications ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ………….. 14
4.3.2 Implications for Donors ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ……… 15
4.3.3 Implications for Governments and Private -Sector Actors ………………………….. ………………….. 15
4.3.4 Implications for Institutions of Global Governance ………………………….. ………………………….. 17
4.3.5 Oth er Considerations ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. …………. 17
4.4 Development Effectiveness as the Development Outcomes from Aid ………………………….. ……….. 18
4.4.1 Implications for Defining Outco mes ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………….. 18
4.4.2 Implications for Measuring Results ………………………….. ………………………….. …………………… 19
4.5 Development Effectiveness as Overall Development Outcomes ………………………….. ………………. 20
4.5.1 General Implications ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ………….. 22
4.5.2 Implications for Donor – and Partner -Country Governments ………………………….. ………………. 23
4.5.3 Implications for Accountability ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………… 24
5. Conclusion and Future Considerations ………………………….. ………………………….. …………………………. 25
References ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. …………. 32

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Acknowl edgements

This paper was undertaken with the financial support of the Government of Canada provided
through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA.)

Disclaimer

Th is paper is a literature review and does not reflect the views or opinions of The North -South
Institute, its Board of Directors, CIDA, or anyone consulted in its preparation.

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Acronyms
ADB Asian Development Bank
AfDB African Development Bank
CSOs civil society organizations
CSR corporate social responsibility
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DFID Department for International Development (UK)
HLF -4 Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness
IDA International Development Association
IDB Inter -American Development Bank
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
IMF International Monetary Fund
MDGs millennium development goals
NSI The North -South Institute
OECD Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development
UN United Nations
UNCTAD United Nations Conferen ce on Trade and Development
UN DCF United Nations Development Cooperation Forum
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women
WP -EFF Working Party o n Aid Effectiveness

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Abstract

In 2011 , the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF -4) will assess progress on
implementing the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and its companion, the 2008
Accra Agenda for Action. Some development acto rs have suggested that the HLF -4 presents an
opportunity to shift from an aid effectiveness framework to one characterized by development
effectiveness; however, no international consensus exists on what development effectiveness
entails.
In 2009, The Nor th-South Institute (NSI) conducted research on development effectiveness and
suggested that development actors have conceptualize d the term in four ways . First,
development effectiveness , viewed as organizational effectiveness , resembles the current aid
effectiveness framework and does not represent a fundamental shift from the status quo.
Second, d evelopment effectiveness as coherence or coordination may require developed
countries to make greater international commitments to policy coherence and may entai l
structural reform at the international level to ensure that institutions of global governance are
more representative and coherent and that they enhance partner -country power and influence in
decision -making, monitoring , and evaluation processes. Third, viewing development
effectiveness as outcomes from aid may mean thinking differently about outcomes and
measuring results . It may also present a problem for mutual accountability frameworks , because
attribution of development outcomes to any one actor is n early impossible. Finally, development
effectiveness in terms of overall development outcomes combines the second and third
conceptualizations, as well as their implications. It draws attention to the country level while
raising questions about the role of aid in the overall development process  in particular, how it
can catalyze alternative development resources with the end goal of discontinuing aid. This
paper builds on th e work of the NSI and assesses the implications of these conceptualizations.

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1. Introduction
In 2011 , the international community will meet in Busan, Korea , for the Fourth High Level Forum
on Aid Effectiveness (HLF -4). Multilateral and bilateral donors, partner countries , and civil
society organizations (CSOs) will assess pr ogress on implementing the 2005 Paris Declaration
on Aid Effectiveness and its companion, the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action. 1 Policymakers will
decide on the framework to underpin future development assistance efforts as the 2015 deadline
for the millennium development goals nears (OECD -DAC WP -EFF 2010: 2).
CSOs engaged in discussions on aid effectiveness are pushing for a new agenda in Busan 
one that moves beyond aid effectiveness to a broader framework of development effectiveness.
The Development Assis tance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co -operation
and Development (OECD) is also considering what the post -2010 agenda might look like,
recognizing that many countries and institutions that endorsed the PD [Paris Declaration] want
work a fter HLF -4 to look at development effectiveness (versus aid effectiveness only)  (OECD –
DAC 2010a: 2).
In preparation for HLF -4, CSOs have articulated their conceptions of development effectiveness
through the BetterAid platform 2 and the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness. 3
However, there is no international consensus on what development effectiveness entails or its
implications for aid policy and practice; as noted by the OECD -DAC (2010a: 2), the concept has
yet to be fully defined. Various devel opment actors have articulated the concept differently in
their institutional policies and programs. Some use the terms aid effectiveness and development
effectiveness interchangeably. Others argue they are distinct concepts, claiming that
development effe ctiveness looks beyond aid and refers to overall development outcomes that
result from aid and non -aid activities, such as economic cooperation, trade, and investment.
In 2009, The North -South Institute (NSI) conducted a literature review on aid and develo pment
effectiveness that culminated in an issues brief titled Development Effectiveness: Towards New
Understandings (Kindornay and Morton 2009). It found that development effectiveness has been
conceptualized in four ways: organizational effectiveness, coh erence or coordination,
development outcomes from aid, and overall development outcomes. As a preliminary survey of
development actors  conceptualizations, this work did not include implications for international
aid policy and practice. Thus, this working paper builds on the 2009 research and assesses the
potential implications arising from various notions of development effectiveness.
This paper is structured in five main sections. Following the introduction, the second section
briefly outlines the resear ch strategy. The third sketches current trends in international
development cooperation and describes the history of the aid effectiveness agenda. The fourth
section describes and updates the four conceptualizations of development effectiveness
identified in the 2009 NSI issues brief. Following each description is a discussion of the
implications for international aid policy and practice. The paper concludes with a look at the
future of aid and development effectiveness.
This paper should be viewed as an ex ploratory piece that seeks to provide some insight into
current thinking and debate on development effectiveness and the implications for aid policy and
practice. It does not assess the merits of the various conceptualizations, nor provide a
conclusive def inition of development effectiveness. The aim is not to establish four distinct
categories as a theoretical framework for understanding development effectiveness; overlap
exists between categories precisely because there is no clear consensus on what devel opment
effectiveness means. Debates on the subject are relatively new and evolving. As more research

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is conducted, it is likely that the categories outlined in this paper will be further explored,
modified, and potentially superseded by new theoretical fra meworks. The aim of this paper is to
inform and prompt debates on development effectiveness in the lead up to HLF -4.

A number of key themes emerged from the research:

· The concept of development effectiveness responds to many of the criticisms leveled a t
development efforts historically , such as : narrow focus on aid, rigid and often ineffective
and irrelevant measurements of successes and failures, the need to address systemic
inequality at the international level and improve partner -country ownership of
development, and limited attention to and insufficient understanding of issues relating to
power and the root causes of poverty.
· Development effectiveness could be an important game changer  for the international
aid effectiveness agenda and have far -reaching implications for global development
agendas and priorities. At this point, careful examination of the concept and its
implications is needed.
· Any agreement on development effectiveness is expected to be different from that of the
Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action. Development effectiveness is arguably
about something more than aid effectiveness, both in design and substance.
· Aid effectiveness is still important in this context and will most certainly be a part of a
development effective ness agenda in the short and medium terms.
· Depending on how it is articulated and operationalized, development effectiveness could
lay the foundation for different types of partnerships between donors, partner -country
governments and institutions, CSOs, p hilanthropists, private -sector actors, and citizens,
with implications for accountability and implementation mechanisms.
· When viewed holistically, the discourse on development effectiveness is concerned not
only with particular development outcomes, but al so with the processes and tools used to
achieve those outcomes. Development actors emphasize outcomes and processes to
varying degrees.
· A shift to development effectiveness will require different evaluation and monitoring tools,
especially if it involves something more than organizational effectiveness.
· Given these considerations, policymakers should avoid rushing into an international
agreement on development effectiveness to ensure that , when (and if) one emerges , it is
based on international consensus and can be easily operationalized and communicated
not only at the global level but also on the ground in partner countries .
2. Methods
Between February and May 2009 and in September 2010, NSI conducted a literature review on
development effectiveness. The goal was to examine how various development actors, namely
multilateral and bilateral donors, partner countries, CSOs, and academics, conceptualize
development effectiveness. The review targeted literature that specifically referenced
development effecti veness  and included reports and evaluations, and official websites,
statements, and policy documents .4 It also considered non -DAC donors such as Brazil, Russia,
India, and China, although public information on their aid and development effectiveness polic ies
was limited. Nevertheless, a growing body of literature on South South cooperation, non -DAC
donors, and statements from high -level fora provide some insights into their views.
Organizations such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNE CA) and the

7

Asian -Pacific Capacity Development for Development Effectiveness Facility offer some
indication of partner -country perspectives.

In addition, on 26 October, I attended a workshop on development effectiveness hosted by the
OECD -DAC as part of t he Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP -EFF) 5 week held in Paris,
France, 25 29 October 2010. The workshop, which was widely attended by WP -EFF members,
included two panel sessions and a number of smaller breakout groups that were held
concurrently. 6 A d raft version of this paper served as a background document for the workshop,
and contributed to the basis for discussions. During the workshop, I participated as a panelist as
well as a resource person  in the breakout group that examined the implications of development
effectiveness at the country level. This paper is informed by the key themes and outcomes of the
workshop. I also attended a two -day plenary session of the WP -EFF, during which participants
discussed their priorities and concerns for HLF -4 as well as issues relating to development
effectiveness more broadly. Over this two -day period, I also conducted nearly half a dozen semi –
structured interviews with partner -country members. 7

Some methodological limitations must be noted. As mentioned, ne w debates on the notion of
development effectiveness are emerging in the lead -up to HLF -4.8 As such, the literature review
is far from exhaustive, and future iterations of this paper will continue to incorporate emerging
perspectives. Moreover, the views o f partner -country representatives interviewed in Paris cannot
be seen as representative of partner -country views across the WP -EFF, as only a limited
number of interviews were conducted. However, interviewees provided insightful comments on
aid and develop ment effectiveness, which inform the discussion throughout. Although the
analysis that follows benefits from consistent examination of official documentation, it would
benefit from more interviews and survey data collected from key development actors regar ding
their understanding of development effectiveness. Future research will also need to consider
publications in French, Spanish, and other languages; at this point, we have only looked at
publications in English.

The analysis that follows is hypothetica l in nature. It describes the implications of various
conceptualizations in theory . The implications for policies, practices, and agreements among
international aid actors will depend largely on how they translate, interpret, combine, and
implement various notions of development effectiveness. Future research should look at the
interrelated nature of the conceptualizations described below and fully explore potential
implications in greater detail. Nevertheless, this working paper serves as a valuable starti ng
point for exploring these issues.
3. Context
3.1 Development and Aid in a Changing World
Over the last two decades, academics and aid officials alike have become increasingly
concerned with the effectiveness of aid in achieving development goals. In 19 96, the OECD –
DAC donors released Shaping the 21st Century (OECD -DAC 1996), a precursor to the MDGs
and the aid effectiveness agenda. 9 In 2000, international policymakers agreed on eight MDGs,
which represented a concerted effort to address development and encapsulate concerns for
economic well -being, gender equality, education, health, the environment, and international
development cooperation. 10 These goals, and their corresponding targets, now underlie
international deve lopment efforts. G overnments (donor and recipient) continued to agree on
common principles and the need to coordinate their actions on aid and development,
exemplified by the World Trade Organization s Doha Declaration (2001), the United Nations

8

(UN) Financing for Development Monterrey Conse nsus (2002), followed by the 2005 Paris
Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and the parallel creation of the UN
Economic and Social Council s Development Cooperation Forum (UN DCF) in 2007. 11 These
processes, among others, represent significa nt international efforts to achieve greater
coherence among official aid actors across aid sectors. In this context, development actors,
more broadly, have also become particularly concerned with the impact on development of non –
aid sectors, such as trade, investment, and migration, and call for solutions ranging from greater
policy coherence for development to reform of the international aid architecture.

Meanwhile a silent revolution  is occurring in development assistance as non -DAC donors 12
offer deve lopment cooperation packages to partner countries on the basis of mutual partnership
and solidarity (e.g., see Bogotá Statement of 2010) . According to Woods (2008: 17), emerging
donors are not overtly attempting to overturn rules or replace them. Rather, by quietly offering
alternatives to aid -receiving countries, they are introducing competitive pressures & [and] weakening the bargaining position of western donors in respect of aid -receiving countries.  The
international community has seen the emergence of South South cooperation fora, such as
India Brazil South Africa and the Forum on China Africa Cooperation. Many non -DAC donors
have chosen to operate outside the established aid architecture and do not abide by the Paris
principles, despite attempts by DA C donors to bring them into the fold (discussed below).

Private actors are also playing an increasing role. The Centre for Global Prosperity at the
Hudson Institute estimates that total private donations 13 in 2008 amounted to USD 233 billion,
compared wit h USD 121 billion in official development assistance (CGP 2010: 6). Development
actors are also increasingly looking to the private sector as an engine for growth in partner
countries and as a potential partner, most notably through private public partners hips. Although
these actors may bring new insights and opportunities to development cooperation, they also
present a challenge to coherence in an already complex aid architecture.

Concerned with maintaining progress on internationally agreed development goals, donors have
sought to engage these new actors in official international aid and development discussions,
through the creation of the WP -EFF, for example (Kumar and Tandon 2009: 3). In September
2009, the WP -EFF created a Task Team on South South Coo peration. The following March
Colombia hosted a High Level Event on South South Cooperation and Capacity Development,
resulting in the Bogotá Statement. The statement recognized the importance of South South
Cooperation as an important instrument of effec tive and inclusive partnerships  and firmly
placed South South cooperation on the aid effectiveness agenda in preparation for HLF -4
(Steering Committee 2010). The OECD -DAC also recently hosted an informal meeting on the
role of the private sector in the co ntext of aid effectiveness ( OECD -DAC 2010 c). In 2008,
recognizing that the evolving global aid architecture includes an increasing number of actors, the
WP -EFF broadened its membership and aims to incorporate lessons on involving not only the
private secto r, but also civil society, municipalities, and parliamentarians in preparations for
HLF -4.
3.2 From Paris to Busan
The Paris Declaration was signed by over 100 countries. It represented a major step toward
establishing agreement by donor and recipients on aid effectiveness, but it was not without
criticism. CSOs criticized the agreement as a government -to-government accord that lacked
CSO involvement 14 and for its technical nature, arguing that it failed to link aid processes with
development goals suffic iently ( ISG 2008: 2 ). In part, the resulting Accra Agenda for Action took
an initial step toward more explicitly recognizing broader development goals ( OECD 2008a; 2) .

9

· It broadened the notion of ownership to emphasize the role of CSOs and
parliamentaria ns.
· It recognized that aid is only one factor in achieving development.
· It stressed the importance of gender equality, respect for human rights, and
environmental sustainability.
· It acknowledged the importance of assessing to what extent aid effectivenes s is
improving and generating a greater development impact. 
· It referred to the importance of South South cooperation, setting out alternative
principles, and emphasizing non -interference, equality, and diversity.
Donors and partner countries alike have difficulty understanding and operationalizing the Paris
principle of mutual accountability (ADB 2008, Egan 2008: 1, OECD -DAC 2008 , Africa Regional
Meeting 2010 a: 5) and there is no broad understanding of what it entails (Steer et al. 2009 : 7).
Historically , mutual accountability had been the most controversial of the Paris Principles and
has raised questions regarding accountability to whom and for what (Egan 2008). While the
Paris Declaration emphasized accountability between donors and recipient governmen ts, in
Accra, it was agreed that all governments are first accountable to their domestic constituencies
(Steer et al. 2009). According to a background paper prepared for the Second Africa Regional
Meeting on Aid Effectiveness, the concept of mutual account ability offers opportunities by
shifting the aid relationship from one of charity to reciprocal obligation. It is a contractual model
of aid delivery that gives rise to a true development partnership  (Africa Regional Meeting
2010a: 5).

However, despite these opportunities, the concept of mutual accountability may create tension
among development partners regarding accountability to each other and to domestic
constituencies. Research shows that donor demands can skew accountability away from
domestic con stituencies in partner countries (Steer et al. 2009: 18). Some have suggested that
this problem can be mitigated by developing a shared agenda and monitoring mechanisms and,
related to these, dialogue, debate, and negotiation (OECD -DAC 2009 a: 3, Steer et a l. 2009: 7 
9). Yet, engagement of civil society and parliamentarians in these processes has been limited
and varies across partner countries (Steer et al. 2009).

A final, important question (although there are many others) relates to which actors have
identified accountabilities. Although many play a role in development processes, accountability
is less clear for some actors, such as private foundations and private -sector actors, as well as
many non -DAC donors (e.g., Brazil, India, Russia, and China), who continue to operate outside
the current aid effectiveness framework. However, CSOs have been actively exploring and
developing their own accountability mechanisms (Open Forum 2010a).

Although mutual accountability is an important issue for development ac tors, it is not their only
concern in the lead up to HLF -4. Partner countries have identified several priorities, including
predictable aid, use of country systems, continued policy conditionality, results -based
development policies, country -driven capacit y development, and reduced transaction costs
(OECD -DAC 2010d). The OECD -DAC (2010a) is calling on donors to focus on areas where
progress is within reach: aid untying, predictability, removal of policy conditionalities, and
transparency.

CSOs have argued that the international aid effectiveness agenda should be reassessed, and
reformulated around a development effectiveness agenda. Their efforts are being coordinated
through the BetterAid Platform and the Open Forum. BetterAid focuses on broad issues of
development effectiveness for reform of international cooperation. The Open Forum is a CSO –

10

led process that will identify specific principles for CSO development effectiveness and their
implications for CSO development practices as well as donor and governm ent policies. 15
4. From Aid to Development Effectiveness
4.1 Comparison of Aid and Development Effectiveness
Considerable consensus exists on the definition of aid effectiveness, which refers to the ability to
achieve expected impacts and stated objectives through aid. As a technical representation of
this understanding, the Paris Declaration does not actually define aid effectiveness. However,
according to a 2008 independent evaluation of the declaration, a definition can be extracted. Aid
effectiveness is the arrangement for the planning, management and deployment of aid that is
efficient, reduces transaction cost and is targeted towards development outcomes, including
poverty reduction  (Stern et al. 2008: vii). This definition focuses on technical aspec ts of aid
delivery, but reviewers suggest that it is assumed aid is development oriented (although this
assumption is relatively unexamined).

A common understanding of development effectiveness  does not exist. Some actors make little
distinction betwee n aid and development effectiveness. For example, in an Asian Development
Bank (ADB) working paper, Quibria (2004: 3) suggests that development effectiveness simply
refers to the effectiveness of aid in development,  and uses the terms development and aid
effectiveness interchangeably. The World Bank has been publishing reviews of development
effectiveness since the early 1990s; however, much of the discussion is framed in terms of the
aid effectiveness principles and language now found in the Paris Declar ation. AusAID s Office of
Development Effectiveness similarly publishes an annual review, but it too focuses
systematically on the effectiveness of Australian aid, rather than addressing or considering non –
aid policy areas that may affect development outco mes (AusAid 2008). The United Nations
Development Group, a platform that unites 32 UN organs with the objective of delivering more
coherent, effective, and efficient assistance, also seems to view development effectiveness in
terms of aid effectiveness pri nciples. 16 Guidelines for UN country teams state that the three
basic elements of country -level development effectiveness are national ownership, acting on the
UN s comparative advantage, and maximizing effectiveness and accountability (UNDG 2009: 3).
These components all coincide with aid effectiveness principles, particularly ownership and
alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability.

Despite the continued use of aid effectiveness principles to describe development effectiven ess
by some organizations, many clearly distinguish between them. NSI has identified four possible
categories to serve as a starting point for understanding various conceptualizations of
development effectiveness. The following section reviews this typolog y. These categories are
neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive, and some development actors have understandings
that overlap categories. The categories should not be understood as classifications of
development effectiveness by aid actor, but rather, by conceptualizations.

Figure 1 illustrates the notions of development effectiveness, starting with more narrow
understandings, namely, organizational effectiveness, moving toward broader notions, such as
development effectiveness as coherence and outcomes from aid, and ending with development
effectiveness as overall development outcomes. The continuum highlights the overlapping and
interrelated nature of these notions. As one moves across the continuum, development
effectiveness entails a progressively mo re ambitious agenda, but also becomes increasingly
more complex, creating difficulties in terms of operationalization and evaluation. Given the

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ambition and difficulties associated with approaches toward the right side of the spectrum, the
likelihood of ge nerating consensus on these notions also diminishes.

Figure 1. The development effectiveness continuum

Organizational Coherence Outcomes Overall development
effectiveness from aid outcomes

Less complex More complex

Focused on inputs and outputs Overall outcomes not
of individual actors attributable to any one actor

Easily operationalized and evaluated Difficult to operationalize
and evaluate

An impo rtant point to consider in the following analysis is that notions of development
effectiveness are implicitly based on some understanding of development. Although it is outside
the scope of this paper to examine these implicit assumptions, they will inevit ably lead to
discussions regarding different understandings of development itself. Policymakers may need to
tackle their assumptions as a preliminary step toward achieving consensus on what
development effectiveness entails. 17
4.2 Development Effectiveness as Organizational Effectiveness
Aid agencies, especially multilaterals, frequently view development effectiveness from the supply
side, in terms of the effectiveness of their own policies and programs or how well they are
achieving stated organizational objectives and goals. Numerous examples exist. The World
Bank s 2005 Review of Development Effectiveness examines the institution s organizational
performance and outputs on multiple levels, through the Bank s global programs, country
programs, and individ ual projects (World Bank 2005). Its 2008 report similarly assesses project
and country program outcomes, as well as the World Bank s work in fostering global public
goods (O Brien 2008).

The Inter -American Development Bank (IDB) launched its Development Effectiveness
Framework in 2008. It situates its discussion of development effectiveness within the overall
push for aid effectiveness, particularly within the Paris process. IDB s framework takes the
OECD -DAC definition of effectiveness as a starting poin t, i.e., the extent to which the
development intervention s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking
into account their relative importance  (OECD -DAC WP -EV 2002: 20 ). It claims to assess its
development effectiveness in terms of w hether it is doing the right things  and doing things
right  (IDB 2008: 2 3).

The IDB sees its new Development Effectiveness Framework as moving from a focus on inputs
to outputs and outcomes ( IDB 2010: xv, 25 ). While it seeks to measure its effectiven ess vis -à-
vis internationally and regionally agreed development goals, its framework focuses on its

12

operational effectiveness. It is a supply -side framework that does not look at overall
development outcomes, but rather the relevancy of IDB activities to d evelopment goals. 18

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD) have also published development effectiveness reports. Early UNDP
reports distinguished between development and organization al effectiveness, but still focused on
the efficiency and effectiveness of UNDP s own programs. According to the 2001 report,
organizational effectiveness measures time -bound organizational objectives and is about
results -based management. Development effe ctiveness measures the impact of aid and
progress toward development goals; it represents the extent to which an institution or
intervention has brought about targeted change & [and] is influenced by various factors,
beginning with the quality of project de sign and ending with the relevance and sustainability of
desired results  (Evaluation Office 2001: 11).

Despite this important distinction and concern for relevance, the report s discussion of
development effectiveness remains confined to the development impact of UNDP itself, and
does not consider external factors, such as who determines development priorities, the role of
other development actors, or the impact of non -aid sectors. As discussed below, UNDP s 2003
report signaled a deliberate move away fr om development effectiveness as organizational
performance to an analysis that looks at the final results of the overall development process and
the contribution of a range of relevant players.

IFAD s 2007 development effectiveness report provides an inte resting and broader definition of
development effectiveness. It depends on the collective and coordinated actions of national and
external actors; therefore, it is a measure of these actors  aggregate impact, with accountability
for results shared by many (IFAD 2007: 4) . The organization claims that its 2007 report has a
broader scope than those of other organizations, on the basis that it goes beyond reporting on
operational effectiveness. IFAD asserts that it is more comprehensive, draws on wider sources,
and reports on results at the corporate as well as country level ( IFAD 2007: iii ). However, the
report remains focused on development effectiveness in terms of IFAD s organizational
performance.
4.2.1 Implications
This view of development effectiveness b roadly resembles the OECD -DAC definition (see
above). Of the four concept ualization s examined here, it is closest to aid effectiveness; it is
concerned with the effective and efficient delivery of assistance. The focus on the relevance of
development inter ventions coincides with the Paris principle on alignment. The focus is not on
actual outcomes, per se , but on ensuring that interventions are relevant to development goals.
There is also little attention to how these particular development goals were deter mined as
priorities for the interventions in the first place. This understanding of development effectiveness
does not imply a fundamental shift from the status quo; it coincides with the existing aid
discourse and evaluation practices.

For CSOs, this app roach does not speak to many of their concerns, namely the need to
measure development effectiveness against actual outcomes, such as the realization of human
rights and greater gender equality. In addition, if development effectiveness is conceptualized a s
organizational effectiveness, it begs the question as to whether the international community
needs a new concept  to serve as the guiding framework for development efforts. This definition
is already largely captured by aid effectiveness, which is assum ed to have a development –
oriented intent. However, although this understanding of development effectiveness does not

13

represent a major shift from current practice, organizational effectiveness is still a very important
component of aid effectiveness and, a rguably, broader notions of development effectiveness;
agencies need to be able to demonstrate they can meet objectives and deliver aid efficiently and
effectively.
4.3 Development Effectiveness as Coherence
Some aid actors view development effectiveness in terms of the consistency of development –
related policies. This approach acknowledges that non -aid policies affect development
processes, thus creating a need for policy coherence across various areas, including trade,
investment, security, and immigrati on. The policy communities (e.g., donors, partner countries,
multilateral development agencies, and CSOs) that include the issue of coherence in their
understanding of development effectiveness offer a variety of policy prescriptions. As
demonstrated below , these responses, which are often advocated in concert, range from whole –
of-government approaches  for donor countries and greater coherence across partner -country
policies to reform of the international aid architecture and ensuring that partner countri es have a
greater say in institutions of global governance.

Some bilateral donors adopt this view of development effectiveness and underline the
importance of policy coherence, while recognizing that aid is not the only factor affecting
development. Who le-of-government  approaches are one reflection of this perspective. An
example of this approach can be seen in Sweden s Policy for Global Development (2003), which
sets out an ambitious government -wide approach to equitable and sustainable global
develop ment  (Sörbom and Davies 2008: 256 6).

Duty -free, quota -free access to developed -country markets by partner countries is another
example. This view tends to be supply -side driven, focusing on how donor countries can improve
coherence between aid and non -aid policies, rather than calling for structural reform of
international rules or bodies. 19

The development cooperation efforts of non -DAC donors, while not defined in terms of the
language of development effectiveness, also seem to recognize the importan ce of a
comprehensive approach to development cooperation that combines aid and non -aid tools,
which tend to be specific to country priorities and development goals. For example, at the first
China Africa Ministerial Conference in 2000, Chinese and African leaders agreed on a broad
program of South South cooperation, based on equality and mutual benefit, 20 that included
provisions on trade, investment, debt relief, tourism, migration, health, education, and human
resources development ( Forum on China -Africa Cooperation 2009a ). Subsequent conferences
have reaffirmed these commitments and broadened them to include, inter alia cooperation on
issues such as peace and security, governance, and local capacity building. 21

Turning to partner countries, the Mutual Rev iew of Development Effectiveness in Africa (ECA –
OECD 2009) points to the coherence of their policies. Although the study does not attempt to
unpack the meaning of development effectiveness, it does focus on the policies that will promote
development effect iveness (rather than on desired outcomes). These include supporting
sustainable economic growth; investing in education, health, and gender equality; promoting
good governance; and enhancing development finance (including an emphasis on domestic
public res ources). These issues also arose during interviews with partner -country
representatives, who pointed to the need for coherence between domestic policies across
departments, such as those responsible for social policy and economic planning. In fact,
intervi ewees tended to be more concerned with the coherence of domestic policies and how
donors can support them than the policy coherence of donors themselves. Many stressed the

14

catalytic role aid can play in harnessing alternative resources for development, a p oint that was
also discussed at the Second Africa Regional Meeting (Africa Regional Meeting 2010a: 23 27).

Development effectiveness as coherence is also broadly captured by concerns over policy
coherence for development in the OECD -DAC and UN DCF. In pr eparation for HLF -4, the
OECD -DAC has hinted that policy coherence for development may be a critical part of the
development effectiveness agenda. While recognizing that development effectiveness has not
been fully defined, the OECD -DAC states that most c ountries see it as a discussion that
encompasses all factors that support development  aid, countries  own resources, policy
coherence for development , the private sector etc  (OECD -DAC 2010a, emphasis added). At the
Workshop on Development Effectiveness, it was similarly recognized that aid is one tool to
achieve development effectiveness among many. The debate on development effectiveness
brings the issue of policy coherence for development to the forefront of policy discussions. In this
context, partici pants felt that aid has a catalytic role to play in harnessing more resources for
development.

The June 2010 Secretary -General s report on the UN DCF called for developed countries to
ensure that policies across sectors support internationally agreed deve lopment goals and for
partner countries to engage more with beyond -aid issues (ECOSOC 2010: 6). The UN DCF
takes a broad view of policy coherence, which includes:

· a focus on whole -of-government approaches for donors and recipients
· coherence between the development programmes of several donors
· coherence between donor and recipient strategies
In their articulation of development effectiveness, CSOs have also indicated the importance of
policy coherence for development. BetterAid has called on governments to:

study the feasibility of a convention on development cooperation to strengthen commitments
to internationally agreed development goals, enhance policy coherence for development from
the international to the national level , address common standards fo r adherence, and
improve international coordination among all actors towards effective responses to both
immediate and long term development challenges and demands (BetterAid 2010 a: 7,
emphasis added).

It is unclear how such a convention would add value t o existing international agreements and
commitments; however, CSOs have suggested establishing a UN Economic and Social Security
Council, which would be broadly representative 22 and have a mandate to monitor the social and
environmental quality of developm ent, coordinate policy between international institutions, build
consensus among development actors, and promote sustainable development  (BetterAid
2010 a: 7) .
4.3.1 General Implications
The concept of development effectiveness as coherence can have variou s implications for
international aid policy and practice. In the examples above, aid actors emphasize different
aspects of coherence, demonstrating that development effectiveness as coherence could have a
wide range of implications. Donors often refer to t he coherence between their aid and non -aid
policies, an approach that relies on the political will of developed countries to ensure internal
coordination between various policies that affect development. The UN DCF, the Multilateral
Review of Development E ffectiveness in Africa, and interviewees all point to the importance of
coherence across policies within partner countries. Mechanisms to ensure this include poverty

15

reduction strategy papers and regional and national development plans. These strategies an d
plans also provide a mechanism through which donors can harmonize and align their own
strategies, implementing the Paris principles. However, the implications of development
effectiveness as policy coherence in terms of aligning aid and non -aid policies, both within donor
countries and at the international level, are less clear.
4.3.2 Implications for Donors
It is unclear how articulating development effectiveness as coherence would provide a more
successful framework for achieving policy coherence for d evelopment now than in the past.
Indeed, policy coherence for development is not a new idea and continues to pose a challenge.
The OECD -DAC has been advocating greater policy coherence since the early 1990s (OECD –
DAC 2009b: 10). Despite DAC -donor commitmen ts to the policy coherence agenda, most
recently in the OECD 2008 ministerial Declaration on Policy Coherence for De velopment (OECD
2008b), 23 DAC peer reviews continue to find considerable variation in the extent of members 
political commitments to [po lic y coherence for development]  (OECD -DAC 2009b: 10).

While donors tend to take a more holistic development approach in some instances, for
example, often coordinating between multiple departments in work with fragile states or in the
form of preferential trade agreements, 24 they have been less willing to ensure development
friendly policies in other areas that are more politically sensitive, such as immigration and border
control and agricultural subsidies. Only some donors  e.g., the United Kingdom, Nethe rlands,
Sweden, and the European Community  have been successful in establishing mechanisms for
coordination, as well as monitoring, analysis, and reporting on the development impacts of non –
aid sectors (OECD -DAC 2009b: 10).

Despite challenges in the pa st, the time may be ripe for renewed commitments to policy
coherence for development. As mentioned, the international development field is changing. Non –
DAC donors offer development cooperation packages to partner countries that include trade and
investmen t provisions. Greater policy coherence for development may be one way for DAC –
donors to ensure their continued relevance in the development process. It may also provide an
additional incentive for partner countries to engage in DAC -donor initiated internat ional
processes, such as the aid effectiveness agenda. Finally, many DAC -donors are concerned with
demonstrating results and value -for -money ; ensuring that non -aid policies do not undermine
aid efforts is one way to address this concern.

Development eff ectiveness as coherence could require donor countries to make specific
commitments in terms of policy harmonization across both aid and non -aid sectors. Although
often politically challenging domestically, this might provide further incentives for donors t o
consider renewed action on politically sensitive issues, such as immigration, balance of trade
issues, the removal of non -tariff barriers, and agricultural subsidies, which are key concerns of
partner countries. 25 Such an agenda would require new mechanis ms and incentives to
coordinate aid and non -aid policies at the national level, unavailable in most donor countries, 26
although the United Kingdom s Trade Policy Unit, which includes policymakers from
development and trade departments, and Ireland s Inter -Departmental Committee on
Development are examples. In this context, CSOs are potential allies and can help donors
engage with and inform the public on the importance of policy coherence for development.
4.3.3 Implications for Governments and Private -Sector Actors
Development effectiveness as coherence may also raise questions for private -sector actors.
These stakeholders engage in development processes in a variety of ways, for example, as

16

philanthropists, through public private partnerships, domestic inves tment, and foreign direct
investment. Although it is outside the scope of this paper to fully explore the role of the private
sector in development processes and the implications of development effectiveness for these
actors, a few points are worth mention ing.

If coherence means that donors should ensure that aid and non -aid policies coincide, then
should private -sector actors be subject to the same obligations? For example, the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation has recently come under fire over investmen ts in agribusiness giants,
Monsanto and Cargill, companies that have faced fierce criticism from environmentalist and
community groups concerned with their agricultural model and its implications for small farmers
and the environment (Vidal 2010). In addit ion, private foundations are governed by varying
degrees of regulation; transparency and reporting on their aid activities is relatively weak
compared with that of official DAC -donors (Marten and Witte 2008: 20). However, the coherence
concept of developme nt effectiveness might encourage these organizations to be more
transparent and ensure coherence across corporate practices that affect development.

Outside private foundations, the private sector is also under increasing public scrutiny and
pressure to adhere to best practice standards that may contribute to development. 27 Some
companies have responded with greater attention to corporate social responsibility (CSR).
However, Ruggie (2008: 17), UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights, notes
that a company cannot compensate for human rights harms by performing good deeds
elsewhere.  Ruggie and the UN Human Rights Council have affirmed a corporate responsibility
to respect human rights  and that this responsibility exists independently of St ates  human rights
duties  and applies to all companies in all situations  (Ruggie 2010: 12 13). Although this is
generally not a legal obligation, except where domestic legislation exists, Ruggie notes it is an
expected  standard in almost all voluntary CSR initiatives. Yet, many individual CSR efforts are
ad hoc  and researchers, CSOs, and community leaders have raised further concerns about the
transparency and effectiveness of enforcement and remedy measures attached to umbrella
voluntary initiatives , such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the Voluntary
Principles on Security and Human Rights, and the UN Global Compact (see, for example,
Williams 2004, SCFAIT 2005 , Global Witness 2007 , PDAC 2007 , IHRB 2010) . Development
effectivene ss as coherence could require governments to endorse such initiatives , support their
improvement and implementation, and, possibly, penalize companies that fail to meet their
commitments.

In other instances, the responsibilities of private -sector actors operating overseas may be
directly tied to state duties. Industry oversight is commonly held to be the responsibility of host
governments. However, coherence may imply that donors should play a greater role in
supporting and strengthening the ability of pa rtner -country governments to hold private -sector
actors  domestic companies as well as multinationals operating within their country  to
minimum standards of working conditions, human rights, gender equality, environmental
protection, etc. Developed -coun try governments could even implement domestic legislation to
this effect. For example, the Alien Torts Claims Act of the United States allows civil law
challenges against American companies that violate human rights abroad. Another possibility is
national legislation that imposes human rights standards on official development assistance
(including procurements and public private partnerships) and public support for domestic
companies abroad. This would create obligations for governments to ensure that all c ompanies
financed by their national development budget, or supported publicly through export credit
agency loans or public pension plan investments, for example, meet legislated standards.

17

4.3.4 Implications for Institutions of Global Governance
Thus far, we have focused on policy coherence in terms of the actions countries or organizations
can take alone, or in concert, to promote greater coherence across their aid and non -aid
policies. Although such initiatives are welcome, partner countries have histori cally advocated
reform of the development cooperation architecture and structural change to the multilateral
system. Partner countries have called for a more equitable and representative system of global
governance through forums such as the Group of 77 (G 77). 28

In addition to an approach to development effectiveness that seeks coherence at the level of
agents, a further agenda might look at the impact of non -aid sectors from a multilateral,
structural and political perspective. This implies a restructurin g of the institutions of global
governance to be more responsive to development concerns and ensure coherence between,
for example, the World Trade Organization and various UN organs. Despite the creation of
initiatives aimed at greater coherence across th e multilateral system, partner countries continue
to seek reform. 29 At the first Africa Regional Meeting on Aid Effectiveness, South/South
Cooperation and Capacity Development (March 2010), countries agreed that the development
architecture should be made more transparent, accountable, participatory and responsive to the
needs of developing [partner] countries  (Africa Regional Meeting 2010b: 2).

In 2008, a statement by the G77 and China similarly claimed:

Progress must be made on enhancing the coherenc e of the international economic
architecture, particularly the interplay of the multilateral trading system and the international
financial and monetary systems. There is a need for more inclusive and transparent
governance of global economic relations, wi th an adequate voice and participation of
developing [partner] countries in international economic decision -making. ( UNCTAD 2008: 2;
see also South Centre 2008 ).

Such an agenda would mean enhancing the representation and voice of partner countries in
exi sting intergovernmental organizations, as well as establishing or improving on mechanisms of
coordination.
4.3.5 Other Considerations
A vision of development effectiveness that employs coherence as a means to achieve
development outcomes could be subject to many of the same critiques as previous development
initiatives, depending on the political will of governments to formulate, implement, and enforce
the policies. Although policy coherence may be a useful tool, it is just that: a tool . As such , it
doe s n ot address CSO critiques of the aid effectiveness agenda that centr e on the limited link
between e fficient aid (and its measurement) and development outcomes, such as the realization
of human rights and improvements in gender equality.

It is unclear how actors would effectively measure policy coherence against development
outcomes (the question of whose development outcomes remains). The problem does not lie in
the assessment of policy coherence for development per se ,30 but rather in linking the effects o f
increased coherence with development outcomes. As discussed below, it is nearly impossible
for donors to identify causality between their actions and development outcomes, given the
number of factors that affect development.

Another important considera tion is where the thrust for such an agenda of development
effectiveness as coherence might emerge. The WP -EFF has engaged with the concept, but

18

policy coherence for development requires political support from the highest levels of
governments and is beyon d the mandate of the WP -EFF. 31
4.4 Development Effectiveness as the Development Outcomes from Aid
In this view, development effectiveness is about measuring outcomes in relation to aid
interventions. It looks specifically at outcomes, rather than at polic y areas or the efficiency with
which each aid dollar is spent. The distinguishing feature between this category and the next
(overall development outcomes) is that it does not focus on aid and non -aid policy areas. This
notion of development effectiveness presents a complementary agenda to aid effectiveness; it
refers to the outcomes aid seeks to achieve and by which it will be measured, whereas the latter
refers to how aid is delivered (Tujan 2009). This concept can be seen in organizations such as
UNIFEM and the OECD -DAC, and also in CSO understandings. Two CSO coordinating groups
are working on development effectiveness: the Open Forum, which focuses specifically on CSO
development effectiveness, and BetterAid, which provides a more general view. As recen tly as
September 2009, CSOs located their conception of development effectiveness in this category.
Through the BetterAid platform, CSOs have shifted toward a view of development effectiveness
as overall development outcomes, discussed below (BetterAid 201 0a), although the Open
Forum remains focused predominantly on outcomes from aid. 32 This shift exemplifies how
understanding of development effectiveness is changing.

The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the OECD -DAC have referred
to d evelopment effectiveness in terms of specific outcomes of aid. While UNIFEM tends to use
the terms development effectiveness and aid effectiveness interchangeably, it sees gender
equality as a determinant of development effectiveness, arguing that it must be considered in all
stages of development interventions (UNIFEM 2008). Although the OECD -DAC has not explicitly
articulated its understanding of development effectiveness (as opposed to effectiveness per se ),
it indicates that consideration of human right s, gender equality, and environmental sustainability
is important to development effectiveness. The report on its 2007 workshop, Development
Effectiveness in Practice , states that attention to these issues enhances development
effectiveness  and that by a ddressing these concerns, development goals can be achieved
(OECD 2007: 1).

Although CSOs participating in the Open Forum see themselves as development, rather than
aid actors, the most recent articulation of their view of development effectiveness (Open Forum
2010b), does not include attention to the policy coherence issues, outlined above; instead, it
focuses on the effectiveness of their activities. 33 In a draft international framework for CSO
development effectiveness, 34 CSOs clearly place human rights , gender equality, environmental
sustainability, social justice, and democratic ownership at the heart of development. 35 While
recognizing the importance of operational effectiveness, CSO development effectiveness
principles are value -based, process -oriente d, and are an expression of the development
outcomes CSOs seek to achieve, as well as a framework to achieve them (Open Forum 2010a:
3). CSO development effectiveness focuses on empowering beneficiaries to choose freely how
they will develop (Open Forum 20 10a: 2).
4.4.1 Implications for Defining Outcomes
Conceptualization of development effectiveness as development outcomes from aid could have
potential implications in terms of what should be measured. The development field has created a
host of indicator s, indices, and evaluation methods to measure inputs, outputs, outcomes, etc.
Each actor has its own assumptions about the most important elements and directions for
development. For many, development is not only about desired outcomes, but also the proces s

19

by which goals and priorities are defined and achieved. This dynamic may present difficulties for
defining development outcomes.

An obvious choice to measure development outcomes may be the MDGs. Indeed, some
commentators have suggested that developmen t effectiveness is the achievement of
sustainable development results related to MDGs that have country -level impacts that have
discernable effects on the lives of the poor  (Stern et al. 2008: vii). One interviewee similarly
suggested that development eff ectiveness is about achieving results articulated in the MDGs
and other national development goals, suggesting that development effectiveness is already a
part of the aid effectiveness agenda because the Paris process makes reference to the MDGs.

However , such an approach to measuring outcomes is not without problems. The MDGs have
been criticized, for example, because they measure progress at the aggregate level and often
say little about local development outcomes or the impact of aid interventions on t he most
marginalized groups. Some suggest development goals should be inherently linked to the
international human rights framework, rather than employ partial targets, such as the MDGs.
Others claim the MDGs discriminate against certain regions, such as s ub -Saharan Africa,
because they do not take into consideration initial levels of development.

Rather than searching for pre -existing indicators, perhaps a more important consideration in this
context is to look at who defines outcomes and how. This draws attention to issues relating to
process and power. How participatory, inclusive and representative are processes that lead to
the identification of desired development goals? Do measurable outcomes reflect the goals
originally identified? For example, whi le poverty reduction strategy papers offer one mechanism
against which to measure development outcomes, many critics argue that they do not reflect a
nationally owned,  democratically derived development vision, but rather, are tailored to meet
IMF/World Bank policy prescriptions (see, for example, Cammack 2002; Ferguson 2006; Weber
2006).

Representatives of the WP -EFF, participants at the OECD -DAC Workshop on Development
Effectiveness, and interviewees stressed the importance of nationally derived devel opment
goals as the basis for measuring outcomes, as well as internationally agreed development
goals, such as the MDGs. During the WP -EFF plenary sessions, representatives agreed that aid
must move past one -size -fits -all approaches. They emphasized the im portance of country and
regional context, as well as the need for donors to take different approaches with development
partners based on country context.

Despite commitments to nationally defined development goals, a number of challenges remain.
A study conducted by the UK -based Overseas Development Institute on mutual accountability at
the country level found that national development plans and decisions regarding aid
effectiveness practices included input from CSOs and parliamentarians to varying degree s
(Steer et al. 2009: 7 8). An understanding of development effectiveness as outcomes from aid
would likely require better mechanisms to ensure that such outcomes are identified and
prioritized through a participatory and inclusive process, to result in br oad national ownership.
4.4.2 Implications for Measuring Results
A conceptualization of development effectiveness as outcomes from aid would also necessitate
a new framework for measurement: aid actors would assess their results not only in terms of the
efficient delivery of aid, but also its effect on overall development outcomes.

20

At the international and national levels, development is measured by a variety of indicators and
indices, such as the MDG targets, economic growth, and the UNDP Human Developm ent Index.
Although these indicators are important for assessing overall trends, they do not attribute
development outcomes to any one intervention, such as aid, or any one actor. They also do not
take into consideration country -specific political and soci oeconomic situations which are
important indicators of development in themselves.

Rather than looking solely at inputs, outputs, mechanisms for the effective delivery of aid, and
the relevancy of an intervention to particular development goals, a new fram ework would need
to assess aid efforts against actual development outcomes . This approach is clearly not without
challenges. For example, the ADB Development Effectiveness Report purports to assess results
at four levels: overall progress on development ob jectives, ADB s contribution, operational
effectiveness, and organizational effectiveness (ADB 2010). The first level measures
development outcomes based on indicators, such as the MDGs, growth, regional cooperation
and integration, governance, and the env ironment. 36 Level two focuses on ADB s outputs. ADB s
contribution to development outcomes is measured through special evaluation studies 
prepared by the Independent Evaluation Department, project completion reports, and technical
assistance completion re ports. This means that while the ADB can measure its effectiveness in
terms of whether it has met stated targets and specific outputs, it cannot identify its actual
contribution to overall development outcomes. This is a fairly well recognized challenge; w hile
linking aid interventions to development outcomes is highly desirable, it is nearly impossible
given the range of factors that affect development (see, for example, Evaluation Office 2003,
Flint et al. 2002).

As previously discussed, it is also very difficult to attribute development outcomes to aid
interventions, let alone any particular aid actor. It remains unclear how aid actors might be held
accountable for development outcomes from aid (outside existing mechanisms under the Paris
process) when a ttribution is nearly impossible.
4.5 Development Effectiveness as Overall Development Outcomes
This view of development effectiveness is the most comprehensive of the four categories. It
overlaps other notions, seeing development effectiveness as a measur e of the overall
development process and outcomes, rather than specific outcomes attributed to aid. Here, aid is
not the central focus; rather, its ability to catalyze and complement alternative development
resources is emphasized. This more holistic view draws attention to the country level, taking into
account all factors affecting the development process as well as how desired development
outcomes are decided. Actors that employ this understanding recognize that development
outcomes cannot be attributed to any one actor or intervention. Different actors have proposed a
variety of approaches to achieve the desired outcomes, all of which are neither mutually
exclusive nor exhaustive, and could be pursued together to achieve development effectiveness.

An i ndependent review of the United Kingdom s Department for International Development
(DFID) refers to two forms of effectiveness: operational and development (Flint et al. 2002).
According to the review, operational effectiveness is based on performance meas ures of the
direct and attributable result of projects, but has little to do with overall development outcomes.
Development effectiveness, on the other hand, refers to the overall development outcome,
which, while highly relevant in assessing any aid progr am, cannot be directly attributed to any
one actor s activities. Development outcomes result from national and international forces,
including aid interventions by various actors, the availability of domestic resources, good
governance, global commodity pr ices, regional stability, and many other determinants.
Discerning exactly which factor has led to a positive outcome may be extremely difficult. This is

21

why the DFID review suggests that it is virtually impossible to illustrate a direct link between
DFID s activities and progress toward the MDGs, despite its various contributions. 37 The authors
suggest that accountability for development outcomes lies with all actors: governments,
international agencies, CSOs, and the corporate sector.

For similar reasons, UNDP s 2003 Development Effectiveness Report (Evaluation Office 2003)
shows that UNDP interventions cannot explain progress on development outcomes in any given
country or sector; responsibility rests with all development partners. This report signaled a
deliberate move from development effectiveness as organizational performance, toward a
broader analysis that looks at the results of the development process and at the contribution of
relevant players to overall development progress. This means assessing w hat works and what
does not, then determining how aid flows can complement these factors. It also means that
trade and global policies must better reflect development concerns to meet the MDGs. In
summary, the report argues that development effectiveness is (or should be) about the factors
and conditions that help produce sustainable development results  to make a sustained
difference in the lives of people.  It is measured in outcomes, such as meeting human
development goals and generating growth (includ ing the quality of growth, equity, participation,
and sustainability), rather than in terms of how money is spent. Moreover the report argues that
there is no one -size -fits -all set of policies; the right combination of trade liberalization, foreign
direct investment, aid interventions, and so on is country specific and depends on history,
geography, culture, etc. By combining elements of categories two and three, the UNDP
approach creates a potentially coherent, integrated view of development effectiveness.

In 2004, the evaluation office of the African Development Bank (AfDB) produced a paper on
possible approaches to the institution s annual review of development effectiveness. Following
DFID reviewers and UNDP, the paper (AfDB 2004) distinguished between development
effectiveness and organizational effectiveness. It argued that, combined, these forms of
effectiveness constitute corporate effectiveness. 38 Here development effectiveness refers to
accomplishments at the country level, which are achievements i n respect of less attributable,
longer -term outcomes and impacts, to which the agency s efforts are ultimately aimed and to
which it contributes, but which are beyond the manageable, controllable interests of [an] agency
alone.  The AfDB cites the MDGs as one indicator of development effectiveness and also
suggests the use of the International Development Association (World Bank) indicators, which
measure areas, such as incomes, poverty reduction, growth, and the governance and
investment climate. 39 The AfDB s Evaluation Office argued for a triple A  approach: alignment,
aggregation and attribution. Yet, this approach is still oriented toward a focus on aid outcomes
and organizational effectiveness. It stresses alignment with county objectives, meaningful
ag gregation of evaluative data, and attribution of country level outcomes to AfDB activities. 40

In preparation for HLF -4, CSOs have also articulated their approach to development
effectiveness in relation to overall development outcomes through the BetterAi d platform. They
stress the need to focus explicitly on the relationship among aid, finance, and trade agendas
(BetterAid 2010a, b). CSOs see development effectiveness as rooted in a notion of development
that is defined by human rights, decent work, gende r equality and women s rights, environmental
sustainability, inclusive democratic power sharing, mutual accountability, and coherent national
and global governance (BetterAid 2010a: 2 3). According to BetterAid:

Development effectiveness is about the impa ct of development actors  actions on the lives of
poor and marginalized populations & . [It] promotes sustainable change that addresses the
root causes as well as the symptoms of poverty, inequality, marginalization and injustice &.

22

The poor and marginalized populations are positioned as the central actors and owners of
development, challenging many of the current approaches to aid effectiveness.

The 2010 Reality of Aid 41 Report, Aid and Development Effectiveness: Towards Human
Rights, Social Justice and Democ racy (Reality of Aid 2010) , stresses three main tools or
processes for achieving development effectiveness:

· Human rights, social justice and empowerment, and, related, the adoption of the
rights -based approach to development
· Reform of development partners hips based on solidarity, sovereignty and mutuality
· Transforming the aid architecture and ensuring policy coherence for development

During WP -EFF week, many participants argued that aid must be situated within the broader
development context and emphasize d the importance of development outcomes, such as
gender equality and the realization of human rights. A variety of tools were suggested to achieve
these goals. Similar to Reality of Aid, many partner -country representatives pointed to the
importance of va lue -based partnerships and the human factor  in achieving development
results. They discussed the need for donors to ensure that representatives in the field are
educated in aid effectiveness principles, to ensure that they understand and carry out
commit ments on ownership and mutual accountability, for example.

All interviewees pointed to the importance of this human factor in determining the nature of
development partnerships. For example, some spoke of the amicable, often informal nature of
their inte ractions with other Southern partners, seeing this dynamic as an important factor in
building mutual understanding and trust. Most stressed value -based relationships and the need
for donors to be more flexible in their engagement with partners.

Rather th an focusing on policy coherence for development per se, members at the WP -EFF
stressed the catalytic role of aid in harnessing other resources for development, in particular,
those from the private sector. Members recognize the importance of the policy coh erence for
development agenda; however, the mandate of the WP -EFF is improving development
assistance. As such, participants used aid as their entry point into discussions on non -aid
development tools. 42 Related to this, many participants stressed decreasin g aid dependency and
developing beyond -aid strategies  and strategies for aid exit. 43 In relation to development
effectiveness, one panelist at the Workshop on Development Effectiveness suggested that aid s
contribution to development effectiveness could be measured by its decreasing relevancy to
partner countries (Ngwira 2010). 44 Here aid can play a vital role by leveraging alternative
development resources, which in the long run should proportionately decrease its relative
importance to partner countries .

Many participants at the workshop, as well as interviewees, stressed that the concept of
development effectiveness shifts the focus of aid discussions to the country level. 45 From the
partner -country perspective, this view is not surprising. For partner countries, aid is one input
among many in the development process; partner -country concerns with, e.g., domestic
resource mobilization, good governance, and harnessing alternative sources of development
finance, reflect this reality. The country -level foc us makes development effectiveness about
overall development outcomes, rather than outcomes from aid.
4.5.1 General Implications
As an approach that combines and deepens many aspects of development effectiveness 
namely attention to country context, deve lopment processes and tools, and outcomes from aid

23

as well as other development interventions  this view reflects many of the implications outlined
above. It raises questions regarding how greater policy coherence could or should be achieved
and how it af fects various actors, particularly the private sector. As explained, one view of
coherence focuses on coordination across aid and non -aid sectors in countries, while another
emphasizes structural reform of the development cooperation architecture. Moreover , because
this concept focuses on overall development outcomes, it has the potential to connect policy
coherence more explicitly to broader development goals and outcomes, unlike the concept of
development effectiveness as coherence, where development outc omes are only implicitly
linked. However, the same issues arise in terms of defining outcomes and attributing results.
4.5.2 Implications for Donor – and Partner -Country Governments
Depending on how development outcomes are defined, certain goals will have priority. How to
determine these priorities is a debate that is not new to policymakers or academics. In the
1980s, development thinking centred on the pursuit of economic growth, while the 1990s saw a
neo -institutional turn, linked with increased attentio n to good governance and state capacity
building (Fukuyama 2004, Evans 2005, Chhotray and Stoker 2009). Development effectiveness
as overall development outcomes, will mean prioritizing certain areas over others; however, the
challenge for aid and developm ent actors will be identifying which sectors and interventions are
the most important for achieving development outcomes, a debate that is already ongoing and
shows no sign of concluding. 46

One approach to this problem may be greater attention to national ownership. This means
moving away from one -size -fits -all, and often externally determined and driven, policy
frameworks and allowing greater flexibility in the identification of development priorities at the
country level. A true commitment to national ow nership means that development cooperation
policies should be differentiated to reflect unique country (and regional) contexts. This view was
elaborated by WP -EFF members across donor, partner, and CSO constituencies, indicating
some appetite within the WP -EFF for differentiated approaches. The International Network on
Conflict and Fragility, a subsidiary body of the OECD -DAC, and the associated Principles for
Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations are an example of this shift
(OECD -DAC 2009c).

At the country level, inclusive participation in political decision -making processes should help
governments, including donors, identify and prioritize the development outcomes that matter to
marginalized and affected groups. As noted earlier , signatories to the Accra Agenda for Action
have already committed themselves to a broad understanding of ownership under the Paris
process that emphasizes the role of CSOs and parliamentarians. These efforts may need to be
stepped up to include empowerin g and strengthening the voices of the most marginalized.
Indeed, an enhanced version of the current principles and mechanisms embodied in the Paris
process may provide one way to identify and prioritize development outcomes. Alternatively,
UNDP suggests th at a rights -based approach to development effectiveness is important in this
context, as it focuses on outcomes and processes, implying a closer examination of ownership,
participation and fair representation (Evaluation Office 2003: 7). 47

The discussion above also has implications for partner -country governments. Development
effectiveness requires that partner countries improve their governance and resource
management (of both aid and non -aid resources), ensure broad participation in the defining of
natio nal development goals, and, as two interviewees put it, enable people to fulfill their
development aspirations and improve their quality of life. A background document on mutual
accountability prepared for the Second Africa Regional Meeting stated that suc h improvements
would require a major change in the way the development process is organized… [including] a

24

dramatic increase in transparency… [and a shift] from post hoc accountability when things go
wrong, to involving communities up front in the dev elopment decisions that affect them  (Africa
Regional Meeting 2010a: 7).

Another important implication of development effectiveness as overall development outcomes
pertains to the role of aid in the development process. As mentioned, members of the WP -EF F
stressed the catalytic role aid can play in harnessing alternative resources for development as
well as the need to develop strategies for aid exit. Following the October 2010 WP -EFF
meetings, these discussions continued at the Second Africa Regional Mee ting, which provided
some insight into African partner -country views on the future role of aid in the context of
development effectiveness. A background paper prepared for the meeting argues that Africa
must improve domestic resource mobilization, trade, a nd investment to meet its development
goals and that aid can play an important role in this process (Africa Regional Meeting 2010a:
23 27). The paper articulates an agenda to end aid dependence, which speaks to both how aid
can play a catalytic role and wh at a strategy for aid exit might entail. This approach is worth
quoting at length:

Dependence -avoidant aid would have a number of features. First, assistance would shift
towards areas that help mobilise alternative source of development finance including
domestic revenue -raising, trade, capital market development and microfinance. Second, aid
activities would be limited in time and avoid crowding out other players. Th ough simply
stated, these changes would involve a profound rethink of what aid should be spent on, and
how it should be delivered.

If the role of aid under development effectiveness as overall development outcomes is to
catalyze other resources to decrease and eventually eliminate aid dependency, then both
partner countries and donors (DAC a nd non -DAC) will need to develop and implement strategies
to achieve this end. Although it is clear from the WP -EFF plenary sessions that these topics are,
at least provisionally, on the agenda for HLF -4, it less clear how partner countries will engage
non -DAC donors on these issues outside the Paris process. There may be benefits to engaging
with non -DAC donors (specifically the BRICs) individually outside the Paris process as this
would recognize the distinctive relationship between these countries and Af rica, but also allow
for the establishment of principles to protect Africa s interests (Africa Regional Meeting 2010a:
32). Key issues that African countries might pursue in this context include, for example, the use
of local inputs, applying clearer envir onmental and social safeguards in infrastructure projects,
encouraging participation in national aid coordination mechanisms and improving transparency.
Increasing the use of local inputs, in particular, might be one strategy for reducing aid
dependency in the long term by building local capacity, generating employment opportunities
and developing the private sector.
4.5.3 Implications for Accountability
UNDP suggests that a view of development effectiveness as overall development outcomes has
important im plications for how we think about accountability. According to UNDP, accountability
is central to development effectiveness and must be established when failures occur (Evaluation
Office 2003: 7). UNDP does not offer any clear frameworks, however, for how mutual
accountability would operate, nor does it draw out implications for policy coherence and the
impact of non -aid sectors on development processes. These areas continue to require future
exploration. Given the number of actors and factors contributing to overall development
outcomes, democratic ownership  and expanding inclusion and participation in assessing both
aid and development effectiveness, as suggested by CSOs (BetterAid 2010a: 7), may be a
useful way to begin operationalizing development effe ctiveness as overall development

25

outcomes and improving accountability. As discussed above, enhanced Paris principles and the
rights -based approach may provide a possible way forward.
5. Conclusion and Future Considerations
The implications of the various conceptions of development effectiveness vary. Development
effectiveness as organizational effectiveness resembles the current aid effectiveness framework
and is not a fundamental shift away from the status quo. Development effectiveness as
coherence may require developed countries to make greater international commitments to policy
coherence for development. For others, it entails structural reforms related to international
cooperation to ensure institutions of global governance are more representative an d coherent
and enhance partner -country power and influence in decision -making, monitoring, and
evaluation. The conceptualization of development effectiveness as outcomes from aid may
mean thinking differently about internationally accepted definitions of outcomes  and measuring
results. It may also present a problem for mutual accountability frameworks, because attribution
of development outcomes to any one actor is very difficult. The final conceptualization,
development effectiveness as overall developme nt outcomes, combines the previous three, as
well as their implications. It draws attention to the country level while raising questions about the
role of aid in the overall development process, in particular, how it can catalyze alternative
development re sources with the end goal of aid exit.
Although interest in development effectiveness is growing, it is unclear to what extent it will
feature in discussions at the HLF -4. CSO momentum is clearly strong, and the WP -EFF has
engaged with the concept. The Wor kshop on Development Effectiveness provided a useful
starting point for launching discussion in the WP -EFF. However, in the open plenary sessions
that followed the workshop, no clear consensus emerged on what development effectiveness
entails exactly, its implications for the WP -EFF and development cooperation more broadly, and
whether it should be made the overarching theme for HLF -4. Moreover, should development
effectiveness become the theme for HLF -4, a truly international agenda would also depend on
the engagement of partner -country governments, DAC donors, non -DAC donors, and other
private -sector actors and on their willingness to expand on the aid effectiveness agenda.

The HLF -4 provides an obvious opportunity to engage multiple stakeholders in deve lopment
effectiveness and perhaps move toward joint commitments. However, the WP -EFF is not the
only forum for these discussions, and it is unclear whether it is the appropriate or desirable
mechanism to launch a development effectiveness agenda. The WP -EF F is mandated to
improve aid effectiveness; thus, many of the issues addressed above, such as policy coherence
for development, are outside its current mandate. By situating the debate within the WP -EFF,
there is also the risk that the concept of developme nt effectiveness will be subsumed into
discussions on aid, rather than serve to embed aid within the broader development context.

Although the WP -EFF is not universally representative, it does include a broad spectrum of
donors, recipient countries, mult ilateral institutions and CSOs among its membership. It has
proved effective as a forum to generate interest and consensus around issues relating to aid
effectiveness and best practices based on concrete evidence and technical analysis through its
cluster working groups, 48 and many partner countries see it as a place where they can engage
donors in longstanding issues on a level playing field. Yet, there is an obvious need to ensure
wide participation and buy -in on development effectiveness. Emerging develop ment actors, such
as private foundations and the BRIC countries, are not fully engaged in the WP -EFF. A key
challenge is how to bring these actors into discussions on development effectiveness (as well as
aid effectiveness). Some commentators suggest that the UN DCF and the UN Financing for

26

Development process are more equitably representative forums and should be involved more in
discussions on aid and development effectiveness (BetterAid 2010a: 4).

The opportunity to strengthen international commitments toward development effectiveness will
require agreement on minimum starting points based on what is meant by the term. This working
paper has suggested four ways in which development effectiveness has been conceived and
used and some of the implications o f these various approaches. Further research is required to
address how various actors, including DAC and non -DAC donors , partner -country governments,
CSO s, and private stakeholders understand and are prepared to work with these approaches .

Endnotes
1 The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which was sponsored by the OECD, was signed
by donors and partner countries in 2005 following the first High Level Forum on Harmonisation in
Rome, 2003. It included commitm ents and implementation targets in five areas: ownership,
alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability (OECD 2005). In
2008, signatories met in Accra to assess progress toward these goals and strengthened
commitments to improve the delivery of aid through stronger country ownership of development,
greater predictability, better use of country systems, changing the nature of conditionality, and
deeper engagement with CSOs (OECD 2008a).
2 The BetterAid platform represents over 70 0 development CSOs from both the North and
South. It is coordinated by the BetterAid Coordinating Group (BACG), which is made up of 28
CSO networks and international non -governmental organizations. BACG is coordinating CSO
preparations on HLF -4; it has two seats on the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and is also
on its Executive Committee (see www.betteraid.org ).
3 Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness (www.cso -effectiveness.org/).
4 We reviewed official d ocuments from multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank, regional
development banks, the OECD -DAC, United Nations organs, including the Development
Cooperation Forum. We also examined documents from DAC donor countries, CSOs, and high –
level events focu sed on aid, South South cooperation, the millennium development goals, etc.
5 The WP -EFF is a multistakeholder forum that brings together policymakers and aid
practitioners from donor and developing countries and multilateral development agencies, as
well as CSO representatives. This inclusiveness makes it distinct from the OECD -DAC. The WP –
EFF monitors progress on implementing the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action,
aims to improve partnerships between aid actors, and serves as the principle di scussion forum
on issues related to aid effectiveness (OECD -DAC 2010b).
6 The breakout groups looked at the implications of development effectiveness in four ways:
implications at the country level; implications for aligning policies; implications for re lations in
development cooperation; and implications for the international framework.
7 Except for one interviewee from academia, WP -EFF members interviewed were generally
responsible for development cooperation, the implementation of the aid effectivene ss agenda in
their country, or both.

27

8 For example, in March 2010, African countries agreed to create the African Platform on
Development Effectiveness, which will be owned and led by African countries and facilitated
through the New Economic Partnership for Africa s Development Planning and Coordinating
Agency. The work plan is not yet available (see NEPAD 2010). 9 See Stern et al. (2008: v). The World Bank s Comprehensive Development Framework s, and
the IMF s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers were also important precursors and reference
points for commitments and indicators in the Paris Declaration.
10 The goals include: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary
education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mort ality; improve
maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other disease; ensure environmental
sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development (UN 2010).
11 The Doha Declaration (2001) recognized the special circumstances facing develop ing
countries, confirmed commitments to development, and launched multilateral trade negotiations
in agriculture, services, market access for non -agricultural products, trade -related aspects of
intellectual property rights, inter alia . Of note, it included trade facilitation provisions for
developing countries (WTO 2001). At Monterrey, bilateral donors, multilateral agencies and aid
recipients pledged themselves to a broad development agenda, recognizing the need for
developing countries to own  poverty -reduction strategies and donors to continue to increase
support for these endeavours. The Paris Declaration and the subsequent Accra Agenda for
Action commit donors and partner governments to a broad, common agenda aimed at improving
the effectiveness of aid . The UN DCF provides a space within the United Nations system for
various development actors to come together and discuss development issues of common
concern, although there is still very limited participation by non -state development actors.
12 I use t he term non -DAC  donors to refer to the supposed emerging donors. Many of the so –
called emerging donors are not new, but rather returning to the scene after a hiatus (see, for
example, Hammad and Morton 2009). Woods (2008: 1206) points out that China s ai d program
reaches back to the 1950s.
13 Includes foundations, corporation, private and voluntary organizations, volunteerism,
universities and colleges, and religious organizations.
14 Kharas and Linn (2008: 3) estimate that the Paris Declaration excludes more than half of all
aid to developing countries when private foundations, NGOs, humanitarian groups, and non –
DAC donors are taken into consideration. According to the South Centre (2008: 8) , it does not
have universal approval in the developing world .
15 Through the CSO Reality of Aid Network, the BetterAid platform is currently conducting
consultations designed to lead to further development of CSOs  conceptualization of
development effectiveness and identify key issues for CSOs to address with donors an d partner –
country governments. The consultations will inform the CSO policy position on development
effectiveness and provide the basis for discussions with the WP -EFF.
16 They also emphasize the importance improving gender equality and taking a rights -bas ed
approach, for example. The main principles of the UN s rights -based approach include
universality and inalienability, indivisibility, interdependence and inter -relatedness, non –
discrimination and equality, participation and inclusion, accountability and rule of law. In practice,

28

programs should intentionally further the realization of human rights, use human rights
standards to guide all stages of the development process, strengthen duty -bearers to meet
obligations and rights -holders to claim rights, tak e into consideration local contexts, and enable
beneficiaries to become empowered owners of their own development (UNDG 2003).
17 During the OECD -DAC Workshop on Development Effectiveness (26 Oct. 2010, Paris,
France) an interesting debate arose regarding this very issue. Some participants felt that
development is no longer controversial, that we  (it was not clear who this entailed) know what it
is, and that development is spelled out in national development strategies. Others, however,
pointed out that development is (and will likely remain) an inherently contested concept,
encompassing different meanings across space and time.
18 The IDB recognizes the inherent difficulty in linking outputs to outcomes is difficult stating that
every effort has been m ade to link outputs with regional goals, but it should be noted that their
relationship is imperfect at best, and the achievement of an output does not necessarily mean
that it will affect the related outcome because of other intervening factors  (IDB 2010 : 52).
19 However, some countries, notably the United Kingdom and Sweden, also focus on enhancing
developing -country voices in international institutions.
20 South South cooperation is often strongly related to the interests of the donor country,
including high levels of direct investment and locking in resources (see, e.g., Reality of Aid
Management Committee 2010).
21 For example, the latest China Africa Action Plan (2010 2012) acknowledged active local
exchanges between China and Africa, and resolved to promote further exchanges and
cooperation across various levels of government (Forum on China Africa Cooperation 2009b:
sec. 2.3.3).
22 It would include governments, bilateral and multilateral donors, private foundations,
parliaments and civil society.
23 This declaration committed OECD countries to take development concerns into consideration
in the drafting of environmental, agricultural, trade, migration, and economic policies, inter alia.
24 For example, the US African Growth and Opportunities Act and t he EU Everything but Arms
Initiative offer preferential trade to African and least -developed countries, respectively.
25 In the 2008 Ministerial Declaration of the Group of 77 and China, developing countries
expressed the need to advance a development -friendly multilateral trading system, pointing to
the centrality of agriculture and, in particular, the reduction of domestic support programs
(UNCTAD 2008).
26 According to the OECD -DAC (2009a: 10), achieving policy coherence for development
requires three p hases: setting and prioritizing objectives; coordinating policy and its
implementation; and monitoring, analysis, and reporting.
27 Best practices often address themes like decent work, reclamation and remediation of
industrial development sites, and benef it-sharing and other equity arrangements with traditional
land -owners based on their consent that a project ensues.

29

28 The Group of 77 (G77) was established in 1964 by 77 developing countries and serves as the
largest intergovernmental organization of deve loping states in the United Nations. It provides a
mechanism for developing countries to articulate and promote their collective economic
interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues
within the United N ations system, and promote South South cooperation for development  (G77
2010).
29 For example, formal relationships exist between the World Trade Organization and the
International Labour Organization (see WTO 2010).
30 The OECD -DAC includes progress on policy coherence for development in its peer review
process. However, this process is not without its own problems. For example, reviews are
carried out by other DAC countries, which means they face the same legitimacy and
representativeness issues facing the OECD.
31 During the workshop many WP -EFF members recognized that policy coherence for
development is beyond the mandate of the WP -EFF. Instead, they tended to focus on aid as a
catalytic, as discussed in section 4.2.
32 It is important to note that man y of the same CSOs are engaged with the BetterAid platform
and the Open Forum and share similar views on development effectiveness in general.
However, development effectiveness, as it has been articulated by the Open Forum, focuses on
CSO development acti vities; references to donor – and partner -country governments are centred
largely on their role in creating an enabling environment for CSOs to achieve their development
effectiveness. As such, I have situated the Open Forum articulation of development
effe ctiveness under outcomes from aid.
33 The focus on non -aid policies is one of the key differences between this articulation of
development effectiveness and development effectiveness as overall development outcomes.
34The draft is a result of consultatio ns with thousands of CSOs in more than 60 countries in all
parts of the world. See Tomlinson and Wanjiru (2010) for more information.
35 CSOs have agreed on eight key principles: respect and promote human rights and social
justice; embody gender equality a nd equity while promoting women s and girl s rights; focus on
people s empowerment, democratic ownership and participation; promote environmental
sustainability; practice transparency and accountability; pursue equitable partnerships and
solidarity; create and share knowledge and commit to mutual learning; and commit to realizing
positive sustainable change. More than 160 CSOs from 82 countries agreed to these principles
at a global assembly of the Open Forum, held in Istanbul, 28 30 Sept. 2010 (Open Forum
2010b). They will be integrated into an international framework for CSO development
effectiveness to be presented at the HLF -4.
36 ADB uses a variety of indicators, such as the World Bank s World Development Indicators, the
OECD World Energy Outlook, and r egional statistics estimated by various United Nations organs
(see ADB 2010: 7 9).
37 However, this may be possible for small countries where DFID is the major donor.

30

38 It is worth noting that the paper recommended a model similar to the one used by the ADB,
which measures effectiveness at several levels, including overall indicators at the country level,
and operational performance (including technical assistance, etc.).
39 As mentioned, measuring outcomes via poverty reduction strategy papers and MDGs m ay be
problematic. These processes are not explicitly linked to the international human rights
framework.
40 AfDB has only released one report following the 2004 publication, the 2008 Annual Review of
Evaluation Results (AfDB 2009). The report does not em ploy the triple A  approach outlined
above, but instead focuses on findings and lessons learned from 14 evaluations, including high –
level  evaluations at the country and sectoral level, for example, and project level evaluations. It
is unclear why the ev aluation did not take the triple A  approach.
41 Reality of Aid is a collaborative, non -profit initiative that brings together non -governmental
organizations from the North and the South.
42 In this respect, one might argue that parts of the WP -EFF discu ssions implicitly employ
development effectiveness as outcomes from aid, rather than overall development outcomes.
43 Background documents for the Second Africa Regional Meeting on Aid Effectiveness, South –
South Cooperation and Capacity Development simil arly addressed these issues, pointing out
that the job of development assistance is to do itself out of a job  (Africa Regional Meeting
2010a: 23).
44 Ngwira pointed out that programming and monitoring should look beyond measuring the
MDGs, to emphasize exit  indicators: i.e., reduction in dependence on aid [or put differently] not reduction in the levels of aid but reduction in [the] proportion of resources given by donors to
partner countries  (Ngwira 2010: 3).
45 Although outside the scope of this pa per, this approach to development effectiveness runs the
risk of ignoring international structural determinants of development outcomes. See Weber
(2007) and Halperin (2007) for excellent accounts of the methodological and historical limitations
to this de velopment paradigm, respectively.
46 For example, some promote the private sector as a means to achieve development goals
(see, e.g., Kharas 2010: 5, Nelson 2010) while others emphasize the fulfillment of human rights
(see, e.g., OHCHR 2006, Khan 2009). Of course this issue is not necessarily a question of
either/or; many donors, such as the United Kingdom, for example, work in both areas.
47 The main principles of the UN s rights -based approach include universality and inalienability;
indivisibility; int erdependence and inter -relatedness; non -discrimination and equality;
participation and inclusion; accountability and rule of law. In practice, programs should
intentionally further the realization of human rights, use human rights standards to guide all
stages of the development process, strengthen duty -bearers to meet obligations and rights –
holders to claim rights, take into consideration local contexts, and enable beneficiaries to
become empowered owners of their own development (see United Nations Develo pment Group
2003: 1 3).

31

48 The WP -EFF has five clusters that focus on: ownership and accountability; global partnership
on country systems; transparency and responsible aid; assessing progress; and managing for
development results. In additions, two task teams focus on the health sector and South South
cooperation. The clusters and task teams focus on evidence -based, technical analysis in their
area to provide the WP -EFF with best practices and solid evidence for policymaking.

32

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